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Terms of reference 
I, IAN CAMPBELL, Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer, pursuant to Parts 2 
and 3 of the Productivity Commission Act 1998, hereby refer the following to the 
Commission for inquiry and report within twelve months of receipt of this 
reference.  
Background 
2.  Regulatory regimes in a number of States and Territories, along with the 
Commonwealth’s  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999, form part of an important transition to more sustainable management of 
Australia’s native vegetation and biodiversity.  The introduction of these 
regimes, particularly within the past five years, has raised concerns over possible 
negative impacts on farming practices, productivity, property values and returns 
and the investment behaviour of affected landholders. These concerns appear to 
have been exacerbated, in part, by a lack of information and awareness about the 
implications of the new regimes. 
Scope of Inquiry 
3.  The Commission is to report on: 
(a)  the impacts on farming practices, productivity, sustainability, property 
values and returns, landholders’ investment patterns and the attitude of 
finance providers, and on other economic activities such as infrastructure 
development and mineral exploration, and flow on effects to regional 
communities, arising from the regulation of native vegetation clearance 
and/or biodiversity conservation, including: 
(i)  both positive and negative impacts;  
(ii)  the level of understanding of the relevant legislative and regulatory 
regimes among stakeholders; 
(iii) the likely duration of such impacts and the factors influencing their 
duration; and 
(iv)  the extent to which existing government measures are mitigating any 
negative impacts; 
(b)  the efficiency and effectiveness of the above regimes in reducing the costs 
of resource degradation and the appropriateness of the current distribution of 
costs for preventing environmental degradation across industry, all levels of 
government, and the community; 
(c)  whether there is any overlap or inconsistency between Commonwealth and 
State/Territory regimes, including their administration;     




(d)  the evidence for possible perverse environmental outcomes, including those 
that may result from perceptions of a financial impact, arising from the 
implementation of the above regimes;  
(e)  the adequacy of assessments of economic and social impacts of decisions 
made under the above regulatory regimes; 
(f)  the degree of transparency and extent of community consultation when 
developing and implementing the above regimes; and 
(g)  recommendations (of a regulatory or non-regulatory nature) that 
governments could consider to minimise the adverse impacts of the above 
regimes, while achieving the desired environmental outcomes, including 
measures to clarify the responsibilities and rights of resource users. 
4.  In assessing the matters in (3), the Commission is to have regard to the 
legislative and regulatory regimes, and associated implementation measures, in 
all States, Territories and the Commonwealth whose primary purpose includes 
the regulation of native vegetation clearance and/or the conservation of 
biodiversity. 
5.  In undertaking the inquiry, the Commission is to advertise nationally inviting 
submissions, hold public hearings, consult with relevant Commonwealth, State 
and Territory agencies, local government, and other key interest groups and 
affected parties, and produce a report. 
6.  The Commonwealth Government will consider the Commission’s 
recommendations, and the Government’s response will be announced as soon as 
possible after the receipt of the Commission’s report. 
 
IAN CAMPBELL 
14 April 2003     
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Abbreviations and explanations 
Abbreviations 
ABARE  Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
ACF Australian  Conservation  Foundation 
ACTPLA  ACT Planning and Land Authority 
AFFA  Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Australia 
AgWA Agriculture  WA 
ANAO  Australian National Audit Office 
ANEDO  Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices 
ANZECC Australian  and  New Zealand Environment and Conservation 
Council 
AONSW  Audit Office of New South Wales 
BBI Biodiversity  Benefits Index 
BMP  Best Management Practices 
CALM  Department of Conservation and Land Management 
CAR Comprehensive,  adequate and representative 
CCC Catchment  Coordinating  Committee 
CHD  Critical Habitat Declaration 
CITES  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora 
CMA  Catchment Management Authority 
COAG  Council of Australian Governments 
CPA  Competition Principles Agreement  
CRG  Community Reference Group 
CRP Conservation  Reserve  Program/Community Reference Panel 
DCA Development  Consent  Authority 
DEH  Department of the Environment and Heritage 
DEHAA  Department of Environment, Heritage and Aboriginal Affairs     




DEP  Department of Environment Protection 
DEST  Department of the Environment, Sports and Territories 
DIPNR  Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources 
DLWC  Department of Land and Water Conservation 
DNRE  Department of Natural Resources and Environment 
DPI  Department of Primary Industries 
DPIWE  Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment 
DSE  Department of Sustainability and Environment 
dse  dry sheep equivalent 
EA Environment  Australia 
EBI  Environmental Benefits Index 
ECNT Environment  Centre Northern Territory 
EIS  Environmental Impact Statement 
EMS  Environment Management System 
EPA Environmental  Protection  Authority 
EPP  Environmental Protection Policy 
ERD  Environment, Resources Development Court 
ESA  Environmentally Sensitive Area 
ESD  Ecologically Sustainable Development 
ESP  Euroka Station Partnership 
FPP  Forest Practices Plan 
FPT  Forest Practices Tribunal 
IAC  Industries Assistance Commission 
IC Industry  Commission 
ICM Integrated  Catchment  Management 
ICO  Interim Conservation Order 
IDCO  Interim Development Control Order 
IUCN  International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources 
IUZ Intensively–used  zone 
LAP Local  Action  Plan/Litchfield Area Plan 
LCDC  Land Conservation District Committee 
LMA  Land Management Agreement   
 




LMT  Lands and Mining Tribunal 
NAPSWQ  National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality 
NCP National  Competition  Policy 
NFF  National Farmers’ Federation 
NHT  Natural Heritage Trust 
NLC Northern  Land  Council 
NOI  Notice of Intent 
NPV  Net Present Value 
NPWS National  Parks  and Wildlife Service 
NRAS  Natural Resource Adjustment Scheme 
NRC  Natural Resources Commission 
NSWFA New  South  Wales  Farmers’ Association 
NVAC  Native Vegetation Advisory Council 
NVC  Native Vegetation Council 
NVRIG  Native Vegetation Reform Implementation Group 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
ORR  Office of Regulation Review 
PC Productivity  Commission 
PER  Public Environment Report 
PFRP  Private Forest Reserve Program 
PIRSA  Department of Primary Industries and Resources South Australia 
PLB Pastoral  Land  Board 
PMAV  Property Maps of Assessable Vegetation 
PVMP  Property Vegetation Management Plan 
PVP  Property Vegetation Plan 
QFF  Queensland Farmers’ Federation 
RAFCOR  Rural Adjustment and Finance Corporation 
RAS  Resource Adjustment Scheme 
RFA  Regional Forest Agreement 
RIS  Regulation Impact Statement  
RMPS Regional  Management and Planning System 
RMPAT Resource  Management  and  Planning Appeal Tribunal 
RPDC  Resource Planning Development Commission     




RVC  Regional Vegetation Committee 
RVMC Regional  Vegetation Management Committee 
RVMP  Regional Vegetation Management Plan 
SAFF South  Australian  Farmers’ Federation 
SCC Safe  Carrying  Capacity 
SEPP  State Environmental Planning Policy 
SLATS Statewide  Landcover and Trees Study 
SLCC  Soil and Land Conservation Council 
SJLCDC Serpentine–Jarrahdale  Land Conservation District Committee 
SoE  State of the Environment 
SRC  State Revegetation Committee 
TCT Tasmanian  Conservation  Trust 
TFGA  Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association 
TSSC  Threatened Species Scientific Committee 
VCAT  Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
VCMC  Victorian Catchment Management Council 
VFF  Victorian Farmers Federation 
VPP  Victorian Planning Provisions 
WACC  Western Australian Conservation Council 
WCA  Wetland Care Australia 
WRC  Water and Rivers Commission 
Explanations 
Recommendations  RECOMMENDATION 
Recommendations in the body of the report are 
highlighted using bold italics with a heading, as this is. 
Findings  FINDING 
Findings in the body of the report are paragraphs 
highlighted using italics with a heading, as this is. 
   
 





Clearing of native vegetation (including native grasses) on a
broad scale, excluding thinning. Typically undertaken using
at least one bulldozer or a plough (to clear grasses). 
Biodiversity  The variability among living organisms, including diversity
within species, between species and diversity of ecosystems.
Clearing  The definition varies across jurisdictions. In general, it is the
removal of native vegetation by mechanical or chemical
processes. 
Land degradation  Decline in the productive capacity of land as a result of land
management practices. Includes lost productivity from soil 
acidification, compaction, salinity and erosion.  
Landholder  Used generically to describe the freehold owner or
leaseholder of land. 
Native vegetation  The definition varies across jurisdictions (see chapter 3). For 
example, it may or may not include native grasses.  
Offsets/offset 
planting 
Plantings required under regulatory regimes to offset the
environmental impacts of land clearing, thinning or lopping. 
Pre-emptive 
clearing 
Clearing that is brought forward in time in anticipation of the 
introduction (or tightening) of clearing restrictions. 
Private land  Freehold and Crown leasehold land. 
Regrowth  The definition varies across jurisdictions (see chapter 3). In 
general, it is native vegetation that has been cleared in the




Legislative and regulatory framework to control the clearing
of native vegetation.     




The definition varies across jurisdictions. In general, it is
native vegetation that is protected from clearing. 
Thickening  An increase in the biomass of shrubs and/or trees through
time from an increase in the girth of existing trees and/or in
the quantity of trees.  
Thinning  Selective removal of trees and/or shrubs to preserve the 
floristic composition of the ecosystem.  
Woody vegetation  A stand of trees with a canopy cover of at least 20 per cent, 
which may include regrowth, exotics, and plantations.  
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•  Retention, management and rehabilitation of native vegetation and biodiversity on 
private land are important for many reasons including resource sustainability and 
protection of endangered ecosystems. But existing regulatory approaches are not as 
effective as they could be in promoting these objectives and impose significant costs: 
– The effectiveness of restrictions on clearing of native vegetation has been 
compromised by: a lack of clearly-specified objectives; disincentives for 
landholders to retain and care for native vegetation; and the inflexible application 
of targets and guidelines across regions with differing characteristics such that 
perverse environmental outcomes often result. 
–  Many landholders are being prevented from developing their properties, switching 
to more profitable land use, and from introducing cost-saving innovations. 
Arbitrary reclassification of regrowth vegetation as remnant and restrictions on 
clearing woodland thickening in some jurisdictions are reducing yields and areas 
that can be used for agricultural production.  
•  Some costs could be reduced and effectiveness improved if regulatory regimes 
followed good regulatory practices that promoted transparency and accountability. 
But more fundamental change is required to promote better targeting of policies to 
achieve clearly-specified environmental outcomes as efficiently as possible. There is 
also an urgent need for more equitable cost-sharing arrangements. 
•  The Commission proposes a process of greater devolution of responsibility to the 
regional level, formalised within national and State/Territory guidelines, whereby: 
–  Landholders, individually and/or as a group, would bear the costs of actions that 
directly contribute to sustainable resource use and, hence, the long-term viability 
of their operations. Regional bodies would determine what actions are required. 
–  The wider community would pay for the extra costs of providing ‘public-good’ 
environmental services, such as biodiversity conservation, that it apparently 
demands. Using regional institutions to deliver public-good objectives would 
promote coordination and consistency of approaches. 
•  Not only would this approach be more equitable but, by encouraging and rewarding 
the ongoing cooperation and effort of landholders, it would be more efficient and 
effective in achieving desired environmental outcomes:  
– Landholders would have positive incentives to retain and manage native 
vegetation and to deliver specified environmental outcomes in flexible, innovative 
and cost-effective ways.  
–  Payments to landholders for public-good conservation would facilitate increased 
scrutiny of costs and benefits of policy intervention.  
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Overview 
There are two main purposes in this inquiry. The first is documenting and assessing 
the impacts of existing native vegetation and biodiversity regulatory regimes on 
landholders and local communities, and the effectiveness of the regimes in reducing 
the costs of resource degradation. The second is to explore whether there are more 
efficient and effective ways of achieving desired environmental objectives. 
The inquiry is not about arguing the case for or against promotion of environmental 
objectives — the desired extent, location and condition of native vegetation is for 
the community to determine. In other words, this report is not about the benefits and 
costs of retaining native vegetation as such, but rather the efficiency and 
effectiveness of using jurisdiction-wide regulations to do so.  
The Commission has concluded that the current heavy reliance on regulating the 
clearance of native vegetation on private rural land, typically without compensating 
landholders, has imposed substantial costs on many landholders who have retained 
native vegetation on their properties. Nor does regulation appear to have been 
particularly effective in achieving environmental goals — in some situations, it 
seems to have been counter-productive.  
In the Commission’s assessment, greater exposure of the costs and benefits of 
additional conservation effort, clarification of environmental objectives, and a 
process for determining agreed landholder and community responsibilities that 
promotes cooperation and trust, will be critical to achieving more efficient and 
equitable solutions. 
Native vegetation and biodiversity regulatory regimes under review 
Over the past 20 years or so, State and Territory governments have introduced, and 
progressively strengthened, legislation controlling the clearing of native vegetation 
on private freehold and leasehold land (which together comprise about 60 per cent 
of Australia’s land mass). Regulatory regimes continue to evolve. During the course 
of this inquiry: the New South Wales and Queensland Governments announced 
their intention to stop all broadscale clearing of remnant native vegetation from mid 
2004 and the end of 2006 respectively; and legislation introducing an integrated 
permit system was passed in Western Australia in late 2003.      
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The main stated rationales for the introduction of clearing controls have been land 
degradation (particularly salinity problems in some States) and a concern in many 
jurisdictions that levels of remnant native vegetation — especially on private 
leasehold or freehold land — were approaching critical levels for habitat and 
biodiversity maintenance.  
Impetus for regulation has also come from a commitment by all Australian 
governments, through the Natural Heritage Trust, to reverse the long-term decline in 
the quality and extent of Australia’s native vegetation cover. While aggregate levels 
of native vegetation are substantial in many jurisdictions (figure 1 and table 1), the 
National Land and Water Resources Audit has expressed concern about the 
representativeness of ecosystems formally secured in ‘protected’ areas, and about 
land and water degradation in particular regions. International obligations have also 
played a part. For example, Australia is a signatory to the United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity.  
Figure 1  Extent of native vegetation in Australia 
Circa 1997 
 
Data source: NLWRA (2002a).     
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Table 1  Remnant native vegetation by State and Territory, 1997 
  % intensively-used zonea
New South Wales  67
Victoria  37
Queensland  72
Western Australia  56
South Australia  64
Tasmania  80
ACT  69
Northern Territory  98
a Representing about 38 per cent of Australia’s total land mass, mainly covering the agricultural, pastoral and 
urban zones in each jurisdiction.  
State and Territory legislation typically sets out (on a jurisdiction-wide basis) when 
permits or approvals must be obtained by landholders who intend to clear native 
vegetation on their properties. The application and breadth of controls varies 
significantly across jurisdictions. Different requirements generally apply to 
leaseholders and owners of freehold title.  
Most regimes provide for some exemptions from the need for a permit to clear 
native vegetation for designated personal use and some agricultural management 
practices (box 1). However, many participants complained that exemptions were ill-
defined and inconsistently applied. 
 
Box 1  Regulatory regimes: selected definitions and exemptions 
‘Native vegetation’ comprises grasses and groundcover as well as trees in New South 
Wales, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia; native grassland is excluded in 
Queensland and (currently) in Tasmania from general permit requirements, although 
grasses may be protected under threatened species legislation and the Australian 
Government’s Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act.  
‘Clearing’ typically includes felling, removing or destroying by any means (usually with 
the exception of grazing activity). In Victoria, permits are required for lopping branches. 
Exemptions typically include: small areas (for example, less than one hectare); planted 
timber; infrastructure; fire-breaks, fencing; firewood for personal use; drought fodder; 
regrowth (for example, less than 10 years old in Victoria, less than 5 years old in South 
Australia). Extractive industries usually are exempt from native vegetation regulations 
though they are subject to industry-specific legislation.  
 
 
Several jurisdictions (New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland) have established 
regional processes to devise regional clearing guidelines, although any regional or 
local guidelines and conditions must at least meet jurisdiction-wide requirements.      
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Most State and Territory governments also have separate legislation protecting 
threatened species of flora and fauna. In addition, there are several other pieces of 
legislation that may regulate whether landholders can lawfully clear native 
vegetation on their properties, regardless of whether exemptions apply under native 
vegetation management legislation. 
At a national level, the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999 (EPBC  Act) provides a framework for Australian Government 
involvement in matters of ‘national environmental significance’ including, of 
particular relevance to primary producers, nationally threatened species, wetlands 
and ecological communities.  
How well have current regimes promoted environmental goals? 
Where stated, environmental objectives of the various Acts that regulate native 
vegetation and biodiversity throughout the jurisdictions are diverse, but generally 
include protection of native vegetation, ecosystems and species and sustainable 
development. However, typically little guidance is provided about how to 
implement and monitor achievement of these higher-level objectives.  
To the extent that effectiveness is monitored, it tends to be measured by changes in 
the estimated level of clearing of native vegetation — a somewhat more tractable 
but partial and imperfect proxy measure of environmental outcomes.  
According to available data, clearing of native vegetation seems to have declined in 
most jurisdictions since the introduction of the regimes (table 2). However, there is 
also evidence of non-compliance and pre-emptive clearing undertaken as insurance 
against possible future policy changes. Reclassification of ‘regrowth’ as ‘remnant’ 
native vegetation after a certain period, for example, often encourages early clearing 
to avoid possible future restrictions.      
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Table 2  Indicative annual rates of native vegetation clearing 
 Period  Hectares  per  year  Comment 
New South Wales  1980–1990  100 000  Clearing of native woody vegetation 
  1991–1995 50  000 
  1995–1997 30  000 
Clearing controls introduced 1995 and 
strengthened 1997  
  1997–2000 14  000   
Victoria  1983–1988  10 438  Clearing of native woody vegetation 
  1989–2001  2 500  Clearing controls introduced 1989 
Queensland  1980–1990 297  560 
  1991–1999 330  555 
  1999-2000 758  000 
Clearing of native woody vegetation 
Clearing controls for freehold land 
announced 1999, introduced 2000 
  2000-2001 378  000   
Western Australia  1983–1993 26  028 
  1994–2001 3  500 
Based on permit applications  
(includes non-woody native vegetation)
South Australia  1983–1993 11  630 
  1996–2002 2  060 
Based on permit applications  
(includes non-woody native vegetation)
Tasmania  1983–1993 6  000 
  2000–2002 1  500 
Clearing of native forest vegetation for 
agricultural purposes 
1983–1993 16  280  Northern Territory 
1995–1999 1  140 
Figures for 1994 onwards relate to 
leasehold land only 
ACT   —  Removal of stands of trees for urban 
development 
The focus of the regimes on preventing clearing of native vegetation often seems 
several steps removed from achieving desired environmental outcomes. While there 
are some significant differences in the application of controls across jurisdictions, 
common themes to emerge include that: 
•  broad rules relating to clearing of native vegetation and targets for retention of 
native vegetation applied across whole jurisdictions have not been sufficiently 
flexible to take account of regional variations. Their application frequently has 
led to perverse environmental effects. For example: premature clearing of 
regrowth and more intensive rotation of paddocks contributes to soil 
degradation. Restrictions on thinning or clearing of woodland ‘thickening’ have 
indirectly promoted soil erosion and biodiversity loss in some cases; 
•  an emphasis on prevention of native vegetation removal, rather than a focus on 
the promotion of desirable environmental outcomes, also can lead to perverse 
effects. For example, innovations in farming practices (such as the introduction 
of water-saving centre-pivot irrigation systems) that in addition to improving 
farm productivity, may improve environmental sustainability, can be prevented 
if paddock trees cannot be removed or if planting offsets imposed as a condition 
of their removal are prohibitively costly. Clearing restrictions can also prevent 
effective removal of weeds and pests;      
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•  incentives for landholders to care for, conserve or re-establish native vegetation 
voluntarily have been diminished because they fear that harvesting or use of 
native vegetation may be prohibited in future. Moreover, if landholders were to 
allow or encourage native vegetation to establish, they risk forfeiting the option 
to use that land for future production, thus restricting their ability to respond to 
changing circumstances. From the landholders’ perspective, native vegetation 
loses its private value and becomes a liability; and  
•  avoidance and evasion of regulations have prompted the progressive 
introduction of stronger regulations and stricter enforcement and penalty 
provisions, creating an adversarial climate and further eroding landholder 
goodwill. 
Operation of the regimes  
Many participants expressed concerns about procedural complexity and a lack of 
transparency and accountability. In those instances where independent audits of 
State and Territory regimes have been undertaken, such concerns seem to have been 
confirmed. Some regimes have met more of the attributes of good regulatory 
practice than others — for example, the Australian Government’s EPBC Act and 
arrangements in Tasmania and the Northern Territory. However, no State or 
Territory regime as far as the Commission has been able to ascertain, meets all 
criteria for good regulation. In particular: 
•  legislation often has been introduced with little or no consultation (sometimes 
deliberately so, to avoid pre-emptive clearing) and without assessment of likely 
costs and benefits; 
•  decision rules often seem to be based on the mapping of remnant native 
vegetation, the accuracy of which is frequently disputed by landholders and 
other parties, and on an incomplete understanding of the dynamics of local 
ecosystems; 
•  the compliance burden placed on landholders often seems excessive. 
Landholders may have to seek information and permits from several government 
departments and authorities. Advice is not always consistent and receipt of a 
permit from one agency does not necessarily satisfy requirements of other 
agencies; 
•  application costs can be high because landholders frequently have to provide 
detailed surveys and other information as part of their applications. Delays in 
processing applications also add to costs;     
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•  a lack of clear environmental objectives in many jurisdictions means that reasons 
for decisions on permit applications, if given at all, are not transparent and often 
appear to be inconsistent, thus making local application of regulations difficult in 
some situations;  
•  regional processes that were intended to build on local knowledge and adapt 
assessment criteria to fit local needs and characteristics seem not to have worked 
well, either because representation has not been ‘local’ and/or because local 
decisions have been circumscribed or overturned by governments; and  
•  appeals and dispute-resolution mechanisms have not been available in some 
jurisdictions and have been limited and costly in others.  
Recent legislative amendments in some jurisdictions address some of these issues, 
including, for example, the provision of an appeals mechanism and introduction of 
an integrated permit system in Western Australia, and provision in New South 
Wales for more flexibility at the regional level. 
Impacts on landholders  
A major part of the terms of reference is to assess positive and negative impacts of 
existing native vegetation and biodiversity regulations on landholders. This focus on 
the impacts of regulatory regimes on landholders elicited criticism from a number 
of participants. The Commission appreciates that considering only the costs 
imposed on landholders by regulatory regimes would not provide a sound basis for 
decision-making. However, although environmental benefits accruing to the 
community at large from retention of native vegetation are not being assessed, this 
does not imply that the community-wide benefits from appropriate native vegetation 
management and biodiversity conservation are insignificant.  
The Commission received evidence from around 180 landholders and their 
representatives, and other participants such a local governments, about the negative 
impacts of native vegetation and biodiversity legislation. Little evidence was 
received from landholders about positive impacts of the regulations, although many 
acknowledged the benefits of sustainable, resource-management practices.  
This is not a random sample of Australian landholders — those who have few or no 
complaints are less likely to participate in this inquiry. (Indeed, a fundamental 
problem with clearing regulations is that they have little effect on landholders who 
have little native vegetation remaining on their properties — those who by choice or 
chance have substantial native vegetation on their properties stand to lose the most.) 
Nonetheless, qualitative evidence of impacts provided by participants, coupled with     
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the Commission’s own observations on numerous field trips and wider research, 
was consistent and generally compelling. 
Negative impacts of regulation  
Clearing controls have four broad types of impact on farming practices:  
•  preventing expansion of agricultural activities; 
•  preventing changes in land use (for example, from grazing to cropping) and 
adoption of new technologies (such as installation of centre-pivot irrigation);  
•  inhibiting routine management of vegetation regrowth and clearing of woodland 
thickening to maintain areas in production; and 
•  inhibiting management of weeds and vermin.  
The scale and nature of such impacts vary across jurisdictions, reflecting the level 
of demand for vegetation clearance, coupled with the severity of restrictions. For 
example, the aggregate impact of clearing restrictions may be higher in New South 
Wales and Queensland, where there is a demand for broadscale clearing and where 
such clearing has been or is about to be stopped. Impacts in the Northern Territory 
and Tasmania, although not zero, appear to be less significant because the demand 
for clearing for agricultural purposes is lower and native vegetation controls so far 
have sought to balance economic and environmental objectives. (That said, 
concerns were raised about the potential impact of inflexible native vegetation and 
biodiversity regulations on the sustainable development and management of large 
tracts of land belonging to Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory.)  
Somewhat surprisingly, the impact of native vegetation restrictions is not confined 
to the ‘frontier’ or areas where broadscale clearing is occurring. Many landholders 
in Victoria and New South Wales commented on the detrimental impact of 
regulation that reclassifies regrowth, including grasses, more than 10 years old, as 
remnant. For cropping and mixed farm enterprises, where long-term rotations are an 
integral part of the production cycle, such arbitrary rules could excise previously 
cropped or grazed areas of land from production in future. Perversely, remaining 
cleared land could be degraded by over-intensive farming in an effort by 
landholders to offset such losses simply to maintain farm viability in the short term. 
There is also evidence that innovation (including the introduction of centre-pivot 
irrigation systems and self-drive tractors using GPS technology) as well as routine 
farming practices (such as paddock rotations and fencing) are being frustrated, 
sometimes stopped, because of restrictions on clearing or even lopping branches 
from paddock trees. Failure to access cost-saving technology could eventually lead     
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to some otherwise viable farms becoming unviable, particularly if the terms of trade 
for agriculture continue to decline.  
The impacts of restrictions are likely to increase over time because: 
•  regrowth and woodland thickening, innovation and farm management are 
ongoing processes, not once-off events; and  
•  controls are continually being strengthened.  
The Commission has not attempted to quantify jurisdiction-wide effects of the 
legislative regimes. Instead, in order to investigate the drivers of the impacts of 
native vegetation clearing restrictions at a regional level, two shires were examined 
— Moree in New South Wales and Murweh in Queensland. Any estimates of the 
impacts of land-clearing restrictions are highly sensitive to data and assumptions 
about future prices, productivity growth, annual rates of clearing, the discount rate 
and the policy scenario. Therefore, the results should be interpreted as providing an 
indication of orders of magnitude, not precise measures of likely impacts.  
Commission estimates suggest that the economic impacts of broadscale clearing 
restrictions that prevent the conversion of land from native vegetation to crops in 
the Moree Plains Shire, or the clearing of woodland to maintain or improve grazing 
capacity in Murweh Shire, could be significant (box  2). The well-documented 
phenomenon of woodland thickening on large tracts of grazing land in Queensland 
could progressively crowd out grazing activity if cost-effective counter-measures 
were not permitted.  
Any reduction in expected net farm returns will roughly translate into a 
commensurate decline in current property values. Evidence was received from a 
number of participants about the increasing gap between the values of uncleared 
and cleared land, where the gap cannot be explained by the costs of clearing and 
differences in land quality. 
Furthermore, a reduction in anticipated returns — or simply an increase in the risk 
premium because of the uncertainty surrounding the impact of native vegetation 
regulations — will also affect farm investment and the willingness of finance 
providers to lend. Finance providers have not participated in the inquiry, although a 
number of landholders provided evidence (some on a confidential basis) that 
lending institutions had reduced the valuation of their properties as a direct result of 
the impact of, or simply the uncertainty created by, native vegetation regulation. 
This had reduced their assessed equity in the property and, hence, worsened their 
risk status.      
XXXII  OVERVIEW  
 
 
Box 2  Estimates of potential impacts of broadscale clearing 
restrictions in Moree Plains and Murweh Shires 
The Commission’s approach has been to estimate landholders’ returns if they were not 
constrained by clearing restrictions, in order to isolate the effects of clearing 
restrictions. It is assumed that landholders would voluntarily retain some native 
vegetation because of shade, shelter, erosion prevention and other private benefits it 
can deliver.  
Using this methodology and a range of data and predictions about prices, costs, 
productivity growth and annual clearing rates, estimates suggest that prohibitions on 
broadscale clearing could reduce the present value of expected net returns (2003 
dollars) to land, capital and management (over a 40-year period) in Moree Plains Shire 
(NSW) by $27–$84 million, depending on the productivity of newly-cleared land, and by 
$42–$124 million in Murweh Shire (Queensland), depending on the outlook for future 
cattle prices and whether woodland thickening can be countered effectively.  
Results from the case studies should not be applied to other regions in the two States 
concerned, or indeed, to other States and Territories. Nor should they be used to 
indicate unavoidable losses incurred by particular landholders that might warrant 
compensation. For example, the estimates include some returns to factors of 
production that are likely to be mobile in the longer term, such as management and 
capital. Adjustment by these factors would tend to reduce estimated long-term losses. 
In addition, as a large proportion of land in Murweh Shire is leasehold, the share of 
losses borne by leaseholders will depend on what they pay (or have paid) for the 
lease. On the other hand, the estimates do not capture adjustment costs that may be 
incurred by landholders and others if alternative employment is not readily available.  
 
 
Government measures mitigating negative impacts  
Compensation for the impacts of native vegetation regulations has been and remains 
the exception rather than the rule. In South Australia, between 1985 and 1991, 
compensation was offered to landholders whose clearing applications were rejected 
and who agreed to set aside the land under a heritage agreement. A similar, if 
somewhat more limited, scheme has operated in Western Australia.  
Assistance packages have been announced for landholders in Queensland and New 
South Wales affected by proposed broadscale clearing bans in those two States, 
although it is not clear that compensation will be paid for losses incurred.  
Several jurisdictions provide for compensation for the effects of threatened species 
legislation. Victoria’s threatened species legislation (Flora and Fauna Guarantee 
Act 1988) provides for compensation of landholders, but the legislation is seldom 
applied to the extent that compensation provisions are invoked — instead, planning 
regulations are used to protect habitat at landholders’ expense.      
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Provisions exist in most jurisdictions for landholders to receive some financial 
assistance (often through Natural Heritage Trust funding) for the costs of fencing-
off native vegetation; they may also receive local rate rebates on set aside land. 
Some States also have programs where environmental services or land covenants 
are purchased from landholders (the pilot BushTender scheme in Victoria and the 
more comprehensive Private Forest Reserve Program in Tasmania).  
Positive impacts for landholders from regulation  
Landholders individually or as a group may benefit from a range of services 
provided by native vegetation such as fodder for stock, timber for fencing, reduced 
soil erosion and prevention of soil and water degradation. However, that there are 
some benefits accruing to landholders does not mean that they necessarily will 
benefit from all of the native vegetation required to be retained by current 
regulations, or that the benefits to them will outweigh the costs.  
Where there are private net benefits from retaining native vegetation, individual 
landholders would be expected to retain native vegetation voluntarily. It is possible 
that the regulations have alerted some landholders to sustainable and profitable 
land-management techniques. However, the weight of evidence in this inquiry 
suggests that landholders are more likely to consider the regulations and their 
implementation to be ill-conceived and often contrary to the long-term sustainable 
management of their properties. Even if there were an educational by-product effect 
of the regulations, a targeted education program is likely to be a more efficient 
instrument. 
Native vegetation and biodiversity regulations generally seek to retain native 
vegetation to promote wider community objectives, including biodiversity, in 
addition to addressing resource degradation issues. As discussed below, local 
communities and landholders acting together are likely to be well placed to address 
resource degradation issues in ways that take account of local conditions and 
knowledge. This may not require retention of native vegetation at levels currently 
imposed by jurisdiction-wide legislation. For example, some services provided by 
native vegetation (such as the prevention of soil erosion and salinity) could be 
provided in other ways, including by non-native vegetation. 
Impacts of regulations on regions and other industries 
To the extent that production and incomes of local landholders are lower than 
otherwise as a result of the regulatory regimes, there may be a flow-on effect to     
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local towns and communities. As in the case of impacts on landholders, impacts of 
regulatory regimes on local communities will vary widely.  
Potential positive impacts on regions from retention of native vegetation under the 
regulations include lower infrastructure maintenance costs from lower salinity 
levels, and increased eco-tourism. To the extent that there are higher-valued uses of 
land, it might be expected that normal market mechanisms would encourage this 
shift. Some landholders indicated that the only prospective buyers of their land, 
which can no longer be cleared because of the regulations, were city dwellers who 
visited for occasional ‘weekend hunting’ and who would contribute little to the 
local community. 
The inquiry received little evidence from the mining and infrastructure industries 
about the impacts of native vegetation regulations. In several jurisdictions, 
extractive industries are exempt from general native vegetation controls and are 
subject to industry-specific legislation. Large mining projects may not have been 
stopped by native vegetation controls, though their costs may have been increased 
because of revegetation and planting offset requirements in some jurisdictions. 
There is some evidence that smaller ventures may have been deterred because of 
these additional costs.  
The apparent lack of interest in the inquiry from infrastructure providers may or 
may not imply that impacts are low. It is possible that regulated infrastructure 
providers are able to set prices to reflect higher operating costs, or that publicly-
owned providers such as roads departments, constrained by budget allocations, 
simply provide services up to the budget ceiling. Local government participants 
from Victoria claimed that the need to obtain permission to clear trees close to roads 
stretched council budgets and delayed roadworks, sometimes with adverse 
implications for driver safety. In both cases, consumers or the community, and not 
the providers, will bear these largely hidden costs.  
Ways of reducing adverse impacts 
The Commission has not been asked to consider whether the benefits of existing 
regulatory approaches outweigh their costs. It is possible that the community 
benefits of current regulatory arrangements outweigh the costs imposed on private 
landholders and others. However, given that environmental outcomes resulting from 
the regimes generally are not assessed, and given the lack of transparency about 
their costs, in the Commission’s view, no-one could make a well-informed 
assessment one way or the other. Indeed, this lack of information about relative 
costs and benefits is a fundamental problem with the current regimes.     
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Nonetheless, based on the evidence presented to the Commission, and its own 
observations and analysis of the incentive structure provided by current regulation, 
the Commission considers that better environmental outcomes could be achieved at 
less cost to the community overall and landholders in particular. The Commission 
proposes a three-part approach to reforming existing arrangements: 
•  improve existing regulatory regimes; 
•  remove impediments to and promote private conservation; and 
•  develop a formal process for sharing costs and devolving responsibilities. 
1  Improve existing regulatory regimes 
Wider application of ‘best-practice’ principles of regulation would introduce greater 
transparency and accountability and reduce procedural complexity (box 3).  
As noted above, legislation in some jurisdictions meets more of the criteria for 
‘good regulation’ than in others — for example, the EPBC Act sets out time limits 
for consideration of applications and requires economic and social factors to be 
taken into account in the approvals process. In some jurisdictions, procedural 
improvements have been foreshadowed or recently implemented.  
 
Box 3  Towards regulatory ‘best practice’  
•  Objectives of legislation should be clearly specified in terms of desired 
environmental outcomes, so that regulations and decisions link back to these 
objectives and performance of the regimes can be monitored and assessed. 
•  Duplication and inconsistencies should be minimised by amalgamating/simplifying 
regulations and permit requirements. 
•  Landholders should be assisted to meet their responsibilities through adequate 
information about those responsibilities, and education about sustainable land 
practices and environmental problems. 
•  Statutory time-frames for assessing permit applications should be applied. 
•  Economic and social factors should be taken into account where applications to 
clear otherwise would be rejected on environmental grounds, and reasons for 
decisions should be made publicly available.  
•  Accessible, impartial appeals and dispute-resolution mechanisms should be 
available. 
•  Regular audits and independent reviews of the overall effectiveness and costs and 
benefits of regimes should be undertaken and the results published.  
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The Commission also proposes a larger role for regional decision making within 
existing regimes, to make use of the extensive knowledge of landholders and local 
communities and to allow regional variations in requirements. This would require 
giving more autonomy (and support) to existing regional committees to develop and 
perhaps implement appropriate requirements. Importantly, a greater regional focus 
would allow relaxation of some seemingly arbitrary, across-the-board requirements 
(such as those applying to native vegetation regrowth in many jurisdictions) and 
native vegetation targets, which seem to impinge significantly on routine 
agricultural practice and impose substantial costs on landholders, often for little 
apparent environmental benefit. The NSW Government has indicated some changes 
to its regime along these lines.  
There is also a need to upgrade the quality of data on which decisions are based (for 
example, ground surveys to verify satellite mapping) and to provide mechanisms for 
data revision and updating. 
Such changes would significantly reduce compliance costs of existing regulation 
incurred by landholders and the community overall, while not detracting from, and 
most probably enhancing, environmental outcomes.  
However, landholders would still bear the costs of supplying many community-
wide benefits (potentially encouraging the community, which is oblivious of the 
costs, to seek more), and prescriptive regulation of clearing of native vegetation 
would remain the principal instrument for bringing about desired environmental 
services. In the Commission’s view, more fundamental reform is warranted for 
several reasons:  
•  regulation of native vegetation clearing is inflexible, prescriptive and ‘input’ 
rather than ‘outcome’ focussed;  
•  regulation of clearing is a partial measure — it does nothing to ensure ongoing 
management of native vegetation or its regeneration. Indeed, landholders are 
faced with disincentives to care for and regenerate native vegetation; and 
•  jurisdictional regulation by design or accident has muddied the issue of 
landholder and community responsibility. 
Regulation may be an efficient instrument in some circumstances, but current 
regulations have been imposed with insufficient consideration of the nature of the 
problem to be addressed and the costs and benefits of current regulation relative to 
other approaches, including less prescriptive regulation.      
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2 Promote  private  conservation 
There is ample evidence that many landholders increasingly are implementing more 
sustainable agricultural practices (box 4), not only because these practices improve 
the productivity of the land, but also because landholders derive other private 
benefits such as visual and recreational amenity. In some cases, they simply may 
wish to be ‘good citizens’. 
 
Box 4  Examples of sustainable agricultural practices 
According to Munmurra Landholder Action Group (New South Wales):  
Examples of these improvements would be: minimum till cultivation; cell grazing; more 
effective vermin control (rabbits, feral dogs and pigs); development of bio-diverse farming 
systems; the growth in farmer participation in catchment management; land care groups and 
the general increase in awareness of the economic benefits of on farm tree planting. 
(sub. 69, p. 2) 
John McKindlay (New South Wales) described his farming practices: 
We have fenced off 70% of the river bank from stock and much of it has been planted with a 
native cane grass to reduce erosion. Over the years we have established 5.5 kms of trees 
and understorey and 12 kms of saltbush. The implementation of a full recycle system for our 
farm has reduced any run off from irrigation and we have established 80 hectares of deep 
rooted lucerne to limit accessions to the water table. We believe we are environmentally 
conscious and we actively promote the landcare ethic. As well as our normal farm operation 
we run a native plants nursery supplying farms, Landcare groups and Government 
Departments. (sub. 114, p. 1) 
Murray Davis, a farmer in western Victoria, noted: 
We understand that there needs to be a balance between production and environmental 
sustainability, so over the last ten years all the waterways on my property have been fenced 
off, native trees have been planted and areas have been fenced off for revegetation. All 
stock have been excluded from all waterways due to the fencing along the creeks. This 
consists of approximately 40 hectares plus other areas retained for shelter belts and has 
resulted in lost productivity to this farm. (sub. 103, p. 1) 
 
 
There are many market and non-market private mechanisms that by increasing 
potential returns, could encourage individual landholders to provide more 
environmental services. These include:  
•  some consumers demanding environmentally-sustainable products (for example, 
‘green labelling’), eco-tourism, or ‘green’ investments; 
•  individuals, corporations, or organisations (such as the Australian Bush Heritage 
Fund, the Australian Wildlife Conservancy and the Trust for Nature) with an 
interest in the environment either buying land or contracting with landholders to     
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deliver environmental services through retention and improved management of 
native vegetation and biodiversity or through restoration activities; and  
•  groups of local farmers engaging voluntarily in cooperative efforts to address 
local environmental problems (for example, Landcare), possibly assisted by 
organisations such as Greening Australia. 
A major advantage of private or voluntary mechanisms is that the outcome 
generally will enhance community welfare because the transaction or activity will 
occur only if the benefits to those paying exceed the costs. In addition, suppliers of 
the environmental services, landholders, will seek out efficient and innovative ways 
of delivering services in order to maximise profits or, in the case of community 
actions, net community gains. 
If conservation of native vegetation can be made compatible with increasing 
landholder benefits, then more conservation will occur voluntarily. However, 
private provision of conservation services may be constrained for many reasons 
(box 5). 
 
Box 5  Constraints on private provision of native vegetation and 
biodiversity  
There are numerous reasons why individuals may not provide the optimal level of 
native vegetation and biodiversity as desired by society as a whole:  
•  lack of access to information about sustainable agricultural practices and their 
benefits and difficulties in signalling sustainable practices to consumers or investors; 
•  short-term financial constraints arising from unviable farm size or external ‘shocks’ 
such as drought and price fluctuations; 
•  restrictions on, or impediments to, private conservation projects or the commercial 
development and sustainable use of native vegetation; 
•  lease conditions preventing alternative land use that may be more ‘environmentally-
friendly’ than stipulated uses; 
•  agricultural assistance (for example, exceptional circumstances assistance including 
drought relief) or input price distortions that may encourage higher stocking rates, or 
the development of, or increased production in, economically-marginal areas;  
•  native vegetation regulations themselves, if uncompensated, which discount the 
private value of native vegetation;  
•  free-rider issues that weaken community efforts to solve local problems such as 
salinity and poor soil and water quality; and 
•  the public-good nature of some environmental services (such as biodiversity or 
carbon sequestration) which inhibits (though does not rule out) private solutions. 
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The variety of causes of under-provision of environmental services on private land 
suggests that different responses targeted at particular constraints are likely to be 
more effective and efficient than across-the-board regulation.  
In many cases, the most effective role for government simply may be to remove 
regulatory or other policy distortions (for example, to promote efficient farm 
rationalisation). In other cases, government could take a more active role facilitating 
increased private effort by, for example, further promoting dissemination of 
information and research into the production benefits of retaining native vegetation, 
or its potential for sustainable commercial uses. 
Environmental externalities and public goods 
Where private under-provision of conservation occurs because benefits accrue ‘off-
site’, governments potentially have a more direct role to play.  
Nonetheless, where negative ‘spill-over’ effects and their solutions are contained 
within reasonably well-defined areas, cooperative voluntary solutions may still be 
feasible. Possible explanations for voluntary community action include the desire by 
individuals to be, or to be seen as, good citizens by their peers, as well as the scope 
for benefits (for example, improved regional water and soil quality) accruing to 
individual property holders. In other words, the potential individual pay-off from 
group effort may exceed the pay-off from individual action or, indeed, non-action.  
The substantial involvement of landholders in the Landcare movement is an 
example. Individuals and groups may also negotiate solutions to localised 
‘spillovers’, for example, where one group pays another to modify its practices. As 
discussed below, government may have a role in facilitating community solutions to 
community problems, for example, by providing resources and information and, in 
some cases, by facilitating or enforcing appropriate practices where free-riding or 
high transactions costs would otherwise undermine achievement of objectives. 
However, where the benefits of native vegetation conservation accrue more widely 
and cannot be charged for, landholders are unlikely to provide the optimal level of 
native vegetation from a whole-of-community perspective. At some point, the 
provision of native vegetation and the production of commodities for profit cease 
being complementary and begin to compete. Beyond this point, native vegetation 
conserved for biodiversity purposes means that landholders lose income because the 
land could be put to more profitable uses from a private perspective.      
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Two issues then arise: which policy instruments are likely to be efficient and 
effective in promoting optimal levels of environmental services, and who should 
pay for what.  
3  Clarify landholder and community responsibilities  
On the whole, the notion that landholders and the community should share 
responsibility to protect the environment seems well accepted, with the wider 
community paying for environmental public goods (box 6). 
 
Box 6  Participants’ views on cost-sharing 
The costs of retaining native vegetation [should] be shared amongst the beneficiaries in 
proportion to the level of the benefit that they receive (eg landholder, local community and/or 
wider community) and that these proportions [should] be determined through the application 
of an agreed cost sharing formula. (SA Government, DR324, p. 41)  
[The] Public good must be supported by appropriate support from the public purse. 
(ACT Sustainable Rural Lands Group, sub. 125, p. 1) 
As a taxpayer I would expect and no doubt do, pay for public good actions wherever they 
happen, in areas other than the environment but do not see that we [landholders] should 
bear almost all the cost of this [environmental] public good. (T.J. Price (Western Australia), 
sub. 38, p. 2) 
The entire community should help bear the cost of public good activities. (Greening Australia 
(Tasmania), sub. 134, p. 2) 
There is also a greater requirement to identify the ‘public versus private good’ of protection 
of native vegetation and the biodiversity it supports. Landholders do have a duty of care to 
maintain and protect their natural resources. To go beyond this requires significant 
resources — capital, knowledge and financial. If the broader community is after benefits that 
go beyond this ‘duty of care’, then the broader community needs to actively contribute. 
(Murray Irrigation Ltd (New South Wales), sub. 79, p. 2) 
Best Practice … should reflect the wider community’s aspirations for natural resource 
management outcomes. Ensuring landholders contribute appropriately to achieving such 
outcomes, however, should be a matter for ‘incentivation’ not regulation … (Tasmanian 
Conservation Trust, sub. 84, p. 5) 
 
 
The problem is that in practice, the distinction between private and public benefits 
is muddied. Some actions will produce private, regional and community-wide 
benefits. For example, salinity reduction or prevention may improve agricultural 
yields on individual properties and across regions, and also improve habitat and 
biodiversity. 
The difficulties of isolating the private, regional and public components of benefits 
under current regulatory arrangements have contributed to disagreement about the     
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extent of the burden that individual landholders or landholders as a group should be 
expected to bear. Establishing a more formal process for identifying and agreeing 
on these different components and, hence, the extent of landholders’ 
responsibilities, will be critical to achieving a long-term solution to environmental 
problems. 
Landholders’ responsibilities 
In the Commission’s assessment, it is reasonable to expect landholders in the 
aggregate to bear the costs of actions that directly contribute to sustainable resource 
use and, hence, the long-term viability of their operations.  
Thus, actions and mechanisms to ‘internalise’ efficiently what could be broadly 
described as externalities occurring within and between regions — landholder 
actions affecting soil and water quality, for example — would constitute the 
responsibility of landholders individually and/or as a group. This approach does not 
mean that individual landholders should only be expected to undertake what is in 
their private interests — it implies a broader responsibility to their neighbours and 
communities and, indeed, where actions have broader impacts, surrounding 
communities.  
Society’s responsibilities 
In the Commission’s assessment, the wider public should bear the costs of actions 
to promote public-good environmental services — such as biodiversity, threatened 
species preservation and greenhouse gas abatement — that it apparently demands, 
and which are likely to impinge significantly on the capacity of landholders to 
utilise their land for production.  
This assessment is not simply based on some notion of fairness (although perceived 
fairness is not irrelevant when landholders are being relied upon to provide the 
environmental services demanded by the wider community). It is based on the 
reality that achieving the environmental outcomes that society desires on private 
land as efficiently and effectively as possible will require: 
•  clear specification of the environmental outcomes demanded; and 
•  the ongoing cooperation, knowledge and effort of landholders who ultimately 
must deliver those outcomes on their land.  
Over and above agreed landholder responsibilities, the Commission therefore 
considers that public-good conservation (including biodiversity, threatened species     
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and greenhouse objectives), should be purchased from individual, or groups of, 
landholders. 
Several participants put the view that landholders should not be ‘rewarded’ for not 
clearing native vegetation. But ‘impacter pays’ is not inherently more efficient or 
equitable than affected parties buying the services they value. A major problem in 
making landholders bear all the costs of not clearing native vegetation on their 
properties is that this necessitates compulsion via regulation. Yet prescriptive 
regulation is unlikely to promote the focus on environmental outcomes and the 
landholder cooperation required to achieve those outcomes. Nor is making a subset 
of landholders bear the costs of providing services that benefit the rest of society 
particularly fair, especially as many other landholders, including governments, have 
been responsible for large-scale clearing in the past. 
Having governments buy the environmental services that the community demands 
(including, in some cases, buying up parts of, or entire, properties) would mimic 
private, voluntary transactions driven by the prospect of gains from trade accruing 
to both parties. This has several advantages over prescriptive regulation for 
promoting public-good conservation on private land:  
•  a process of buying environmental services will require more precise 
specification of the environmental outcomes demanded; 
•  the approach can be flexible, taking account of local variations, utilising local 
knowledge and encouraging innovative and cost-effective solutions that are 
consistent with actions to promote regional environmental objectives. Therefore, 
a given level of environmental services is more likely to be provided at 
minimum cost; 
•  a requirement to pay will place some discipline on the community’s ‘demand’ 
for environmental services and compel prioritisation of environmental demands. 
It is more likely (though certainly not guaranteed) that the community’s 
willingness to pay would be tested and the cost–benefit trade-off revealed in the 
aggregate and for individual projects. With uncompensated regulation, retention 
of native vegetation on private land essentially is a ‘free good’ for everyone 
except adversely affected landholders; and 
•  contract terms and conditions can be designed to provide certainty to landholders 
and provide positive incentives for them to retain and manage native vegetation 
appropriately in the long term. For the landholder, native vegetation would 
become an asset rather than a liability.  
Such an approach has been trialled in Victoria and used extensively in Tasmania 
and overseas with promising results. It is not costless or without potential problems.     
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Criteria have to be developed for prioritising environmental objectives and for 
assessing environmental outcomes. Methods of eliciting ‘competitive’ contract 
prices (such as auctions) for desired environmental outcomes need to be developed. 
Contracts need to be designed, monitored and enforced. Because it requires case-by-
case assessment, the approach can be resource-intensive. But prioritisation and clear 
specification of environmental objectives, the discovery of least-cost solutions and 
monitoring of outcomes so that performance of the intervention can be assessed and 
improved over time, should be undertaken for any policy intervention, including 
regulation. 
In some cases, it is feasible that regulation to promote some public-good objectives 
may be efficient — for example, where a simple rule is more efficient than 
negotiations or auctions at property or regional levels. Importantly, however, if 
regulation involves the imposition of significant losses on some landholders, 
payment of compensation would promote acceptance of, and compliance with, the 
rule. The efficiency of regulation as a policy instrument does not rest on the 
uncompensated transfer of long-accepted — and bought — rights. 
The cost-sharing approach outlined would shift some, but not all, costs currently 
incurred by landholders to taxpayers. Although some may regard the potential 
budgetary impact as a major disadvantage, possibly limiting the provision of 
conservation effort, the appropriate objective of policy should be maximising net 
community benefits, not minimising budgetary outlays. 
Devolving responsibility to regional communities  
If landholders and local communities are expected to address, and largely pay for, 
some environmental problems (such as local salinity and soil and water quality 
problems) themselves, there is a strong case for allowing them greater flexibility 
and authority to devise and implement efficient ways of doing so — and not simply 
imposing solutions from above, ostensibly for landholders’ benefit.  
Importantly, solutions to regional environmental issues may or may not involve 
retention of native vegetation, at least not to the level demanded by the public at 
large. For example, in Western Australia the principal stated reason for imposing 
clearing restrictions has been the need to control salinity. While salinity 
undoubtedly is a major problem in that State, some have suggested other approaches 
such as deep-rooted, perennial commercial crops. It is not within the Commission’s 
expertise to say what the precise solutions will be, but the current regulatory 
approach inhibits exploration of, and experimentation with, potentially lower-cost 
options. Of course, to the extent that native vegetation is retained in order to solve     
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regional environmental problems, the rest of the community can ‘free-ride’ on any 
biodiversity or other services delivered. 
In the Commission’s view, the most important design features are that institutions 
provide for genuine regional consultation and decision making and that they are 
delegated sufficient flexibility, authority and resources to implement their decisions. 
Representation should reflect the regional population and a range of viewpoints and 
interests, with the scope for input and guidance from government departments. That 
said, regional institutions will need to be accountable for delivering agreed 
outcomes.  
There are few precedents for how responsibility might be devolved under regional 
approaches and, hence, there may need to be a process of experimentation and 
adaptation, building on many promising examples of landholders coming together 
to identify and solve environmental problem in their regions. Building trust and a 
sense of ‘ownership’ will be critical for success. 
Policy mechanisms that regional bodies could employ to achieve regional objectives 
include commercial or market-based instruments, voluntary efforts, codes of 
practice, education or even regulations stipulating certain practices. (Where the 
environmental benefits to landholders are direct and clear, regulations and rules 
may be appropriate and more likely to be accepted and complied with.) 
Redistributive mechanisms may be appropriate in some instances to share costs 
among landholders. In Western Australia, for example, currently only those 
landholders with remnant native vegetation on their properties bear the costs of 
clearing regulations which, among other things, are aimed at controlling salinity, 
caused largely by past clearing on other properties. 
Public-good environmental objectives formulated by the Australian, State and 
Territory governments ideally should be fed through regional institutions to 
promote coordination and consistency of approaches and, ultimately, development 
of least-cost ‘joint’ solutions. Thus there would be a ‘nested’ hierarchy of planning 
and outcome-focussed objectives, with regional bodies largely responsible for 
devising ways of delivering those objectives in an efficient manner (for illustrative 
purposes, one possible structure is outlined in figure 2).  
Some participants considered that the Council of Australian Governments and 
National Competition Policy provided an appropriate institutional model. The 
Commission sees some value in developing an agreed set of broad principles to 
guide development of consistent approaches to, and to monitor and review, native 
vegetation and biodiversity management at the national, state and regional levels.     
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Concluding remarks 
Over the past twenty years or so legislation to prevent clearing of native vegetation 
on private land has been relied upon heavily to achieve biodiversity and other 
environmental objectives. The current evaluation suggests that this approach has 
serious design and implementation deficiencies, in many cases leading to 
inefficient, ineffective and inequitable outcomes.  
The Commission considers that progressive implementation of the reforms outlined, 
by building on private effort and landholder knowledge and goodwill, could reduce 
the need for government intervention over time, would better clarify landholder and 
community responsibilities, provide better incentives for landholders to retain and 
manage native vegetation, and introduce greater policy variety, flexibility, 
accountability and transparency.  
A crucial thrust of the Commission’s recommendations is that policies that fail to 
engage the cooperation of landholders will themselves ultimately fail. In addition, 
greater transparency about the cost–benefit trade-offs involved in providing desired 
environmental services would facilitate better policy choices.      




Recommendations and findings 
Recommendations 
Before introducing new or amending existing native vegetation and biodiversity 
policy, a comprehensive regulation impact statement or its equivalent should be 
prepared that includes an assessment of the problem being targeted, expected 
costs and benefits of the proposed policy, and an assessment of alternative 
instruments. This assessment should be made public. 
All native vegetation and biodiversity policies should be subject to ongoing 
monitoring and regular independent reviews of all costs and benefits in the light 
of articulated objectives. Reviews of performance should be published. 
Ongoing efforts are required to improve the quality of data and science on which 
native vegetation and biodiversity policy decisions are based, particularly ‘on-the-
ground’ assessments to test the accuracy of vegetation mapping based on satellite 
imagery. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.4 
Current regulatory approaches should comply with good regulatory practice, 
including: 
•  clear specification of objectives of the legislation so that guidelines and 
decisions clearly link back to these objectives, and performance of the regimes 
can be monitored and assessed; 
•  minimisation of duplication and inconsistency by amalgamating and 
simplifying regulations and permit requirements, for example, by rationalising 
legislation and regulation within each State and Territory and/or by 
coordination between agencies; 
RECOMMENDATION 10.1 
RECOMMENDATION 10.2 
RECOMMENDATION 10.3      





•  assistance to, and education of, landholders to meet and to understand their 
responsibilities by providing accessible information about those 
responsibilities, and how they relate to sustainable land-management practices 
and environmental problems; 
•  statutory time-frames for assessing permit applications;  
•  consideration of economic and social factors where applications to clear 
otherwise would be rejected on environmental grounds (a ‘triple bottom line’ 
approach), with reasons for decisions to be given and reported; and 
•  provision of accessible, timely and impartial appeals and dispute-resolution 
mechanisms. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.5 
Greater flexibility should be introduced within existing regulatory regimes to 
allow variation in requirements at a regional level. To this end:  
•  greater use should be made of the extensive knowledge of landholders and 
local communities;  
•  regional committees and bodies should be given greater autonomy (and 
support) to develop appropriate requirements; and  
•  some across-the-board rules, particularly those currently applying to native 
vegetation regrowth, could be relaxed and replaced with requirements that 
meet environmental objectives but which reflect regional environmental 
characteristics and agricultural practices.  
As a matter of priority, governments should seek to remove impediments to, and 
facilitate, increased private provision of environmental services. Actions could 
include: 
•  removal of tax distortions or lease conditions that discourage conservation 
activity relative to other activities;  
•  removal of impediments to efficient farm rationalisation and/or management 
and operation; 
•  research into, and facilitation of, sustainable commercial uses of native 
vegetation and biodiversity; and  
•  enhanced provision of education and extension services to demonstrate to 
landholders the private benefits of sustainable practices. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.6      





Landholders individually, or as a group, should bear the cost of actions that 
directly contribute to sustainable resource use (including, for example, land and 
water quality) and, hence, the long-term viability of agriculture and other land-
based operations. Redistributive mechanisms may be appropriate in some 
instances to share costs among landholders and regional communities. 
Regional institutions should be further developed and charged with addressing 
regional and inter-regional resource sustainability issues within broad 
parameters determined at national, State and Territory levels. Regional bodies 
should provide for genuine regional consultation, representation and decision 
making and be granted sufficient flexibility, authority and resources to implement 
their decisions.  
Over and above agreed landholder responsibilities, additional conservation 
apparently demanded by society (for example, to achieve biodiversity, threatened 
species and greenhouse objectives), should be purchased from landholders where 
intervention is deemed cost-effective. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.10  
Public-good native vegetation and biodiversity objectives ideally should be fed 
through regional institutions to promote coordination and consistency of 
approaches and, therefore, least-cost ‘joint’ solutions.  
Findings 
This section draws together all findings contained in this report. Findings are listed 
under the relevant chapter. 
Chapter 3  State and Territory regulatory arrangements 
In most jurisdictions, little formal consideration has been given to policy 
approaches other than regulation for delivering environmental goals. Regulation 
impact assessments, or equivalent assessments in the absence of formal RIS 
requirements, do not appear to have been undertaken. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.8 
RECOMMENDATION 10.9 
FINDING 3.1     






In most jurisdictions, there has been limited assessment of the likely economic and 
social costs of native vegetation and biodiversity regulatory regimes, while the 
benefits of the regimes appear to be taken as self-evident. 
The level of consultation associated with the introduction of native vegetation 
legislation and associated regulations has varied across jurisdictions. In some 
jurisdictions, there has been adequate consultation; in others, there has been little 
or no public consultation. This has been the case particularly when regimes have 
been introduced to avoid pre-emptive clearing, or in cases when regimes have been 
changed through policy announcements, regulation or administration rather than 
legislative amendment.  
Generally, there has been greater public consultation about the development of 
biodiversity legislation than native vegetation legislation, but the processes for 
consultation in application of the Acts vary. 
Generally, regional consultation processes have been effective in involving local 
communities in native vegetation management. However, the effectiveness of the 
process in some jurisdictions appears to have been hampered by inadequate 
technical support (such as accurate mapping) and a lack of funding. ‘Outside’ 
representation on regional committees also appears to have been a source of 
discontent with some consultation processes.  
Disenchantment with the regional consultation process has arisen where regional 
vegetation management plans have not been adopted or, subsequently, have been 
changed by government. 
The obligations placed on landholders by the various regimes often seem 
unnecessarily complex and onerous. In some jurisdictions, landholders are required 
to obtain approval from several government departments and authorities. 
FINDING 3.6 
In several jurisdictions, a lack of published guidelines and the absence of publicly-
available information about the rationale for decisions on clearing applications, 
have encouraged perceptions of inconsistency in the decision-making process. 
FINDING 3.3 
FINDING 3.4 
FINDING 3.5     





Consideration of economic and social factors when assessing clearing applications 
is not required in all jurisdictions and is precluded in some. In jurisdictions where 
these factors are required to be examined, little guidance has been provided on how 
to weigh economic and social factors against environmental considerations. 
Few jurisdictions specify the time periods within which applications to clear native 
vegetation have to be assessed and, in some jurisdictions, long delays occur. Delays 
in processing applications add to costs even if applications ultimately are 
successful. 
Appeals and dispute-resolution mechanisms have not been available in some 
jurisdictions and have been limited and costly in others. Recent legislative 
amendments appear to improve appeals mechanisms in some jurisdictions. 
Landholders frequently have to provide detailed surveys and other information as 
part of their applications, increasing compliance costs. 
Chapter 4  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 
FINDING 4.1 
The actual and perceived impacts of the EPBC Act on landholders appear to differ 
markedly. In terms of preventing activities, or of requiring activities to undergo the 
assessment and approval process, the EPBC Act to date has had little direct impact 
on the agricultural sector. However, uncertainty about its potential future impacts 
has been a concern for some landholders. 
FINDING 4.2 
The listings of threatened species and ecological communities under both the 
EPBC  Act and State and Territory legislation contribute to confusion and 
uncertainty for landholders because listings, or the requirements that arise from 
them, differ in some cases. 
FINDING 3.8 
FINDING 3.9 
FINDING 3.10     






Opportunities for public involvement in decision making under the EPBC  Act 
appear to be adequate. Public reporting of key information about the Act’s 
operation promotes transparency. 
Chapter 5  Promoting environmental goals 
FINDING 5.1 
In a number of jurisdictions, the environmental objectives of the regulatory regimes 
are not specified or are poorly specified. Conflicting and multiple objectives are 
also likely to hinder the attainment of environmental goals. 
In general, reported clearing rates have declined following the introduction of 
regimes regulating the clearing of native vegetation. However, there is also some 
evidence of pre-emptive clearing and illegal clearing. 
FINDING 5.3 
In a number of jurisdictions, monitoring and enforcement of the regulations appear 
to be hampered by a lack of resources. 
In several jurisdictions, the arbitrary reclassification of regrowth vegetation as 
remnant after a certain time, has resulted in landholders clearing regrowth more 
frequently than otherwise. This has the potential for perverse environmental 
impacts, since landholders may otherwise have left land fallow and/or revegetated 
for substantially longer periods of time, with associated native vegetation, 
greenhouse, and biodiversity benefits. More frequent clearing of regrowth also may 
contribute to erosion and water quality decline. 
FINDING 5.5 
In a number of jurisdictions, the current regimes regulating native vegetation 
clearance and biodiversity conservation have an adverse impact on landholders’ 
ability to manage pest species. 
FINDING 5.2 
FINDING 5.4     




FINDING 5.6  
The current regulatory regimes narrowly focus on native vegetation protection in a 
way that is not always consistent with the achievement of longer-term conservation 
and broader environmental goals. 
FINDING 5.7 
In some jurisdictions, the current regulatory regimes have created incentives for 
landholders to clear native vegetation earlier, to clear more, or to degrade native 
vegetation, that are inconsistent with promoting the regimes’ environmental 
objectives.  
Chapter 6  Impacts on landholders, other industries and regional 
communities 
Native vegetation and biodiversity regulations have adversely affected the returns 
of many landholders by imposing a range of restrictions on farm practices, 
including: 
•  limiting the opportunities to expand or reconfigure the area of productive land; 
•  restricting the ability to maintain the amount of productive land on a property; 
•  inhibiting the introduction of new technologies; 
•  restricting or preventing changes in land use; and 
•  inhibiting a range of normal farm practices such as thinning vegetation, rotating 
(fallowing) parts of the property, clearing around fencelines and managing pest 
animals and weeds. 
Native vegetation and biodiversity regulations have reduced the values of 
properties on which the income-earning potential has fallen because permission to 
clear native vegetation has been refused, or because there is uncertainty about the 
future ability to clear. 
FINDING 6.3 
All else equal, reductions in property income-earning potential, and consequent 
declines in owner equity, mean that landholders restricted from clearing areas of 
native vegetation on their properties are less able to obtain finance or face higher 
interest rates. 
FINDING 6.1 
FINDING 6.2     






Those landholders most severely affected by the regulations have often suffered 
serious personal stress in the face of the resultant marginal viability, or even loss, 
of their property. 
FINDING 6.5 
There are positive impacts for many landholders in retaining selected vegetation 
and biodiversity on their own and surrounding properties. These benefits will be 
greater in areas prone to soil and water degradation. However, this does not mean 
that landholders necessarily will benefit from all of the native vegetation required 
to be retained by current regulations, or that benefits to them will outweigh the 
costs. 
Regional impacts of the regulations appear to have been limited to date, although 
impacts on some smaller communities may have been more serious. Controls on 
broadscale clearing are likely to have more significant impacts on regions with 
significant native vegetation cover. 
The regulations may have imposed costs on forest industries in some jurisdictions, 
especially by creating uncertainty about future rights to harvest native timber 
planted on private land. The regulations also impose costs on some mining and 
infrastructure projects, although often these will be small relative to the size of the 
project. In some cases, native vegetation regulations have added substantially to the 
costs of road construction and maintenance.  
FINDING 6.7 
Government measures to mitigate negative impacts of the regulations on 
landholders have been limited and have not been available to all affected 
landholders. Any payments typically cover only a small portion of the negative 
impacts of the regulations. 
Chapter 7  Assessment of current regimes 
The effectiveness of regimes to protect native vegetation and conserve biodiversity 
would be enhanced if the objectives of the regimes were clearly specified. 
FINDING 6.6 
FINDING 7.1     





Permit systems to regulate clearing of native vegetation:  
•  do not provide on-going incentives for the voluntary management of remnant 
native vegetation; 
•  may encourage the fragmentation of native vegetation holdings; and 
•  affect only those who apply to, or intend to, clear native vegetation. 
FINDING 7.3 
A flexible definition of regrowth — for example, reflecting regional differences and 
objectives — would reduce the disruption to established patterns of agricultural 
production and facilitate improved environmental outcomes. 
Flexible regimes able to accommodate the contribution of regional committees and 
to take account of regional differences are likely to promote better environmental 
outcomes. 
Appropriately-trained extension officers and the placement of departmental staff 
with representative organisations would facilitate landholder understanding of their 
obligations and facilitate the operation of the regimes. 
FINDING 7.6 
Transparency and accountability of the assessment process would be enhanced if 
the agency making the decision is required to make its reasons available. This 
would include a statement of any conditions attached to the clearing permit and the 
reasons why these conditions have been imposed. 
The inclusion of statutory time-frames within legislation would provide an objective 
standard against which the performance of the regulatory agencies can be assessed. 
FINDING 7.8 
Transparency and accountability of the assessment process would be improved if 
the economic and social cost to landholders and the community of rejected clearing 
applications were explicitly considered. 
FINDING 7.4 
FINDING 7.5 
FINDING 7.7     






Access to fair and impartial dispute-resolution processes is important for promoting 
the transparency and accountability of the assessment process. 
FINDING 7.10 
A reduction in the number of legislative instruments in some jurisdictions may 
improve the integration and the consistency of various elements of the jurisdiction’s 
environmental protection regimes. 
FINDING 7.11 
Preparation of a comprehensive regulation impact statement can improve the 
quality and effectiveness of the regulation. 
FINDING 7.12  
Governments should be mindful of the compliance costs imposed on landholders by 
requirements for them to provide information in support of permit applications. 
FINDING 7.13 
Many of the current regimes intended to protect native vegetation and conserve 
biodiversity appear not to utilise the knowledge and experiences of individual 
landholders. 
FINDING 7.14 
It is important that there are mechanisms that enable mapping errors to be 
corrected when better information is available. Landholders themselves can be a 
key source of information.  
FINDING 7.15 
A legislative requirement to monitor the performance of the regimes and to subject 
them to periodic review can help ensure that the best instruments are being used to 
address the underlying problem and provide transparency and accountability. 
Chapter 8  Criteria for policy selection 
Careful identification of the policy problem, the objectives sought, and 
consideration of the context in which a policy option will be applied, are important 
FINDING 8.1     




for choosing the best policy options to promote native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation on private land. 
Chapter 9  Policy options for native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation 
FINDING 9.1 
Many individuals and organisations voluntarily provide conservation services. An 
advantage of relying on these efforts is that they have relatively high levels of 
community acceptance and raise fewer enforcement and equity concerns than 
approaches that compel landholders to undertake conservation. However, while the 
altruistic conservation efforts of individuals and groups can contribute to achieving 
community conservation objectives, they are unlikely to be sufficient on their own to 
achieve significant increases in conservation on a broad scale. 
FINDING 9.2 
Market-based policy approaches to encourage native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation offer several advantages, such as flexibility, the ability to deliver 
outcomes at least cost and incentives for innovation. There is scope for existing 
markets in native vegetation and biodiversity products to contribute to promoting 
conservation objectives.  
FINDING 9.3  
Government policies in areas other than the environment may be inadvertently 
compromising government objectives with respect to native vegetation and 
biodiversity conservation. 
FINDING 9.4 
Accurate and up-to-date information and education are critical for the success of 
any policy option to promote native vegetation and biodiversity conservation 
objectives. Information and education approaches can also be pursued in their own 
right to promote these objectives. In particular, when poor conservation outcomes 
are due to a lack of information about the benefits and costs of conservation, 
specific information and education, tailored to an individual’s or a region’s 
problems, are likely to be most beneficial for achieving change ‘on the ground’. 
Taxes or subsidies that target specific, assessable actions by landholders may be 
efficient instruments for promoting some specific environmental objectives. 
FINDING 9.5     





However, because they necessarily focus on inputs rather than environmental 
outcomes, taxes and subsidies are unlikely to be efficient instruments for promoting 
complex objectives such as biodiversity.  
FINDING 9.6 
Government purchase of environmental services from landholders, on a voluntary 
basis, offers several potential advantages, including:  
•  flexibility and scope for innovation in identifying ways of promoting 
environmental objectives;  
•  a requirement for specification and prioritisation of environmental objectives;  
•  closer alignment between landholders’ incentives and governments’ objectives 
for native vegetation and biodiversity conservation;  
•  greater certainty for, and acceptability amongst, landholders than compulsory 
policy instruments; and 
•  increased transparency of the costs of conservation, relative to some other 
approaches, which can impose some discipline on government and community 
demands for conservation. 
However, different approaches must be developed for particular circumstances and, 
consequently, the approach can be resource-intensive in terms of program design 
and contract monitoring. 
FINDING 9.7 
Imposition of a duty of care may be efficient where actions by individual 
landholders have a direct, observable impact that is well understood by them and 
where there is broad acceptance of the level of responsibility implied by the duty. 
However, imposition of a statutory duty of care on landholders, beyond their ability 
and knowledge to deliver the required duty efficiently, as in the case of provision of 
public-good native vegetation and biodiversity services, is unlikely to be an efficient 
policy instrument.  
Regulations can be efficient where the environmental objective is targeted directly 
and the regulations are broadly accepted and complied with.  
The effectiveness and efficiency of regulation in promoting public-good native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation goals appears limited because: 
•  the problem is too complex, dynamic and geographically heterogeneous for 
jurisdiction-wide rules that necessarily focus on achievement of proxy targets;  
FINDING 9.8     




•  potentially lower-cost, innovative solutions to environmental problems are 
precluded; and  
•  achievement of environmental goals may be undermined if landholders regard 
regulations as imposing an unfair burden on them and governments neither 
compensate for regulatory takings, nor assume responsibility for effective 
management of protected remnants on private land. 
Where environmental values of land are high relative to alternative uses, and public 
management of the land would be more cost-effective than private stewardship, 
government purchase of entire properties (or part thereof) may be efficient. 
However, it is likely that, for a majority of agricultural land, it will be more efficient 
to leave land in private ownership and encourage joint production of environmental 
services and commercial outputs. 
FINDING 9.9     
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1 Introduction   
In this chapter, the terms of reference are summarised and the background to, and 
scope of, the inquiry are briefly discussed. The Commission’s approach to, and 
conduct of, the inquiry are also outlined.  
1.1  About this inquiry 
The Productivity Commission has been asked to undertake an inquiry into the 
impacts of native vegetation and biodiversity regulations and to report within twelve 
months, that is, by 14 April 2004. 
The terms of reference ask the Commission to report on the impacts on:  
… farming practices, productivity, sustainability, property values and returns, 
landholders’ investment patterns and the attitude of finance providers, and on other 
economic activities such as infrastructure development and mineral exploration, and 
flow on effects to regional communities, arising from the regulation of native 
vegetation clearance and/or biodiversity conservation. 
In addition, the Commission is to assess the overall effectiveness and efficiency of 
the regulations in reducing the costs of resource degradation, and to recommend 
how adverse impacts of these regimes could be minimised, while achieving desired 
environmental outcomes. The terms of reference are reprinted in full at the 
beginning of this report. 
1.2  Background to the inquiry 
In recent years, Australian governments have introduced a number of measures 
aimed at achieving more sustainable management of Australia’s native vegetation 
and biodiversity resources. The impetus for these changes came, in part, from a 
commitment by all Australian governments, through the Natural Heritage Trust, to 
reverse the long-term decline in the quality and extent of Australia’s native 
vegetation cover (NRMMC 2001). (Box 1.1 summarises National Land and Water 
Resources Audit findings relating to native vegetation and biodiversity.) 
International obligations have also played a part. For example, Australia is a 
signatory to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (1992).     






Box 1.1  Australian Native Vegetation Assessment 2001: selected 
findings 
Since European settlement, approximately 13% of Australia has been cleared of native 
vegetation — mostly in the higher rainfall areas of the south-east and far south-west of the 
continent. The condition of the remaining vegetation varies. 
Around 32% of native vegetation in the intensively used areas (mainly the agricultural and 
urban zones) is cleared or highly modified. Across this region approximately 68% (or 
1 968 000 km
2) of native vegetation remains.  
The most affected of the major vegetation groups are: heath; low closed forests and closed 
shrublands; mallee woodlands and shrublands; eucalypt tall open forest; eucalypt 
woodlands; and rainforests and vine thickets. Much of the remaining native vegetation in the 
intensively used areas is fragmented and, in many areas, occurs as isolated trees on narrow 
strips along old stock routes and rail reserves.  
25 of Australia’s 245 river basins and 42 of Australia’s 354 biogeographic subregions have 
less than 30% native vegetation remaining.  
Key impacts on native vegetation (over the past 200 years) include: clearing for broadacre 
agriculture and grazing on improved pastures; logging, harvesting or disturbing forest 
species; grazing native pastures; changing fire regimes; weeds and feral species, or exotic 
plants; filling of wetlands in urban areas and clearing for transport corridors.  
Source: NLWRA (2002a). 
 
 
Several other inter-governmental initiatives have also addressed native vegetation 
management and biodiversity conservation issues, including the National Strategy 
for Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESDSC 1992), the National Strategy for 
the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity (DEST 1996) and the National 
Framework for the Management and Monitoring of Australia’s Native Vegetation 
(NRMMC 2001).  
One outcome of these initiatives has been the introduction of legislation to regulate 
native vegetation clearance and to require biodiversity conservation and 
management on non-public land. ‘Private’ land comprises about 60  per  cent of 
Australia’s land mass — about two-thirds of private land is Crown leasehold and 
the remaining one-third, or around 21  per  cent of Australia’s total land area, is 
freehold (table 1.1). Fourteen per cent of Australia’s land belongs to Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander communities.  
The Australian Government introduced the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 and, during the past five years, nearly all State 
and Territory governments have announced or introduced new, or significantly 
modified, regimes to regulate the removal of native vegetation and/or the 
management of biodiversity on private leasehold and freehold land.      
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These regulatory regimes have resulted in changes to: 
•  the circumstances in which regulatory approval is required for the removal, 
destruction or lopping of native vegetation; 
•  regulatory criteria by which applications to remove or modify native vegetation 
are assessed; and  
•  penalties for non-compliance with regulations.  
Table 1.1  Land tenure in Australia 
Tenure category  Thousand square kilometres  %
Public 1767.9  23
Private  
 Crown  leasehold  3234.6  42
 freehold  1585.0  21
Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander  1094.8  14
Total 7682.3  100
Source: Geoscience Australia (2003). 
1.3  Scope of the inquiry 
While the scope of the inquiry is broad, the terms of reference and, indeed, time 
constraints, impose some boundaries: 
•  the Commission is required to assess legislation and regulations (in Australian, 
State and Territory Government jurisdictions), the primary purpose of which 
includes the regulation of native vegetation clearance and/or the conservation of 
biodiversity. While there is an array of legislation and regulation that has the 
potential to influence the way native vegetation and biodiversity is managed, in 
most jurisdictions there are one or two Acts that dominate and which are the 
focus of this inquiry. Nonetheless, where relevant, other legislation and 
regulations that affect how landholders manage native vegetation on their 
properties are also considered; 
•  the focus of the inquiry is on the impacts of the regulatory regimes under review 
on landholders (including leaseholders), farming and other activities such as 
mineral exploration and infrastructure development. The terms of reference do 
not extend explicitly to management of public lands. However, the 
Commission’s attention has been drawn to instances where management of 
native vegetation and biodiversity on public lands may have significant 
implications for private landholders and primary production; and     





•  the Commission has not been asked to assess the benefits of retaining native 
vegetation and/or biodiversity conservation as such. 
The focus of the inquiry on the impacts of existing regulatory regimes on 
landholders has elicited criticism and comment from a number of participants. For 
example, Tamborine Mountain Landcare, Queensland, expressed concern that:  
… a focus on economic impacts of native vegetation and biodiversity regulations will 
concentrate on short term economic impacts and ignore the long term adverse 
economic and environmental effects which could result from land degradation if native 
vegetation and biodiversity are not protected. (sub. 5, p. 1) 
The Australian Conservation Foundation stressed:  
It’s very important … to look at the costs and the benefits to the private and the public 
good, in short, the net effect of the policy approaches that are being applied  … 
(trans., p. 560) 
In similar vein, WWF Australia observed: 
We’d be encouraging the inquiry to look at net costs; so not only direct costs imposed 
on land-holders by regulation, but also looking at the costs to downstream users and the 
environment from clearing and other activities ... (trans., p. 842) 
The Commission appreciates that considering only the costs imposed on 
landholders by environmental policies would not provide a sound basis for decision-
making. However, it should be emphasised that in this inquiry:  
•  both positive and negative impacts of regulatory regimes on landholders and 
regional communities are considered; and  
•  although environmental benefits accruing to the community at large are not 
being assessed, this does not imply that the community-wide benefits from 
native vegetation management and biodiversity conservation are insignificant. 
Indeed, benefits may be very large. That said, the benefits are likely to be 
context specific and, in the absence of agreed measures, difficult to quantify.  
The Commission’s task is to assess and compare the effectiveness of current and 
alternative approaches in promoting the community’s environmental goals and thus 
to establish whether desired environmental goals can be achieved at less cost to 
landholders and/or society overall than current regulatory arrangements.      
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1.4  The Commission’s approach 
The Commission’s approach to this inquiry has been guided by the terms of 
reference and the operating principles and general policy guidelines contained in the 
Productivity Commission Act 1998 (box 1.2).  
 
Box 1.2  Productivity Commission: operating principles and general 
policy guidelines 
In undertaking its work, the Commission follows three fundamental operating 
principles: 
•  the provision of independent analysis and advice; 
•  the use of processes that are open and public; and 
•  to have over-arching concern for the community as a whole, rather than just the 
interests of any particular industry or group.  
In conducting inquiries, the Commission facilitates transparency and consultation by 
seeking submissions from interested parties, holding public hearings and releasing a 
draft report to facilitate further comment and debate.  
Broad policy guidelines outlining how the Commission is to undertake its functions, 
including inquiries, are contained in the Commission’s founding legislation, the 
Productivity Commission Act 1998. In brief, they require the Commission to: 
•  improve the productivity and economic performance of the economy; 
•  reduce unnecessary regulation; 
•  encourage the development of efficient and internationally competitive Australian 
industries;  
•  facilitate adjustment to structural change; 
•  recognise the interests of the community generally and all those likely to be affected 
by its proposals; 
•  promote regional employment and development; 
•  have regard to Australia’s international commitments and the trade policies of other 
countries; and 
•  ensure Australian industry develops in ecologically sustainable ways. 
 
 
These principles and guidelines establish a framework for assessing current 
regulatory arrangements and possible alternatives, including non-regulatory 
approaches.1 In particular, the Commission is required to have an over-arching 
                                              
1  For the purposes of this inquiry, the word regulation refers to compulsory ‘command and 
control’ instruments.      





concern for the community as a whole and not just the interests of any particular 
industry or group. Peter Wren took issue with this approach: 
Such fundamental bias is the reason why private landowners of native vegetation have 
been made to wear the unfair burden of providing public good for the community at 
their (private landowners’) private cost and hardship. (sub. 119, p. 1) 
However, this principle should be read in conjunction with other guiding principles, 
and definitely should not be interpreted as advocating subjugation of the interests of 
a minority for the benefit of the majority. In essence, the Commission’s task is to 
explore the most efficient policies for promoting overall community well-being and, 
where necessary, to identify ways of facilitating adjustment to resultant structural 
change. Where policies promote whole-of-community well-being (that is, increase 
the size of the ‘pie’), there will be at least the potential to ensure that each member 
of the community is made better off or at least left no worse off.  
It should also be noted that although in public inquiries the Commission necessarily 
relies heavily on the evidence provided by participants, a range of alternative 
information sources, in addition to economic analysis, is used to ensure thorough 
assessment of the issues. 
Although this inquiry is not a legislative review under the requirements of the 
Competition Principles Agreement (CPA),2 the principles embodied in that 
agreement, and the guidelines for good regulation that flow from it, provide some 
guidance for assessing the regulatory regimes under review and, indeed, alternative 
approaches. For example, before introducing regulation that affects business or 
restricts competition, Australian Government departments are required to submit 
Regulation Impact Statements (RISs). The issues that RISs must address are set out 
in box 1.3. RISs are also required, where appropriate, to include an assessment of 
impacts on ecologically sustainable development.  
The specific approach taken by the Commission in this inquiry has been to: 
•  examine the nature of the environmental problems being addressed and the 
rationale for government intervention (chapter 2); 
•  describe current regulatory arrangements, examine their implementation and 
operation, and assess their efficiency and effectiveness in promoting 
environmental goals (appendixes B–J and chapters 3–5); 
                                              
2  In 1995, the CPA was signed by the Australian Government, States and Territories as part of the 
National Competition Policy reform package. The CPA, in essence, sets out the principles to be 
followed by governments in relation to the agreed competition policy reforms.     
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•  describe and assess the impacts of existing regulatory regimes on landholders, 
other industries and local communities, including opportunity costs and direct 
compliance costs as well as private benefits (appendixes B–K and chapter 6);  
•  provide an overall assessment of the performance of current arrangements and 
the key factors underlying this performance (chapter 7); 
•  consider the effectiveness and suitability of other approaches, including 
encouraging increased private conservation efforts and alternative, non-
regulatory, forms of government intervention (chapters 8 and 9); and  
•  develop recommendations designed to reduce negative impacts on landholders 
and society overall while maintaining (possibly enhancing) environmental 
outcomes (chapter 10). 
Appendixes B–J describe in detail principal legislation by jurisdiction, and its 
development and operation.  
 
Box 1.3  Regulation Impact Statements — adequacy criteria  
RISs are required to set out: 
•  the problems or issues that give rise to the need for action; 
•  the desired objectives of the intervention; 
•  assessments of viable alternative options (regulatory and non-regulatory); 
•  regulatory impacts (costs and benefits on consumers, business, governments and 
the community); 
•  the extent of consultation;  
•  a recommended or preferred option; and  
•  a strategy to implement, monitor, enforce and review the regulation. 
Source: ORR (1998). 
 
 
1.5  Conduct of the inquiry 
Dr Neil Byron is the Presiding Commissioner for this inquiry. Dr Brian Fisher and 
Professor Warren Musgrave have both been appointed as Associate Commissioners 
specifically for the inquiry. 
As required by the terms of reference, and in line with normal Commission inquiry 
procedures, the Commission has encouraged and sought maximum public 
participation. Soon after receipt of the terms of reference, advertisements were     





placed in national, capital city and national rural newspapers. The first circular was 
sent to almost 2000 individuals and organisations considered likely to have an 
interest in the inquiry, including all rural councils. In addition, the first circular was 
sent electronically to more than 900 rural media outlets and organisations. An issues 
paper was released in May 2003 to assist participants prepare their initial 
submissions. 
The Commission held informal discussions with organisations, government 
agencies and departments and individuals to seek information and canvass a wide 
range of views. Commissioners and staff made several regional field trips. Two 
hundred and twenty-one submissions were received in response to the issues paper. 
Initial public hearings were held in Brisbane, Cairns, Canberra, Perth, Adelaide, 
Melbourne, Hobart, Sydney, and Moree, with 76 participants making presentations.  
One hundred and three submissions were received in response to the draft report. (A 
few submissions were received just prior to completion of the report. Every effort 
was made to incorporate them within the limited time available.) Seventy-four 
participants made presentations at a second round of public hearings held in 
Mackay, Toowoomba, Sydney, Dubbo, Albury, Perth, Geraldton, Hobart and 
Melbourne in February 2004. Details of places, individuals and organisations 
visited, submissions and participants at hearings are provided in appendix A.  
All non-confidential parts of submissions and transcripts of public hearings were 
made available on the Internet, at Commission and State libraries, and from 
Photobition Digital Imaging Centre. 
The Commission engaged a consultant to provide data for its assessment of the 
impacts of restrictions on broadscale clearing of remnant native vegetation on 
Murweh Shire. Two independent commentators were asked to assess the 
Commission’s case studies and their reports were made available on the 
Commission’s website, along with the consultant’s reports. A workshop was held 
on 27 February 2004 to discuss the Commission’s quantitative analysis. A list of 
workshop participants is also provided in appendix A.  
The Commission thanks participants for their participation in meetings with the 
Commissioners and Commission staff, their participation in public hearings and for 
their submissions.     




2  Analytical framework  
Several preliminary issues addressed in this chapter underpin the Commission’s 
assessment of the impacts and effectiveness of current regulations and other options 
for bringing about desired environmental outcomes. Section 2.1 explores potential 
benefits from, and the beneficiaries of, native vegetation and biodiversity. 
Section 2.2 discusses the notion of socially-optimal levels of native vegetation and 
biodiversity.  
Possible reasons for private under-provision of environmental services are outlined 
in section 2.3. Section 2.4 considers a potential role for government intervention, 
and includes a discussion of the rationale for increased conservation effort on 
private land. Finally, in section 2.5, some conceptual issues relevant to apportioning 
costs of conservation effort are explored. 
2.1  Benefits of native vegetation and biodiversity  
This inquiry is not asked to assess the benefits of native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation as such — in other words, the Commission has not been asked to 
conduct a full cost-benefit analysis of current regulatory arrangements. Nonetheless, 
the nature and causes of the environmental problem policy-makers are seeking to 
rectify should be understood before assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of 
existing regulatory regimes in promoting environmental objectives (chapters 5–7) 
and, indeed, whether there may be less costly approaches (chapters 8–9). 
As noted in chapter  1, the Commission is required to assess legislation (in 
Australian Government, State and Territory jurisdictions), the ‘primary purpose of 
which is the regulation of native vegetation clearance and/or the conservation of 
biodiversity’ (box 2.1).     
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Box 2.1  Defining native vegetation and biodiversity 
Native vegetation is defined differently in different jurisdictions (box 3.2) but typically is 
defined to include naturally occurring local vegetation (in some cases defined as 
vegetation that existed before a certain date), including in some jurisdictions native 
grasses and aquatic vegetation. The definition of terms such as ‘remnant’, ‘regrowth’, 
and ‘thickening’ is more contentious (see appendixes B–J). 
The United Nations has defined biodiversity as:  
… the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, 
marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; 
this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems. (United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 2, 1992) 
An almost identical definition is used in the Australian Government’s Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.  
 
 
Potential benefits of native vegetation and biodiversity that have been suggested in 
the National Framework for the Management and Monitoring of Australia’s Native 
Vegetation (NRMMC 2001) and by various commentators are outlined in box 2.2.  
 
Box 2.2  Potential benefits of native vegetation and biodiversity 
Native vegetation 
•  Fodder; food; seeds; wildflowers and plants; medicines; timber, including for fencing 
and firewood; shade; shelter; honey production; pollination and pest control services 
•  Tourism, recreation and visual amenity 
•  Habitat for native fauna  
•  Soil and water protection (eg prevention of salinity, soil erosion or acidification) 
•  Biodiversity  
•  Carbon sinks and/or storage 
•  Climate  
•  ‘Existence’ and ‘option’ values 
Biodiversity 
•  Health of ecosystems — their ability to maintain and regulate atmospheric quality, 
climate, fresh water, marine productivity, soil formation, cycling of nutrients and 
waste disposal 
•  Resilience of ecosystems — their ability to respond to and recover from external 
shocks such as drought, flood, and climate change 
•  Cultural values 
Sources: Gillespie (2000); NRMMC (2001). 
 
     




The descriptor ‘potential’ is used advisedly because: 
•  not all native vegetation in all locations will deliver all or even some of these 
benefits to the same degree; and  
•  in some cases, the link between native vegetation and the potential benefit is 
reasonably straightforward (for example, the provision of shade, fodder), though, 
as discussed below, not always easily measurable (for example, visual amenity). 
In other cases, such as the link between native vegetation and biodiversity and 
climate, the nature of the connection is very complex and not fully understood. 
For example, what levels and/or types of native vegetation and biodiversity are 
required to deliver healthy genetic, species and ecosystem diversity? Perrings 
et al. (1992, p. 201) observe:  
… the problem of biodiversity conservation … requires neither the preservation of all 
species, nor the maintenance of the environmental status quo. Indeed, the rationale for 
focusing on biodiversity conservation is precisely for the creative evolution of 
ecosystems subject to stress from economic activity.  
  In the absence of a clear understanding of biodiversity functions, in practice, 
native vegetation and biodiversity policies often seek to preserve all current 
species or all existing native vegetation or even to restore native vegetation to 
levels thought to have existed in the past. Such approaches, which seek to 
preserve a ‘snapshot’, are likely to fail because ecosystems are dynamic and will 
change over time. Hence, a key issue to be resolved for policy intervention 
designed to promote biodiversity, is sensibly defining what that means in 
practice. 
It is also feasible that some of the listed benefits could be provided from sources 
other than native vegetation, possibly more efficiently and effectively. For example, 
shelter and shade, timber and firewood, carbon sequestration, and prevention of soil 
erosion, could be provided by non-native vegetation. Prevention of soil erosion and 
degradation may also be facilitated via application of low-impact farming 
techniques such as minimum-till cultivation. For example, Pannell (2003) suggests 
that in future, salinity in Western Australia may be prevented efficiently by planting 
deep-rooted, perennial crops. Graham Davies (sub. 9) made a similar point.   
Who benefits? 
Some of the potential benefits generated by native vegetation are so-called private 
goods — that is, the benefits are captured by property owners or leaseholders. 
Native vegetation can provide a range of inputs to the production process (for 
example, fodder for stock, timber for fencing, reduced soil erosion), which improve 
agricultural output yields or product quality, as well as services (for example,     
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firewood and recreation areas) directly consumed by landholders. In some cases, 
native vegetation may be harvested by landholders as a commercial crop in its own 
right (including timber, seeds, oils, wildflowers).  
Some benefits, such as visual amenity, prevention of soil and water degradation, 
habitat for fauna that provide pest control and pollination services, may accrue to a 
landholder but are also likely to extend to neighbours and people residing in the 
region; visual amenity and recreation benefits may accrue as well to visitors to the 
area. Benefits of protection of habitat, carbon sequestration and biodiversity will 
extend still more widely to all in the community, possibly globally. Many eco-
system services and non-use or ‘existence’ benefits, almost by definition, accrue to 
those who are ‘off-site’.  
As discussed below, it is precisely because individual landholders (or their children) 
cannot capture all of the benefits of native vegetation and biodiversity — that is, 
because of the ‘public good’ characteristics of some benefits or because of the 
inherent uncertainty that attaches to them — that they will tend to provide less than 
is considered desirable from the wider community’s perspective (box 2.3).  
 
Box 2.3  Externalities and public goods 
Externalities refer to situations where the actions of an individual affect the welfare of 
one or more other individuals and where those effects are not the result of a market 
transaction or bargain between the parties. These ‘spillover’ effects may be positive or 
negative. If they have a positive effect, it may be desirable to encourage more. If the 
impact is negative, social welfare may be improved by a reduction in the harmful 
activity. Externalities arise because of the infeasibility of payments to encourage 
positive spillover effects or to discourage negative spillovers. Where external effects 
are confined to a relatively small area or a small number of individuals, they can be 
‘internalised’ in a variety of ways without government intervention. For example, 
neighbours can negotiate, local communities can form ‘clubs’, firms can integrate. 
Where very large numbers of people are affected by externalities, private solutions 
may not be feasible. The high costs of negotiating solutions and the problem of ‘free-
riding’ (that is, some people not paying their share), are two possible reasons.  
Public goods may be considered a special type of externality where equal amounts are 
available for consumption by everybody in the community simultaneously (it may be 
valued differently by different individuals). Because consumption of the public good (or 
bad) is ‘non-rivalrous’ (consumption by one person does not affect the amount 
available to others), and ‘non-excludable’ (people cannot be prevented from 
consuming the good (or bad)), private provision is likely to fall short of the social 
optimum because payments for services cannot be enforced.  
 
     




Put another way, landholders acting in their own interests (individually or as a 
group) may cause more environmental degradation, or provide less environmental 
enhancement, than society deems appropriate. 
Nonetheless, with many benefits accruing to landholders, it is reasonable to expect 
that they will provide native vegetation (and possibly biodiversity) to the point that 
the extra benefits to them of providing more, equal the additional costs incurred. 
This has implications for estimating the impacts of regulatory intervention to 
require native vegetation retention on private land (chapter  6) and, as discussed 
below and in chapters 8 and 9, for determining the extent and type of intervention 
that may be warranted and who should pay for it. 
2.2  ‘Optimal’ provision of native vegetation and 
biodiversity 
As discussed in chapter 1, several participants have criticised what they regard as 
the narrow focus of the inquiry on the impacts of current regulatory regimes on 
landholders. This focus, they suggest, may obscure the fact that the benefits of 
conserving native vegetation and biodiversity are very large, warranting much 
greater conservation effort (for example, Australian Conservation Foundation, 
sub. 146, Wilderness Society, sub. 89). Senator Andrew Bartlett observed: ‘Urgent 
action is required to prevent further degradation of our natural resource base and 
natural heritage’ (sub. 168, p. 3). 
Rising incomes, advances in knowledge and developments in social attitudes have 
contributed to changes in the way the Australian community (including many 
landholders) views the environment. This has resulted in an increase in the social 
valuation of native vegetation and biodiversity for its own sake and growing 
concerns with a range of environmental impacts of land and water use, including 
salinisation of land and water, deterioration in river-habitats for native fish and 
birds, and reductions in the attractiveness of streams and landscapes for recreation 
and aesthetic purposes. As Gillespie (2000) notes, increasing population will also 
increase the social valuation of environmental public goods.  
However, that total benefits may be large does not automatically mean more 
environmental services are required. What is required for policy purposes is a 
comparison of the extra benefits generated and the additional costs of supplying 
extra environmental services, to ascertain if more services will promote community 
welfare. Box 2.4 sets out the problem in a simple diagrammatic framework.     
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Box 2.4 Socially-optimal  provision of native vegetation 
Demand and supply for native vegetation are stylised in figure 2.1. The quantity of 
vegetation is measured on the horizontal axis, the value of benefits and costs on the 












The Snv curve plots the incremental (efficient) costs of supplying native vegetation — 
these costs include the opportunity costs of taking land out of alternative production, 
plus the costs of labour and other inputs required to maintain vegetation, such as 
fencing and weed and pest control. Its upward slope reflects the relative scarcity of 
factors of production, especially land. Additional amounts of native vegetation can only 
be provided at increasing marginal cost. The Dnv curve represents the willingness to 
pay, or the demand, for the services from native vegetation — it sums the community 
valuation of these benefits. Its downward slope reflects the general preference of 
individuals to consume a bundle of goods and services — as they consume more of 
one item (in this case native vegetation) relative to others, they value it less at the 
margin because it becomes relatively more abundant, even though total benefits 
(measured by the area under the demand curve) may be very large.  
Welfare maximisation (or economic efficiency) requires that native vegetation is 
supplied to the point where the additional costs of supplying it equal the additional 
benefits that it produces. Provided that the marginal value of benefits falls as 
consumption increases, an efficient equilibrium exists that balances marginal costs and 
marginal benefits (QNVO). The supply of native vegetation beyond this level will cost 
more than the additional benefits it generates; a lower level (such as QNVP) implies 
that net benefits are forgone (equal to the shaded area).  
A focus of debate is the valuation of these benefits, which sets the position of the 
demand schedule relative to the costs of supply and, hence, influences the optimal 
level of provision of services from native vegetation. In addition, benefits and costs 
(and hence the optimal level of provision) change over time, influenced by a range of 
factors including changes in tastes, incomes and market conditions.  
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These additional or ‘marginal’ costs include the net value of output forgone (that is, 
the net loss of economic surplus) (chapter 6), as well as the direct costs of managing 
native vegetation in a manner that delivers appropriate environmental benefits (such 
as the costs of weed and pest control, fire management and fencing). 
Guy Fitzhardinge criticised the use of an economic framework to analyse 
environmental costs and benefits, in large part because of ‘the failure to know the 
true costs or benefits of various actions’ (sub. DR225, p. 1). While the Commission 
agrees that quantifying costs and benefits is a serious challenge for good policy 
(discussed below), the point made here simply is that there is a cost-benefit trade-
off. The economic framework presented in figure 2.1 (box 2.4) is ‘value-free’ in the 
sense that it does not impose values on the benefits from consuming or the costs of 
producing environmental services. It simply provides a framework for comparing 
expected costs and benefits as they are valued by the community. Moreover, the use 
of monetary values for comparative purposes does not imply that only those 
environmental services with a market value are taken into account — in principle, 
benefits should include all use and non-use values determined in markets or in other 
ways. 
Unless the value of additional environmental services always exceeds the marginal 
value of other goods or services (including, for example, food),1 there will be an 
‘optimal’ trade-off between the costs and benefits of environmental services and an 
optimal level of environmental outputs (and, by implication, an optimal level of 
environmental degradation). The issues are how much private provision falls short 
of this optimum and whether there is a role for government to make up any gap. 
As mentioned above, in practice, a major difficulty in assessing the case for 
intervention is identifying the relative costs and benefits. Where goods are traded in 
markets, the price is observable.2 Generally speaking, market prices together with 
information about costs of production will signal whether more or less of a good 
will enhance community welfare.  
The costs of providing environmental services usually are amenable to market 
valuation. For the benefits of environmental services, however, only some of which 
typically have a commercial value and where, in some cases, even the nature of the 
benefit is uncertain, other approaches are required.  
                                              
1  Production and consumption of other goods may be feasible to the extent that their production is 
complementary with provision of environmental benefits. This is discussed further below.  
2  However, even in commercial markets usually not much is known about cost and demand 
schedules; that is, total costs and benefits.     
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There are various non-market methods of valuing environmental benefits, including 
indirect valuation methods such as how much individuals pay to travel to national 
parks, observed differences in property prices that may reflect valuation of the 
environment, replacement costs (that is, the amount paid to remedy damage), and 
contingent valuation methods. Each approach has strengths and weaknesses (see, 
for example, Heal 2000 and Gillespie 2000). For example, contingent valuation 
methods ask respondents to state how much they would be willing to pay for 
conservation, but there may only be a negligible, if not zero, probability that they 
will have to pay the amount they bid, which may lead to inflated valuations. 
Several participants have pointed to the costs of environmental degradation caused 
by broadscale land-clearing to highlight the magnitude of the benefits of native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation. The Wildflower Society of Western 
Australia and the Western Australian Government (subs 33 and 151 respectively) 
observed that there were significant costs arising from salinisation of waterways and 
dryland salinity in that State attributable to land clearing, in particular, the costs of 
forgone agricultural production and damage to regional infrastructure such as roads 
and railways. The Environment Centre Northern Territory (sub. 147) cited estimates 
that soil erosion in South Australia cost that State up to $23 million each year.  
However, the costs of environmental degradation caused by past practice generally 
do not measure the benefits from conservation effort today. The critical question is 
what amount the community would be willing to pay to remedy past damage or to 
prevent impacts in future. 
The theoretical and practical limitations of techniques for valuing non-market 
environmental benefits have meant that the political process is often relied upon to 
infer the community’s demand for environmental services, at least at a very broad 
level.3 However, that a majority may favour certain policies does not necessarily 
imply that the benefits of that policy exceed the costs, particularly if it is the 
minority that is being required to pay. In other words, majority voting does not 
necessarily elicit relative willingness to pay.  
Difficulties in evaluating benefits have led to policy interventions being guided by 
‘safe minimum standards’ (such as a native vegetation cover target or threshold) or 
across-the-board rules such as a ‘net gain’ or ‘no net loss’ of native vegetation. Use 
of these standards and rules also may reflect a concern that even if individual 
valuations of native vegetation could be correctly ascertained, the sum of all 
                                              
3 As discussed in later chapters, many current controls over native vegetation have been 
introduced as regulations within planning legislation. This tends to reduce the opportunity for 
public scrutiny, and obscures the costs and benefits.      




individuals’ willingness to pay would not reflect the true social value of native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation, for two main reasons:  
•  individuals may not understand the linkages between biodiversity and ecological 
services, and/or they may underestimate the risks of certain actions today on the 
future provision of those services; and  
•  current generations may be ‘selfish’ and discount the impact of their actions on 
future generations excessively.  
In short, it is sometimes argued that today’s population may underestimate what is 
good for it and future generations. The proposed solution then is to impose rules or 
valuations that place a greater value on conservation actions implemented today 
than the value placed on them by the existing population — for example, by 
applying the precautionary principle (box 2.5).  
Kinrade (1995) argues that intergenerational equity considerations and the 
precautionary principle should override economic notions of benefits and costs and 
the notion of an optimal trade-off between those benefits and costs. A somewhat 
similar view was put by the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) 
(trans., pp. 1639–43  and  sub. DR302).  However, that there will be costs and 
benefits associated with conservation effort, which have an implicit monetary value, 
is an inescapable matter of fact. Kinrade, in effect, seems to be arguing that the 
benefits schedule never intersects the cost curve, implying that the value, and 
optimal level of provision, of the environmental good is infinite (and the optimal 
level of the environmental ‘bad’ is zero). 
As already noted, the Commission has not been asked to measure benefits of native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation. Nor is it the Commission’s place to 
suggest where the optimal level of provision may lie. Crucially, however, a major 
requirement for a policy intervention to be efficient is that it recognises and 
explicitly identifies, or has a process in place for revealing and making transparent, 
the cost-benefit trade-offs.  
In its 1999 report Implementation of Ecologically Sustainable Development by 
Commonwealth Departments and Agencies, the Commission observed that ‘in some 
cases, existing tools for policy-making are inadequate in integrating economic, 
environmental and social considerations in decision-making’ (PC 1999,  p. xxiii). 
The need for policies to integrate these considerations has been a key factor in the 
Commission’s assessment of the various policy options (chapters 5 and 7–9).  
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Box 2.5  The precautionary principle 
There are various definitions of the precautionary principle ranging from the ‘strong’ 
version — do not allow a substance to be emitted or a polluting activity to be 
undertaken unless you have proof that it will do no harm to the environment — to the 
weaker version adopted in the ‘Rio Declaration’:  
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation. (Ministerial Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development 1992, Principle 15) 
Australian Governments adopted a similar version in the Intergovernmental Agreement 
on the Environment 1992. However, in the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999, the latter reference to cost-effectiveness in the definition of the 
principle is omitted:  
… lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing a measure to 
prevent degradation of the environment where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
environmental damage. (s. 391) 
The key difference between the strong and weak versions is that the former places the 
onus on the proponent of the activity to prove that it will not cause harm. This implies 
that the public is not prepared to bear any environmental risk. Whether not taking any 
environmental risks increases other risks (eg increasing poverty or famine) is another 
matter.  
The weaker version opens the way for preventative action in the absence of full 
knowledge of potential harm but does not necessarily proscribe the activity. It is 
designed to reduce significantly, but not necessarily eradicate, the environmental risk 
borne by the community. Morris describes it as ‘taking a hyper-cautious approach to 
change’ (2000, p. 13).  
That governments have adopted the weaker version may reflect recognition of the 
unworkability of the strong version because it is likely to prevent many productivity-
enhancing developments. Nevertheless, the weaker version gives environmental 
regulators a great deal of discretion to intervene. Application of the principle may result 
in policy rules that require preservation of species implicitly at any cost, or which place 
environmental concerns above all others once specified trigger points are reached.  
Source: Morris (2000).  
 
 
2.3  Private provision of native vegetation and 
biodiversity  
Economists assume that individuals generally behave in a way that maximises their 
utility or well-being; firms are assumed to maximise their profits. Owners of family     




farms probably pursue both profits and well-being — their properties are income-
generating businesses on the one hand and a source of lifestyle benefits on the other.  
Whatever landholders seek to maximise, private provision of native vegetation and 
biodiversity, and the range of environmental services they deliver, is likely to be 
significantly greater than zero because, as discussed above, many production and 
consumption benefits from environmental services accrue to landholders. 
Nonetheless, this level is likely to fall short of the level society deems appropriate. 
This may occur for a number of reasons, which can be broadly categorised as: 
•  market distortions or regulations that directly or indirectly discourage private 
conservation effort; 
•  the absence of markets for many environmental services (a consequence of 
externalities and public goods); 
•  ignorance of the benefits to themselves of environmental services; and 
•  differences in risk preferences and concern for future generations. 
The history of European settlement in Australia suggests that several of these 
factors may have contributed to excessive environmental degradation in rural areas 
(box 2.6). The evidence also suggests that improved knowledge of environmental 
linkages has driven significant changes in agricultural practices in recent decades.  
 
Box 2.6  Agriculture since European settlement  
The history of agriculture in Australia is one of transition from extensive, exploitative 
grazing to intensive cropping and animal husbandry. In the pastoral era, spanning the 
three decades to 1850 (Davidson 1981), squatters with insecure land tenure often 
over-grazed the native vegetation and practised burning to encourage regrowth on 
their unfenced expanses of land (Barr and Cary 1992). Yet there were strong social 
pressures even then for spreading the ownership of land more widely.  
Land Acts passed in all colonies in the 1860s made it possible for a settler to establish 
on between 40 and 640 acres of Crown land, even if the land were already occupied 
by a squatter (Davidson 1981). The size of the permitted holdings, together with 
conditions requiring that selectors live on their land, invest certain sums in fencing and 
cultivate a certain proportion of their land, made it hard for farmers to develop their land 
profitably. Many of the selectors had only a short period as farmers.  
 (Continued next page) 
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Box 2.6  (continued) 
The conflict between the ideal of a nation of robust, independent small farmers and the 
reality that enduring economic viability requires a combination of land, capital and 
knowledge, is a theme throughout the history of Australian farming. Large public 
investments in closer settlement (much of which occurred in irrigation areas), including 
settling ex-servicemen in farming after both world wars, had strong social support, but 
have not generally been judged a success in economic terms (Pike 1929; Rural 
Reconstruction Commission 1944; Davidson 1981). 
The early Europeans who settled in Australia did not understand the land to which they 
had come. The settlers:  
... applied English farming methods, which had been developed in a land of cool wet 
summers, to a land where summers were dry, hot and long. Farming methods had to be 
relearned in the brown land. (Barr and Cary 1992, p. 1) 
Agriculture-related environmental problems were encountered in the first century of 
settlement, including: 
•  in an effort to reduce soil loss, unlicensed tree clearing along the Hawkesbury River 
was prohibited by Governor King in 1803 (Munchenberg 2003); 
•  the explorer Strzelecki warned of land degradation in the 1840s (Munchenberg 
2003); and 
•  introduced species such as the blackberry, the prickly pear and, especially, the wild 
European rabbit — introduced to the Geelong area for sport in 1859 (Barr and Cary 
1992) — were responsible for much land degradation, including soil erosion and 
damage to native trees and grasses. 
Nonetheless, land degradation was not just a post-European settlement phenomenon. 
According to Chartres ‘some features such as bare, naturally eroded surfaces were 
commonplace before European settlement according to accounts of early explorers 
such as Sturt’ (1987, p. 9).  
In February 1829, the water of the Darling River was too salty for Sturt and his horses 
and bullocks to drink (Sturt 1963). That was not because of agricultural practices, but 
because the Murray-Darling Basin is a naturally saline environment.  
Neither was environmental degradation solely the result of private actions. Closer 
settlement and irrigation policies of successive governments have not been particularly 
successful in economic or environmental terms. Government-imposed requirements to 
clear stipulated areas of native vegetation, or to maintain certain stock levels, have 
often been conditions in allocating freehold and leasehold land for farming 
(NLWRA 2001b; Davidson 1981; PC 2002a). Graham Davies (sub. 9) commented that 
farmers in Western Australia were advised by government officers to grow shallow-
rooted annual crops and pastures, rather than perennial native vegetation, which had 
the unintended effect of promoting rising water tables and salinity. Tax incentives and 
cheap government loans made land clearing more financially attractive to farmers in 
the period 1970–1990 (AGO 2000).  
 
     




Landholders’ incentives and constraints 
Had there been a better understanding of the impacts of traditional European 
agriculture on the Australian landscape, many environmental impacts would have 
been avoidable and may in fact have been avoided if the benefits of doing so had 
outweighed the costs. Ignorance of long-term environmental impacts pervaded 
landholder and government decisions alike.  
But landholders have a strong incentive to seek information, to learn and to adopt 
practices that improve farm productivity in order to remain profitable and, in many 
cases, to bequeath an asset to their children. They have an incentive to respond to 
any shift in consumer preferences to ‘clean and green’ products. There is abundant 
evidence that Australian farmers are increasingly aware of, and employing, 
sustainable farming practices.  
Barr and Cary (1992) suggest that the history of Australian agriculture can be 
viewed as a learning process, a 200-year search for sustainability. This is not to say 
that the learning process has been completed, nor that more mistakes will not be 
made. But it is important to recognise that landholders face a range of incentives, 
not least commercial realities, which are likely to promote continual improvements 
in agricultural practices.  
Several intensive agricultural industries, including rice, dairy, cotton and sugar, 
have established environmental codes of practice to promote sustainable resource 
use (NLWRA 2001b; Canegrowers, sub. 101, Ricegrowers Association of Australia, 
sub. 113 and trans., pp. 828–40). A recent survey of wool growers found that ninety 
per cent of respondents considered that natural resource management was a key 
component of their whole farm enterprise (Land, Water & Wool 2003). A survey of 
farmers’ attitudes to native vegetation and land care in the wheatbelt of Western 
Australia, conducted in 1996, concluded that ‘there had been big changes in the 
attitudes of farmers to bushland on farms’ (Jenkins 1998, p. 56). The changes were 
attributed in large part to greater knowledge of the problems of degradation caused 
by over-clearing. Many participants in this inquiry have also provided evidence of 
the adoption of more sustainable agricultural practices (box 2.7).  
Because land is a long-lived asset, it is to be expected that landholders — especially 
those with long-terms leases or freehold title — take into account the longer-term 
impacts on their properties of actions today. Either because they plan to leave 
properties to their children — an inter-generational bequest — or they are 
concerned about the market value of their property, they face significant incentives 
not to degrade the productive capacity of the land. Some may just think it is the 
‘right thing to do’.     
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Box 2.7  Examples of sustainable agricultural practices 
According to Munmurra Landholder Action Group (New South Wales):  
There can be no doubt that the more enlightened, scientific approach the majority of farmers 
are now taking in the management and development of their country, is more 
environmentally sustainable than some past practices. 
Examples of these improvements would be: Minimum till cultivation; Cell grazing; More 
effective vermin control (rabbits, feral dogs and pigs); Development of bio-diverse farming 
systems; The growth in farmer participation in catchment management; Land care groups 
and the general increase in awareness of the economic benefits of on farm tree planting. 
(sub. 69, p. 2) 
John McKindlay (Moama, New South Wales) described his farming practices: 
We have fenced off 70% of the river bank from stock and much of it has been planted with a 
native cane grass to reduce erosion. Over the years we have established 5.5 kms of trees 
and understorey and 12 kms of saltbush. The implementation of a full recycle system for our 
farm has reduced any run off from irrigation and we have established 80 hectares of deep 
rooted lucerne to limit accessions to the water table. We believe we are environmentally 
conscious and we actively promote the landcare ethic. As well as our normal farm operation 
we run a native plants nursery supplying farms, Landcare groups and Government 
Departments. (sub. 114, p. 1) 
Murray Davis, a farmer in Western Victoria, noted: 
We understand that there needs to be a balance between production and environmental 
sustainability, so over the last ten years all the waterways on my property have been fenced 
off, native trees have been planted and areas have been fenced off for revegetation. All 
stock have been excluded from all waterways due to the fencing along the creeks. This 
consists of approximately 40 hectares plus other areas retained for shelter belts and has 
resulted in lost productivity to this farm. (sub. 103, p. 1) 
 
That said, however, some farmers will face short-term constraints, including debt 
constraints due to drought or a price collapse, which may focus their attention on 
measures required to remain viable in the short term. The size of some farms simply 
may be uneconomic. Nonetheless, the market process, over time, will tend to weed 
out poorer performers, as Anthony Wait (Victoria) observed:  
Any farms that have been run down in this district have eventually been sold. The next 
owners have picked up the pieces and started again and have these properties back to 
their former productive capabilities. (sub. 43, p. 1) 
Lack of information and understanding of the relationship between certain actions 
and their effects on the natural resource base is also likely to continue to inhibit 
adoption of appropriate, cost-effective practices. According to Anthony Witham 
(Western Australia): 
The farmer’s self imposed environmental constraints on how much land should be 
cleared are currently defined by either genuine environmental concern on the part of the 
farmer or a reaction to obvious degradation that has already occurred or is likely to     




occur (such as wind erosion, water logging and salinity). The more subtle cases of 
degradation such as the approaching critical point of soil biochemistry toxicity, or 
continually greater fluxes of pest insect populations are not being accounted for … In 
the Broomehill and Tambellup districts we have no information how important 
biodiversity per se is to maintain the stability of current production systems. 
(sub. 34, p. 2) 
Government policies may continue to distort individual decisions with undesirable, 
albeit unintended, environmental effects. For example, exceptional circumstances 
assistance may encourage higher stocking rates during drought years and impede 
farm rationalisation (PC 2003a). Other distortions may include: 
•  restrictions on exporting, farming or harvesting native flora and fauna that 
prevent the development of commercial markets;  
•  disincentives for the establishment of private conservation areas (PC 2001a); and 
•  prices for water or other inputs that do not fully reflect social opportunity costs 
and which consequently distort production decisions.  
As discussed further in chapter  5, native vegetation controls themselves may 
discourage private conservation effort because they reduce the private value of 
native vegetation. 
In the case of off-site effects, such as native vegetation clearing on one property 
affecting salinisation of land or water downstream, there is not the same financial 
incentive for the landowner to protect the natural resource base. Yet landholders 
have also initiated and engaged in voluntary collective activities through Landcare 
and through catchment management bodies. In its 2001-02 Annual Report, 
Landcare Australia Limited (2002) reports that there were around 4500 landcare and 
catchment groups and more than 1000 coastcare groups operating across Australia. 
The activities of these groups have been directed partly at enhancing the catchment-
wide sustainability of farming.  
Possible explanations for voluntary community action include the desire by 
individuals to be, or to be seen as, good citizens by their peers, as well as the scope 
for benefits (for example, improved regional water and soil quality) accruing to 
individual landholders. In other words, the potential individual pay-off from group 
effort may exceed the pay-off from individual action or, indeed, non-action. These 
private, community solutions are more likely to occur where spillovers or 
externalities are confined to a region and/or affect relatively small numbers.  
However, where there is little likelihood of commensurate reward (or simply 
recognition), it is unlikely that individual landholders voluntarily will address off-
site effects at their own expense, especially if the scale of effort required would     
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significantly affect their financial viability. Hence, they are unlikely voluntarily to 
set aside large tracts of native vegetation (that may have some prospect of future 
commercial use) where the private benefits to them of doing so are not obvious 
even though the off-site or spill-over benefits to the wider community, the public 
benefits (such as the benefits of biodoversity), may be greater than the private costs. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that production and consumption of public good-type 
conservation services are complementary with production and consumption of 
private benefits, then the community will be able to ‘free-ride’. 
2.4  A role for government? 
From society’s viewpoint, the optimal ‘solution’ is the provision of environmental 
services from native vegetation to the level where the additional benefits to the 
community equal the extra costs. Importantly, however, even though there may be a 
divergence between social and private benefits flowing from native vegetation and 
biodiversity conservation and the level of private provision, this does not of itself 
justify policy intervention — it is a necessary but not sufficient condition. The 
problem is that intervention is not costless. Intervention to correct any remaining 
shortfall in the provision of the environmental good can be justified only where the 
benefits of the intervention outweigh the costs. 
In those cases where government policy constrains private conservation effort, the 
efficient policy response may be reasonably straightforward (though not necessarily 
so politically): address the policy distortion. Where private costs and benefits are 
affected by a lack of information or high costs of information, there may be a 
possible role for government in funding research (for example, into the benefits of 
native vegetation or potential commercial use of native vegetation) and 
dissemination of information (for example, extension services). 
Where the problem is caused by public good or externality-type issues, policy 
intervention is more problematic. On the one hand, governments have coercive 
powers that may overcome some of the factors, including transactions costs and 
strategic bargaining,4 that may undermine market or private collective (or so-called 
club) solutions. For example, governments potentially can overcome the problem of 
free-riding. On the other hand, a major challenge for policy-makers is identifying 
the efficient solution.  
Major practical impediments to devising good policy to address large-scale 
externalities and public goods related to native vegetation include: 
                                              
4  If one party can ‘hold out’ because of market power, an efficient transaction may not proceed.     




•  the incompleteness of scientific knowledge about cause and effect; and 
•  the need to devise mechanisms for revealing society’s willingness to pay and for 
bringing about least-cost solutions, thus delivering an appropriate trade-off 
between costs and benefits.  
The high costs of obtaining information or simply a lack of clear objectives, for 
example, may mean that governments implement policies that make matters worse 
by imposing high costs for little environmental pay-off. Thus, while governments 
have some advantages over the market in addressing externalities and public goods, 
it cannot be assumed that government intervention will generate better outcomes 
than private actions. The main advantage of private mechanisms is that willingness 
to pay for environmental services is revealed — the outcome generally will be 
welfare-enhancing because a transaction will occur only if the benefits to buyers 
exceed the costs.5 In addition, suppliers of the environmental services, landholders, 
will seek out efficient and innovative ways of delivering services in order to 
maximise profits or, in the case of community actions, net community gains.  
Recognition that government intervention may ‘fail’ has underpinned the national 
competition policy review process, for example, to ensure that the benefits of anti-
competitive regulations outweigh their costs. Regulatory review principles and 
principles of good regulation have also been agreed through the Council of 
Australian Governments process (chapters 1 and 7). A major task for this inquiry is 
to consider the efficiency and effectiveness of various forms of policy intervention, 
including regulation, against the background of the information and incentive 
problems confronting policy-makers in attempting to improve conservation 
outcomes on what is currently private land (chapter 8).  
The rationale for promoting public good conservation on private land 
Historically, native vegetation and biodiversity public-good conservation have been 
provided in national parks and other public reserves. The current approach of 
increasing native vegetation conservation on private land has been justified partly 
on the grounds that certain habitats and biota are not well represented in national 
parks. A number of ecological and biogeographical studies have argued that to 
achieve conservation outcomes in protected areas, sympathetic management of 
adjoining private land is essential. Perhaps because of the budgetary costs of 
expanding reserves, or of paying inducements to landholders, most governments 
control clearing of native vegetation on private land by way of regulation.  
                                              
5  Assuming that private values do not diverge significantly from social values.     
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Leaving aside short-term budget considerations and the question of who should bear 
the costs of public-good conservation efforts, a more fundamental economic 
rationale is that conservation of native vegetation and biodiversity can be provided 
more efficiently (that is, at lower cost to the community overall) and effectively on 
private land than in public reserves. This result is possible if the private land can 
continue to be used for private and commercial purposes as well as public-good 
conservation. As Clarke observes:  
In some cases if land can be jointly used for conservation and other commercial uses, 
conservation objectives can be advanced at lower cost than would occur with 
specialised pursuit of biodiversity conservation alone. (2002, p. 306) 
In other words, at least over some range, production and consumption of 
environmental public goods such as biodiversity and the production and 
consumption of other land-based outputs may be complementary.  
At some point, however, it is likely that production of increased levels of 
conservation on private land will begin to ‘crowd out’ commercial and other private 
uses, and the cost advantage arising from joint production and/or consumption 
gradually will be lost. At some stage, private land virtually will become public land 
devoted to community-wide conservation objectives. Then the only possible cost 
advantage to society of retaining the land in notional private ownership is if the 
landholder can be made (via compulsion or inducement) to manage the land at a 
lower cost to the community overall than public agencies. 
That there may be social cost advantages (over some range) in providing 
conservation and other commercial outputs jointly on private land may be an 
argument for policies that encourage joint production, but not necessarily an 
argument for landholders bearing any additional costs arising from increased 
conservation effort. Some issues relevant to cost-sharing are discussed below. 
2.5  Who should pay? 
An important part of the debate is about who should pay for the provision of 
environmental services provided by native vegetation on private land. Some issues 
are discussed in this section that the Commission considers pertinent to attempting 
an answer.  
In the case of externalities, where the actions of one landholder directly affect other 
landholders or local communities and vice versa, there is a clearer case for 
landholders, in the aggregate, to pay. Which particular landholders pay will depend 
on the mechanism used and property rights assignment — beneficiaries could pay 
‘the polluter’ to cease the offending activity, or the polluter could be made liable for     




the consequences of his or her actions. In some cases, solutions might involve all 
landholders making a contribution in kind (for example, pest and weed control) or 
via a levy.  
In practice, some actions will produce private, local and community-wide benefits 
(for example, salinity reduction or prevention may improve agricultural yields on 
individual properties and across regions, and also improve biodiversity). The 
difficulties of isolating the private, regional and public components of benefits have 
contributed to disagreement about the extent of the burden that individual 
landholders or landholders as a group should be expected to bear. Establishing an 
agreed process for identifying these different components and, hence, the extent of 
landholder responsibilities, will be critical.  
A wide spectrum of views has been presented by participants on the matters of 
property rights and compensation (box 2.8). At one end are those landholders who 
dispute that governments have any right to interfere with their right to farm their 
freehold land. At the other end are those who argue that governments have a duty to 
act to promote whole-of-society objectives and, moreover, that ‘polluters’ should be 
made liable. The latter view seems to have underpinned the introduction of clearing 
restrictions on freehold and leasehold land, in most cases without compensation.  
Thus, while the Victorian Government acknowledged that:  
… the initiation of native vegetation retention controls in Victoria, under Planning 
Schemes, weakened landholders’ property rights to native vegetation in some instances, 
transferring power from landholders to the community, (sub. 185, pp. 18–19) 
there has been no provision for compensation for the effects of native vegetation 
policies under Victorian Government planning controls.6  
In similar vein, Grafton (2003) argues that landholders do not have ‘rights’ but 
rather have been granted ‘privileges’ to undertake certain activities. Importantly, he 
argues that landholders do not have a right to cause harm to the property rights of 
others, where harm is interpreted broadly to include harm to the environment 
generally.7 The ACF commented that they were ‘not comfortable that retaining 
native vegetation should necessarily be cast as the provision of an environmental 
service’ (trans.,  p.  1647). In other words, from this perspective, the concept of 
common law nuisance and externality is extended to a broader notion of 
environmental harm now and in the future.  
                                              
6  However, there is provision for compensation under Victoria’s threatened species legislation, 
but this legislation is seldom invoked, partly because planning provisions can be used to pursue 
these objectives (chapter 6).  
7  Even so, Grafton notes that removal of ‘privileges’ may warrant compensation.     
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Box 2.8  Participants’ views on property rights and compensation 
The Constitutional Property Rights Committee questioned the validity of current 
regulations in New South Wales and defended landholders’ ‘legislative right to a 
‘continuing and existing use’ of the significant freehold primary investment [land]’ 
(sub. 51, p. 3).  
Professor Wolfgang Kasper argued that: 
The proliferation of diverse regulations to conserve nature in Australia amounts to the 
confiscation of many private property rights, frequently without offers of ‘just compensation’ 
(to use the words of the Commonwealth Constitution). (sub. 13, p. 1) 
The Wildflower Society of Western Australia stated that it:  
… does not support compensation to landholders that are prevented from clearing remnant 
bushland. The Society strongly believes that farmers wanting to clear native vegetation for 
business viability must look for alternatives, and further clearing is unacceptable. 
(sub. 33, p. 2) 
While acknowledging that there may be a case for short-term adjustment assistance, 
the Western Australian Government expressed the view that: 
In considering the appropriateness of the current distribution of costs for preventing 
environmental degradation, regard must be had to the ‘polluter pays’ or ‘impacter pays’ 
principle, according to which the person who causes environmental damage should bear the 
cost of avoiding or abating that damage. (sub. 151, p. 5) 
The Australian Conservation Foundation expressed its opposition to rights to 
compensation per se for environmental regulation because environmental laws ‘are an 
exercise of government’s authority to regulate the use of private property that has 
always been recognised’ (sub. 146, attachment 1, p. 5). However, it also accepted: 
… legitimate equity concerns demand a ‘cost-sharing’ solution … the cost of which should 
be funded on the following principles: 
•  Application of the ‘polluter’ or ‘impactor’ pays principle, reflecting the sustainability 
responsibilities of landholders to manage both on-farm and off-farm impacts. 
•  Contributions of public funds from both Commonwealth and state governments … where 
regulations impact beyond private sustainability obligations to benefit the wider national 
interest. (sub. 146, attachment 1, p. 2) 
 
 
A contrary view is put by Epstein (1998) who observes that while ‘the law of 
nuisance represents a good first rough and ready means to regulate by law relations 
between neighbors’ (emphasis in original, p. 229): 
… common law actions are forlorn in the context of habitat preservation, because so 
much of the modification and destruction of habitat … typically comes from ordinary 
husbandry of land … It would take a stunning reversal of hundreds of years of legal 
history if these activities, generally productive, were now for the first time, castigated 
by the common law as generally harmful. (p. 229)     




Indeed, several participants argued that clearing restrictions affecting existing use of 
freehold land was illegal (for example, Constitutional Property Rights Committee 
(New South Wales), subs 51, 55 and DR224 and Kevin Cole (New South Wales), 
sub. DR228). However, although clearing restrictions may yet be challenged in the 
courts, at the end of the day, governments have wide-ranging powers to regulate. In 
addition, the Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices 
(sub. DR235) observed that currently there is no constitutional or legal obligation 
for Australian governments to compensate for ‘regulatory’ takings.8 
Whether or not governments have the powers to take without compensation, in the 
Commission’s view, the more pertinent issue is whether a particular form of 
intervention (and the associated allocation of costs), on balance, is likely to have 
desirable or undesirable incentive, efficiency and equity consequences. In other 
words, given the problem at hand, what is likely to work best? Simply because 
governments may have the power to take private property via regulation without 
paying compensation, does not automatically imply that this is a desirable course of 
action to take. At the same time, government intervention cannot be ruled out 
simply because it may affect property rights.  
Efficiency considerations 
If governments had perfect knowledge and were inclined to maximise social 
welfare, they could and would impose the efficient solution in this and every other 
matter. Who should bear the cost of (or benefit from) that solution would simply be 
a matter of determining the socially-desirable distribution of income.  
Reality is different — imperfect information and self-interest are pervasive for 
individuals and governments alike. Once the limitations of government actions are 
admitted, then the question of who should pay may have a bearing on efficiency as 
well as equity because of the potential incentive effects of policy. For example, a 
policy that is deemed unfair and consequently is not complied with, or which 
unintentionally encourages evasive practices that undermine the policy objective, is 
not good policy.  
                                              
8  However, Bryan Pape (trans., p. 956) drew attention to Mr Justice Deane’s judgement in the 
Tasmanian Dams case to the effect that a buffer zone required by the Department of Defence 
might constitute ‘an effective confiscation or acquisition of the benefit of use of the land in its 
unoccupied state, notwithstanding that neither the owner nor the Commonwealth possessed any 
right to go upon or actively use the land affected’.     
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Economic theory does not indicate, a priori, who should pay for conservation effort 
on private land.9 It is sometimes suggested that having ‘polluters’ pay is preferable 
because it forces them to ‘internalise’ the externality — that is, to take into account 
the social cost of environmental resources used in the production process. However, 
an externality can also be internalised efficiently if beneficiaries of any remedial 
action pay the producer to take such action — the opportunity cost incurred by the 
producer in using up the environmental resource is then the payment 
(compensation) forgone. Thus, in the context of a market solution, if the ‘polluter’ 
holds the property right, the potential for compensation, or payment, is critical in 
bringing about that solution. In short, then, there is no presumptions that ‘polluter 
pays’ is more efficient than the beneficiary paying. Which assignment of costs 
works better in practice will depend on the circumstances of the problem at hand, 
especially the information and incentive effects of any particular assignment.  
Where the market solution proves infeasible because of high transactions costs (for 
example, because there are many affected parties as in the case of a public good), as 
already noted, there is a potential role for government intervention. The approach 
currently in place in most Australian jurisdictions is regulation of native vegetation 
clearing by private landholders without, in most cases, any automatic right to 
compensation. Potential efficiency consequences of the absence of compensation are 
that: 
•  So long as the parties benefiting from an increase in the services provided by 
native vegetation do not have to pay, they are likely to continue to press for 
further conservation effort until there are no more benefits to be had (where the 
marginal benefit is zero, or the point QNVX in figure  2.1). In other words, 
without the constraint imposed by having to pay the costs of producing 
environmental benefits, there may be over-provision of the environmental public 
good, which imposes a net social loss (Coase 1960 and Buchanan and 
Stubblebine 1962); and 
•  Regulation of native vegetation on private property essentially asserts public 
ownership of the native vegetation resource, with the landholder then expected 
to manage the land. If there is an expectation that permission to use native 
vegetation on their properties will not be granted, then the only way private 
landholders have to avoid what most perceive as a ‘taking’ and loss, and to 
retain ‘ownership’ of the native vegetation, is to clear it illegally (after taking 
                                              
9  Coase (1960) demonstrated that in the case of externalities, provided property rights were 
allocated to one party, and trade were feasible, the efficient solution could be achieved 
regardless of the initial rights assignment. If a particular allocation of rights reduces the 
likelihood (increases the costs) of achieving (negotiating, monitoring or enforcing) the market 
solution, then the assignment of rights may have efficiency implications, but that is an empirical 
matter.     




into account the probability of being caught and penalised), to allow it to 
degrade (for example, by allowing weed and vermin infestation or over-grazing), 
or to clear it before regulations are imposed. 
These possible incentive effects are arguments against regulation without payment 
of compensation for losses incurred but not necessarily the regulatory instrument 
itself. The efficiency of governments establishing prescriptive rules requiring 
retention of native vegetation on private land is considered in subsequent chapters 
of this report. However, there are also some efficiency arguments against payment 
of compensation for regulation — principally, that payment of compensation may 
encourage inefficient investments and actions by landholders (Blume et al. 1984).  
As discussed in chapter 9, there are other policy instruments that avoid the need for 
compensation for compulsory takings because they mimic voluntary private trades. 
As such, they involve payments being made to landholders for environmental 
services rendered, which could include retention of native vegetation.  
While there is an argument that the budgetary impact of compensation or payments 
to landholders may constrain the level of public conservation effort (see, for 
example, Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices, sub. DR235), if 
the policy actions are socially-desirable, then the benefits will outweigh the costs 
such that beneficiaries would still be in a position to compensate losers and reap net 
gains.  
Fairness and equity considerations  
Fairness is a slippery concept — what seems fair to one person will seem unfair to 
another. It should be noted that fairness and efficiency considerations are not 
unrelated. For example, if a policy is considered unfair, those affected may not 
comply with and/or may lobby against the policy. Some dimensions of fairness are 
discussed briefly in this section, including the distribution of impacts across 
landholders and the treatment of landholders compared with the treatment of other 
groups affected by policy interventions. 
Should polluters pay?  
Leaving aside efficiency implications, making the polluter pay may seem ‘fair’ 
because it appears to apportion blame. However, there are several reasons why 
imposing costs on those landholders with native vegetation on their properties may 
not be fair: 
•  those landholders (rural and urban) and others, including governments, who have     
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been responsible for the damage caused by clearing in the past are largely 
unaffected by clearing restrictions. Indeed, they may benefit from clearing 
controls placed on others who have caused little or no damage;  
•  not all land-clearing imposes net costs on society and, indeed, over some range 
will deliver net benefits (figure 2.1). Suggesting that an individual landholder 
who clears part of his or her property is solely responsible for land degradation 
or biodiversity loss misses the point that it is the aggregate impact of many 
individual actions that leads to clearing beyond the socially-optimal level; and 
•  where native vegetation conservation is undertaken largely for the benefit of 
society overall, if the landholder held what may be termed a ‘presumptive’ 
property right in the sense that certain actions historically had not been 
proscribed and, as a consequence, the landholder suffered large losses from an 
effective reassignment of that right to the public domain, it is not clear why this 
would be more equitable than the beneficiaries paying.  
Are property owners compensated for the effects of other policies? 
Bonyhady (1992) highlights numerous inconsistencies with respect to payment of 
compensation within and across Australian jurisdictions. While he suggests some 
reasons for different treatment apart from ‘political expediency’ (for example, size 
of losses or the need for cooperation from affected parties), he also observes that 
legislators rarely proffer any such rationales. A question then is whether it would be 
inequitable to recompense property owners for any detrimental impact of the 
environmental policies under review or whether, indeed, there may be a rationale 
for superficially inconsistent treatment of farmers affected by environmental 
regulation and, say, urban landowners affected by planning laws.  
Several participants (for example, Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s 
Offices, sub. DR235) pointed out that many activities of rural and urban landholders 
are regulated without compensation being paid, for example, by urban planning 
laws and zoning.  
Urban planning laws and by-laws are designed to internalise what are usually 
localised externalities, that is, where the effects are largely confined to neighbours. 
For example, the opportunity cost to one party of not being allowed to build a 
certain development may be broadly offset by the fact that their amenity will not be 
diminished by an adjacent development by a neighbour. While such reciprocity is 
unlikely to be perfect, there is a rough symmetry of costs and benefits, which may 
explain broad acceptance of those rules, and the absence of compensation.     




Another example of uncompensated regulation might be by-laws proscribing the 
‘burning off’ of rubbish. Once again, the benefits of the restriction are localised and 
likely to be evenly distributed. Moreover, in this case, the costs are likely to be 
minimal, especially as alternative forms of rubbish removal exist (for example, 
green waste collection and composting).  
Pest and weed controls which have long applied to landholders also seem to fall 
within this category; that is, the costs and benefits largely accrue to landholders. 
Landholders appear to have been more accepting of their responsibilities because 
inaction by a neighbour could impose costs on them. Indeed, in the absence of such 
regulation, landholders are likely to devise informal rules or other mechanisms to 
address such local externality problems.  
The ACF (trans., p.  1627) argued that benefits from native vegetation clearing 
restrictions would accrue to landholders (as a group) through time, thus balancing 
costs they incurred today. While there may be net long-term benefits to landholders 
from retaining some native vegetation, the critical question is whether the benefits 
to them exceed the costs of retaining all native vegetation protected by regulation. 
Given the lack of information about costs and benefits of current regulation, it 
would appear difficult to assert that costs and benefits balanced. Moreover, 
landholders typically are forward-looking because they own a long-lived asset and, 
as such, might be expected to take into account future private benefits arising from 
management practices undertaken today. For the same reason, many landholders are 
likely to accept responsibility for (and the cost of) taking actions designed to 
address resource degradation and sustainability across regions.  
In a report on structural adjustment, the Commission notes that:  
Where a policy change is likely to impose large losses or result in large adjustment 
costs, and those affected can be readily identified, well designed direct compensation or 
specific adjustment assistance may be appropriate. (PC 2001b, p. 67)  
For example, dairy farmers have been compensated for removal of dairy quotas in 
some States and similarly owners of taxi licences, even though the scarcity value of 
quotas has been artificially created by government-imposed restrictions. In other 
words, in these instances, there has been a recognition that the scarcity rents have 
been capitalised into the value of the businesses and removal of this scarcity rent 
would impose significant losses.  
Another common form of compensation is the ‘grand-fathering’ of allocations of 
property rights when introducing an auction system or secondary market trading 
(for example, water rights, emission quotas, and airport slots). Thus, while scope for 
trading of these rights promotes efficiency, incumbents retain or realise profits from 
their initial allocations.      
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Where the adverse effects of policies are less clear, the Commission (PC 2001b) 
identifies other approaches frequently used to promote structural adjustment, 
including the phasing in of policy change (which allows capital assets to depreciate 
and gives employees time to learn new skills), broad-based reforms that roughly 
allow gains and losses accruing within various groups to cancel out, and adjustment 
assistance for relatively mobile factors such as labour (including standard 
unemployment and re-training benefits).  
One possible explanation for the suitability and use of different approaches relates 
to the mobility and adaptability of the productive factors (land, capital and labour) 
— key determinants of the potential to adjust to the effects of the policy change. 
Where an explicit or implicit property right exists, the value of the right 
encapsulates the net present value of expected future net earnings. For freehold (or 
long-term leasehold) land, where the asset normally is not written off over time, a 
permanent policy change that affects net earnings affects the income stream in 
perpetuity. Phasing in of a policy change in this context may reduce the effect on 
the property value but not eliminate it.  
With a depreciating asset such as machinery, however, policy delay can allow the 
asset to be used up and then the financial capital to be switched to other areas. For 
example, stricter emission standards often have been introduced progressively to 
give firms time to depreciate and phase-out old, and to introduce new, equipment 
and technology. In this sense, the delayed policy change largely is not 
‘retrospective’, whereas policies that affect the value of freehold land or even long-
term leases virtually always will contain an element of retrospectivity.  
Mutual obligation 
It has been suggested that if landholders receive various forms of assistance (for 
example, exceptional circumstances assistance, subsidised services) from the rest of 
the community they have an obligation to promote the community’s environmental 
goals at their own expense.  
Certainly it would seem difficult for landholders who support and benefit from 
various government interventions to argue against the right of governments to 
intervene on environmental matters. However, policies are best judged on their own 
merits. If assistance of some form is inefficient and/or confers unwarranted benefits 
on a particular group, then attempting to rectify this by requiring landholders to bear 
other policy costs (which may or may not be efficient) is unlikely to be the most 
appropriate response. If the assistance is efficient, and corrects a distortion, then the 
argument for an offsetting ‘payment’ from the beneficiary breaks down.      





The purpose in this chapter is to set out some key preliminary issues relevant to the 
framing of efficient and effective native vegetation and biodiversity policies. In 
particular, effective policy should be based on an understanding of:  
•  the nature of the problem being addressed and its causes; and 
•  the nature of the cost-benefit trade-off.  
Where the objective is to increase native vegetation and biodiversity conservation 
on private land, an understanding of landholder incentives is especially critical. 
Without landholder cooperation, it is unlikely that environmental objectives will be 
achieved efficiently. On the question of who should pay, on efficiency grounds, 
there is no theoretical basis for preferring ‘polluter pays’ over another cost 
assignment. It is a matter of assessing the incentive and transaction cost 
implications of different cost allocations. Nor is there a clear-cut answer as to what 
cost allocation is fair. Relevant factors are the size of losses imposed (for example, 
whether livelihoods are affected) and the distribution of costs and benefits.      





3 State  and  Territory  regulatory 
arrangements  
Current and, where relevant, proposed legislation regulating native vegetation 
clearance and biodiversity conservation on private land in each State and Territory 
are briefly summarised in this chapter. The development and implementation of the 
regimes are explored, including the extent of community consultation and 
involvement (terms of reference 3(f)), the adequacy of assessments of economic and 
social impacts (terms of reference 3(e)), and the level of understanding of the 
regimes amongst stakeholders (terms of reference 3(a)(ii)).  
Administrative aspects of the regimes are also discussed, including the consistency, 
transparency and accountability of decision-making, the adequacy of dispute-
resolution and appeals mechanisms and the direct and indirect costs of compliance, 
administration and enforcement. These matters are relevant to the Commission’s 
assessment of the overall effectiveness of existing regimes in achieving their 
objectives (chapter  7). Comprehensive discussions of the regulatory regimes 
applying in each State and Territory jurisdiction are presented in appendixes C–J. 
3.1  State and Territory native vegetation and 
biodiversity legislation 
The primary legislation currently underpinning native vegetation and biodiversity 
management regimes in each State and Territory is outlined in box 3.1. In some 
jurisdictions, legislation has been introduced very recently or is currently being 
amended (details of foreshadowed changes are given where possible).  
Native vegetation controls 
State and Territory legislation typically sets out (on a jurisdiction-wide basis) when 
permits or approvals must be obtained by landholders who intend to clear native 
vegetation. As discussed below, however, the application and breadth of controls 
varies significantly across jurisdictions.      






Box 3.1  State and Territory native vegetation and biodiversity 
legislation  
New South Wales 
The Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NVC Act) controls clearing on private 
rural land. The Act provided for the development of Regional Vegetation Management 
Plans (RVMPs) to guide the clearing of native vegetation. In the absence of RVMPs, 
landholders must obtain approval for the removal of native vegetation (subject to some 
exemptions).  
In December 2003, the NSW Parliament passed the Native Vegetation Act 2003. The 
Native Vegetation Act is expected to replace the NVC Act by mid-2004 (when 
supporting regulations for the new Act have been developed). Objects of the Native 
Vegetation Act include: to provide for the management of native vegetation on a 
regional basis; and to prevent broadscale clearing unless it improves or maintains 
environmental outcomes. Under the Native Vegetation Act, approval is required to 
remove native vegetation (but not for clearing ‘regrowth’). Biodiversity objectives are 
pursued under the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995.  
Victoria 
Under the Planning and Environment Act 1987, landholders must obtain permits for the 
removal, destruction or lopping of native vegetation (with some exemptions). Objects 
include: the protection of natural and man-made resources and the maintenance of 
ecological processes and genetic diversity; and to provide for the fair, orderly, 
economic and sustainable use and development of land. There is provision for 
Regional Native Vegetation Plans but none has yet been finalised. The Flora and 
Fauna Guarantee Act 1988 aims to ensure that Victoria’s flora and fauna can ‘survive, 
flourish and retain their potential for evolutionary development in the wild’ (s. 4(1)(a)). 
Queensland 
The  Vegetation Management Act 1999 (VM  Act) makes clearing on freehold land 
assessable under the Integrated Planing Act 1997. The Land Act 1994 applies to 
leasehold land. Objects of the VM  Act include regulating the clearance of native 
vegetation to maintain or increase biodiversity. The Vegetation (Applications for 
Clearing) Act 2003 imposes a moratorium on applications to clear remnant vegetation 
on freehold and leasehold land (clearing exempt under the VM Act or Land Act is not 
affected). In March 2003, the Government introduced the Vegetation Management and 
Other Legislation Bill 2004. Regulation of native vegetation clearance on both freehold 
and leasehold land is to be consolidated under this legislation. The Bill has been 
introduced to phase out clearing of remnant vegetation by 2006 and is expected to 
take effect by mid 2004. The Nature Conservation Act 1992 focuses on conserving and 
managing native animals and plants and declaring and managing protected areas such 
as national parks. It allows for the declaration of protected areas on private property.  
(Continued next page) 
 
     






Box 3.1  (continued) 
Western Australia 
Native vegetation management is regulated under the Soil and Land Conservation Act 
1945 (SLC Act), in conjunction with the Conservation and Land Management Act 1984 
and the Environmental Protection Act 1986. Under the SLC Act, landholders intending 
to clear more than one hectare of vegetation for a change in land use are required to 
notify the Commissioner of Soil and Land Conservation. The WA Parliament recently 
passed the Environmental Protection Amendment Act 2003. The Act provides for a 
permit system for the clearance of native vegetation. However, the sections of the Act 
which relate to clearing controls have not yet been proclaimed. A Biodiversity 
Conservation Bill is being developed to replace the Wildlife Conservation Act 1950. 
South Australia 
The primary legislation for native vegetation management in South Australia is the 
Native Vegetation Act 1991 (NV Act). The NV Act requires property managers, in 
matters not covered by an exemption, to submit a proposal to the Native Vegetation 
Council seeking approval for the clearance of native vegetation. The Council was 
established under the Act and has responsibility for overseeing all issues concerned 
with vegetation. The Council represents a range of interests including the South 
Australian Farmers’ Federation and the Conservation Council of South Australia. 
Tasmania 
In 2002, the Forest Practices Act 1985 was amended to make clear that non-
commercial clearing of forests for the purposes of agriculture is subject to the same 
environmental regulation applying to the commercial harvesting and clearing of forests. 
In April 2003, as a result of a bilateral agreement with the Australian Government, the 
Tasmanian Government announced its intention to strengthen regulation of non-forest 
communities and ‘vulnerable’ forest communities. Biodiversity objectives are contained 
in the Threatened Species Protection Act 1995. 
Northern Territory 
New native vegetation clearing controls for freehold and crown land were introduced in 
December 2002 under the Planning Act. Landholders are required to obtain a permit to 
clear more than one hectare of native vegetation. Pastoral leases are subject to 
clearing controls under the Pastoral Land Act. 
Australian Capital Territory 
The Land (Planning and Environment) Act 1991 establishes the Territory Plan. The 
Plan sets out when permits are required for the removal of remnant native vegetation. 
Since 1991, rural lessees have been required to enter into 5-year land management 
agreements with Environment ACT. The Nature Conservation Act 1980 provides for 
the establishment of a Nature Conservation Strategy that formulates conservation 
objectives and strategies. 
 
     





This planning approach means that applications to clear native vegetation are 
treated as development proposals, with the onus placed on the landholder to obtain 
consent or otherwise face possible penalties. Several jurisdictions (New South 
Wales, Victoria, and Queensland) have established regional processes to devise 
regional clearing guidelines. Local governments usually may impose planning 
overlays or conditions on permits, although any regional or local guidelines and 
conditions must at least meet jurisdiction-wide requirements. 
In some jurisdictions, leasehold land represents a significant proportion of private 
rural land (table 3.1). In Queensland and the Northern Territory, clearing of native 
vegetation on leasehold and freehold land is subject to different legislation, with 
requirements for Crown lessees incorporated in long-standing legislation governing 
lease conditions.1 There are some differences between the treatment of Crown 
lessees and holders of freehold title, typically with more onerous requirements 
being placed on the former group. In the Australian Capital Territory all rural land 
is leasehold. 
Table 3.1  Leasehold and freehold land 
 
State/Territory 
Total land area 
(thousand km
2)  Freehold (% total) 
Private Crown
 Lease (% total)
New South Wales  803  50.5  38.5
Victoria 228  68.1  0
Queensland 1  722  36.4  54.6
Western Australia  2 511  8.2  35.8
South Australia  978  16.2  42.8
Tasmania 68  40.0  0
Australian Capital Territory  2  0  39.0
Northern Territory  1 346  0.5  49.5
Source: Geoscience Australia (2003). 
Species and biodiversity conservation 
In addition to planning controls over native vegetation clearing, which may be used 
to protect habitat and species, most States and Territories also have legislation 
targeted specifically at preservation of endangered or threatened species and their 
habitats. These Acts typically provide for listing of endangered or threatened 
species. Depending on the Act and the category of species listing, the Acts may 
require the development of species ‘recovery plans’ aimed at controlling activities 
                                              
1  Under reforms proposed by the Queensland Government in March 2004, clearing controls for 
both leasehold and freehold land are to be contained in one piece of legislation.     





that may threaten species survival, including the preservation of habitat on private 
land that otherwise would be exempt from native vegetation clearing controls.  
Other legislation 
In most jurisdictions there is a range of other legislation that can affect native 
vegetation clearing and/or management on private land, including: 
•  soil conservation legislation; 
•  environmental protection legislation; 
•  coastal protection legislation; 
•  water and catchment management legislation;  
•  fisheries legislation; 
•  heritage legislation; 
•  national parks legislation (especially where private land abuts public land); and 
•  weed and vermin legislation. 
Landholders must also comply with the Australian Government’s Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act). 
This chapter focuses on the primary legislation controlling native vegetation 
removal on private land. However, requirements imposed by other legislation 
occasionally can lead to inconsistencies and, for some landholders, can affect their 
management of native vegetation significantly, as well as generally increase the 
complexity and burden of landholder responsibilities.  
3.2  Development and introduction of the regimes 
Most of the native vegetation regimes under review are of relatively recent origin, 
yet several have been, or are in the process of being strengthened.  
The main stated rationales for the introduction and progressive tightening of 
clearing controls have been land degradation (particularly salinity problems in 
Western Australia, and to a lesser extent Victoria, Queensland and South Australia, 
attributed to native vegetation clearing), and a concern in some jurisdictions that 
levels of remnant native vegetation were approaching critical levels for habitat and 
biodiversity functions. The extent of native vegetation is shown in figure 3.1 — 
approximately 32  per  cent of native vegetation in the ‘intensively-used’ areas is 
estimated to have been cleared or highly modified. Estimated levels of native     





vegetation by State and Territory are presented in table 3.2.2 While aggregate levels 
of remnant vegetation remain substantial in many jurisdictions, the National Land 
and Water Resources Audit (2002a) expressed concern about the representativeness 
of ecosystems and land and water degradation in particular regions (box 1.1). 
Figure 3.1  Extent of native vegetation in Australia 
Circa 1997 
 
Data source: NLWRA (2002a).  
South Australia and Victoria introduced comprehensive native vegetation clearing 
controls in 1983 and 1989 respectively. In both jurisdictions, criteria guiding 
assessments of clearing applications have been progressively tightened. For 
example, in 1997, Victoria introduced a State-wide target of ‘no net loss’ of native 
vegetation by 2001; in 2002, a policy of ‘net gain’ was announced. In South 
                                              
2  Because the percentage area covered by native vegetation might be ‘inflated’ by remote and 
almost uninhabited areas of native vegetation (eg semi-arid and arid areas), NLWRA excised 
these areas and assessed native vegetation as a percentage of the ‘intensively used areas’.      





Australia, penalties for non-compliance have been progressively increased, and the 
overall guiding principle is achievement of net environmental benefits.  
Table 3.2  Native vegetation by State and Territory 1997 
 
State/Territory 
  Native vegetation (% total 
intensively-used zone)a
New South Wales    67
Victoria   37
Queensland   72
Western Australia    56
South Australia    64
Tasmania   80
Australian Capital Territory    69
Northern Territory    98
a Native vegetation includes shrublands and grasslands. Intensively-used zone refers to the agricultural area 
of Australia where the predominant land uses are cropping and improved grazing, with introduced grasses and 
legumes (Hamblin 2001). 
Source: NLWRA (2002a). 
The Victorian Government observed that: 
Over two thirds of Victoria is private land. Of this, some 95 per cent of tree cover has 
been lost … The extent of clearance varies around Victoria. Accessible and relatively 
fertile landscapes that were developed for pastoral and agricultural activities have been 
the most affected. These areas now contain the most severely depleted and poorly 
reserved ecosystems in Victoria. 
There are two major legacies of this history of clearing. Many of the ecosystems upon 
which our presence and productivity depends are now beyond the point of 
sustainability and the biodiversity that built and maintained these ecosystems is also in 
decline … Many threatened habitats and species are now confined to private land. For 
example, about 29 per cent of known threatened species populations occur on private 
land, 38 per cent within parks and reserves and 18 per cent in State forests. Thus, 
private land has an important role to play in conserving nearly one third of our 
threatened species. Private land is also important for species that move between places 
to obtain essential resources. (sub. 185, pp. 5–6) 
In 1995, the NSW Government introduced the State Environmental Planning 
Policy 46 (SEPP  46) as an interim measure to regulate the clearing of native 
vegetation. It then replaced SEPP 46 in 1998 with the more comprehensive Native 
Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NVC Act). In December 2003, the NSW 
Parliament passed a suite of legislation reforming natural resource management. 
Part of the reforms include replacing the NVC Act with the Native Vegetation 
Act 2003 (box 3.1). The Native Vegetation Act is expected to be in force by mid-
2004 and is to be implemented with the objective of ending broadscale clearing in 
the State (subject to some exemptions — box 3.3). In announcing the reforms, the     





NSW Government considered that the regime implemented through the NVC Act 
was ‘overly complicated and couldn’t deliver on agricultural and conservation 
outcomes’ (DIPNR 2003b, p. 1).  
In Queensland, where more than 80  per cent of the State was estimated to be 
covered by remnant vegetation in 2000, clearing controls were introduced in 1997 
for leasehold land and in 2000 for freehold land, prompted by what were considered 
to be high rates of land clearing and loss of endangered vegetation. In April 2003, a 
moratorium on new applications to clear native vegetation on freehold or leasehold 
land was announced. In March 2004, the Queensland Government introduced a bill 
to the Parliament that is intended to ‘phase out broadscale clearing of remnant 
vegetation in Queensland by December 2006’ (NRM&E  2004, p.  1). The Bill 
differs from other State and Territory native vegetation legislation in that the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is explicitly listed as an object of the 
legislation (along with objectives such as the prevention of land degradation and the 
loss of biodiversity).  
In Western Australia, where a major rationale for intervention has been salinity 
control, soil conservation legislation has been in place since 1945. This legislation 
has been the principal vehicle for a progressive tightening of clearing controls, 
particularly since the mid 1980s. According to the WA Government: 
Western Australia faces enormous economic costs from salinity and rising water tables, 
which could have been avoided or ameliorated with the earlier introduction of native 
vegetation clearance controls. Annual costs to the State due to salinity are estimated at 
$660 million … It is important to point out that the retention of native vegetation assists 
in containing these costs by maintaining watertable levels and thus reducing salinity 
impacts. (sub. 151, p. 2) 
Legislation passed in the WA Parliament in October 2003 introduces a permit 
system to be administered by one agency (the Department of Environmental 
Protection), bringing regulation of native vegetation clearing more into line with 
regulatory arrangements operating in the rest of Australia (box 3.1).  
Until recently, in Tasmania, regulation of native vegetation removal focused on 
commercial forestry operations. Removal of forest vegetation for non-commercial 
reasons was brought within the purview of regulation requiring clearing approvals 
in 2001. The Tasmanian Government announced its intention to strengthen 
regulation of ‘non-forest communities’ and ‘vulnerable’ forest communities’ in 
April 2003. Details of these changes are yet to be specified.  
In the Northern Territory where most private land is leasehold (just 0.5 per cent is 
freehold), regulation of native vegetation clearance is of relatively recent origin, 
presumably reflecting the low level of clearing in the past (less than 0.4 per cent of     





the Territory has been cleared, for any purpose) and relatively low demand for 
clearing currently.  
In announcing the introduction of new controls for freehold land in the Northern 
Territory, the Minister stated that: 
These new measures clearly demonstrate this Government’s commitment to the long-
term sustainable development of our natural resources … While the Northern Territory 
has so far avoided the environmental damage that goes with poor land clearing 
practices, now is the time to act. (Vatskalis 2002, p. 1) 
In November 2003, the NT Government announced a moratorium on further land 
clearing in the Daly Region until an Integrated Regional Land Use Plan is 
developed for the region.  
In the Australian Capital Territory, where all rural land is leasehold, conservation 
objectives are integrated into the management of rural leasehold land (box 3.1). 
Assessment of regulatory impacts 
Regulatory impact assessment guidelines for Australian Government legislation and 
regulation are outlined in chapter 1. Broadly, the objectives of these guidelines is to 
encourage the development of regulations that are both ‘effective’ and ‘efficient’ — 
that is, that regulation should only be implemented where the benefits outweigh the 
costs and where no other approach could deliver greater net benefits.  
Regulatory Impact Statements (RISs) must be prepared by all Australian 
Government agencies making, reviewing and reforming regulations. State and 
Territory governments also widely use RISs (ORR 1998, PC 2003b).3 Some of the 
legislation under review pre-dated development of RIS processes. Based on 
responses to its inquiries, the Commission is not aware that formal or informal RIS 
statements have been prepared for any of the State and Territory regulatory regimes 
under review.  
Consideration of alternative policy options  
The Commission has found little evidence in jurisdictions regulating clearing of 
native vegetation that alternative approaches (including non-regulatory methods of 
                                              
3  Formal RIS requirements now exist in all Australian jurisdictions with the exception of Western 
Australia. The South Australian, Tasmanian, Northern Territory and ACT Governments require 
RISs to be produced for both primary and subordinate legislation. RISs are required only for 
subordinate legislation in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. In Western Australia 
impact statements focus only on small business and regional effects.      





limiting clearing or other ways of delivering environmental goals) were formally 
considered.  
In South Australia, a voluntary scheme was introduced in 1980 that provided 
financial incentives to encourage farmers to enter into heritage agreements to retain 
and manage areas of native vegetation. The assistance on offer was not sufficient to 
encourage many landholders to enter into agreements, and the program was 
abolished in 1985. The Tasmanian Government has ‘placed a strong emphasis on 
facilitating conservation on private land through incentives, conservation plans, 
education and awareness’ (sub. 201, p. 8) although it also recently announced an 
extension of regulation. 
The WA Government (sub. DR290) argued that there has been ongoing State and 
Territory government consideration of alternative approaches to native vegetation 
regulation as part of the national environmental policy process. The National 
Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (1992) and the National 
Strategy for Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity (1996) were cited as 
examples of programs where alternative policy options have been considered, 
including options for managing the clearing of native vegetation. In relation to 
consideration given to policy approaches other than regulation to achieve 
environmental objectives, the WA Government argued that an: 
 … enormous amount of effort … has been devoted to these policy questions by all 
Governments, and stakeholders, over an extended period. (sub. DR290, p. 3) 
Moreover, the WA Government considered that the introduction of State and 
Territory regulations was often influenced by Australian Government policy: 
… examples of the Commonwealth driving the agenda to control land clearing include 
the  National Land and Water Resource Audit …  and the National Objectives and 
Targets for Biodiversity Conservation 2001-2005 … and very importantly, linking 
these to Commonwealth funding programs such as the Natural Heritage Trust. 
(sub. DR290, p. 3)  
There is evidence that financial incentives increasingly are recognised as having a 
role in encouraging appropriate management of native vegetation (for example, 
payments for fencing and, in some States, stewardship programs) and therefore in 
supplementing regulation. However, a strong underlying view remains that 
regulation is required to prevent further clearing. This view does not appear to be 
based on an assessment of the relative efficacy of regulation4 in achieving 
environmental goals, but may simply reflect cost-sharing preferences. For example, 
                                              
4  In a Victorian Government working paper, Stoneham et al. (2003) proffer an argument for 
regulation of clearing on efficiency grounds. However, no such rationale had been suggested 
previously by State and Territory governments.      





the Victorian Government commented that in ‘Victoria’s case, the legislative and 
regulatory framework for native vegetation defines, in effect, a landholder’s ‘duty 
of care’ for biodiversity on their land’ (sub. 185, p. 18). 
The Victorian Government also noted that it was continually seeking to implement 
the most cost-effective policies, although regulation generally would underpin other 
mechanisms:  
Victoria has traditionally focussed on delivering biodiversity outcomes via a mix of 
regulation and investment through information and education programs. More recently, 
market-based mechanisms have been successfully developed and Victoria continues to 
investigate the relative benefits of alternative approaches for their ability to achieve 
desired biodiversity and native vegetation protection and management outcomes in a 
cost-effective manner. As a general rule most voluntary, self-regulatory and/or market-
based mechanisms are underpinned by regulation. (sub. 185, p. 14) 
A somewhat similar approach is being adopted by the NSW Government. 
Approximately $406 million, jointly funded by the Australian and NSW 
Governments, has been made available to implement natural resource management 
reform in New South Wales. Part of these funds are to ‘encourage land managers to 
actively manage and restore vegetation’ (DIPNR 2003a, p.  2). While the 
introduction of financial incentives is an important component of the reforms, 
regulation remains central to the regime, with the Government also intending to 
strengthen the native vegetation compliance framework (NSW Legislative 
Assembly, 12 November, p. 4898).  
In most jurisdictions, little formal consideration has been given to policy 
approaches other than regulation for delivering environmental goals. Regulation 
impact assessments, or equivalent assessments in the absence of formal RIS 
requirements, do not appear to have been undertaken. 
Consideration of costs and benefits 
As far as the Commission has been able to ascertain, no jurisdiction has attempted a 
benefit–cost analysis (in the sense of quantifying likely costs and benefits) of 
clearing regulations across States and Territories prior to or, indeed, since their 
introduction. That said, some jurisdictions state that they seek a balance of 
environmental, economic and social considerations (for example, the NSW 
NVC Act and Native Vegetation Act, and the Tasmanian Government’s 20-year 
social, economic and environmental plan Tasmania Together). 
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While the benefits of the regulatory regimes seem to be accepted as axiomatic, that 
they may impose costs appears to be less well accepted. In part, this may reflect a 
view expressed by the Australian Conservation Foundation that ‘many of the 
benefits of protecting biodiversity and controlling land clearing accrue to 
landholders themselves, although this is not often acknowledged’ (sub. 146, p. 14). 
(Potential benefits accruing to landholders of current regimes are considered in 
chapter 6). 
Commenting on the introduction of the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (VM Act) 
in Queensland, AgForce stated that:  
In the lead up to the legislation being debated and subsequent to its passing through 
Parliament, there has been NO assessment of the likely social and economic impact on 
individuals as well as rural and regional communities. (sub. 54, p. 40) 
The Queensland Government is to introduce measures to offset some of the costs 
associated with reforms to native vegetation management announced in March 2003 
(box 3.1). A $150 million financial assistance package is to be made available to 
landholders ‘disadvantaged’ by changes to tree clearing laws: 
The bulk of that funding, some $130 million, will form a structural adjustment package 
similar to existing industry adjustment packages. It will assist landholders significantly 
disadvantaged by the new vegetation framework, with a focus on sustaining primary 
production in the affected regions. Twelve million dollars will be provided for targeted 
incentives to support landholders willing to manage and maintain remnant and high 
value non-remnant native vegetation as part of their operation. The remaining $8 
million will be used to provide direct financial assistance to support rural industry 
groups in promoting best management practices in sustainable agriculture. (Queensland 
Legislative Assembly, 18 March 2004, p. 66) 
The WA Government acknowledged that some costs were imposed by the 
regulations, albeit that these were likely to be small: 
… the progressive tightening of clearing controls during the 1990s has affected land 
values, albeit not in a uniform way. The Valuer-General’s office advises that in the 
more remote wheat and cropping areas the value of uncleared land has been 
significantly discounted, but in the higher rainfall and more populated areas land values 
are being sustained by non-agricultural buyers.  
The rural real estate market has been adjusting to the tighter clearing controls 
introduced in the past decade. The landowner who has held bushland for more than a 
decade with the expectation of future development prospects is most affected. The 
proportion of landowners in this category is small. (sub. 151, p. 3) 
As discussed in chapter  6, Western Australia and South Australia have offered 
limited compensation at various times to landholders for the effects of clearing 
restrictions; Victoria, Queensland and Tasmania provide for compensation for the     





effects of biodiversity legislation but these provisions have been exercised 
infrequently.   
FINDING 3.2 
In most jurisdictions, there has been limited assessment of the likely economic and 
social costs of native vegetation and biodiversity regulatory regimes, while the 
benefits of the regimes appear to be taken as self-evident. 
Consultation when introducing native vegetation legislation  
The level of consultation associated with the introduction of legislation and 
associated regulations has varied across and within jurisdictions. In some instances, 
there appears to have been a decision taken deliberately not to consult in order to 
prevent pre-emptive clearing of vegetation (for example, Victoria in 1987 and South 
Australia in 1983,5 and Western Australia and Queensland in 2003). The SA 
Government commented that: 
Legislation controlling the clearance of native vegetation needs to be drafted in 
consultation with stakeholders, however panic clearing is a real issue for other States 
without legislation. The South Australian experience is that a moratorium on clearance 
is vital. (sub. DR324, p. ii) 
In Queensland, the Minister noted in the second reading speech for the Vegetation 
(Application for Clearing) Act 2003, which established a moratorium on 
applications to clear native vegetation, that:   
… the halt was agreed to in discussions between the Commonwealth and Queensland 
governments as a precursor to consultation with stakeholders about strengthening 
vegetation management arrangements across the State. (Queensland Legislative 
Assembly, 27 May 2003, p. 2082) 
In terms of the operation of the native vegetation regimes, the Queensland 
Government has encouraged stakeholder involvement in development of clearing 
guidelines for leasehold and freehold land, as well as through regional committees, 
which are discussed below. 
In some jurisdictions, consultation appears to be regarded as an important part of 
the development of environmental policy. The Tasmanian Government, for 
example, advised that it places significant weight on the role of community 
participation in establishing ‘an agreed direction for the use and development of 
resources and the appropriate parameters to achieve it’ (sub. 201, p. 5). 
                                              
5  In South Australia, extensive consultation was undertaken prior to the introduction of a 
replacement regime in 1985.      





In the Northern Territory and in New South Wales, consultation has occurred after 
the introduction of interim measures. Following the introduction of SEPP  46 in 
1995, the NSW Government undertook extensive consultation prior to the 
introduction of the NVC Act — which included the establishment of a community 
forum, and the release of a White Paper seeking public comment.  
Consultation prior to the implementation of the Native Vegetation Act in New 
South Wales appears to have been focussed on key interest groups. In response to a 
report released by the Wentworth Group (2003), the NSW Government appointed 
the Native Vegetation Reform Implementation Group (NVRIG) to identify ways to 
improve native vegetation management. The NVRIG comprised members of the 
NSW Farmers’ Association (NSWFA), peak environmental interests, the 
Wentworth Group and representatives of State government agencies. The NVRIG’s 
report (NVRIG 2003) formed the basis of reforms introduced in late 2003.  
Following the introduction of a 2-year Interim Development Control Order 
prohibiting the clearing of native vegetation on freehold or Crown land without 
consent, the Northern Territory Planning Act is currently being reviewed with 
public submissions invited.  
Notwithstanding the existence of formal consultation channels, the Commission 
received several complaints from landholders about a lack of consultation and 
transparency of process. This was especially the case when criteria for assessing 
clearing applications had been tightened via policy announcements, regulation or 
administration rather than by legislative amendment.  
For example, in Victoria, a 1997 policy announcement targeting no net loss of 
native vegetation by 2001, has been strengthened to a policy of ‘net gain’. This 
policy has since been promulgated as regulation. While such changes may have 
significant implications for the assessment of clearing applications (and planting 
offset requirements), they have been introduced into the planning system without 
the scrutiny that normally would accompany legislative amendment. The Victorian 
Farmers Federation (VFF) noted that although the rules look the same, their 
interpretation changes (sub. 149).  
Several participants criticised the WA Government for failing to consult. John Dival 
claimed that: 
The degree of transparency and extent of community consultation when developing 
regulatory conservation regimes has been low, and, when implementing the regimes at 
an individual level, almost secretive. (sub. 137, p. 24)     





Peter Wren expressed a similar view: 
The West Australian State Planning Strategy and in particular the Leeuwin-Naturaliste 
Statement of Planning Policy in 1998 … arbitrarily reclassified our land use categories 
from rural and farming to reflect nature conservation and landscape values. 
Consultation with private landowners was available only after the maps were drawn 
and new land use categories set. No consideration whatsoever was granted as to the 
financial implications of losing the choice to determine the future use of our private 
freehold land. (sub. 119, p. 1) 
The WA Government explained its approach:  
The level of consultation has varied depending on whether the change that has been 
implemented is an incremental change or a major change. For example, the 1995 policy 
announcement signalling a tougher approach to clearing applications was a change in 
approach to clearing applications rather than a whole new regime for considering 
clearing applications, and so did not go through a broad public consultation process. On 
the other hand, the proposal for a new Biodiversity Conservation Act to replace the 
existing Wildlife Conservation Act 1950 is a clear change in the regime relating to 
biodiversity conservation, and is going through a detailed public consultation process 
involving public comment on a consultation paper and draft Bill. (sub. 151, p. 7) 
The WA Government also highlighted the level of consultation associated with the 
introduction amendments to the Environmental Protection Act 1986 (EP Act): 
… a number of reviews of the current system of native vegetation regulation have 
occurred including the final report of the Native Vegetation Working Group (2000) and 
the  Report from the Inter-Departmental Committee on Native Vegetation (2001). 
Groups representing landholder, conservation interests and Government compiled these 
reports … a large proportion of the amendments … to the EP Act are a result of 
implementing recommendations from these reports. (sub. DR290, p. 13) 
Consultation when introducing biodiversity legislation 
In jurisdictions that have introduced biodiversity (threatened species and ecosystem) 
legislation, the Commission did not receive any comments about a lack of 
consultation prior to the introduction of the legislation. In 1988, Victoria introduced 
the  Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act 1988 (FFG Act). Queensland introduced 
similar legislation in 1994, and New South Wales and Tasmania in 1995. Western 
Australia is in the process of introducing biodiversity legislation. (There is no 
specific biodiversity legislation in South Australia, the Northern Territory or the 
Australian Capital Territory.) 
The Tasmanian Government consulted with interested parties prior to introducing 
the  Threatened Species Protection Act 1995. In Western Australia, the current 
proposal for a Biodiversity Conservation Act is undergoing a detailed public 
consultation process involving a consultation paper and a draft Bill.      





There appears to have been little public consultation associated with the 
introduction of the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (TSC Act) in New 
South Wales. In the second reading speech for the Bill in 1995, the Minister 
acknowledged that there was a lack of time to undertake adequate consultation 
because the existing threatened species legislation, the Endangered Fauna (Interim 
Protection) Act 1991, was due to expire and a new Act needed to be introduced 
urgently. The Minister stated that:  
… intensive effort has gone into the development of new legislation and a detailed 
scheme was delineated. Inevitably, however, there has not been time available for full 
consultation with industry or with conservation interests. We knew that this would be 
the case. Having given a preliminary briefing on the new scheme to key stakeholders in 
recent days, it was obvious that both conservation and industry interests had 
concerns … (NSW Legislative Assembly, 7 December 1995, p. 4483) 
There have been some concerns about the transparency and extent of community 
consultation regarding the operation of the regulatory regimes established under 
biodiversity legislation in New South Wales and Tasmania. For example, concerns 
have been expressed about the processes used to determine species listings as well 
as about the development and implementation of species recovery plans. In 
Tasmania, the Resource Planning Development Commission (RPDC 2002, p. 51) 
observed that while: 
… consultation has occurred on what is essentially a technical scientific issue with a 
limited number of interested stakeholders, it appears that the process for community 
consultation on changes … for management of priority species has not always been full 
and open to the public.  
The NSWFA (2003a) questioned the effectiveness and integrity of the listing 
process in the State. The Local Government Association & Shires Association of 
NSW observed: 
… in relation to socio-economic implications of listings of threatened species through 
the [TSC Act] … Greater consultation with the regional and local community is 
required to ensure that recovery plans for these species can be implemented with 
success, and fully consider the implications to local communities. (sub. 178, p. 2) 
The VFF considered that there was appropriate scope for public consultation 
contained in the provisions of the FFG Act: 
The [FFG Act] is far less adversarial than much of Victoria’s other conservation 
legislation and regulation, and appears designed around consultation and agreement, 
rather than command and control. There are also provisions within this Act for payment 
of compensation to landowners who are required to protect a critical habitat. It is felt 
that this legislation has been largely usurped by the VPPs, which has no provision for 
compensation and requires protection of all native species at the cost of the landowner. 
(sub. 149, p. 7)     






The level of consultation associated with the introduction of native vegetation 
legislation and associated regulations has varied across jurisdictions. In some 
jurisdictions, there has been adequate consultation; in others, there has been little 
or no public consultation. This has been the case particularly when regimes have 
been introduced to avoid pre-emptive clearing, or in cases when regimes have been 
changed through policy announcements, regulation or administration rather than 
legislative amendment.  
Generally, there has been greater public consultation about the development of 
biodiversity legislation than native vegetation legislation, but the processes for 
consultation in application of the Acts vary. 
Regional consultation processes 
An important element of the native vegetation regimes operating in New South 
Wales, Victoria and Queensland has been the promotion of regional approaches to 
guide native vegetation management. Regional committees and processes have been 
a major vehicle for fostering community involvement and consultation. 
In Queensland and Victoria draft plans have been developed for all designated 
regions (24 regions in Queensland and 10 catchment areas in Victoria) but await 
approval. In New South Wales, 2 plans of a potential 22 were finalised before the 
process was suspended in 2003. Under reforms introduced by the NSW 
Government in late 2003, a new regional system of vegetation management is to be 
implemented, with 13 Catchment Management Authorities replacing the existing 
Regional Vegetation Committees, Catchment Management Boards and Water 
Management Committees. 
The Commission received evidence about the effectiveness of regional consultation 
processes. A common theme was that, even where the consultative process had 
worked well and a draft plan had been developed, plans submitted for approval had 
been subsequently modified by State Governments or, in the case of Queensland 
and New South Wales, superseded by changes in the regulatory framework. (In 
New South Wales, the RVMP process ended with the introduction of the Native 
Vegetation Act, whereas in Queensland, the regional planning process ended with 
the announced moratorium on new clearing applications).  
Peter Voller described the consultation process in developing regional plans in 
south-western Queensland:  
The process we ran was participative. We had over 400 land-holders who actually 
participated in a discussion paper process before we even started writing the vegetation     





plans and across south-west Queensland over 1200 people formally participated in 
written discussions with us about their concerns before we even started writing and that 
process of communicative participation is the basis of those quite supportive and 
powerful outcomes in terms of vegetation planning in our landscape. (trans., p. 1022) 
At public hearings in Moree, several landholders from south-western Queensland 
praised the efforts of Mr Voller in ‘husbanding’ their regional plans; they also 
expressed their disappointment about the announcement in May 2003 of a clearing 
moratorium which: 
… left everyone with a very bitter taste in their mouth because really we put an awful 
lot of time into this process and we were told we should have been talking about 
greenhouse and not biodiversity or as well as biodiversity. (Denzil Mills, 
trans., p. 1024) 
The Institute of Public Affairs noted that while, in some cases, the regional planning 
process may have been effective in involving local communities it ‘does not mean 
that they had any effect other than as a listening post’ (sub. DR279, p. 4). Similarly, 
Murrumbidgee Irrigation argued that a number of shortcomings with the RVMP 
process in New South Wales limited its effectiveness and contributed to community 
frustration: 
… the department support was patchy, data was limited, advice was inconsistent and 
the focus squarely on legislative means. Ideas developed at the committee level to deal 
with a regional issue were often overridden by the government desire to have a single 
approach across the state. This just compounds the regional community feeling that 
they are not consulted and remote/political decisions are being made with no reference 
to the local considerations. (sub. DR262, pp. 1–2) 
In relation to draft regional vegetation management plans prepared for Victoria’s 
catchments, the VFF stated that:  
… in the last few months the VFF has learned that these Draft Regional Native 
Vegetation Plans have been internally reviewed and edited by Catchment Management 
Authorities to conform to the State Framework. It is understood that these substantially 
altered documents are being prepared for imminent release, without the stakeholder 
involvement required to ensure practical applications are considered.  (sub. 149,  
pp. 6–7). 
Regional committees often include representatives from outside the region for 
which a plan was being developed (for example, from environmental non-
government organisations and State government agencies). This issue appears to 
have been a particular concern in New South Wales. The Local Government 
Association and Shires Association of New South Wales noted that there was a 
concern in local communities:     





… in relation to Committee representatives making decisions about future activities in 
a region but not residing in the region, or having any link to the region, or livelihood 
dependent on the economy of the region. (sub. 178, p. 3) 
The range of diverse interests on committees sometimes makes consensus in 
decision making difficult, and has the potential to extend the time required to 
achieve consensus. The problem of consensus decision-making in natural resource 
management was highlighted with regard to New South Wales: 
The risk is that committees relying on total consensus often make limited progress 
toward developing resource management plans and dissolve into unresolvable stand-
offs. (Thompson 2001, p. 66)  
In New South Wales and Queensland, questions were raised as to whether regional 
committees had adequate resources to develop effective regional management 
plans, including technical and other support, including good quality mapping. 
AgForce (Queensland) commented: 
… without mapping and data accuracy, incorrect decisions will be made. Mapping 
needs to be ‘ground-truthed’ and other data tested with appropriate bodies before being 
used as guidance on any environmental issues. AgForce has examples of incorrect 
mapping that has led to unfounded warrants being issued on landholders. 
(sub. 54, pp. 43–4) 
Legislation introduced by the NSW Government in December 2003, appears to be 
intended to improve the regional management process by addressing issues such as 
a lack of funding and non-local participation on regional committees. 
Generally, regional consultation processes have been effective in involving local 
communities in native vegetation management. However, the effectiveness of the 
process in some jurisdictions appears to have been hampered by inadequate 
technical support (such as accurate mapping) and a lack of funding. ‘Outside’ 
representation on regional committees also appears to have been a source of 
discontent with some consultation processes.  
Disenchantment with the regional consultation process has arisen where regional 
vegetation management plans have not been adopted or, subsequently, have been 
changed by government. 
3.3  Key features of the regimes 
The regulatory regimes in each State and Territory, with one or two exceptions, are 
broadly similar in their approach in that a permit is generally required to remove 
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native vegetation, unless the activity is specifically exempted (box 3.2). Broadly 
speaking, in most jurisdictions, exemptions are designed to allow small-scale 
clearing for personal use and routine farm management. Urban residential and 
industrial areas also usually are exempt from native vegetation regulations, although 
not new developments on agricultural land. Thus all jurisdictions allow some 
removal of native vegetation, but regimes differ significantly in their detail and 
impacts.  
In Queensland, restrictions placed on leaseholders are somewhat more onerous than 
those placed on owners of freehold title. In New South Wales, Victoria, South 
Australia and Western Australia, regulation generally extends to the clearing of 
native grasslands. In Queensland and Tasmania grasslands are excluded from the 
general regulatory framework. (However, there may be restrictions on the removal 
of certain species of native grasslands under threatened species or biodiversity 
legislation in these States).  
Variation also exists in the extent to which regulation applies to the clearing of non-
native vegetation, and to native vegetation planted by landholders. For example, a 
permit is required for the removal of non-native trees and shrubs on leasehold land 
in Queensland and for the removal of non-native forest vegetation in Tasmania. In 
New South Wales a permit generally is not required for the removal of non-native 
vegetation except on areas designated as being susceptible to land degradation 
(steeply sloping land and land alongside streams and riverbanks).  
A summary of the main features of native vegetation legislation in each State and 
Territory is provided in table 3.3. It should be noted that the information in the table 
relates only to the primary native vegetation legislation in each jurisdiction — in 
some instances, biodiversity legislation or local planning instruments may override 
the requirements described in the table.     






Box 3.2  Key definitions and requirements  
New South Wales 
Under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997, a permit is required to clear native 
vegetation including: indigenous trees; understorey plants; groundcover (where native 
vegetation is not less than 50 per cent of vegetation); and wetland plants in areas 
where a regional plan has not been developed or an exemption does not apply.  
The  Native Vegetation Act 2003 provides new definitions for native vegetation, 
regrowth and broadscale clearing. Native vegetation includes indigenous trees, 
understorey plants and groundcover. Vegetation is considered indigenous if it is of a 
species, or comprises a species of vegetation that existed in the State before 
European settlement. Broadscale clearing is not to be permitted unless ‘it improves or 
maintains environmental outcomes’ (s. 3). Consent is not required to clear regrowth (as 
defined in the Act). In cases where consent is needed to clear native vegetation, 
landholders have two options: submitting a development application to the Department 
of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources; or submitting a Property Vegetation 
Plan to the relevant Catchment Management Authority.  
Victoria 
Permits are required to remove, destroy or lop any native vegetation. The overarching 
objectives are ‘net gain’ and, where possible, to avoid clearing. However, some 
flexibility is introduced through offsets. The area to be revegetated or protected, as an 
offset, is linked to the quality and quantity of the vegetation to be cleared.  
South Australia 
Permits are required for clearing native vegetation, which is defined as naturally-
occurring local native plants including trees, native grasses, wetland plants and marine 
plants. Clearing is not permitted if native vegetation provides significant habitat or 
diversity of plant species; is a rare, vulnerable or endangered species; is in a wetland 
environment; is a significant remnant in an area already cleared to a significant extent; 
or if clearing would contribute to soil erosion or salinity or a deterioration in surface or 
underground water quality. 
Australian Capital Territory 
A licence is required for the felling of native timber on leasehold land. Native timber is 
defined as timber taken from a tree which is a native plant. Considerations taken into 
account when assessing a licence application include: the effect of the felling on the 
land to which the application relates; the conservation requirements of the native 
timber species or ecological community with which it is associated; and the 
management objectives for the land. 
(Continued next page) 
 
     






Box 3.2  (continued) 
Western Australia 
Landholders are required to notify the Commissioner of Soil and Land Conservation of 
their intention to remove native vegetation. Clearing can proceed in 90 days if objection 
is not raised. The grounds for objecting are officially limited to land degradation issues 
such as salinity. Where there may be implications for biodiversity or water quality, the 
proposal is referred to the government agency with responsibility for the legislation 
dealing with that issue. Under legislation passed in October 2003, a permit system is to 
be introduced where it will become an offence to clear without a permit. The legislation 
contains clearing principles that must be considered when assessing applications for 
permits. The clearing principles are based on principles in use in South Australia. 
Queensland 
Permits are required for clearing native vegetation, which includes any native tree or 
plant other than grass or mangrove on private land; and trees and shrubs (which need 
not be native) on leasehold land. Clearing of remnant ‘endangered’ ecosystems, areas 
of high conservation value or areas vulnerable to land degradation generally is not 
allowed on leasehold or freehold land. For leasehold land, ‘of concern’ regional 
ecosystems are also protected and additional objectives such as visual and landscape 
values may guide decisions.  
Under the proposed Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 
2004, broadscale clearing on both freehold and leasehold land is to be phased out by 
2006. The proposed legislation provides for a transitional clearing cap of 500 000 ha, 
some of which will be allocated to landholders through a ballot. Broadscale clearing 
permits will not be issued once the ballot process has been completed. Landholders 
will be able to make ongoing applications to clear some vegetation for the purposes of 
thinning out ‘thickening vegetation’ and managing invasive weeds. Landholders will not 
be required to obtain approval to clear vegetation designated as ‘regrowth’ through an 
agreed Property Map of Assessable Vegetation.  
Tasmania 
An approved ‘forest practice plan’ is required for clearing trees (clearing, cutting, 
pushing or otherwise removing, or destroying in any way). The regulation applies to 
forest vegetation only — any woody plants with a height or potential height of 5 metres 
or more, whether native or introduced. The primary objective of the legislation is to 
achieve sustainable management of public and private forests with due care for the 
environment. 
Northern Territory 
Permits are required for cutting down (but not lopping) or destroying native vegetation 
by any means. The objective has not been to stop clearing but to ensure that it occurs 





Table 3.3  Selected features of State and Territory native vegetation regulations 
Regulatory requirements to clear native vegetationa 
  New South Wales  Victoria  Queensland  South Australia 
  Native Vegetation 
Conservation Act 




Native Vegetation Act 
Approval not required  • Less than 2 ha/year 
• Regrowth less than 
10 years old 
• Fencelines 
• Routine agricultural 
activities 
• Regrowth (as defined 
in the Act) 
• Properties of less 
than 0.4 ha  
• Firebreaks 
• Regrowth less than 
10 years old 
• Clearing associated 
with building a single 
residence 
• Clearing for routine 
management 
(including regrowth)  
• To comply with 
another Act 
• Maintenance of 
agricultural land for 
cultivation 
• Regrowth less than 
5 years old 














• Apply to have 
vegetation classified 
as ‘regrowth’, which 
can then be cleared 
• Application to local 
council to clear native 
vegetation. State 
Government is the 
referral authority for 
applications greater 
than 10 ha 
•  Approvals granted 
usually contain offset 
requirements to meet 
‘net gain’ policy 






• A moratorium has 
been placed on 
accepting 
applications to clear 
remnant native 
vegetation 
• Approval required 
from statutory 
authority to remove 
any non-exempt 
native vegetation 




not be granted 
• Stricter guidelines for 
‘State protected land’ 
(steeply sloping land, 
riparian land) 
• Broadscale clearing 




• Clearing of ‘protected 
regrowth’ 
  • Stricter guidelines for 
areas of ‘high 
conservation value’ or 
‘vulnerable to land 
degradation’ 
• Where vegetation 
contains a high level 
of diversity; and 
where it contains 
significant habitat for 
wildlife 
(Continued next page)  
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Table 3.3  (continued) 
  Western Australia  Tasmania  Northern Territory  ACT 




Forests Practices Act  Planning Actc  Nature Conservation 
Act 
Approval not required  • Less than 1 ha of 
land 
• Details currently 
being negotiated 
• Where volume of 
timber harvested is 
less than 100 tonnes 
a year, or the area of 
land is less than 1 ha 
• Less than 1 ha of 
land 
• Weed removal 
• Lopping  
• Timber planted by 
landholder 
• Timber cleared for 
personal use 
Approval process  • Notification to 
statutory authority of 
intention to clear 
more than 1 ha of 
land for change in 
land use. If no 
objection received, 
clearing may proceed 






• A ‘no net loss’ 




• Approval required 
from statutory 
authority to remove 
any non-exempt trees 
(exotic or native) 











not be granted 
• Some proposals may 
be referred to State 
Government for 
further assessment 
• Proposals with 
implications for 
salinity are unlikely to 
be approved 
  • Proposed clearing 
that is inconsistent 
with the published 
guidelines  
  
a Regulatory requirements described in this table are not comprehensive. In addition, in some instances biodiversity legislation or local planning instruments may 
override or complement the requirements described. b Provisions of this legislation relating to some aspects of native vegetation management are yet to take effect. 
c Applies to freehold land only.     





3.4  Implementation and administration  
In this section, the processes for submitting and assessing applications to clear 
native vegetation in the various jurisdictions are discussed and assessed. 
Obtaining approval to clear native vegetation 
In all jurisdictions, the onus for determining whether approval is required to clear or 
modify native vegetation lies with the landholder. In most jurisdictions, State and 
Territory government agencies have provided considerable information on the 
requirements necessary to comply with legislative regimes. However, the 
Commission received evidence that the demands placed on landholders to 
understand the operation and interaction of the various regimes were often 
significant. Landholders are required to determine which, if any, legislative regime 
applies to the proposed activity — for example, local government planning order, 
State legislation (threatened species or native vegetation controls) or the Australian 
Government’s EPBC Act.  
Complexity 
Complex regulatory regimes increase the costs to landholders in terms of the time 
and effort needed to understand the regulation. Uncertainty as to how regulations 
apply may also result in non-compliance due to incorrect interpretation of the 
restrictions. The complexity of regulation was an issue that was raised by 
participants from most jurisdictions (box 3.3).  
The South Grafton Residents Progress Association (New South Wales) argued: 
The statutes are very complex and will require considerable expenditure on the part of 
landholders to ensure that they do not become penalised for breaching various sections 
of one or more of the requirements. 
Where clearing of an area requiring the submission of a development application 
becomes necessary the landholder (at his/her cost) could be required to secure expert 
reports as well as legal assistance to ensure that their application has a chance of 
success. Further costs will be incurred if an appeal mechanism is undertaken when an 
application is rejected. (sub. 104, pp. 2–3) 
     





Box 3.3  Participants’ views on the complexity of native vegetation and 
biodiversity regulation 
AgForce (Queensland): 
The key point is that the interpretation of the different requirements of State and Federal 
Legislation requires considerable advice  …  The impact of these Acts and the 
inconsistencies between them create a high level of uncertainty for producers in terms of 
their right to develop and manage their properties. They also create significant expense in 
seeking advice and approval under each Act. (sub. 54, pp. 4–5) 
Kempsey Shire Council (New South Wales): 
The confusion and often intimidation felt by many farmers as a result of this complicated 
procedure (gaining consent) may drive farmers to undertake works in an illegal manner 
(according to one piece of legislation or another). Many farmers have indicated (to me) that 
this menagerie of legislation requirements is often used by agencies to avoid the 
identification of responsibilities in certain situations by certain agencies. (sub. 3, p. 2) 
South Australian Farmers’ Federation: 
Enquiries regarding native vegetation matters represent a major proportion of concerned 
farmer calls to the South Australian Farmers’ Federation on natural resource matters. In an 
attempt to rectify the confusion that exists in rural communities the Federation has published 
a series of articles — written by Native Vegetation Council Officers — detailing the current 
controls on clearing and existing exemptions. The need to do this is evidence enough of a 
failure by the Council to properly communicate current rules and regulations to the general 
public. (sub. 140, p. 10) 
Reserve Design Management (Tasmania): 
One of the main issues we had come across in [dealing with some local councils] was that 
there was a very limited understanding and an enormous amount of confusion in the 
community about the responsibilities of individuals, the requirements that are placed on 
organisations by legislation, regulation and the opportunities that exist for them to achieve 
funding. (trans., p. 801) 
 
 
Inconsistencies in regulation 
Understanding of, and compliance with, regulation appears to be impeded in some 
jurisdictions as a result of inconsistencies in regulatory regimes. In New South 
Wales, for example, clearing that is exempt under the NVC Act may be subject to 
other regulation such as a local government planning order or a recovery plan made 
under the threatened species legislation. The National Farmers’ Federation argued, 
in relation to the situation in New South Wales, that: 
Farmers [who] are required to comply with the [NVC Act] … must seek approval to 
clear land … unless it falls within a statutory exception … Yet where a proposed 
development activity falls within this exception it may still trigger the [TSC Act] which 
may result in severe restrictions in property use. Under the [TSC Act] where a species 
is identified as ‘threatened’ it is an offence to ‘harm, pick or damage’ the species and     





potential development is likely to involve an expensive and time-consuming Species 
Impact Statement. The [TSC Act] provides that clearing done in the interests of 
‘routine agriculture’ may be exempt from the operation of the Act yet fails to provide 
any definition of what this exemption entails. (sub. 128, p. 15) 
In relation to Queensland, the Queensland Farmers’ Federation observed:  
Amid the natural resource management reform process of late, it is clear that 
Queensland’s primary producers are struggling to keep up with the raft of natural 
resource management agendas at local, State and Commonwealth levels. In Queensland 
natural resource management has evolved in a piecemeal fashion, with vegetation, 
water, salinity, greenhouse, biodiversity conservation, chemical management and other 
priorities addressed inconsistently in terms of planning and the subsequent 
implementation of such planning. (sub. 177, p. 1) 
Inconsistency between legislation does not appear to be a problem in jurisdictions 
where decisions made under the primary vegetation legislation have primacy over 
other regulatory instruments, such as in Tasmania. 
Some considered that the administration of native vegetation regulations had 
implications for other legislative and policy objectives, such as controlling noxious 
weeds and maintaining road safety.  
In New South Wales, some participants argued that native vegetation controls were 
preventing landholders from meeting their obligations under the Noxious Weeds Act 
1993  to remove designated species of weeds from their properties. Rod Young 
(trans., pp. 1240–59) argued that when ‘cost-effective’ measures such as the 
spraying and burning of weeds are prohibited because of their implications for 
native vegetation, landholders are effectively prevented from managing the weeds. 
Other NSW participants who expressed similar views included Doug Stanton and 
Jim Edwards (trans., pp. 1240–59) and Anne Waugh (sub. 106).  
The Dalrymple Landcare Committee (Queensland, trans., pp. 1047–56) observed 
that the Dalrymple Shire Council classified Parkinsonia as a ‘high priority’ weed 
targeted for control in the local catchment area. However, native vegetation 
regulations have prevented the Landcare Committee from employing measures to 
control the weed. In this situation, the native vegetation regulations ‘have taken 
precedence’ (trans., p. 1052). 
Robin Weatherald (trans., pp. 1596–602) described the tension in Victoria between 
local government requirements to manage roadside vegetation for safety purposes 
and State vegetation management regulations.      




Mr Weatherald considered that councils’ ability to manage native vegetation was 
hampered by the legislation and contributed to increased compliance costs: 
… there’s an extraordinarily large amount of money being required to be spent on 
roadside vegetation and its management. Just the removal of one tree basically has the 
estimated cost of approximately up to $5000 in paperwork bureaucracy. We’ve had it 
explained to us by officers that in particular positions, the lopping of limbs off 
overhanging trees on roadways will require a planning permit …  
It’s totally unsustainable for local government in my opinion to continue on down this 
process. (trans., pp. 1597–8) 
Other participants who highlighted the issue of native vegetation regulations and 
road safety included Geoff Sebire (trans., pp.  1609–23) from Victoria and Sally 
McKay and Jim McDowall (trans., pp. 1689–702) from South Australia.   
The obligations placed on landholders by the various regimes often seem 
unnecessarily complex and onerous. In some jurisdictions, landholders are required 
to obtain approval from several government departments and authorities. 
Assessment of applications to clear native vegetation 
Applications for permits to clear native vegetation are usually the responsibility of a 
State government agency or statutory body (for example, the Native Vegetation 
Council (NVC) in South Australia and the Forest Practices Board in Tasmania). In 
Victoria, under the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (PE Act), local government 
assesses small applications, but for applications to clear an area greater than 
10  hectares, local government is required to seek the view of the Victorian 
Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) and implement their decision. 
Under the proposed NSW regime, landholders may apply to the DIPNR for 
development consent to clear native vegetation, or submit a Property Vegetation 
Plan (outlining the proposed removal or modification of native vegetation) to a 
Catchment Management Authority for certification. The Forest Practices Act 1985 
(FP Act) in Tasmania provides for limited self-regulation, where landholders and 
the forestry industry have some responsibility for the development and certification 
of Forest Practice Plans. 
Transparency and consistency 
In a number of jurisdictions the decision-making process has been criticised for a 
lack of transparency. Transparency may be aided by the publication of guidelines on 
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how applications are assessed, and by making available the reasons and rationale for 
rejecting or accepting a particular application.  
The Audit Office of New South Wales considered that there were a number of 
factors that contributed to a lack of transparency in the assessment process in that 
State. These factors included that internal staff guidelines for assessment, and 
detailed assessment reports on decisions, were not made available to the public and 
that there were no public hearings for major proposals (AONSW 2002). 
In South Australia, operation of the Native Vegetation Act 1991 (NV Act) has been 
criticised for a lack of transparency (Elliot 1999a). The Act was amended in 2002, 
in part, to ensure that the process of permit approvals for native vegetation follows a 
more transparent process, including allowing public comment in relation to the 
granting or refusal of consent to an application to clear native vegetation. 
The WA Government considered that recent amendments to the EP Act will 
contribute to a more open decision-making process: 
The new legislation will require proposals to clear native vegetation to be advertised, 
and submissions from the public to be considered. All decisions will be made public, 
along with the reasons for the decision and proponents and third parties may appeal 
these decisions. This will allow third parties to obtain information regarding permits 
and decisions and submit appeals and comments. (sub. DR290, p. 14)  
A lack of transparency appears to have contributed to perceptions of inconsistency 
in the determination of applications in a number of jurisdictions (box  3.4). 
Assessment processes were also criticised for using policies or decision-making 
rules that were not clearly articulated in the relevant legislation or supporting policy 
documents. In some jurisdictions, participants considered officers administering the 
regulations had too much discretion in interpreting and applying regulation. 
In New South Wales, Mark Drury provided an example of apparent inconsistent 
application of regulations in regard to the need for exemptions to clear certain types 
of native grasses: 
… the fact that [the requirement to submit a clearing application] has been applied 
differently in different regions by different representatives of the one regulatory 
authority is surely a matter of great concern … Representatives from the Department of 
Land and Water Conservation [DLWC]  …  operating in the northern part of my 
organisation’s operating area were requiring clearing applications to be submitted 
before any form of clearing could be undertaken on native grasses when representatives 
in my area of working were allowing clearing of such grasses under exemptions set out 
in the NVC Act. Surely this is not an acceptable approach to applying this legislation as 
inconsistency undermines the legitimacy of the legislation. (sub. 217, p. 2)      




In South Australia, the South Australian Farmers’ Federation (SAFF) argued that 
the policy, under NV Act, of allowing clearance in particular cases with ‘a 
requirement to compensate the environment for the losses associated with the 
clearance’, had been more broadly applied than the legislation allowed: 
The development of this policy is a good example of lapses in accountability with 
regard to administrative standards which is a charge often levelled at the NVC and its 
Officers. It is a feature of law that administrative policy may not exceed the powers of 
the parent Act or its associated regulations. The development and implementation of 
this policy is a clear example [of] where the principles of proper administrative 
behaviour have been breached. (sub. 140, p. 11) 
 
Box 3.4  Participants’ views on consistency of permit processes 
The Victorian Farmers Federation: 
The regulations appear to vary significantly from Shire to Shire, and region to region, 
depending upon the way in which Department personnel or Shire planners are willing to 
interpret them. (sub. 149, p. 11) 
Murray Irrigation Ltd (New South Wales):  
… there is a lack of consistency in the treatment of different applications for vegetation 
removal/clearing … Whilst flexibility is an important component in assessment, inconsistent 
interpretations and administration is not desirable, and leads to further frustration within the 
community. (sub. 79, p. 1)  
Ron Hawkins (West Wimmera Shire Council, Victoria):  
… problems arise when referral bodies take on more authority than their charters warrant, 
when they attempt to regulate where they are entitled only to advise. Also, farmers should 
be able to rely on consistency in permit application outcomes — this consistency is too 
frequently lacking in referral authority advice and requirements. (sub. 111, p. 1) 
Peter Weston (New South Wales): 
The [DIPNR’s] inconsistency and consent process and the time lag is quite 
unacceptable. We’ve got an example … [where] they’ve allowed a family to take 
out individual trees across the landscape … yet another chap up the road, who’s got 
8000 acres of encroached timber, made an application to clear 600 acres to try and 
get some degree of drought control … he got denied [completely]. He could not 
disturb a tree. (trans., p. 1284) 
 
 
Bruce Meyer, a Councillor with the West Wimmera Shire Council (Victoria), 
considered that broadly-worded regulations allowed too much discretion to those 
administering the legislation: 
… exemptions need to be spelt out more clearly as the [DSE] often try and interpret 
what they mean, and try to put their own slant on it. Replacement numbers for removal 
also need to be better spelt out as there is a continual upward movement. Replacing 
1 tree with 30 others makes the operation unviable, with no consideration given to other  
     





remnant and existing vegetation on private and public land. Replacement numbers are 
not spelt out in the Act but are the policy of the individual [DSE] branches, leading to 
much confusion. (sub. 112, p. 2) 
Similarly, in Tasmania, the Southern Midlands Council argued that application of 
the Regional Management and Planning System (RMPS) had given too much 
discretion to administrators in the development and implementation of legislation:  
… independent and non-democratically accountable bodies within the RMPS are 
forced to make ‘informal’ state policies. Such policies, on occasion, result in the 
removal of the rights of citizens. It is often highly questionable whether State 
Parliament intended such rights to be removed when it set the overarching ‘sustainable 
development’ objectives for the RMPS. In other words, too often there is no clearly 
traceable link between actions ‘on the ground’ that remove the rights of citizens and the 
intent of their elected representatives. (sub. 166, p. 4)  
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In several jurisdictions, a lack of published guidelines and the absence of publicly-
available information about the rationale for decisions on clearing applications, 
have encouraged perceptions of inconsistency in the decision-making process. 
Consideration of economic and social factors in the application process 
There is variation across jurisdictions regarding the requirement to consider the 
economic and social aspects of applications to clear native vegetation. Variation 
also exists in the extent to which economic and social considerations need to be 
considered in the application of regimes within a jurisdiction. 
In Western Australia, under the Soil and Land Conservation Act 1945, the focus of 
the regime is on attaining environmental objectives and there is no formal 
requirement for economic and social aspects to be considered in the assessment of 
applications. The WA Government (sub.  151, p.  6) stated that environmental 
considerations generally are not balanced against economic and social 
considerations when assessing rural clearing proposals. However, recent 
amendments to the EP Act in Western Australia, recognise the need to address the 
‘social and economic impacts of protecting the environment’ when assessing 
clearing applications (WA Government, sub. DR290, p. 15).  
In South Australia, under the NV Act, the Native Vegetation Council considers the 
extent to which its decision may affect the viability of the property. However, in 
both Western Australia and South Australia, a lack of consideration of economic 
and social aspects was raised by participants.      




Tatiara District Council (South Australia) stated that:  
… the current legislation does not provide for … social, economic and environmental 
benefits … It seems that the current landholders are being penalised for excessive 
vegetation clearance that has been undertaken over previous years. (trans., p. 444) 
The Shire of Dandaragan (Western Australia) argued that:  
… little or no weight is given to these assessments if indeed they are ever carried out. 
The Western Australian Commissioner of Soil and Land Conservation does not balance 
the likelihood of land degradation resulting from the proposed clearing against the 
social and economic benefits that may result from the clearing. (sub. 191, p. 4) 
The WA Government (sub. DR290) noted that the Commissioner of Soil and Land 
Conservation does not have the authority to consider the social and economic 
benefits of a clearing proposal. 
Some regimes have as their objective the sustainable use of natural resources. In a 
number of these, there appears to be an implicit requirement to consider economic 
and social aspects when assessing applications to clear native vegetation.  
In Tasmania, an objective of the FP Act is to achieve ‘sustainable management of 
State and crown forests’ (Schedule 7). Threatened species legislation in Tasmania 
has more explicit environmental objectives, but these are to be pursued within the 
context of the objectives of the State’s planning system, the RMPS. One objective is 
to ‘facilitate economic development’ in accordance with the sustainable use of the 
State’s natural and physical resources. Planning legislation in the Northern Territory 
has a sustainable resource use objective as does the VM Act in Queensland. 
In Victoria, vegetation clearing controls are implemented through the State’s 
planning system, which aims to achieve ‘a sensible balance between economic 
development, social growth and cohesion and the sustainability of Victoria’s 
environment’ (Thwaites 1999). However, decisions on individual applications for 
permits for native vegetation clearance are based on environmental factors.  
In Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia, an application to clear may be 
approved on the condition that the landholder agrees to provide native vegetation 
‘offsets’. The offsets are implemented with the objective of mitigating the 
environmental impact of the proposed clearing. The VFF observed: 
There is no requirement on those who apply native vegetation and biodiversity 
legislation to assess the cost of their decisions or to balance costs against environmental 
benefits. The current policy position of the State Government is to produce a ‘net gain’ 
at any cost. The Federal position through the EPBC Act is also to conserve everything 
at any cost (even the cost of improved native vegetation management). (sub. 149, p. 10)      





Nonetheless, offsets allow potentially ‘high value’ projects to proceed.6  
Other regimes have an explicit requirement for economic and social impacts to be 
taken into consideration. An objective of the NVC Act in New South Wales is to 
‘encourage and promote native vegetation management in the social, environmental 
and economic interests of the State’ (NVC Act, s. 3). A number of the processes and 
instruments, such as recovery plans, implemented under threatened species 
legislation in Victoria, Tasmania and New South Wales require the consideration of 
economic and social impacts. 
However, even where there is a requirement for the consideration of economic and 
social aspects, participants suggested that insufficient weight was given to these 
factors, particularly when assessing clearance applications that had implications for 
threatened species (box 3.5). The NSW Audit Office observed: 
Reconciling multiple objectives can be difficult, and there is limited guidance to staff 
on how to address this tension. The [DLWC’s] staff guidelines do not generally 
distinguish environmental screening criteria that are likely to trigger a refusal, from 
tradeable benefits and costs. In particular, there is little guidance on ‘trading-off’ 
environmental impact for socio-economic gain. (AONSW 2002, p. 36) 
 
Box 3.5  Participants’ views on the consideration of economic and 
social implications of clearing proposals 
Ferguson, Kenneison and Associates (Western Australia): 
There has been virtually no assessment in Western Australia, conducted at any level, of the 
social and economic impacts ensuing from decisions arising from the regulation of native 
vegetation clearance and biodiversity conservation. (sub. 142, p. 19) 
Southern Midlands Council (Tasmania): 
… most decisions within the [Regional Management and Planning System] … in Tasmania 
do not adequately take into account economic and social values as well as natural values. 
They certainly take into account natural values … most of the decision-making in this sphere 
seems to be centred on assessing the natural values and the economic and social values 
are add-ons … if they’re considered at all, or are not considered. (trans., p. 773) 
District Council of Elliston (South Australia): 
Observation of the approval process indicates that the main criteria for consideration are the 
considered impact on the flora and fauna species. It is not apparent, from local government 
perspectives, that economic or social impacts are considered. (sub. 120, p. 4)  
 
 
                                              
6  As currently applied, ‘offsets’ require new and additional activity (eg tree planting) even if other 
parts of the property have been protected or regenerated over many years. Some participants 
noted that they receive no ‘credit’ for actions taken previously or elsewhere.      





Consideration of economic and social factors when assessing clearing applications 
is not required in all jurisdictions and is precluded in some. In jurisdictions where 
these factors are required to be examined, little guidance has been provided on how 
to weigh economic and social factors against environmental considerations. 
Delays 
Lengthy application processes can result in increased uncertainty for landholders 
and lost production opportunities. Reasons provided to the Commission for 
extended assessment processes included the complex nature of the regulation and 
insufficient resources allocated to the agencies responsible for administering the 
regimes. For example, in Queensland, landholders and environmental groups were 
concerned that insufficient resources had been provided to administer land clearing 
regulations efficiently.  
In New South Wales, the time taken to assess clearing applications was often 
considerably longer than the 40-day period recommended in the administering 
agency’s customer service guarantee (AONSW 2002, p.  34). The Nature 
Conservation Council (New South Wales) considered this was partly because of 
inadequate funding: 
The implementation of the NVC Act has seen widespread failure of government 
departments to promote the spirit and intent of the regulations perhaps due to confusion 
or antagonism towards the process. 
There has been an unrealistic 40 day turn around period for all applications. Staffing 
resources have not been adequate to uphold this promise, which has not helped to 
inspire confidence in the system. Further to this, the criteria for assessing applications 
are not sufficiently transparent, making the auditing process for clearing applications 
difficult and cumbersome. (sub. 109, p. 3)  
In Victoria, the VFF noted that a decision on a development application ‘can take 
months or even years’ (sub. 149, p. 9). 
Few jurisdictions specify the time periods within which applications to clear native 
vegetation have to be assessed and, in some jurisdictions, long delays occur. Delays 
in processing applications add to costs even if applications ultimately are 
successful. 
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In a number of jurisdictions, controls on the clearing of native vegetation are 
implemented, either directly or indirectly, through general planning legislation. In 
these jurisdictions, appeals against decisions on native vegetation clearing proposals 
are heard in the tribunals or courts established to hear appeals against planning 
decisions.  
In New South Wales, appeals against decisions made under the NVC Act are heard 
in the Land and Environment Court. In Victoria, decisions on native vegetation 
clearance can be appealed to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. In 
Tasmania, decisions made under the RMPS are heard in the Regional Management 
and Planning Appeal Tribunal, while the Forest Practices Tribunal is established 
specifically under the FP Act to hear appeals arising from the regulation of native 
forest vegetation. 
Generally, tribunals or courts established to hear appeals under planning legislation 
attempt to resolve appeals through mediation, before moving to more formal, and 
costly, court or tribunal hearings. Information on the number of appeals specifically 
related to decisions made on native vegetation clearance proposals tends not to be 
available. In New South Wales, the Department of Infrastructure, Planning and 
Natural Resources is required to maintain a public register of appeals made against 
decisions implemented under the NVC Act. Since the introduction of the Act, there 
have been few appeals. The NSW Audit Office noted that opportunities to appeal 
decisions were limited and expensive (AONSW 2002, p. 38). 
The issue of landholders’ unwillingness to appeal decisions on native vegetation 
clearance because of the costs of the process was raised by participants in 
Queensland (Canegrowers, sub. 101) and Victoria. Peter Pacers (Victoria) observed: 
Should a farmer disagree with the State or Local government environmental legislation 
implementation decision their only recourse is [to] take that body to the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal or Supreme Court respectively. For farmers struggling with drought, 
low commodity prices and the impacts of environmental legislation this is a recourse 
most cannot afford. (sub. 93, p. 7) 
In Tasmania, under the FP Act, the Forest Practices Tribunal is established to hear 
appeals arising from the regulation of clearing of native forest vegetation. The 
Tribunal appears to be more informal, and less costly to use, than the appeals 
process that applies to other planning decisions in the State (those made under the 
Resource Management Planning System). However, the Forest Practices Tribunal 
has been criticised for a perceived lack of independence (Tasmanian Conservation 
Trust, sub. 84).     




In South Australia, a recent amendment to the NV Act, allows appeals made against 
decisions of the NVC to be heard in the Environment, Resources and Development 
(ERD) Court. Appeals to the ERD Court may result in the matter being returned to 
the NVC for further consideration. However, the ERD Court may not overturn the 
ultimate decision of the NVC. Helen Mahar (sub. 40) suggested that a lack of an 
appropriate appeals mechanism for decisions made by the NVC weakened the 
accountability of the system.  
Similarly, SAFF observed: 
Perhaps the greatest inequity in this whole process has been the lack of mechanisms of 
appeal (other than resorting to the courts) against either process or the science 
underlying [NVC] decisions. In a democracy it is completely inappropriate that any 
section of the government is removed from scrutiny. (sub. 140, p. 11) 
In Western Australia, there does not appear to have been a standing dispute 
resolution process. Appeals against decisions made by the Commissioner of Soil 
and Land Conservation are made to the Minister for Agriculture. The Minister 
establishes an appeal committee to report on the matter, with the Minister’s decision 
being final (WA Government, sub. DR290). A more transparent and independent 
appeals process appears to be provided for in the regulatory regime established 
under the 2003 legislation. Under the proposed system, the Office of the Appeals 
Convenor is responsible for administering the appeals inquiry process and 
recommending an ‘appropriate action’ on the appeal to the Minister. The rationale 
for the Appeals Convenor’s recommendation is to be made public, as are the 
reasons for the Minister’s final decision. 
Under the interim arrangements regulating the clearing of native vegetation on 
freehold land in the Northern Territory, there is no facility for landholders to appeal 
decisions of the consent authority.  
Appeals and dispute-resolution mechanisms have not been available in some 
jurisdictions and have been limited and costly in others. Recent legislative 
amendments appear to improve appeals mechanisms in some jurisdictions. 
Costs of administration and compliance 
The costs of developing and administering native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation regimes are borne primarily by one or two State or Territory agencies. 
In some jurisdictions, local government has an important role in the administration 
of regimes, through the development of planning instruments and assessing 
applications to clear native vegetation. Local government, and others, such as 
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landholders and representatives of environmental organisations, may also bear some 
of the administrative costs through their participation on bodies such as regional 
vegetation committees and catchment authorities. 
In New South Wales and Queensland, State government agencies are primarily 
responsible for administering native vegetation and biodiversity regulations. The 
NSW Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources is responsible 
for assessing applications to clear native vegetation, monitoring the status of native 
vegetation (through mapping and maintaining a register of permits), assessing 
compliance with the regulations and pursuing breaches of the Act. The National 
Parks and Wildlife Service is responsible for developing and administering 
instruments under the threatened species legislation.  
Territory agencies are responsible for administering native vegetation and 
biodiversity legislation in the Northern Territory (Department of Infrastructure, 
Planning and Environment and the Pastoral Land Board) and the Australian Capital 
Territory (Environment ACT and the ACT Planning and Land Authority). In South 
Australia and Western Australia, responsibility for administering native vegetation 
legislation lies with state-funded statutory bodies, the NVC and the SLCC 
respectively. The permit system to be introduced in Western Australia is to be 
administered by one agency, the Department of Environmental Protection. 
The system of regulation of forest native vegetation in Tasmania is intended to be, 
as far as possible, self-funding. The Forest Practices Board oversees a system where 
the forest industry and landholders undertake activities such as preparation and 
certification of forest practice plans, supervision of forest practices and the training 
and education of forest practice officers. The State Government provides some 
funding for the implementation of the forest practices system. The Tasmanian 
Department of Primary Industries, Water and the Environment is responsible for 
administering threatened species legislation. 
Local government in Tasmania also has a role in implementing native vegetation 
and biodiversity regulations through the State’s planning system, the RMPS. The 
issue of local government being able to effectively administer the requirements of 
the RMPS with respect to native vegetation was raised by the Huon Valley Council: 
An issue for Council[s] is the increasing complexity of vegetation management and the 
associated regulatory framework. Local councils must be fully informed and 
understand how this framework is administered in order that the Council's role as a 
planning authority is able to be fulfilled. Councils must not only ensure that the 
regulations are being met in regard to new development applications but also must 
monitor compliance in regard to existing activities …      




This complexity is an issue in itself. A regulatory framework that is overly complex 
will not be effectively implemented and this has been an ongoing concern for local 
government within Tasmania. (sub. DR230, p. 2) 
Administration of native vegetation legislation in Victoria differs from most other 
jurisdictions in that administration and enforcement of regulation generally rests 
with local government. Local government is responsible for assessing native 
vegetation clearing applications, although for applications involving an area of 
clearing greater than 10 hectares, councils must seek and implement the views of 
the DSE. The issue of whether local governments were appropriately resourced for 
their role in the implementation of native vegetation regimes was raised by some 
participants. For example, Nillumbik Shire Council (sub. 174, p. 3) commented that 
local government needed more resources to ensure that native vegetation regimes 
were adequately monitored and enforced. Similar concerns were raised by the 
Corangamite Shire Council (sub. DR236, p. 2) and Moyne Shire Council: 
Of major concern at a local government level is the requirement to implement the 
Native Vegetation Framework through the [PE Act]. To be effective Council relies 
upon the skills and availability of staff within the [DSE] to assist with the 
implementation of the Native Vegetation Framework. Councils are neither resourced 
nor adequately skilled in native vegetation ecological assessments to effectively and 
efficiently implement the framework. (sub. DR229, p. 1) 
As a consent authority on planning applications, local government is required, in 
most jurisdictions, to ensure that planning applications are consistent with the 
relevant threatened species legislation. For example, local government has this role 
in New South Wales, Tasmania and Victoria. Shoalhaven City Council noted that in 
New South Wales, there: 
… are costs to both Council and landowners in the Shoalhaven that arise from 
legislation that deals with biodiversity conservation and native vegetation protection. 
Because Council is a consent authority, they are required to invest resources into 
assessment relating to biodiversity conservation and native vegetation protection that 
relate to requirements under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979] 
and the [TSC Act]. Because of the nature of Shoalhaven, Council has many 
applications that need to have issues of threatened species assessed and has therefore 
employed a Threatened Species Officer to deal with the large amount of environmental 
assessment work that is required in development applications. (sub. 98, p. 1) 
Compliance costs 
Although fees to submit an application tend to be nominal or non-existent in most 
jurisdictions, providing the information required by a government agency to assess 
an application can often involve significant costs for landholders.      





In Queensland, under the VM Act, applications to clear native vegetation on 
freehold land must be accompanied by a Property Vegetation Management Plan. 
The Plan is required to provide information on: the location and extent of clearing; 
the amount and type of native vegetation to be cleared; and the possible 
implications of the proposed clearing for soil quality, erosion and threatened 
species. In some instances, Plans are required to include proposals on ways to 
improve or rehabilitate areas of native vegetation on properties. Similar information 
needs to accompany applications to clear in Tasmania under the FP Act, and in New 
South Wales under the NVC Act. 
Depending on the jurisdiction and the nature of the proposed clearing activity, an 
assessment of impacts of the activity may need to be procured from an independent 
consultant at the landholder’s expense. In New South Wales, for example, when a 
proposed clearing activity has implications for threatened species, a Species Impact 
Statement may need to be submitted as part of the application. Similar requirements 
exist under Queensland and Victorian legislation. The VFF noted that: 
Farmers who seek permits for farming activities often regret trying to conform with the 
regulations. More often than not, a development application will incur great expense 
and the requirement for flora and fauna studies and consultant reports. (sub. 149, p. 9) 
The Institute of Public Affairs (New South Wales) observed that: 
Under the [NVC Act], any ‘clearing’ is subject to the development consent procedures. 
The clearing application process involves 30 or more steps, numerous consultations, 
opportunities for almost anyone to object and a mountain of paper. This puts such 
processes beyond the reach of most landowners. They all have a day job and are 
already grappling with many other regulations. (sub. 135, p. 4) 
Landholders frequently have to provide detailed surveys and other information as 
part of their applications, increasing compliance costs. 
3.5 Summary 
All jurisdictions in Australia now have in place regimes that require a landholder to 
apply for a permit to remove native vegetation. There is significant variation in the 
nature of the regimes across jurisdictions. 
The amount of consultation associated with the introduction of regimes has varied 
significantly across jurisdictions. No jurisdictions have undertaken cost–benefit 
analysis of clearing regulations prior to their introduction.  
FINDING 3.10     




Decisions made under the regimes are often characterised by a lack of 
transparency —  guidelines are generally not publicly available and reasons for 
decisions sometimes are not given. A lack of transparency appears to have 
encouraged perceptions of inconsistency in the decision-making process and 
perceptions that officers have acted outside the purview of the relevant legislation. 
Economic and social considerations do not appear to have been adequately 
incorporated into the assessment of clearing applications.  
In most jurisdictions, the legislation is complex and has resulted in significant 
compliance costs for landholders, in terms of the information required to be 
provided in the application process and the length of time taken to obtain a decision. 
Dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the administration of the regimes appears to 
have contributed to landholder antagonism to the regimes in general. 
In some jurisdictions, recently-announced changes appear to be intended to address 
some of the issues associated with the implementation and administration of 
regimes raised in this inquiry.     
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4  Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act  
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) is 
the Australian Government’s main legislation dealing with native vegetation and 
biodiversity conservation. The EPBC Act commenced on 16 July 2000.  It 
comprises: 
•  environmental impact assessment and approval processes for certain actions that 
affect the environment; and  
•  mechanisms to conserve biodiversity.1 
Through the EPBC Act, the Australian Government consolidated and updated its 
regulations for the environment, and enacted Australia’s obligations under several 
international treaties, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity. This chapter 
summarises some key aspects of the EPBC Act. Additional information is in 
appendix B.  
In addition to administering the EPBC Act, the Australian Government plays other 
important roles in environmental management. For instance, it:  
•  coordinates development of national policies and programs (such as the National 
Framework for the Management and Monitoring of Australia’s Native 
Vegetation), which are adopted by all States and Territories as well as the 
Australian Government; 
•  funds research on environmental issues through programs such as the National 
Land and Water Audit and the Australian Biological Resources Study; and  
•  provides significant funding for projects that protect or enhance the environment 
through the programs of the $2.7 billion Natural Heritage Trust (established by 
the Natural Heritage Trust of Australia Act 1997) and through other programs 
such as the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality (box 4.1).  
                                              
1  In addition, in September  2003, the Australian Parliament passed legislation to also protect 
places of heritage significance under the EPBC Act. A new system to protect heritage started on 
1 January 2004. It comprises a National Heritage List and a Commonwealth Heritage List and 
retains the Register of the National Estate. A new advisory body — the Australian Heritage 
Council — will replace the Australian Heritage Commission (DEH 2004a).     






Box 4.1  Natural Heritage Trust and National Action Plan for Salinity 
and Water Quality  
In May 2001, the Australian Government extended the Natural Heritage Trust (NHT) 
(established in 1997) to 2006-07 with an extra $1 billion in funding. The $2.7 billion 
program funds environmental actions under four categories — Landcare, Bushcare, 
Rivercare and Coastcare. Its overarching objectives are biodiversity conservation, 
sustainable use of natural resources, and community capacity building and institutional 
change. Under the NHT extension there will be a shift towards more strategic 
investment and regional implementation, with regional delivery of funding to follow the 
model established by the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality 
(NAPSWQ), where appropriate.  
In November 2000, the Australian, State and Territory Governments jointly committed 
$1.4 billion over seven years to address salinity problems and to improve water quality 
under the NAPSWQ. The NAPSWQ complements the NHT. 
The NAPSWQ targets 21 priority regions across Australia that are most affected by 
salinity or water quality problems. Accredited regional plans that address the specific 
water quality, salinity and biodiversity problems of each region form the basis for 
funding under the NAPSWQ. Community-based catchment/regional bodies will develop 
and implement the plans for each priority region, with the support of government. 
It is stated in the NAPSWQ agreement that funding from the Australian Government 
will be contingent on ‘land clearing being prohibited in areas where it would lead to 
unacceptable land or water degradation’ (p. 5) and also that compensation to promote 
adjustment may be required.  
Funding under the NAPSWQ has been made available for a National Market-based 
Instruments Pilot Program. This program aims to increase understanding of the use of 
market-based instruments to address environmental issues, particularly salinity and 
water quality problems.  
Sources: COAG (2000); EA and AFFA (2002). 
 
 
4.1  Description of the EPBC Act  
Under the Act, certain ‘actions’ are prohibited unless prior approval is obtained 
from the Australian Government Environment Minister. Actions that ‘trigger’ the 
approval process under the EPBC Act include those that have, will have, or are 
likely to have a significant impact on: 
•  a ‘matter of national environmental significance’ (these matters are listed in the 
Act); or      
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•  the environment2 on Commonwealth land even if the action is taken outside 
Commonwealth land, and on the environment in general if the action is taken on 
Commonwealth land; or  
•  the environment, inside or outside Australian jurisdiction, where the actions are 
undertaken by the Australian Government or Australian Government agencies.  
The Department of the Environment and Heritage (DEH) noted that the approach to 
native vegetation and biodiversity conservation regulation under the EPBC Act 
differs from that generally taken by the States and Territories:  
In contrast to most State and Territory vegetation protection legislation that directly 
regulates the clearing of areas of native vegetation, the EPBC Act does not specifically 
apply to native vegetation per se. Rather the EPBC Act is triggered only when a 
specific action has a significant impact on a matter of national environmental 
significance such as listed threatened species. (sub. 190, p. 3) 
Thus, the legislation potentially could apply to clearing of native vegetation if the 
action has a significant impact on one of the areas listed above. The definition of 
action in the legislation is very broad — projects, developments, undertakings, 
activities or a series of activities, or an alteration to any of these (EPBC Act, s. 523) 
— but environmental assessment and approval are required only for ‘new’ actions. 
Approval is not required to continue actions that were authorised before 
commencement of the Act or that represent a lawful continuation, in the same place, 
of land use started before the Act’s commencement, unless these actions are 
enlarged, expanded or intensified (ss  43A–43B). DEH considered that there is 
confusion about this exemption: 
… [there is] a misconception that a cyclical increase in use occurring sometime after 
the commencement of the Act is an enlargement, expansion or intensification and 
therefore subject to the assessment and approval requirements of the Act. (sub. 190, 
p. 16) 
The Act contains other exemptions from the environmental assessment and 
approval process, including discretion for the Minister to exempt an action if it is in 
‘the national interest’ to do so. Because of these exemptions, DEH submitted that: 
… the overwhelming majority of agriculture activities do not trigger the EPBC Act. 
Examples include routine grazing (including periodic grazing), cropping and crop 
rotation, maintenance of existing dams, roads and fences, and continuation of existing 
weed control programs. 
                                              
2  Amongst other things, the definition of ‘environment’ under the Act includes ecosystems and 
their parts, natural and physical resources and the heritage values of places (s. 528).     





Even for actions that come within the scope of the EPBC Act, experience has been that 
the actions of individual farmers rarely meet the threshold test of having a ‘significant 
impact’ on a matter of national environmental significance as defined in the Act. 
(sub. 190, p. 3) 
Indeed, the Act places more onerous requirements on the Australian Government as 
a landholder and in terms of its activities, than on the private sector. This is because 
Australian Government actions that have a significant impact on the environment 
(which is broader than ‘matters of national environmental significance’) are 
regulated. In addition, most of the biodiversity provisions in chapter 5 of the Act are 
binding only on Australian Government agencies, or in Commonwealth areas.  
Matters of national environmental significance  
The triggers most likely to subject private sector activities to environmental 
assessment and approval are matters of national environmental significance. The 
Act currently lists seven of these: 
•  World Heritage properties; 
•  National Heritage places (since 1 January 2004); 
•  wetlands of international importance (Ramsar wetlands); 
•  listed threatened species and ecological communities; 
•  internationally protected listed migratory species; 
•  Commonwealth marine areas; and 
•  nuclear actions.  
In the first three years of the Act’s operation, ‘listed threatened species and 
ecological communities’ was the most common trigger for assessment, including for 
agricultural activities (appendix B). DEH argued that: 
Conceptually … it is difficult to envisage how or why the farming sector might be 
treated differently from other sectors, particularly given other sectors are more affected 
by the protection of species and communities afforded by the Act both in overall 
numbers of referrals and in the overall value of projects. (sub. 190, p. 5) 
The Environment Minister may add additional matters of environmental 
significance to this list through regulations, but must consult with the States and 
Territories before doing so. 
Some participants commented on the list of matters of national environmental 
significance. For instance, the Brisbane Region Environment Council 
(sub. 132, p. 2)  considered  the  triggers ‘narrow and insufficient’ while the     
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Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF, sub.  146) recommended that land 
clearing be included as a matter of national environmental significance so that 
assessment and approval would be required for land clearing of areas greater than 
100 hectares.  
Significant impact 
As stated above, approval under the EPBC Act is required if an action has (or is 
likely to have) a ‘significant impact’ on certain matters (for example, a matter of 
national environmental significance). Despite its importance in the regulatory 
regime, the term ‘significant impact’ is not defined in the EPBC Act or its 
regulations. However, DEH has issued EPBC Act Administrative Guidelines on 
Significance  (EA  2000) which set out criteria for judging whether an impact is 
likely to be significant. Supplements to the Guidelines have been produced for some 
specific species of interest to the agricultural sector, such as the Bluegrass 
ecological communities, the Spectacled Flying-fox and the Grey-headed Flying-fox. 
The Guidelines are currently being reviewed (DEH, sub. 190).  
While these publications may help clarify the meaning of significant impact, the 
National Farmers’ Federation (NFF) observed: 
… these guidelines are non-binding, provide no statutory protection and do not provide 
any guidance as to how a referred action will be assessed. (sub. 128, p. 27) 
The absence of clear guidance on the meaning of this term contributes to 
uncertainty regarding the scope of the operation of the Act. The Queensland 
Farmers’ Federation (QFF) submitted that: 
From a producer’s perspective, the amount of knowledge required for them to 
determine if an action they propose to undertake constitutes a significant impact and the 
referral lodgement process is daunting, though the establishment of the EPBC 
Information Officer based with the National Farmers’ Federation has assisted in 
clarifying the process and has provided useful advice ... (sub. 177, p. 18) 
In addition to producing administrative guidelines and publications such as fact 
sheets, DEH has established other arrangements to help landholders understand and 
comply with the Act. Examples include:  
•  development of the EPBC Act website (www.deh.gov.au/epbc), including a 
section specifically for farmers;  
•  funding a full-time EPBC Act officer position at the NFF; and 
•  assisting landholders through site visits (DEH, sub. 190).      





DEH also noted that a referral ‘toolkit’ is being developed to provide examples of 
referrals of agricultural activities and to give landholders information about how to 
access maps and data on matters of national environmental significance.  
Assessment and approval processes 
Actions that trigger the EPBC Act are required to undergo an environmental 
assessment and approval process that involves three key stages: 
•  referral by the proponent; 
•  assessment; and 
•  approval.  
Essentially, the Act requires case-by-case assessment of certain activities to 
determine whether or not they may proceed. AgForce Queensland commented on 
this approach: 
The Federal systems tend to have more ‘ground-truthing’ involved. For example, the 
EPBC Act 1999 referral process aims at examining the individual’s case rather than 
adopting a broad landscape approach … 
A system closer to the Federal Government’s approach to identifying key issues and 
managing them on an individual (or regional) basis results in far more positive 
outcomes. (sub. 54, p. 42) 
In its recent audit of referrals, assessments and approvals under the Act, the 
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO  2003, p.  12) concluded that processes 
were ‘generally thorough and well documented’ and that they were improving with 
experience. 
Referral 
The EPBC Act (s. 68) requires those proposing to take an action that they think will 
have, or is likely to have, a significant impact on a matter protected, to refer a 
proposal to the Australian Government Environment Minister for a decision on 
whether it is a ‘controlled action’. Certain State and Territory agencies may also 
refer an action or the Environment Minister may request a referral (s. 70).  
As noted by Gecko – Gold Coast & Hinterland Environment Council (sub. 127), the 
requirement for proponents to establish whether an action should be referred can be 
onerous. However, where a proponent is in doubt, an action may be referred for a 
binding decision from the Minister on whether it is a controlled action.      
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On the basis of the information contained in the referral, the Minister determines 
whether the proposal is a controlled action and which of the controlling provisions 
apply. A controlled action then proceeds to the assessment stage.  
DEH (sub.  190) submitted that only 27 of the 958  referred actions as at 
31  July  2003, related to ‘agriculture and forestry’. Seventeen of these were ‘not 
controlled actions’ (or were withdrawn or lapsed) and could proceed. Of those 
requiring approval, three were approved, one was rejected, one was withdrawn and 
five were still undergoing assessment. (Appendix B contains additional statistics on 
operation of the Act). These statistics suggest that the Act is having little direct 
impact on agricultural activities, a view supported by DEH (sub. 190) and by the 
ACF: 
Apart from contradicting the claims of farmers that the EPBC Act is causing 
unreasonable hardship on their operations, the figures suggest a disturbing trend of non-
compliance within the agricultural sector with the existing provisions of the EPBC Act.  
… the EPBC Act as currently drafted should be attracting a greater number of referrals 
from the agricultural sector than it currently is. After all, the agricultural sector is a 
sector that: 
•  has a direct impact on approximately 60% of the Australian landscape;  
•  is largely responsible for clearing over 500 000 hectares of native bushland every 
year … (ACF, sub. 146, attachment 2, p. 3) 
Similarly, WWF Australia considered that:  
… the evidence indicates that the EPBC Act has had little or no impact on landholder 
decisions in relation to clearing native vegetation, and consequently are likely to have 
had minimal economic effect on landholders despite claims to the contrary … 
(sub. 108, p. 3) 
In contrast, the NFF claimed that: 
… the small number of referrals is unrepresentative of the real effect of the Act in 
producing both real and perceived uncertainty within the farming sector. (sub. 128, 
p. 12) 
While the QFF submitted that: 
It is difficult to determine the major impacts on agricultural practices and production, 
especially any long-term impacts given the EPBC and VMA [Vegetation Management 
Act (Qld)] are comparatively new pieces of legislation. Further, it is difficult to 
determine the impacts on individual producers and growers … and the combined 
impacts of the regimes with other environmental and natural resource management 
reform agendas, such as agendas associated with water use and allocation. (sub. 177, 
p. 11)     





In a submission on the Commission’s Draft Report, the Queensland Resources 
Council (sub. DR311, p. 2) noted ‘what appears to be the growing potential of the 
… [Act] to impact on the mining and resources sector’ after a Federal Court 
decision in December 20033 indicated that the Environment Minister is required to 
consider all likely consequential impacts of an action and not just its immediate 
direct impacts.  
DEH also acknowledged that application of the Act to actions in sectors other than 
agriculture (for example, the Meander Dam in Tasmania and the Paradise and 
Nathan Dams in Queensland) may affect the agricultural sector. However, it 
observed that such projects would be subject to State and Territory assessment and 
approval in any case.  
FINDING 4.1 
The actual and perceived impacts of the EPBC Act on landholders appear to differ 
markedly. In terms of preventing activities, or of requiring activities to undergo the 
assessment and approval process, the EPBC Act to date has had little direct impact 
on the agricultural sector. However, uncertainty about its potential future impacts 
has been a concern for some landholders. 
Assessment  
If the Minister determines that approval is not required, the action may proceed 
provided other approvals, such as State and Territory approvals, have been 
obtained. For controlled actions, the Minister must choose, generally within 20 
business days, how the impacts of the proposed action will be assessed. The 
following assessment options are available to the Minister under the Act: 
•  preliminary documentation; 
•  an accredited assessment process — a bilateral agreement or Ministerial 
declaration (see below); 
•  a public environment report; 
•  an environmental impact statement; or 
•  a public inquiry. (s. 87)  
These options vary in terms of the information that must be supplied and the extent 
of public consultation required (appendix B). If a bilateral agreement is in place, the 
assessment will be conducted by the State or Territory on behalf of the Australian 
                                              
3 Queensland Conservation Council Inc v Minister for the Environment and Heritage FCA 1463, 
19 December 2003.     
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Government. If a declaration is in place, the Australian Government agency with 
which the declaration is made will conduct the assessment. To date, the Minister has 
usually required assessment on the basis of preliminary documentation or an 
accredited assessment process. Both of these options may result in fewer delays and 
lower information costs for proponents relative to the other assessment options.  
Bilateral agreements  
Some participants were concerned about potential duplication and ‘layering’ of 
regulatory requirements with respect to the environment. For instance, the QFF 
stated that: 
In isolation the EPBC and VMA  [Vegetation Management Act (Qld)] may not 
disastrously impact on landholders however, together and combined with the myriad of 
other environment natural resource management focused reforms it is the cumulative 
impacts that may be the cause of most concern at the grass-roots level. (sub. 177, p. 4) 
In addition to potentially reducing duplication of regulatory requirements by 
restricting the Australian Government’s role to certain matters (such as matters of 
national environmental significance), the EPBC Act also allows for ‘bilateral 
agreements’ to reduce potential duplication and inconsistencies in environmental 
assessment and approval, and to improve timeliness (s. 44). A bilateral agreement 
between the Australian Government and a State or Territory Government allows for 
Australian Government accreditation of environmental assessment and/or approval 
processes in the State/Territory (or vice versa). To date, the Australian Government 
has signed bilateral agreements with Tasmania  (2000), the Northern 
Territory  (2002) and Western Australia  (2002). It is difficult to assess whether 
timeliness has improved as a result of the bilateral agreements due to the limited 
number and age of such agreements in place, and the fact that only some referrals 
are assessed under them. Where there is no bilateral agreement, State and Territory 
assessment processes can be accredited case-by-case (DEH, sub. 190). 
Some participants considered that there is no problem of duplication or 
inconsistency between the States and Territories and the Australian Government. 
For example, the SA Government noted that ‘there do not appear to be problems in 
this regard’ (sub. DR324, p. i).  
Similarly, the WA Government observed:  
There is, in general, no problem of inconsistency between the Commonwealth’s 
[EPBC Act] … and  Western  Australia’s native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation regimes. The normal practice of the Commonwealth is to accredit the 
State’s assessment process on a case-by-case basis, so that any dual assessment is 
avoided. This will be formalised when a bilateral agreement between the   
Commonwealth and Western Australia comes into effect [this came into effect in     





November 2003]. Under this bilateral agreement … environmental impact assessment 
is carried out by the State for all matters requiring approval under Part 9 of the EPBC 
Act. (sub. 151, p. 6) 
However, the WA Government also noted that the petroleum industry in Western 
Australia had expressed concerns about overlaps between the EPBC Act and the 
Australian Government’s petroleum legislation.  
The Victorian Government (sub.  185) said that there needs to be a bilateral 
agreement between Victoria and the Australian Government to recognise the role of 
Victorian legislation in achieving national environmental goals and to promote cost-
effective achievement of those goals.  
In contrast, the Brisbane Region Environment Council was concerned that a 
bilateral agreement might reduce protection for the environment in Queensland: 
Future application of the EPBC Act in Qld may be hampered by a bilateral agreement 
with the Qld Government which would have powers delegated by the Commonwealth 
particularly to the State Works Act and the inadequate Integrated Planning Act 1997 
[IPA]. This IPA has featured many rollbacks of environmental standards … It is an 
anathema to most communities and to many thinking Councillors. [italics in original] 
(sub. 132, p. 1) 
Gecko – Gold Coast & Hinterland Environment Council considered that a ‘layering’ 
of regulatory requirements by different levels of government can be beneficial: 
One of the benefits of this legislation [EPBC Act] is the control on state government 
infrastructure, where the proponent and the regulator are the same. The other benefit is 
that the nexus between developers and state government Ministers is broken by the 
requirement for the Commonwealth to oversee assessment and approval of proposed 
developments. (sub. 127, p. 6) 
Approval 
On the basis of the completed assessment, the Minister generally has 30 business 
days (at least 40 business days if a commission has conducted a public inquiry) to 
decide whether or not to approve the action (with or without conditions). Generally, 
before doing so, the Minister must receive a notice from the relevant State or 
Territory Government that impacts of the action (on matters other than those of 
national environmental significance) have been assessed.  
In deciding whether to approve an action, and whether to attach conditions to it, the 
Minister must consider economic and social matters in addition to environmental 
matters (s. 136). Information about economic and social matters is obtained from     
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public comments, other Ministers, information provided by the proponent, and 
information contained in the assessment documentation (DEH, sub. 190). 
In 2002-03, an approval was refused for the first time, while 24 controlled actions 
were approved with conditions and one was approved with no conditions 
(appendix B).  
Biodiversity conservation  
Chapter 5 of the EPBC Act contains other mechanisms to encourage biodiversity 
conservation. In general, however, only Australian Government agencies are 
required to comply, or compliance is required only for Commonwealth areas. That 
said, some non-coercive provisions, such as conservation agreements, may apply to 
the private sector.  
The provisions for listing threatened species, ecological communities and key 
threatening processes are outlined below. Other biodiversity provisions are outlined 
in appendix B. 
Listings of threatened species, ecological communities and key threatening 
processes  
The EPBC Act requires the Minister to establish a list of threatened (native) species 
(ss 178–80) and a list of threatened ecological communities (ss 181–2) (table 4.1). 
Table 4.1  Categories of threatened species and ecological communities 
 Threatened  species  Threatened ecological 
communities 
Extinct  3   
Extinct in the wild  3   
Critically endangered  3  3 
Endangered  3  3 
Vulnerable  3  3 
Conservation dependent  3   
Source: EPBC Act (ss 178–80; ss 181–2). 
In addition, the Minister must establish a list of ‘key threatening processes’ — a 
process which ‘threatens, or may threaten, the survival, abundance or evolutionary 
development of a native species or ecological community’ (s. 183).      





While the Minister is required to ‘take all reasonably practical steps’ to ensure that 
all of the eligible threatened species and ecological communities are included in the 
lists (s. 185), this requirement does not apply to the list of threatening processes.  
At 30 June 2003, total listings were:  
•  threatened species — 1611; 
•  threatened ecological communities — 29; and  
•  key threatening processes — 13 (DEH 2003, p. 205).  
Although not directly comparable (for example, because not all ecosystems would 
necessarily be eligible for listing as threatened under the EPBC Act), a few 
participants (for example, the ACF, sub. 146) observed that the total numbers of 
threatened species and ecological communities listed under the Act are significantly 
lower than those identified in the Australian Terrestrial Biodiversity 
Assessment 2002 (NLWRA  2002b), which found that Australia has almost 
2900 threatened ecosystems. 
The threatened species and ecological communities lists maintained under the 
EPBC Act do not necessarily match similar lists maintained by the States and 
Territories. For example, with respect to species found in the Shoalhaven area that 
are listed under the NSW Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995, Shoalhaven 
City Council (sub. 98) observed that 24 plants and 26 animals are also listed under 
the EPBC Act. However, it said that some local species listed under the EPBC Act 
are not listed under the NSW Act.  
The QFF also commented on the listing of species: 
Another area that may present inconsistencies and replication of effort is the listing of 
numerous species both under the EPBC and Queensland Nature Conservation Act 1992 
such as the Mary River Tortoise (Elusor macrurus), listed as Vulnerable under the 
Nature Conservation Act 1992, and Endangered under the EPBC ... dual listing poses 
extra complexities when it comes to the management of the species, especially given 
the different emphasis caused by the different levels of classification. The development 
of recovery plans, threat abatement plans and so forth for the species may take different 
priority under the different jurisdiction[s] in accordance with the level of classification 
… adequate communication across jurisdictions is required to ensure duplication is 
minimised. (sub. 177, p. 19) 
FINDING 4.2 
The listings of threatened species and ecological communities under both the 
EPBC  Act and State and Territory legislation contribute to confusion and 
uncertainty for landholders because listings, or the requirements that arise from 
them, differ in some cases.     
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The Threatened Species Scientific Committee (TSSC) (established under the EPBC 
Act to advise the Environment Minister on listing matters) said that it: 
… agrees that there is a need to improve alignment between the Australian Government 
and State/Territory lists of threatened entities. (sub. DR223, p. 1) 
The TSSC is working to address this issue.  
The list of key threatening processes includes ‘land clearance’ (effective 
4 April 2001) which refers to the destruction of native vegetation and its substantial 
replacement with non-local species or human artefacts (TSSC  2001). Land 
clearance includes clearing of native vegetation for crops, pasture, plantations, 
gardens, houses, mines, buildings and roads but does not include activities like 
grazing, which can also change native vegetation composition and structure. The 
listing of land clearance as a key threatening process appears to have had no direct 
effect on landholders’ activities. For instance, there is currently no threat abatement 
plan (appendix B) for dealing with land clearance. A threat abatement plan is only 
required for a key threatening process if the Minister decides that it is a ‘feasible, 
effective and efficient way of abating the process’ (s. 270A). 
Any person may nominate a native species, ecological community or threatening 
process for listing. Some farming organisations were concerned that public 
nomination could result in excessive claims for protection. However, the Minister 
can choose not to forward a nomination to the TSSC for advice if it is ‘vexatious, 
frivolous or not made in good faith’ (s. 191). Given the research and consultation 
requirements of listing, the TSSC usually has 12 months to provide its advice to the 
Minister. The threatened species, ecological communities and key threatening 
processes lists must be made available to the public (s. 194).  
Not surprisingly, changes to the threatened species and ecological communities lists 
can generate vigorous debate. For instance, the listings of Bluegrass dominant 
grasslands of the Brigalow Belt Bioregions (North and South) and the Brigalow 
ecological communities made in April 2001 generated controversy as these 
ecological communities occur in productive agricultural areas. Box 4.2 outlines a 
case involving a proposal to clear Brigalow. Although changes to the threatened 
species and threatened ecological communities lists are likely to attract attention 
from the agricultural sector, DEH observed: 
Typically, actions by individual farmers impacting on native vegetation and 
biodiversity will trigger the Act only when they have a significant impact on nationally 
protected species or ecological communities, whether threatened or migratory. 
(sub. 190, p.3)     





DEH also considered that: 
The vast majority of agricultural activities undertaken in Australia, by themselves, do 
not have a significant impact on protected species or ecological communities per se 
even if they might impact on individual members of the species or parts of a protected 
community. (sub. 190, p. 3) 
 
Box 4.2  Proposal to clear Brigalow under the EPBC Act  
The EPBC Act lists some of the Brigalow ecological community as ‘endangered’.  
A Queensland farmer sought to develop his 5000 hectare property which contained 
Brigalow (some not protected by the EPBC Act). The EPBC Act Information Officer, 
seconded to the National Farmers’ Federation, visited the farmer’s property with an 
officer from the Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Mines to identify 
the listed community, to help the farmer with his proposal and to ensure that Australian 
Government considerations were consistent with State requirements for Brigalow. 
The farmer submitted a referral under the EPBC Act to clear 2300 hectares of Brigalow 
country and to protect 1100  hectares of the listed community that had never been 
cleared. The farmer proposed development of a property vegetation management plan 
(required by State legislation prior to obtaining Queensland Government approval to 
clear) to protect remaining remnant Brigalow and to maintain buffer zones adjacent to 
the remnant. The Australian Government is funding surveys and helping the farmer 
develop his plan.  
The Environment Minister determined that the referred action was ‘not a controlled 
action’, provided the steps outlined above for protecting the Brigalow were taken.  
Source: DEH (sub. 190). 
 
 
With respect to a more recent nomination for listing — Western (Basalt) Plains 
Natural Temperate Grasslands — the Victorian Farmers Federation (VFF) 
commented: 
An unknown party nominated the Western Native Temperate Grasslands for the EPBC. 
In our view, the listing process is the dumbest way of all to protect these grasslands …  
We are talking about something in the order of two and a half thousand hectares of 
private land … It would be far simpler and much more effective to find out where the 
grassland exists on private land and if the community is endangered, as suggested, then 
either purchase the land or pay the farmers to protect it. The cost would be much less 
overall than the total EPBC nomination process, I would suggest. (trans., pp. 667–8) 
(Other options, such as purchasing land or paying farmers, to promote native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation objectives are discussed in chapter 9.) 
When making or changing either the threatened species or threatened ecological 
communities lists, the Minister must not consider any matter that does not relate to     
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the survival of the native species (s.  186) or to the survival of the ecological 
community concerned (s. 187). The VFF (sub. 149, p. 7) described this as ‘conserve 
at all costs’. However, the Act specifically requires the Minister to take the social 
and economic factors into account when making approval decisions. In addition, the 
Minister has been calling for public comments on nominations before the TSSC has 
submitted its assessment, even though there is no statutory requirement to do so 
(EPBC Unit 2002). This information could be relevant for individual assessment 
and approval decisions under the Act. DEH (sub. 190) also said that it uses the 
information collected through this process to develop communication strategies to 
explain the implications of listing, to facilitate compliance with listing 
requirements, and to allay concerns of those who may be potentially affected by the 
listing. 
While still expressing some concerns about the process for amending the lists 
maintained under the Act, the QFF stated that it: 
… has been encouraged by advice received from Environment Australia, indicating that 
whilst the Threatened Species Scientific Advisory Committee (TSSC), in assessing 
nominations under the Act, is unable to take social or economic considerations into 
account, any information on such issues could provide important background 
information for the Minister during consideration of activities requiring approval under 
the Act. However, despite this creating an avenue to provide socio-economic advice, 
QFF maintains that a Socio-Economic Committee of the same Ministerial status as the 
TSSC must be established. (sub. 177, p. 18) 
In addition to requiring approval for actions with a significant impact on listed 
threatened species and ecological communities, it is an offence to kill or injure 
members of listed threatened species (except ‘conservation dependent’ species) or 
listed threatened ecological communities that are in Commonwealth areas (s. 196). 
It is also an offence to take, keep, trade, or move members of listed threatened 
species or listed threatened ecological communities in Commonwealth areas, except 
in certain circumstances (s. 197).  
Other notable provisions of the EPBC Act  
Opportunities for public involvement and reporting requirements  
Apart from requirements for the Minister to consult with State and Territory 
Governments, the Act provides many opportunities for public involvement. For 
example, members of the public may: 
•  comment on referrals and assessments made under the Act; 
•  comment on the development and operation of bilateral agreements; and      





•  nominate species, ecological communities or threatening processes for listing 
under the Act. 
In its audit of referrals, assessments and approvals under the EPBC Act, the 
ANAO (2003, p. 41) noted that stakeholders had identified opportunities for public 
comment on referrals as one of the ‘most positive aspects’ of the Act and an 
‘example of good practice management’. However, while the role of Indigenous 
people is recognised under the EPBC Act, the Northern Land Council said: 
These formal statements [of the role of Indigenous people in sustainable use and 
conservation] are welcome … However, we are aware of no coherent steps to achieve 
that engagement in northern Australia. There is certainly no evidence of a 
comprehensive Federal plan. Representation of a few Indigenous people on advisory 
boards on biodiversity conservation/resource use or management boards for national 
parks cannot be reasonably construed as satisfying these objectives. (sub.  221,   
pp. 14–15) 
DEH communicates with the public through the public notifications page of the 
‘EPBC website’ (www.deh.gov.au/epbc) and through weekly notices in the 
Australian Government Gazette (DEH 2002). Sections 170A and 515A of the Act 
list the types of information DEH must publish on the internet every week, such as 
the Minister’s intention to develop a draft bilateral agreement, referrals received, 
and decisions made about controlled actions.  
QFF stated that it supported the: 
… transparent decision-making process of the EBPC, particularly the posting of 
referrals, refused referrals, approvals etc on a web based information system for public 
access. (sub. 177, p. 17) 
The Act imposes other reporting requirements on the Minister. A report on the 
Act’s operation must be produced and laid before each House of Parliament each 
year (s. 516) (some of the statistics included in these reports have been summarised 
in appendix  B). The Act also requires ‘state of the environment reports’ to be 
prepared every five years with the next report due in 2006. The Act must also be 
independently reviewed at least every 10 years (s. 522A).   
FINDING 4.3 
Opportunities for public involvement in decision making under the EPBC  Act 
appear to be adequate. Public reporting of key information about the Act’s 
operation promotes transparency.     
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Enforcement mechanisms  
The Act provides for severe civil and criminal penalties for breaches concerning 
matters of national environmental significance. Penalties are lower for breaches in 
relation to the environment on Commonwealth land, or for actions by the Australian 
Government. 
In  2001-02, DEH responded to more than 120  reports of potential impacts on 
matters listed under the Act, of which a small proportion required detailed 
investigation and further enforcement action (DEH  2002). In other cases, DEH 
chose to use low-level responses, such as sending ‘educative’ letters to those who 
may potentially breach the Act to promote compliance (ANAO 2003). In 2002-03, 
three masters of Indonesian fishing vessels were sentenced under the Act for 
illegally killing dolphins in Australian waters (DEH 2003).  
In addition to enforcement by the Australian Government, the Act allows an 
‘interested person’ to apply to the Federal Court for an injunction, or interim 
injunction, restraining a person from engaging in conduct that contravenes the 
legislation. An interested person is defined as an individual: 
•  who is a citizen or resident of Australia; and 
•  whose interests are, have been or would be affected by the conduct or proposed 
conduct; or 
•  who, at any time in the two years immediately preceding the conduct or 
proposed conduct that is the subject of complaint, was engaged in environmental 
protection activities or conducted research into environmental issues (s. 475). 
The Federal Court may also order repair or mitigation of damage to the environment 
if an injunction is granted. The usual common law obligation to provide an 
undertaking as to damages when seeking an interim injunction has been removed. 
Interested parties have sought several injunctions under the Act (appendix B). 
In its submission, the Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices 
(ANEDO) considered public involvement in the regulatory regime desirable:  
The need for public participation throughout the development process is highlighted by 
the fact that Governments of all types have often been reluctant to enforce their own 
legislation ... In the first two years of operation, the Commonwealth has also only 
recently brought its first enforcement proceedings under the EPBC Act, whilst the 
Queensland EDO has brought two sets of proceedings on behalf of both a concerned 
individual and a conservation group ... (sub. 131, p. 7) 
Indeed, ANEDO suggested that the Act be amended to allow for open standing for 
more effective enforcement of the legislation, noting that the experience in other     





jurisdictions (such as New South Wales) indicates that open standing does not ‘open 
the floodgates’ to litigation. 
4.2  Development of the EPBC Act  
In 1997, a review of the roles of the Australian Government and the States and 
Territories with respect to the environment resulted in a Council of Australian 
Governments  Heads of Agreement on Commonwealth/State Roles and 
Responsibilities for the Environment. Reform of Australian Government 
environmental regulation was required to implement some aspects of this 
Agreement. Following a review of existing legislation, a consultation paper was 
released for public comment and the EPBC Bill was drafted.  
Around the time of the Act’s commencement, DEH gave presentations about the 
Act to State and local governments, peak industry groups and professionals, 
members of the public and provided more detailed workshops for environmental 
consultants and Australian Government Departments. 
Regulation Impact Statement  
The Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) prepared for the EPBC Bill stated that the 
objectives of reviewing Australian Government environmental legislation were to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the regulatory regime. Two options for 
achieving these objectives were outlined in the RIS — ‘status quo’ (that is, no 
reform of environmental legislation) and ‘reform the Government’s environmental 
legislation’.  
The impact analysis in the RIS focused on the potential benefits to governments and 
industry from reforming the legislation, such as streamlined assessment and 
approval processes and greater clarity and certainty about the Australian 
Government’s role in environmental regulation. The costs to governments and 
industry of revising procedures for environmental assessment and approval, and of 
becoming familiar with new arrangements, were raised but it was considered that 
these ‘should be small’ (Senate 1998, p. 16). However, the likely costs for industry 
from the potential restrictions the Act might impose on activities, for example 
through the listing of threatened species and ecological communities, were not 
discussed in the impact analysis.      
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4.3  Administration and implementation 
Although acknowledging the existence of some complaints, DEH considers that 
industry has generally reacted positively to administration of the Act because it 
provides ‘greater certainty and a more streamlined approach than the previous ad 
hoc regime’ (DEH 2002, p. 170). This view was supported by the Department of 
Defence:  
Generally, Defence’s experience of the assessment and approval process under the 
EPBC Act is that the legislation provides greater certainty and timeliness of process 
than previous regulations. (sub. 42, p. 1) 
However, as acknowledged by DEH  (2002), parts of the farming sector are 
concerned about operation of the Act. Some of these concerns were discussed 
above. Some participants also expressed concern about the Act in terms of its 
overall effectiveness in promoting its objectives. For instance, the ACF stated: 
The EPBC Act has clearly not had a large impact on landholders, either in relative or 
absolute terms. Nor has it or will it have a major impact in actually protecting 
biodiversity or native vegetation unless several weaknesses in the Act are addressed … 
The Act’s weaknesses result in the failure of the Act to achieve its objectives … 
(sub. 146, p. 8) 
Anthony Witham from Western Australia considered: 
The EPBC Act has teeth but only for the limited circumstances where the ecosystems 
or species being protected have a high profile and or are under imminent threat of 
extinction. (sub. 34, p. 2) 
In contrast, the Cardwell Shire Council (in conjunction with the Development 
Bureau of Hinchinbrook and Cardwell Shires Inc) considered that the Act: 
… and [VM Act (Qld)] are contributing an additional planning control above the 
Planning Scheme that is resulting in a higher level of conservation. (sub. 123, p. 3) 
Given its recent introduction, it is difficult to judge the long-term effects of the 
EPBC Act on the environment. However, the Act contains strong mechanisms to 
promote its objectives. Effectiveness in terms of environmental outcomes depends 
on how the Act is used and enforced.  
4.4 Summary 
The EPBC Act consolidated prior Australian Government legislation for the 
environment. The Act seeks to clarify the situations in which the Australian 
Government will be involved in environmental impact assessment and approval. 
While the Act goes some way to clarifying the roles of the Australian Government     





and the States and Territories regarding the environment, there remains potential for 
duplication and inconsistency, particularly with respect to the listing and protection 
of threatened species and ecological communities. There may be scope to define 
more clearly which jurisdiction is responsible for this, or to improve coordination of 
listings.  
Despite DEH’s efforts, there also still appears to be considerable uncertainty about 
the Act’s impact on landholders. However, the evidence suggests that operation of 
the Act to date has had little direct impact on the agricultural sector overall, in terms 
of requiring assessment and approval of activities.  
The Act offers opportunities for public involvement, processes are transparent and 
information about operation of the Act is readily available on the EPBC website. 
Statutory timeframes that apply to the assessment and approval process are 
generally met. DEH has made various efforts to educate landholders and others 
about the Act’s requirements, and social and economic factors must be taken into 
account in approval decisions. There was also some opportunity for the public to 
comment on development of the Act. Additional information about the EPBC Act, 
including its development, operation and impacts on landholders, is contained in 
appendix B.     





5  Promoting environmental goals 
The environmental objectives of the various jurisdictions’ regulatory regimes, 
including their clarity, consistency and transparency, are discussed in this chapter. 
For each of the jurisdictions, evidence is provided on the progress of the regimes 
towards attaining their objectives. Perverse environmental outcomes stemming from 
the regulations and their implementation are discussed.  
5.1 Environmental  objectives 
The importance of clear, concise and transparent objectives in legislation cannot be 
overstated. Not only does the objects section in legislation guide Ministers, 
government agencies and others in interpreting and applying the legislation, but it 
may be used to indicate the boundaries of legal power under the legislation 
(PC  2002b). The environmental objectives of legislation therefore underlie and 
guide the specific regulations in place. 
It is imperative for good regulation that the objectives of the regulatory regime be 
specified so as to address the underlying environmental problem. However, the 
Office of Regulation Review (ORR) warns that objectives should not be specified 
so closely as to align with, and thereby pre-justify, the particular effects of proposed 
regulations: 
The objective should be clear, concise and as specific as possible. It should be specified 
broadly enough to allow consideration of all relevant alternative solutions, but should 
not be so broad or general that the range of alternatives becomes too large to assess, or 
the extent to which the objective has been met becomes too hard to establish. 
(ORR 1998, p. D3)  
The environmental objectives of the various Acts that regulate native vegetation and 
biodiversity throughout the jurisdictions are diverse. In some cases, the objectives 
appear to be quite clearly specified, in other instances they are of a very broad 
nature, and in still other cases, objectives are altogether absent from the legislation. 
Where objects have not been specified in the legislation, they may sometimes be 
inferred from second reading speeches or other public statements.  
Nearly all of the legislation regulating land clearing, across all jurisdictions, 
specifies sustainable development as an objective. However, clarity may be     





compromised and implementation difficulties may arise with legislation that 
specifies such broad objectives. For example, the problem with specifying 
‘ecologically sustainable development’ (ESD) as an objective is that the definition 
of ESD is nebulous at best, and there are several widely-accepted meanings 
(PC 1999; Pearce et al. 1989; Upton 2002).  
This may mean that the range of alternatives for achieving a broadly-defined 
objective is difficult to establish and, therefore, does not satisfy the ORR definition 
of a well-specified objective of legislation. Of course, the specification of broad 
objectives is preferable to a failure to specify any objectives at all. This is because 
objectives provide the benchmark against which the success of the regulatory 
regime is assessed.  
Several Acts relating to native vegetation and biodiversity conservation fall into the 
category of failing to specify objectives, including: 
•  Tasmania’s  Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 and 
Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993; 
•  Northern Territory’s Planning Act 1999; and 
•  Australian Capital Territory’s Nature Conservation Act 1980.  
In the case of the Northern Territory Planning Act, the second reading speech for 
the Planning Bill gives some insight into the objectives of the legislation. For the 
other Acts listed above, environmental objectives appear not to be specified in other 
public documents.  
Where legislation omits objectives, it is also difficult to maintain transparency and 
accountability of decision-making. It is difficult for landholders to know the basis 
for assessment of clearing applications. Some participants (in Western Australia) 
suggested that clearing permits could be denied because removal of native 
vegetation would cause environmental harm by way of salinity. Others had been 
denied permits on the basis of a different type of environmental harm (biodiversity 
loss), even though the applicant had proposed measures to limit the potential impact 
of salinity. The WA Government argued that the need to avoid secondary salinity is 
the overriding objective of its legislation, even though the objective is not explicitly 
stated in the legislation (sub. DR290).  
Even where objectives have been clearly defined, there may be debate as to their 
appropriateness. For instance, the New South Wales Native Vegetation 
Conservation Act 1997 (NVC Act) has been criticised for its focus on conservation 
of native vegetation above all else, including sustainable resource use 
(NSWFA 2003b).      





The objectives of Tasmania’s Regional Forest Agreement have also been 
questioned. There is debate as to whether the native vegetation retention targets are 
appropriate, and whether the system is providing adequate protection for certain 
classifications of forest communities. 
Where objectives have been set out, there may also be an issue in relation to the 
way those objectives are achieved. In some instances, the problem may lie in 
enforcement of the legislation. For example, Senator Bartlett argued that: 
The manner in which the EPBC Act [Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act] is being administered and the Commonwealth’s reluctance to take 
enforcement action have ensured the Act has had little or no impact on our 
environmental problems. It has also diminished the incentive for landholders to comply 
with the Act’s obligations. This must be rectified if the objectives of the EPBC Act and 
the potential benefits to landholders and the broader community are to be realised. 
(sub. 168, pp. 16–17) 
In other instances, the scope of the exemptions allowed in legislation may 
compromise achievement of environmental goals. For example, exemptions under 
the SA Native Vegetation Act 1991 for clearing around fences and isolated trees 
were criticised (Hansard, WA Legislative Council 4 August 1999).   
Multiple objectives 
Where legislation has multiple objectives, the ORR (1998) recommends that where 
possible, a distinction should be made between primary and subsidiary objectives. 
This may reduce uncertainty about the priority assigned to different objectives.  
The objectives in the Acts under review generally are not prioritised, with the 
exception of Queensland’s Land Act 1994. In this case, the legislation clearly 
indicates general provisions of the Act, and also the more specific provisions that 
relate to native vegetation. In this way, the legislation clearly delineates the over-
arching objectives that may not be compromised in the pursuit of the specific 
objectives. 
In some cases, the objectives specified in one piece of legislation overlap and/or 
conflict with objectives set out under other legislation. Conflicting objectives cause 
problems for the agencies administering the legislation because they must determine 
the weightings to attach to objectives that are at variance.  
There is conflict between the objectives of weed control and protecting native 
vegetation (both of which yield environmental benefits) in a number of 
jurisdictions. For example, in Queensland, the Dalrymple Landcare Committee 
noted the conflict between legislation requiring them to control weeds (Parkinsonia)     





and the requirements of the Queensland regime for protecting native vegetation 
(sub. DR256). This occurred even though both requirements were administered by 
the same state government department. Rod  Young  (trans., pp. 1240–59)  raised 
similar concerns in relation to weed control and the clearing regime in New South 
Wales.  
This conflict can often be to the detriment of protecting environmental values. 
Dalrymple Landcare Committee (Queensland) argued that there were significant 
environmental benefits from controlling weeds:  
By controlling weeds you can increase biodiversity and also maintain those ecological 
processes which are part of the objectives of the veg management regulations because 
often it's best to have a diverse population of plants than a monoculture of weeds. 
(trans., p. 1050) 
In relation to the objectives of the various regimes, the Northern Land Council 
argued that: 
… divergent objectives and related criteria for determining modes and targets of 
resource use have been muddled at both Federal and State/Territory levels. As a 
consequence, regulatory provisions and practices are often poorly matched to putative 
objectives. This has led to approaches to conservation that are demonstrably 
ineffective, expensive, and often counterproductive … (sub. 221, p. 7) 
In New South Wales, although the objectives of the three main Acts are broadly 
consistent, there is potential for conflict between the NVC Act and the Threatened 
Species Conservation Act 1995 (TSC Act). This conflict may arise because the 
NVC Act directs that social and economic aspects be considered in the regulation of 
native vegetation management, whereas no such direction is made under the TSC 
Act. This conflict of objectives caused problems in the development consent 
application process administered by the (former) Department of Land and Water 
Conservation. 
FINDING 5.1 
In a number of jurisdictions, the environmental objectives of the regulatory regimes 
are not specified or are poorly specified. Conflicting and multiple objectives are 
also likely to hinder the attainment of environmental goals. 
5.2 Environmental  benefits 
Good regulations achieve their stated objectives while delivering the greatest net 
public benefit (Argy and Johnson 2003). Where environmental objectives have been 
clearly specified in legislation, it may be possible to devise indicators that measure 
whether those objectives have been achieved. However, without clearly-specified     





environmental objectives, it is difficult to judge how well an existing set of 
regulations might be performing. Since, in most cases, no analysis has been 
undertaken to determine the most efficient way of delivering desired environmental 
outcomes, it is not possible to determine whether the regulations in place deliver the 
highest level of net public benefit. 
Achieving objectives 
Ascertaining performance against specific objectives is extremely difficult and 
unlikely to be achieved with any level of precision. This may be one reason why 
vegetation clearance is often used as a proxy for the measurement of progress 
towards environmental objectives. The rate of native vegetation clearance following 
the introduction of a regulatory regime is one indicator that may be used. However, 
it is at best only a partial indicator of the effectiveness of the regulations in 
achieving higher-order environmental objectives, such as preventing the 
degradation of soil and water, biodiversity conservation and habitat protection. One 
reason for this is that the relationship between land clearing and performance in 
achieving environmental objectives may be weak or non-existent. Another reason is 
that land clearing can be affected by many other factors, such as commodity prices, 
exchange rates and developments in land-clearing technology. The rate of clearing 
also fails to identify the quality or environmental value of the vegetation being 
cleared.  
Nonetheless, because comprehensive monitoring of progress towards attaining 
regulatory objectives is still a long way from implementation in all jurisdictions, the 
rate of native vegetation clearance remains the most used ‘stand-in’ measure of 
success or failure at achieving environmental objectives.  
Monitoring vegetation clearance can be problematic for several reasons. Often there 
are very large areas involved which creates problems of resourcing. In addition, a 
significant portion of illegal clearing takes place on private land, which is difficult 
to observe. Monitoring is thus typically undertaken using satellite imagery or 
monitoring of clearance approvals.  
However, each of these methods has drawbacks. Satellite mapping, where available, 
is not always accurate. It does not allow for monitoring of native grassland and 
shrubland clearance as it focuses only on woody vegetation. A study conducted by 
the National Parks and Wildlife Service of clearing in the New South Wales 
wheatbelt found that targeted aerial photography exposed a rate of clearing ten 
times that revealed by satellite imagery alone (AONSW 2002).     





Monitoring of clearance approvals may also understate the actual area cleared, as it 
does not include illegal clearance, and clearing that occurs under exemptions. 
However, figures based on clearance approvals may also overstate clearance where 
only part of the area approved was cleared, or where clearing was postponed or 
never undertaken.  
In addition, if there is an expectation that clearing regulations may be introduced, 
there is an incentive to undertake pre-emptive clearing. Mr Rod Reedman (Mackay) 
noted that: 
… in the area around my farm there was more clearing done in the 12 months prior to 
the legislation coming out than there would ever have been if the legislation hadn’t 
been in the wind. So I believe that the legislation has caused more clearing than it’s 
saved. (trans., p. 1033)  
Where pre-emptive clearing takes place there may be a reduction in land-clearing 
applications when the regime begins, because the landholders have already cleared 
a significant amount of land.  
Data available on current rates of clearing, as determined by approvals, or satellite 
mapping, are outlined in table 5.1. Across the jurisdictions, clearing rates have 
tended to decline following the introduction of legislation although, in some cases, 
pre-emptive clearing has been evident.  
Despite reasonable annual data on the rates of clearing, it is still not possible to 
determine the extent to which jurisdictions are achieving the environmental 
objectives set out in their legislation.  
In general, reported clearing rates have declined following the introduction of 
regimes regulating the clearing of native vegetation. However, there is also some 
evidence of pre-emptive clearing and illegal clearing. 
FINDING 5.2     





Table 5.1  Indicative annual rates of native vegetation clearing  
State/Territorya  Period  Hectares per year  Comment  








Clearing of native woody vegetation 
Clearing controls introduced 1995 and 





Clearing of native woody vegetation 









Clearing of native woody vegetation 
Clearing controls for freehold land 
announced 1999, introduced 2000 




Based on permit applications 
(includes non-woody native vegetation)




Based on permit applications 





Clearing of native forest vegetation for 
agricultural purposes 




Figures for 1994 onwards relate to 
leasehold land only 
ACT    —  Removal of stands of trees for urban 
development 
a In New South Wales for the 1980s, estimates are of clearing of native woody vegetation with a canopy 
cover greater than 20 per cent. For the 1990s, estimates are of clearing of native woody vegetation with a 
canopy cover greater than 12–15 per cent (NVAC 1999). In Victoria for the period 1983–1993, the estimates 
are of clearing of woody vegetation with a height greater than 2 metres and a density greater than 10 per cent 
(DEST 1995). From 1993 onwards, estimates are of clearing of woody vegetation based on TREE100 dataset 
(ie woody vegetation at the 1:100 000 scale) (DNRE 2002). In Queensland for the 1980s, estimates are of 
clearing of woody vegetation (AGO 2000). From 1990–2000, estimates are of clearing of perennial woody 
plants of all sizes that can be distinguished with Landsat TM imagery (NR&M 2003a). Estimates of clearing of 
native vegetation in Western Australia are based primarily on land clearing permits issued by the Soil and 
Lands Conservation Council (and include non-woody native vegetation) (DEST 1995, Western Australian 
Government, sub. 151). South Australian estimates are based on land clearing permits and include non-
woody native vegetation (DEST 1995, SA Parks and Wildlife 2002). In Tasmania for the period 1983–1993, 
estimates are of native vegetation clearance for agricultural purposes (includes non-woody vegetation) 
(DEST  1995). Estimates for 2000–2002 are based on applications to clear native forest vegetation for 
agricultural and infrastructure purposes (ie does not include clearing for commercial forestry operations: 
approximately 11  000 hectares of native forest vegetation were cleared for forestry purposes and were 
replaced by either plantation or regeneration in 2001-02) (FPB 2002b). Estimates for the Northern Territory 
for the period 1983–1993, are of clearing of native woody vegetation on pastoral leasehold land (DEST 1995). 
Data for 1995–1999 are based on clearing applications and include non-woody vegetation (Brock 2001).  
Monitoring and enforcement 
The Commission has received evidence from various parties suggesting that 
monitoring and enforcement are an ongoing concern due to a lack of resources. 
Compliance may be affected by a low risk of detection and prosecution, as well as 
inadequate penalties.     





The Trust for Nature (Victoria) pointed out the threat to environmental values when 
legislation cannot be adequately enforced: 
In farming areas, grasslands are subject to destruction and degradation from over-
grazing and cropping despite having regulatory protection. Confusion and suspicion 
about what actually constitutes a native grassland amongst landholders combined with 
a lack of resources for compliance and enforcement of legislative requirements is 
offering little protection for remnant grasslands and even less improved management of 
these areas. (sub. 129, p. 2) 
Tatiara District Council (South Australia) also noted that: 
Enforcement and monitoring seems to be an ongoing concern due to lack of resources. 
There seems to be increased legislation in an attempt to control environmental issues. 
An alternative option may be to direct additional resources to on-ground staff and 
education to build better relationships with landholders as this may achieve the desired 
outcomes. (sub. 60, p. 3) 
The Humane Society International (Australia) commented that a lack of resourcing 
was creating problems for the effective operation of the Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act): 
… Environment Australia is in need of significantly increased resources to fulfil the 
[EPBC Act] potential to protect Matters of National Environmental Significance, to 
consult effectively with landholders to develop environmentally and socially 
satisfactory solutions that uphold the law, and to carry out effective implementation and 
enforcement. (sub. 126, p. 3) 
In response to an Australian National Audit Office audit, which also found that the 
Department of the Environment and Heritage was not monitoring the progress of 
approved actions, the Department acknowledged that its compliance, enforcement 
and auditing functions had been under-resourced (ANAO 2003). The Victorian 
Farmers’ Federation (sub.  149) stated that the authorities rely heavily on 
landholders ‘dobbing in’ their neighbours as a means of finding breaches of the 
regulations. 
Several parties indicated that lack of enforcement has been a problem under New 
South Wales legislation (subs 109 and  146; Wentworth Group 2003). The Audit 
Office of New South Wales (AONSW 2002) and the Nature Conservation Council 
of NSW (sub. 109) claimed that the number of broadly-worded exemptions under 
the NVC Act have made enforcement difficult. Bartel (2003) argued that inadequate 
mechanisms to enforce the provisions of the NVC Act, combined with low 
penalties, were unlikely to provide strong incentives for compliance.  
South Australia has recently increased penalties for illegal clearing under the Native 
Vegetation (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2002  (NV Amendment Act)  to 
$100 000 or a prescribed rate per hectare of land, whichever is greater. This penalty     





also applies to contravention or failure to comply with a condition attached to a 
clearing consent. However, AgForce (trans.,  pp.  71–2) expressed concern that 
approaches to improve compliance through the imposition of harsher penalties 
conflict with attempts to obtain greater landholder involvement in vegetation 
management. 
FINDING 5.3 
In a number of jurisdictions, monitoring and enforcement of the regulations appear 
to be hampered by a lack of resources. 
Compliance 
Compliance with regulations varies across the jurisdictions (box 5.1). To some 
degree, this reflects the level of land clearing that has already occurred in the past 
— in areas where large amounts of clearing have occurred, compliance with 
regulations is likely to be higher.  
The complexity of regimes and the cost of meeting administrative requirements can 
affect compliance rates. The WA Government noted that: 
The new clearing provisions under the amended EP Act will also introduce a simpler, 
more streamlined application and assessment process. Landholders will be able to 
clearly understand how the system works and what the requirements are. It is 
anticipated that this is likely to increase compliance. (sub. DR290, p. 18) 
Landholder attitudes to the legislation will also influence compliance. Dennis 
Toohey (New South Wales) argued that the nature of the native vegetation and 
biodiversity legislation has adversely affected farmer’s views of government:  
What to me got the land-holders’ backs up was that it was the use of one particular 
aspect of that legislation which was about ‘prevent’ … very little effort or attention was 
paid to the words of ‘encourage’, ‘improve’ and ‘promote’, so we had a command-
control approach …  
One of the by-products of that command-control approach that has been applied is that 
we have now got substantial areas of the countryside where farmers are suspicious, 
concerned, wary, about actions and motives of government. I find that — from a person 
who grew up in an area where government was seen as supportive, of helping facilitate 
change, to provide educational and suasive sort of actions — we have now got 
suspicion and wariness. (trans., pp. 1306–7)  
Compliance will also be related to the chance of illegal activities being detected, the 
likelihood of prosecution, and the size of the penalties in relation to the benefits 
gained from illegal clearing. Where cases of illegal clearing have been reported, the 
rate of prosecution has generally been low across all jurisdictions. Where     





prosecution has resulted in conviction, the size of the penalty has been less than the 
maximum permitted.  
 
Box 5.1  Compliance in selected jurisdictions 
Australian Government 
The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO 2003) found that overall compliance with 
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 is adequate.  
Queensland 
The Statewide Landcover and Trees Study identified 61  000 hectares of potential 
illegal clearing — 25  000 hectares on freehold land and 36  000 on leasehold land 
(Robertson 2003).  
New South Wales 
Level of reported illegal clearing increased steadily following the introduction of the 
Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 in January 1998.   
Between 1998 and 2002, there were 705 reported breaches of the Act. No action was 
taken in approximately 70 per cent of these cases. However, warning letters were 
issued in about 20 per cent of cases and almost no cases were prosecuted. 
South Australia 
Between 1998 and 2002, reported cases of alleged illegal clearing fluctuated between 
120 and 152 per year.  
In 2001-02, around 30 per cent of reported breaches were not taken further, and 
17 per cent of cases ended in prosecution. 
Western Australia 
Since July 2001, 3000 hectares of land have been reported as illegally cleared. 
In 2001-02, four summonses were issued for failures to notify clearing, and one 
summons was issued in relation to breach of a Soil Conservation Notice.  
 
 
5.3  Perverse environmental outcomes 
The Commission has received evidence from several jurisdictions of perverse, or 
unintended, environmental outcomes resulting from the regulatory arrangements 
(such as more frequent clearing and lack of pest management). These outcomes may 
stem from: a lack of clarity in the specification of regulations; a failure to apply the 
regulations flexibly on a case-by-case basis in a way that focuses on environmental 
outcomes; a lack of recognition of the economic incentives underlying the problem 
at hand; and/or a lack of resources to ensure effective environmental management.      





Definition of regrowth 
Evidence of problems stemming from the definition of regrowth has been received 
from stakeholders in several jurisdictions. Where such problems arise, they 
generally occur due to either a lack of clarity in the regulations, leading to 
landholder misinterpretation, or simply due to government failure to understand the 
incentives created by placing arbitrary timeframes on regrowth clearance.  
Typically, landholders are allowed to clear regrowth without approval until it 
reaches a certain age or height, after which it is classified as remnant and 
permission must be sought. However, this approach creates incentives for 
landholders to clear regrowth before age or height restrictions come into force. The 
Queensland Farmers Federation (QFF) stated that this has led to landholders 
clearing regrowth at a very early stage, which can result in   
environmentally-perverse outcomes:  
Shortened cycles of clearing and re-clearing may not enable enhanced greenhouse 
objectives to occur, as the regrowth would have reduced periods of carbon 
sequestration and increased incidences of the release of carbon coinciding with the 
more frequent clearing. (sub. 177, p. 17) 
Canegrowers and CSR Sugar noted the environmental consequences of such 
clearing: 
Currently, landholders are motivated to behave inappropriately in regard to 
management of vegetation cover that has not reached trigger levels for the regulations. 
This leads to unintended consequences with erosion and water quality  … 
(sub. 164, p. 6)  
Where regrowth restrictions are not clearly specified, landholders may be clearing 
prematurely for fear of losing the capacity to develop their farms. The South 
Australian Farmers’ Federation (SAFF) (sub. 140) submitted that while legislation 
in South Australia provides exemption periods of ten years for grazing and five 
years for activities such as cropping and maintaining pasture, landholders are not 
always certain which timeframes apply to which activities.  
The fact that timeframes appear to be arbitrary also creates problems because 
landholders are encouraged to clear land far more rigorously than they otherwise 
would. The SAFF argued that: 
Because of the five-year rule, you would be under an obligation to clear regrowth 
within that five-year cycle rather than leaving things until you want to clear it. Neither 
the five-year rule in the lower country nor the 10-year rule in the northern country 
really relates to farming cycles of pasture renovation, et cetera. They are just 
completely out of sync with reality. (trans., p. 477)     





Most authorities appear to have opted for administrative simplicity in the adoption 
of definitions for regrowth. However, while simple, broad-brush criteria help to 
allay administrative costs, they leave less scope for assessments of applications to 
clear regrowth based on relative costs and benefits. Simple definitions also fail to 
capture the diversity of conditions that may occur within a jurisdiction. Chinchilla 
Shire Council stated that: 
Regrowth responses to clearing vary widely and this is reflected in the wide variety of 
clearing rotation times in the pastoral areas. The frequency of regrowth clearing is 
largely dictated by a balance of economics and land/pasture conservation practice. For 
those communities found on the poorer quality soils with relatively slow rates of 
regrowth, clearing times dictated by declines in pasture productivity may extend to 
10 years or longer where poor rainfall seasons or low commodity prices extend the time 
to when maximum financial benefit can be obtained. Clearing more frequently may 
result in decreased soil fertility benefits following clearing and a lower pasture 
regrowth response. Conversely in the better quality soils and [regional ecosystems], 
unless cropping is introduced immediately after clearing, regrowth can become 
problematic much more quickly (normally within 5 years). (sub. 88, p. 5)  
In several jurisdictions, the arbitrary reclassification of regrowth vegetation as 
remnant after a certain time, has resulted in landholders clearing regrowth more 
frequently than otherwise. This has the potential for perverse environmental 
impacts, since landholders may otherwise have left land fallow and/or revegetated 
for substantially longer periods of time, with associated native vegetation, 
greenhouse, and biodiversity benefits. More frequent clearing of regrowth also may 
contribute to erosion and water quality decline. 
‘Pest’ species 
There are several potential perverse outcomes involving pest species where 
landholders have been unable to clear native vegetation on their land. First, invasive 
native vegetation can result in land degradation and loss of biodiversity. For 
example, in New South Wales, the NSW Farmers’ Association (NSWFA 
2001, p. 10) said: 
In many of the lower rainfall areas of the State, woody regrowth of Cyprus Pines, 
Bimble Box and other invasive natives leads to the choking out of understorey species 
that are crucial to the survival of many indigenous species of fauna. The resulting 
monocultures do nothing to promote diversity and may in fact result in severe erosion 
and environmental degradation.  
FINDING 5.4     





Second, stands of native vegetation can become subject to invasion by non-native 
plant species that may be poisonous. Third, areas of native vegetation can harbour 
feral animals that have detrimental impacts on adjacent cleared land. 
Some invasive non-native species, such as Lippia, compete strongly with native 
pastures but are unpalatable to stock and can reduce the carrying capacity of land 
and make soil more prone to erosion (Augusta Saunders (Western Australia), 
sub. 19; Faye McPherson (New South Wales), sub. 173). Some landholders claimed 
that they are restricted, under the NVC Act, from undertaking the necessary 
management activities to control weeds effectively (Murray Darling Basin Lippia 
Working Group, sub. 170).  
In South Australia, some of the regulations in place to deal with removal of pest 
plants are alleged to be onerous and ineffective. For example, the regulations 
require some pest plants to be removed by hand which is time-consuming and 
ineffective (Sally Mackay, sub. 78). Nonetheless, landholders are obliged under the 
Animal and Plant Control Act to destroy pest plants on their land. If they do not, the 
Animal and Plant Commission has the authority to undertake the required activities 
and to invoice the owner for the cost of doing so.  
Stringent regulations relating to destruction of pest plants could be a factor 
exacerbating clearing of native vegetation. For example, if landholders cannot spray 
weeds on their properties, the only solution may be to clear the native vegetation 
along with the pest plants. 
Other participants considered that removing invasive vegetation is more cost-
effective if it is combined with cropping: 
The common practice of incorporating weed eradication with cropping to cover this 
expensive exercise is also prevented, so the chance to eradicate perennial weeds such as 
Box Thorn and Galvanised Burr is lost. Failure to destroy weeds in this way leads to a 
downward spiral in productivity. (Raymond Perkins, sub. 86, p. 2) 
Reduced carrying capacity due to weed infestation also places greater pressure on 
the productive areas of a property, which has implications for the long-term 
sustainability of agricultural land. Tania Hall (New South Wales) observed: 
Normally the property is productive where it is open, but extreme pressure is put on 
these open areas by domestic livestock, uncontrolled numbers of feral and native 
animals, and cropping, because of the inability to use the rest of the property 
productively. (sub. TS10, p. 1) 
Improperly managed invasive species therefore have the potential to reduce the 
carrying capacity of agricultural land directly as well as indirectly to lead to land 
degradation on areas of productive farmland, by increasing the burden on such land.      






In a number of jurisdictions, the current regimes regulating native vegetation 
clearance and biodiversity conservation have an adverse impact on landholders’ 
ability to manage pest species. 
Failure to achieve integrated environmental management 
Evidence has been received from various participants to suggest that a flexible, all 
encompassing view of environmental management is often neglected when 
assessing applications to clear native vegetation on private land.  
For example, some landholders from South Australia, Victoria and New South 
Wales asserted that they have been prevented from installing centre-pivot irrigators 
because they could not clear scattered paddock trees from their land under existing 
regulations. This is potentially an environmentally-perverse outcome, since centre-
pivot irrigation is significantly more water-efficient than flood irrigation, which it 
often replaces (Tatiara District Council (South Australia), sub. 60, p. 2).  
In addition to reducing water use, centre-pivot irrigation is a more economic method 
of irrigation. This means that landholders using this technology may be financially 
better placed to maintain their properties and prevent land degradation.  
From an integrated environmental management perspective, restrictions on the 
clearance and maintenance of native vegetation in regrowth areas and along access 
routes could also be counter-productive. The Inland Burnett Regional Vegetation 
Management Committee (Queensland) suggested that: 
Early dominance by several tree species and other primary species could extend … the 
recovery of some of the original and short-lived species by exhausting seed banks, 
thereby precluding their regeneration. Thinning these regenerating trees will therefore 
maintain higher levels of biodiversity and hasten system recovery whilst also 
maintaining productivity. (sub. 139, p. 4) 
Restrictions on management of fuel loads could also have impacts on biodiversity, 
as an inability to reduce fuel build-up may increase the incidence of catastrophic 
fires. The Country Fire Authority of Victoria suggested that:  
The management of the vegetative fuel in bushland areas is a key prevention and 
suppression activity. This can have profound impacts on biodiversity. However, some 
techniques for managing fuel can also have positive benefits for the natural 
environment. (sub. 138, p. 1)     





Ben Rees (Queensland) raised similar concerns with regard to fire control: 
Less developed landowners will be forced to rely more heavily on fire to control 
unwanted undergrowth. This will mean increased incidence of fires and subsequent 
serious consequences for rural service communities and larger centers. Environmental 
damage will also occur from the forced reliance upon hot fires to control unwanted 
undergrowth regeneration from time to time. (sub. 210, p. 2)  
Similarly, Peter Pacers (Victoria) (trans., p. 504) observed that the relatively small 
amount of land clearing undertaken by landholders is likely to be far less destructive 
than risking large bushfire events. Such risks, he claimed, were heightened by an 
‘overzealous application of a sort of no disturbance policy’ in the legislation.  
FINDING 5.6 
The current regulatory regimes narrowly focus on native vegetation protection in a 
way that is not always consistent with the achievement of longer-term conservation 
and broader environmental goals. 
Economic incentives  
Some participants indicated that the failure of governments to recognise the 
economic impacts of native vegetation and biodiversity regulations, and the 
incentive structures linked to regulations, have resulted in perverse environmental 
outcomes. 
The Nature Conservation Council of NSW (sub.  109) noted that during any 
transitional phase, such as legislative review, the incidence of pre-emptive or panic 
clearing is heightened. In Western Australia, pre-emptive clearing occurred in both 
rural and urban areas when clearing regulations were announced. While early notice 
of intended changes to legislation may be crucial in ensuring that the transparency 
and consultation requirements of government are upheld, the incentives created by 
such announcements often result in landholders rushing to clear before the new 
restrictions are imposed. The SA Government made a similar point (sub. DR324).  
Price (sub. 38) indicated that the scale and rate of paddock tree clearance greatly 
increased in anticipation of the recent passing of the Western Australian 
Environmental Protection Amendment Bill. He noted that this eventuated even 
though it was still unclear whether permits will be required for such activity, or 
whether some form of exemption may be granted.      





QFF also provided evidence that landholders may engage in panic clearing during 
periods of legislative change: 
In essence, the introduction of the [Vegetation Management Act (VM Act)] resulted in 
areas of land to be ‘panic’ cleared as growers and producers thought that their ability to 
clear land in the future would be lost and hence those who had no short term plans to 
clear decided they had no option but to clear — a ‘use it or lose it’ mentality. The 
accelerated clearing was one such perverse outcome that had occurred resulting from 
the impending introduction of the [VM Act]. (sub. 177, p. 17) 
While panic clearing may be reduced through the use of retrospective clauses in 
legislation, it is often the case that landholders will have a window of opportunity to 
clear before new restrictions are enforced, and many will be unwilling to risk losing 
the capacity to make decisions in regard to their land. However, the Australian 
Conservation Foundation (sub. 146) noted that although the proposed introduction 
of new regulations may cause panic clearing in the short term, longer-term clearing 
rates should be lower as a result of regulation. 
Some participants indicated that strict controls on land clearing are required to 
prevent widespread panic clearing. However, it is usually the case that panic 
clearing is a response by landholders to the threat of land-clearing controls or 
simply uncertainty about future controls.  
Participants in New South Wales highlighted that there are poor incentives for 
landholders to look after threatened species on their land. As a result, environmental 
assets may not be protected by the people who may be best able to look after them, 
namely private landholders. Not only does the existing regulatory approach 
encourage landholders to keep quiet about threatened species on their land, but it 
may even create incentives for them to destroy such species. This is because the 
regulations impose such strict management conditions on land found to contain 
threatened species that the landholder may question the viability of allowing the 
species to remain on their land (Rod Young, sub. 27 and NSWFA 2001). 
In Victoria, variation in offset requirements according to the environmental quality 
of the native vegetation cleared, creates poor incentives for landholders to maintain 
the environmental quality of the vegetation. If landholders believe they may wish to 
clear in future, there is an incentive for them not to manage or even actively to 
degrade the land to reduce the potential size of offsets. Gippsland Private Forestry 
Inc. (Victoria) commented that:  
There appears to be little ‘reward’ to native vegetation owners for good past or future 
management. In fact one can argue there is in fact the opposite. Degraded native 
vegetation is generally given wider management options than quality native vegetation. 
The scope to undermine the intent of policy aiming to achieve sustainable native 
vegetation communities in the future by inadvertent or deliberate negative management     





actions will not be lost on landowners who do not support adoption of regimes they 
regard as unfair or unreasonable. (sub. 92, p. 2) 
The SA Government (sub. DR324) noted the potential for perverse incentives where 
a landholder who had degraded an area was given permission to clear while one that 
had looked after native vegetation was denied permission.  
Other risks apply to planting native forests that may later become subject to 
regulatory restrictions. This means that landholders are less likely to engage in 
revegetation activities. Eva and Arnfried Duden (New South Wales) (sub. 57) noted 
that landholders were refraining from planting native vegetation because of the risk 
of potential restrictions on management and harvesting activities. The Leverton 
Pastoral Company (New South Wales) observed that:  
Since the [NVC Act] has been introduced there is less incentive to improve the 
environment as it is a burden to our livelihoods. (sub. 96, p. 1) 
Sally McKay (South Australia, trans.,  p.  470) also indicated that the current 
regulations in South Australia act as a disincentive to planting trees as landholders 
have to prove that they planted the trees, rather than the authorities having to prove 
that the vegetation is remnant.  
Regulation may create uncertainty that affects landholders’ long-term plans for their 
land and create incentives to take short-term gains. Blue Chip Forestry Services 
(New South Wales) noted that the uncertainty associated with regulation can create 
an incentive to harvest timber in the short-term rather than focus on the long-term 
sustainable management of forests (sub. DR248).  
The long delays often associated with applications to clear, and with appeal 
processes, may mean that landholders take matters into their own hands and clear 
land illegally, especially if refusal to clear would render their farm non-viable. This 
was the case presented by a landholder in Western Australia who applied in 1997 to 
clear his land and then spent six years appealing the decision before deciding to 
clear the land for cropping regardless (trans., pp. 377–8).  
FINDING 5.7 
In some jurisdictions, the current regulatory regimes have created incentives for 
landholders to clear native vegetation earlier, to clear more, or to degrade native 
vegetation, that are inconsistent with promoting the regimes’ environmental 
objectives.      





Lack of resources  
Several participants commented on the inadequacy of resources available to ensure 
that environmental objectives are achieved. For example, with respect to 
government agencies buying up private properties for conservation (such as under 
the South Australian Native Vegetation Management Act 1985), the Institute of 
Public Affairs (sub.  135) noted that governments lacking resources to manage 
existing national parks are not likely to have the resources to manage areas of 
formerly private land. Moreover, the creation of a fragmented public conservation 
estate over multiple isolated areas is unlikely to promote environmental values in 
the most effective manner.  
The Australian Conservation Foundation argued that other programs (such as 
BushTender in Victoria) may support land-clearing regulations, but: 
… funding levels are clearly not adequate, either to encourage enough landholders to 
participate, or to ‘out-compete’ the market pressures — and perverse incentives — that 
encourage land clearing and biodiversity decline in the first instance. 
(sub. DR302, p. 7) 
In relation to threatened species legislation, the Tasmanian Conservation Trust 
highlighted the importance of adequately resourced supporting measures to ensuring 
that the objectives of the legislative framework are achieved.  
… the legislative framework that went into place assumed that the state government 
would put resources into making it work. That hasn’t happened, as a result of which 
you do have a regulatory obligation — a legislative obligation, without any of the 
parallel supporting measures to make it happen. (trans., p. 1384)  
Several participants, for example Dennis Toohey (New South Wales, 
trans.,  pp.  1307–8) and Paul McGowan (Victoria, trans.,  p.1335), argued that 
greater resources need to be applied to educational programs to explain the rationale 
behind native vegetation and biodiversity regulations.  
5.4 Summary 
Current native vegetation and biodiversity regulatory regimes appear to have had 
mixed success in promoting environmental objectives. In a number of jurisdictions, 
the legislation does not specify any objectives, or the objectives are poorly 
specified. This creates uncertainty for landholders and may make implementation of 
the regulatory regimes less transparent.  
It is difficult to determine the success of the regulatory regimes in achieving 
environmental objectives in part because of the difficulty of ascertaining their     





objectives. There is some evidence that the rate of land clearing has slowed 
following the introduction of regulation in most jurisdictions. However, there is also 
evidence of illegal clearing and there is no information available on the 
environmental quality of the vegetation retained, or how well it is being managed.  
The focus of the regimes on using permits to regulate the clearing of native 
vegetation has been at the expense of creating a broader framework for the 
protection and management of native vegetation and the achievement of 
environmental objectives.  
There is also evidence of significant unintended perverse outcomes from the 
regulations that may reduce their ability to achieve environmental objectives. 
Problems with clearing of regrowth, pest plants and feral animals, and the creation 
of unintended adverse incentives for landholders to care for, or plant, native 
vegetation are apparent in a number of jurisdictions.      





6  Impacts on landholders, other 
industries and regional communities 
Terms of reference 3(a) directs the Commission to report on various impacts (both 
positive and negative) of regulation of native vegetation clearance and/or 
biodiversity conservation on landholders and other economic activities, and the 
flow-on effects to regional communities. This chapter examines these issues. More 
detailed discussions of these impacts in individual jurisdictions are presented in 
appendixes C–J and the impacts of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation  Act  1999 (EPBC Act) are considered further in chapter  4 and 
appendix B.  
Section  6.1 examines the various impacts the regimes may have on individual 
landholders and considers the information the Commission has received on these 
effects. Section 6.2 presents the results of two regional case studies of the potential 
impacts on landholders’ returns of banning all broadscale remnant woody 
vegetation clearance in the Moree Plains Shire (covering 1.8 million hectares in 
northern New South Wales) and the Murweh Shire (4 million hectares in southern 
Queensland). Section 6.3 examines impacts on regional areas and other industries, 
while section  6.4 considers government measures to mitigate the impact of the 
regulations. Section 6.5 presents the main conclusions to be drawn from the chapter. 
6.1  Impacts on landholders 
Regulations restricting native vegetation clearance and protecting biodiversity often 
reduce the levels of private production that landholders with native vegetation on 
their properties can achieve, either by restricting vegetation clearance, or through 
delays in the approval process. They can also add to landholders’ costs in managing 
native vegetation and impose costs of dealing with regulators. Some of these 
regulations can also provide benefits to landholders — particularly if they are 
applied selectively to address regional land and water degradation issues. However, 
to the extent that the regulations enforce broader community objectives, such as 
protecting biodiversity and controlling greenhouse gas emissions, they are more 
likely to have net negative impacts on those landholders whose activities are 
restricted.     





That regulations may impose net negative impacts on one section of the community 
does not preclude net benefits accruing to the community as a whole. Nonetheless, 
an evaluation of the type, size and cause of negative impacts should assist policy 
makers in determining the most efficient means of achieving the objectives of the 
regulations. An assessment of the size and causes of costs imposed on landholders 
will also help indicate the level of offsetting benefits necessary to justify the 
regulations or particular aspects of them. The extent and distribution of negative 
impacts would also be important if compensation were to be paid.  
What are the impacts on landholders? 
The impacts on landholders of native vegetation and biodiversity regulations are the 
costs and benefits accruing to them compared to the situation in the absence of 
regulation. As noted in chapter 2, many landholders receive both production and 
amenity benefits from selective retention of native vegetation and biodiversity. Over 
at least the past 30 years, there has been a growing awareness of these benefits 
among landholders, as evidenced by their central role in the Landcare movement. 
Numerous submissions to this inquiry have indicated that many landholders 
recognise the need to maintain a certain amount of native vegetation to improve the 
productivity and sustainability of their properties.1 In addition, in some cases, 
vegetation is retained because the costs of clearing are currently not justified by the 
net income that would be generated.  
In all of these situations, not being able to clear the vegetation cannot be considered 
a cost of the regulations — the landholder would not have cleared the vegetation in 
any event.2 Similarly, the net private gains from retaining the vegetation will not be 
a benefit of the regulation. Any associated regional or community-wide 
environmental benefits from the retention of this vegetation for private reasons will 
be a bonus.  
If a landholder intends to clear the property in stages over time the regulations may 
not impose an immediate cost but could do so in the future. 
In some regions, there are benefits to landholders as a group from reduced soil and 
water degradation (for example, reduced salinity and erosion) arising from targeted 
                                              
1  These include, Thomas Phelan (sub. 61) from Nathalia in Victoria, Tatiara District Council 
(sub. 60) of South Australia, Ron and Jennifer Collins (sub. 182) from Mt. Barker in Western 
Australia and Jack Vallance (sub. DR222) from Tempy in Victoria. 
2  However, there may be costs (including compliance costs) of not being able to manage the 
vegetation efficiently for production purposes, for example, thinning vegetated areas, 
controlling weeds and animals within the vegetation and lopping branches near fence lines, due 
to regulatory restrictions.     





vegetation retention or plantings. In such cases, while some of these benefits may 
accrue directly to the landholder involved in retaining or replanting vegetation, 
there will be additional benefits to other landholders (as well as to the wider 
regional community). In this situation, there would tend to be an under-retention of 
vegetation by private landholders acting in isolation, although some landholders 
have developed cooperative mechanisms to address at least partially some of these 
problems (for example, Landcare).  
A number of environmental groups (for example, WWF Australia, sub. 108, the 
Environment Centre Northern Territory, sub. 147, and the Wildflower Society of 
Western Australia, sub.  33) argued that native vegetation and biodiversity 
regulation resulted in significant benefits for landholders due to reduced land and 
water degradation as a result of retaining native vegetation.  
The National Land and Water Resources Audit (NLWRA 2001a) estimated that 
nearly 6  million hectares of Australia’s agricultural and pastoral zone had high 
potential for developing dryland salinity. Based on current knowledge and 
information, and in the absence of effective solutions, it predicted that the area at 
risk would expand to 17 million hectares (mostly agricultural land) by 2050. These 
risk areas are concentrated in certain regions such as the south-west areas of both 
Western Australia and Victoria, the Murray Darling Basin in New South Wales and 
numerous scattered areas in the east of Queensland.  
In assessing benefits to landholders from reducing salinity, it is not the magnitude 
of costs from existing salinity that is relevant but rather the future improvements in 
productivity that can be achieved from containing or reducing salinity. These 
benefits are long term in nature. Hence, to determine the net impact on landholders 
the benefits would need to be discounted to present values to compare with costs to 
landholders of retaining vegetation to reduce salinity.3  
Regulation is one option for dealing with this under-retention of native vegetation 
and a number of jurisdictions have developed catchment management frameworks 
for this purpose. Such regulation usually encourages or requires landholders to take 
a variety of actions (including targeted retention or replanting of vegetation) which 
provide benefits to landholders in the catchment as a group. To the extent that it 
                                              
3  From the viewpoint of landholders (and possibly the community), efficiently addressing soil and 
water degradation may not result in all existing or future degradation being remedied. Net 
benefits to landholders will decline if vegetation is retained beyond the point where its marginal 
benefits in preventing land and water degradation exceed the marginal cost of retaining it. Also, 
the issue of the appropriate distribution of the costs among the individual landholders involved 
in reducing soil and water degradation will need to be resolved. Costs and benefits to the rest of 
the community would also need to be included in assessing the overall impact of salinity 
reduction programs.     





provides the appropriate vegetation retention (extent and type of vegetation) to 
address the costs of regional land and water degradation efficiently, regulation 
could provide a net benefit to landholders as a group. Landholders themselves also 
have addressed these issues through forums such as Landcare and voluntary 
catchment management bodies (for example, in Queensland). 
Regulation that requires retention of vegetation and protection of biodiversity 
beyond the above levels will impose a net cost on the landholders affected. All 
jurisdictions appear to seek to protect native vegetation and biodiversity well 
beyond that needed to provide net benefits to landholders.4 
The loss to landholders will not be total revenue foregone but rather the net income 
loss after deducting clearing costs and production costs (including landholders’ 
labour and capital costs). Ongoing losses of net income due to mandatory vegetation 
retention will result in property values being lower than otherwise. These reductions 
in property values encapsulate the reduction in the present value of expected future 
net income losses, and hence are not additional to those income losses.5 Reduced 
property values are not an additional cost to landholders but merely encapsulate the 
expected impact of the restrictions on current and future income potential from the 
property. 
Landholders will also incur costs of complying with these regulations, including the 
costs of delays before approvals are granted. In some regimes, permits are granted 
subject to offset plantings of vegetation elsewhere on the property. The costs of 
these plantings, the ongoing maintenance costs, as well as the production loss from 
the land concerned, will all be negative impacts for landholders, although, if 
incurred, such costs would be less than the cost of not being permitted to clear at all. 
There may also be long-term costs in inhibiting innovation because restrictions on 
clearing vegetation may limit the potential to adopt new technologies. Similarly, the 
ability for some landholders to adapt to new opportunities — for example, if trade 
                                              
4  The WA Government (sub. DR290) argued that, for its State, the severe and ongoing impact of 
salinity caused by previous land clearing meant that its regulations provide net benefits to 
landholders as a group. Clearly the possibility of halting or reversing dryland salinity offers 
significant benefits to landholders and others. Nonetheless, organisations representing Western 
Australian Farmers (subs 91, 94, DR287, DR289 and DR313) have been highly critical of the 
regulations. Specifically they have commented on the way in which the regulations have been 
administered and the extent to which the regulations have been used to achieve broader 
community environmental objectives. These organisations also questioned whether present 
clearing regulations provide the best means of addressing salinity problems.  
5  Some of the reduced income may reflect a loss of returns to the particular management skills 
(for example, local knowledge) of the landholder and, hence, will not translate into lower 
property values.     





liberalisation opens up further markets for Australian agriculture — may be 
restricted by vegetation clearance regulations. 
If landholders purchased their property after the regulations were introduced and 
understood (and their implementation was not made unexpectedly more onerous on 
landholders), then the impact of regulations should have been factored into the 
purchase price. In this situation, the negative impact will have fallen on the original 
landholder who received a lower price for the property than would have been paid 
in the absence of restrictions. In the case of government-owned leasehold land, the 
impact eventually will fall on taxpayers as leases are renewed or as annual rentals 
are reduced — although, in the short term, the lessee will suffer a loss of income.6 
In both cases, there will be an ongoing reduction in the current landholder’s ability 
to earn income from his or her property. The lower purchase price paid, or reduced 
ongoing lease payments in recognition of the restrictions, will offset these losses to 
some degree.7 
Impacts on individual landholders 
Around 150 landholders and over 30 organisations representing landholders gave 
evidence to the Commission detailing a range of impacts (almost uniformly 
negative) on them as a result of the restrictions imposed by native vegetation and 
biodiversity regulations (see appendixes B–J). Available information indicates that 
many similarly affected landholders have not made submissions.8 In addition, 
                                              
6  The ACT Government (sub. 17) has had a policy of valuing land for renewal of rural leases to 
reflect restrictions on vegetation clearance. 
7  Over time, the initial equivalence of these positive and negative impacts on new landholders 
may diverge to the extent that market expectations at the time of the purchase are not fulfilled. 
Unanticipated changes in factors influencing the impact of native vegetation on the value of a 
property (for example, unexpected changes in the regulations or fires resulting in vegetation 
being cleared) may result in windfall gains or losses to the new landholders.  
8  For example, Rod Young (trans., p. 945) of Coonabarabran in New South Wales, noted there 
were close to 40 people negatively affected by the regulations who he had encouraged to make a 
submission, but who had not done so. He commented that ‘there are many hundreds of cases of 
victimisation and discrimination out there that you will never be made aware of for several 
reasons’. The submission by Peter Pacers (sub.  93) of Lower Gellibrand in Victoria was 
endorsed by a further 51 landholders, while Geoff Sebire (sub. DR319) of Strathbogie Shire in 
Victoria noted that many landholders supported his submission but did not feel confident to 
prepare a submission of their own. The South Australian Farmers’ Federation (trans., p. 487) 
considered that because the regulations in that State were over a decade old, even those who had 
lost considerable potential production were resigned to the new situation. The Western 
Australian Farmers Federation (sub.  94) submitted that it had numerous members adversely 
affected by environmental regulations but they were very reluctant to be used as case studies.     





submissions have been received from 20 local government bodies, most broadly 
supporting many of the impacts noted by landholders. 
At the same time, there will also be many landholders that are not affected, or only 
marginally affected, by the regulations. They are much less likely to make 
submissions to this inquiry. Hence it is difficult to assess from individual 
submissions the exact extent of negative impacts on landholders as a group. What is 
clear is that a relatively large number of landholders have been affected and, for 
some of those, the negative impacts have been significant.  
Although the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) considered that severe 
impacts would be relatively rare: 
… at property level there will be unusual cases where real hardship is faced as a result 
of changes in regulations. (sub. 146, p. 4) 
Vegetation clearance regulations are currently permit-based systems. While there 
are some blanket restrictions on clearing (for example, in environmentally-sensitive 
areas), the impact of the regulations on landholders will depend on the extent to 
which permits are given and the conditions placed on them. Proposed changes to the 
New South Wales and Queensland regimes appear likely to result in much tighter 
controls on broadscale clearing in those jurisdictions, with commensurately higher 
negative impacts on landholders’ returns. 
Because prices for much of the output of the agricultural sector are established on 
markets largely unaffected by the supply of Australian products, most of the costs 
imposed on agricultural landholders cannot be passed on to consumers and will be 
borne by landholders.9 
Negative impacts on farm practices and returns 
Australian agriculture has a long history of adapting to large changes in market 
conditions (especially prices and market access), costs, technology, weather and 
industry-specific government regulations. Ben Rees, from Miles in Queensland, 
noted: 
Under conditions of long-term declining industry terms of trade, increasing farm 
efficiency and rising productivity become the key to long-term survival for farm 
families. (sub. DR227, p. 4) 
A critical part of the ability of landholders to adapt has been flexibility in land use, 
property re-configuration, and the introduction of new technology. Many 
                                              
9  Of course, even if landholders could increase their prices, this would merely transfer some of 
the costs of the regulations to domestic consumers.      





landholders and their representatives have provided examples of costs due to 
restrictions in land use or innovation as a result of native vegetation and/or 
biodiversity regulations. It is those landholders trying to improve productivity by 
changing the way they operate their properties that are most likely to be restricted 
by regulations controlling vegetation clearance. 
Native vegetation regulations in many jurisdictions contain exemptions designed to 
facilitate some common farming practices (for example, clearing regrowth and 
maintaining fencelines). Nonetheless, the Commission has also received numerous 
submissions concerning properties where native vegetation and/or biodiversity 
regulations have significantly restricted routine farming practices or required 
lengthy approval processes and hence have increased production costs. 
Restricting available land 
The most direct way in which the regulations on vegetation clearance can reduce 
landholders’ returns is by restricting the amount of land available for production or 
by reducing the productivity of available land. Many submissions have indicated 
that restrictions on clearing have prevented the long-term expansion necessary to 
make a property viable. The ability of landholders to react to changed market 
conditions, which requires larger cultivated areas, has also been inhibited. 
Landholders in this position include Kevin and Sue Campbell (sub.  11) of 
Hermidale, Anne Waugh (sub. 106) of Wauchope and Russell Murdoch (sub. 118) 
all in New South Wales, Ron and Jennifer Collins (sub. 182) of Mount Barker and 
Peter and Manya Wren (sub. 119) of Karridale both in Western Australia, K. and M. 
K. Hamill (sub. 176) of Yelarbon and Joe Galeano (sub. DR244) of Lower Tully, 
both in Queensland, Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association’s King Island 
case study (sub. 195). 
In some instances, vegetation clearance is permitted but significant offset plantings 
are required at a cost to the landholder of seedlings, labour, fencing and upkeep, as 
well as the loss of the land used for revegetation. 
Clearing regrowth and thinning vegetation 
Most jurisdictions provide certain exemptions from permit requirements for clearing 
regrowth of previously-cleared vegetation. The definition of regrowth varies across 
jurisdictions, but the exemption usually relates to the age of the regrowth or the 
extent of vegetation cover. Once regrowth vegetation exceeds these limits, it is 
treated as remnant vegetation for the purposes of the regulations.     





Numerous submissions provided examples of reduced returns due to a decline in the 
area available for production because of restrictions on clearing regrowth of 
previously cleared vegetation, that is now declared remnant. These included: John 
Dival (sub. 137) of Toodyay in Western Australia; Miriam Vale Rural Science and 
Landcare Society (sub.  105) from Queensland; D.M.McL. and J.A.  Stewart 
(sub.  77) of Lake Grace Western Australia; and AgForce (sub.  54) from 
Queensland. In some cases, the vegetation was originally planted by the landholder 
(for example, Sally McKay, sub. 78, of One Tree Hill, South Australia and Jack 
Jones, trans., p. 1362, of the Ovens Valley in Victoria).  
Early clearing of regrowth to avoid vegetation being declared remnant can decrease 
landholders’ returns and sometimes leads to poor environmental outcomes 
(chapter 5). Chinchilla Shire Council of Queensland noted the conundrum facing 
landholders in its shire, where long regrowth cycles are appropriate: 
In these areas of lower pasture productivity, clearing rotations are longer, the benefits 
from clearing virgin stands are higher and many properties have extensive areas of aged 
regrowth as a result. This problem is compounded by the fact that seasonal conditions 
and commodity prices often extend the regrowth rotation period. (sub. 88, p. 6) 
Leverton Pastoral Company from Moree in New South Wales observed: 
Paddocks that would have been cleared on a 20 to 30 year cycle now cannot be cleared. 
Our land has enormous regenerative ability, regrowth timber, (belah, box and myall) 
which has not been taken into consideration in the [Native Vegetation Conservation Act 
1997]. Therefore our response has been to develop all the land that could legally be 
cleared, even though I would have preferred not to. I.e the legislation has forced us to 
farm the land so that future generations will have the chance to change land use should 
the market demand it. (sub. 96, p. 1) 
ICM Agribusiness (sub. 4) of Hillston and Joseph Mansour (sub. 206) of Kyogle, 
both in New South Wales, observed that ploughing had been undertaken in order to 
prevent vegetation being declared remnant, even during drought conditions when 
significant topsoil loss resulted. Because in New South Wales regrowth vegetation 
(including grass) is declared remnant after ten years, Charles Reynolds (sub. 48) of 
Narrabri has altered his traditional crop rotations, commenced using fertilisers and 
undertaken more frequent ploughing. He estimated the cost of the changed practices 
at $80 000 per year. The South Australian Farmers’ Federation (SAFF, sub. 140) 
noted that in South Australia, the five-year period before regrowth on non-grazing 
land became classified as remnant created large costs and encouraged an inefficient 
rotation regime. 
Where woodland thickening occurs land may still be used for grazing, but at much 
reduced productivity compared to cleared land. Sally and Gordon Moon of the 
Wulgulmerang area of East Gippsland in Victoria (National Farmers’ Federation     





(NFF), sub. 128, appendix H) were not granted a permit to clear 120 hectares of 
their property on which clearing for pasture would have increased carrying capacity 
30-fold from 0.5  dse (dry sheep equivalents) to 15  dse.10 At Goshen Station at 
Mount Garnet in Queensland, cattle-stocking rates are around 8 times higher on 
developed land than on uncleared land. If permission is not given to control 
thickening, carrying capacity is predicted to halve within ten years (AgForce, 
sub. 54). Property Rights Australia (sub. 171) noted the rapid rate of thickening and 
encroachment of woody vegetation into rangeland or pasture areas in Queensland. 
The Landholders Institute (Queensland) (sub. 207) also argued that if landholders 
were not allowed to manage woody regrowth, livestock carrying capacity of grazed 
woodlands would be reduced to unsustainable levels.  
The potential impact of restrictions on the control of thickening remnant vegetation 
is discussed further in section 6.2 and appendix K. 
Introducing new technology and changing land use 
The regulations can also restrict the technology used by landholders thereby 
affecting their returns. A number of participants made this point including: Clyde 
Cook (sub.  12) of Nyngan in New South Wales, Tripod Farmers (Victorian 
Farmers’ Federation (VFF), sub.  149) of Bacchus Marsh in Victoria, and the 
Western Australian Farmers’ Federation (WAFF), sub. 94). 
The NSW National Party observed: 
The argument is often made that disallowing further development leaves the existing 
landholder no worse off. Such an argument assumes that current farming practice is 
both sustainable and profitable indefinitely. This is only the case if competitors do not 
take advantage of the same technologies or enterprises that the farmer was seeking for 
his own land. (sub. 115, p. 5) 
Elizabeth Tomlinson of Narrabri in New South Wales argued: 
The loss of the right to introduce, rapidly, new technology can not see our farmers 
continue to be amongst the most efficient in the world. If it is necessary to pass by a 
government department any wish to change, the time lag could see the advantage lost. 
(sub. DR246, p. 1) 
Reg Holt of Wedderburn in Victoria considered: 
Agricultural machinery has had to become wider to enable farms to remain viable. 
Sparse native vegetation may be close enough to prevent the passage of these machines 
                                              
10  The conditions that would have been attached to the permission to clear (conserving   
2–4 hectares of currently uncleared land for every hectare cleared) were considered too onerous 
by the Moons.     





through the paddocks and needs to be removed … Farmers have to compete on the 
international market place to sell their produce. It is absurd to expect them to do this 
whilst telling them that they cannot rearrange their assets to allow them to be as 
productive as they can be. (sub. 87, p. 2) 
Centre-pivot irrigation systems can deliver significant increases in farm productivity 
and make much more efficient use of water resources, thereby delivering 
environmental benefits. However, their installation and efficient operation may 
require the removal of paddock trees. NFF (sub. 128, appendix J) cited a case in 
south-west New South Wales where installing a centre-pivot irrigation system 
required the removal of 19 isolated trees. A clearing permit was offered in return for 
5000 trees being planted, which the landholder estimated would cost $25 000 plus 
the loss of usable land on an already well-vegetated property.  
A number of other participants (for example, Tatiara District Council, sub. 60, of 
South Australia, West Wimmera Shire Council, trans., p. 532, from Victoria and the 
Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association, sub.  160) noted cases where the 
regulations prevented the use of these systems or required expensive vegetation 
offsets for the removal of isolated trees. WAFF (sub. 94) noted that using global 
positioning systems to sow crops can be rendered ineffective by single paddock 
trees. 
Vegetation clearing restrictions can reduce or remove the ability to change land use 
totally or partially. Because of significant changes in prices, technology and 
regulatory arrangements, preferred land use of an agricultural property often 
changes over time. Also many properties have multiple land uses (for example, 
cropping and grazing) in order to reduce the risks of relying on a single product and 
to allow for more sustainable use of a property over time. Graham Potter from the 
Deniliquin district noted how efficient configuration of his joint grazing and cereal 
cropping property was restricted by clearance restrictions: 
Market forces have an impact on gross margins and Native Vegetation restrictions limit 
the decisions that can be made to react to the impact of market forces. It used to be the 
physical size and capability of the property that put a limit on such decisions but with 
the introduction of Native Vegetation legislation, physical size and capability are 
further reduced. (sub. 183, p. 4) 
Bruce Meyer of West Wimmera Shire in Victoria observed problems for 
landholders wishing to change land use and to adopt new technology: 
Land uses are changing and there now is a changing emphasis on cropping in the 
southern part of the shire in traditional grazing areas. However, to grow crops such as 
canola and winter wheat, there often is a need to remove trees. In the northern part the 
size of machinery is increasing meaning that it is often difficult to get down roads and 
between some trees in certain paddocks. (sub. 112, p. 1)     





Similarly, Don McShane of Perth in Tasmania argued: 
Farmers may need to use some non-forest grassland (silver tussock country) to grow 
wheat or poppies when the wool market is slack. (sub. DR274, p. 3) 
Wally Peart (sub. DR304) of Injune in Queensland observed that because he had 
left significant tree cover on his property he was now unable to switch from grazing 
to cropping, unlike his neighbour who had cleared ‘fence to fence’ before clearing 
regulations were introduced. 
There have also been cases where property reconfigurations not involving a 
significant net loss in vegetation coverage have been restricted by the regulations. 
For example, the Victorian and South Australian regimes often require offset 
plantings significantly greater than the area where clearing is proposed, thereby 
making reconfiguration uneconomic for landholders.  
Implementation of new methods and technologies is often associated with younger 
farmers either joining or taking over operations of a family farm or purchasing an 
underdeveloped property. A number of participants observed how restrictions on 
vegetation clearance can inhibit this process. Ben Rees from Miles in Queensland 
noted: 
An un-discussed side effect of a prohibition on clearing remnant vegetation will be the 
impact upon young farmer entry. ‘Starter blocks’ for young farmers are generally 
underdeveloped properties that lend themselves to improvement through development 
(sub. DR227, p. 5) 
In some cases young farmers purchase properties on which vegetation had gradually 
regrown over a number of years because the former owner had farmed less 
intensively. Under most native vegetation regimes such regrowth would be declared 
remnant and the opportunity for younger farmers to redevelop the property would 
be lost.  
Others concerned about the impact on potential new farmers and farm workers 
included W.R. Clarke (sub.  24) of Tumbarumba Shire and Stewart and Jenny 
Hutchins (sub.  DR266) of Narrandera, both in New South Wales, the Country 
Women’s Association of New South Wales (sub.  31), Paul McGowan 
(trans.,  p.  1337) of Barnawartha in Victoria and Harry Berger (sub.  DR251) of 
Cardwell,  Agforce  (trans., p. 67)  and Bob Katter MP (sub.  DR253), all from 
Queensland.  
Costs of managing native vegetation 
The existence of native vegetation — particularly if effective management by 
thinning is not permitted — can increase costs or reduce returns if it becomes a     





haven for kangaroos, feral animals and weeds. F.S. Hespe of Rockley in New South 
Wales commented: 
Numerous weeds can only be effectively eliminated by clearing, and the establishment 
of dense pasture swards. In the central tablelands, for example, serrated tussock 
(Nassella trichotoma) is a pest of major proportions and a declared noxious weed. 
Apart from clearing and the establishment of improved pastures, the only practicable 
method of eradication is the repeated application of large quantities of expensive and 
toxic herbicide. (sub. 62, p. 5) 
Augusta Saunders (sub.  19) from Jerramungup in Western Australia noted that 
kangaroos and emus sheltering in the significant amount of native vegetation on her 
property caused considerable damage to fences and crops. 
Most jurisdictions have legislation requiring landholders to manage declared weeds 
and pest animals on their properties. This creates an ongoing cost of managing 
native vegetation that landholders are not permitted to clear. Many landholders 
complained about these costs, including Russell Murdoch (sub.  118) from New 
South Wales and Shaun and Tonya Ellis (sub. 14) of Tallandoon in Victoria. The 
SAFF noted how common weed and pest control practices, extremely valuable to 
farm productivity, were precluded by the South Australian regulations: 
The treatment of fire as a clearance activity is also a significant difficulty for 
landholders who are hamstrung in their farm management practices to manage pests 
and weeds in native vegetation. Snails are a major pest in cereal growing areas. They 
take refuge wherever possible, including in remnant vegetation. Fire, the preferred and 
most effective management tool for farmers is difficult or impossible to use because of 
native vegetation regulations, leaving farmers exposed to increasing snail populations 
as they search for other long term options such as biological control measures. 
(sub. 140, p. 7) 
Dalrymple Landcare Committee (sub.  DR256) from Charters Towers in 
Queensland, submitted that delays and restrictions caused by the way in which 
native vegetation clearing regulations had been applied, had significantly impeded 
actions to control Parkinsonia (as required by the Land Protection Act 2002) in its 
region. 
Vegetation close to fencelines can add to costs of maintenance by restricting access 
and threatening safety of farm workers. Falling trees or branches can damage fences 
and allow stock to stray on to roads or adjoining properties. Generally some form of 
exemption from clearing restrictions is provided on the landholders’ side of 
fencelines. A number of landholders commented that the area covered by these 
exemptions is often not sufficient to protect fences and guarantee safety. In 
addition, the administration of the exemptions has sometimes imposed costs and 
delays (VFF, sub. 149). Other participants noted that vegetation on the road side of 
fences (which local authorities are often required to retain) provides a similar risk of     





damage to fences (for example, Sally McKay, sub. 78, of One Tree Hill in South 
Australia and J and M Boardman, sub. 39, of She Oaks in Victoria), as do trees on 
adjacent crown land (for example, Geoff Lucas (trans., pp. 1345–6) of Wooragee, 
Ian and Sue Jack (sub.  141) of Barnawartha and Robin Weatherald 
(trans., pp. 1600–01) of Strathbogie Shire, all in Victoria). 
Native vegetation and biodiversity regulations have adversely affected the returns 
of many landholders by imposing a range of restrictions on farm practices, 
including: 
•  limiting the opportunities to expand or reconfigure the area of productive land; 
•  restricting the ability to maintain the amount of productive land on a property; 
•  inhibiting the introduction of new technologies; 
•  restricting or preventing changes in land use; and 
•  inhibiting a range of normal farm practices such as thinning vegetation, rotating 
(fallowing) parts of the property, clearing around fencelines and managing pest 
animals and weeds. 
Impacts on property values 
There are many factors that will determine the market value of farms. Current levels 
and future expectations regarding prices, weather conditions and technological 
change are all variables that affect property values. For those farms containing 
native vegetation that landholders may wish to clear now or in the future, native 
vegetation and biodiversity regulations will also have an impact on land values. 
Attributing any observed changes in property values to the effects of environmental 
regulations and to other factors can be difficult and contentious. Nonetheless, in the 
longer term, regulations like vegetation clearing restrictions that can permanently 
reduce a property’s income-earning capacity, can be expected to reduce property 
values by the discounted present value of the future loss in net income, in the 
property’s best available use.11  
                                              
11 This may not always be the current use. For example, in grazing properties in Moree Shire 
vegetation clearing restrictions may have some negative impact on current income but are likely 
to have a greater impact on potential income if the property were to be switched to cropping. 
The market value of agricultural properties in areas that are zoned for residential development 
may not be reduced at all by restrictions on vegetation clearance although their value for 
agricultural production may be affected. 
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As discussed above, the Commission has received numerous individual examples 
from most jurisdictions of significant permanent reductions in the net income that 
can be earned from rural properties as a result of restrictions on clearing native 
vegetation. In these cases, the property value could be expected to be reduced 
broadly in line with these reductions in returns. Leverton Pastoral Company of New 
South Wales, stated: 
On our farm I estimate the [NSW Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1992] is costing 
our business in excess of $600  000 a year in foregone production revenue. I have 
written to the valuer general and due to the native vegetation and the resulting loss of 
productivity on one block of land it has been devalued by $200 000. (sub. 96, p. 2) 
Graham Davies’ 1200-hectare property in Albany Western Australia was valued (in 
1999) at $486 000 if clearing of 548 hectares were allowed, at $354 000 if clearing 
were not allowed, and at $405 000 if 234 hectares could be cleared (sub. 9).12 Gary 
Anderson (sub. 194) from Arno Bay in South Australia estimated that the uncleared 
75 per cent of his property was worth one tenth of the cleared 25 per cent. Raymond 
Perkins (sub.  86), a valuer from Dubbo in New South Wales, indicated that 
properties that had conserved native vegetation are now considered ‘restricted use’ 
with a much lower value. 
The WA Government stated: 
… it is acknowledged that the progressive tightening of clearing controls during the 
1990s has affected land values, albeit not in a uniform way. The Valuer-General’s 
office advises that in the more remote wheat and cropping areas the value of uncleared 
land has been significantly discounted, but in the higher rainfall and more populated 
areas land values are being sustained by non-agricultural buyers. (sub. 151, p. 3) 
Roy Dickson (sub. 163), a licensed valuer from Cardwell in Queensland, provided 
several examples of large reductions in property values due to restrictions on 
clearing vegetation. Other participants who observed significant declines in 
property values due to native vegetation or biodiversity regulations included Jane 
Manchee of Moree (sub. 83) and Rod Young (trans., p. 946), both from New South 
Wales, Neil Kerr (sub. 154) of Drik Drik and Murray Davis (VFF, sub. 149) of 
Dergholm, both in Victoria and D.M.McL. and J.A. Stewart (sub. 77) of Lake Grace 
in Western Australia. 
Significant reductions in property value can have particularly severe impacts for 
landholders approaching retirement. A number of individuals and organisations 
commented that landholders often planned for the sale of their property, or the 
timber contained on it, to be their ‘superannuation’. These included Glen and 
                                              
12 Because of the property’s location, the vegetated section could be sold as a hobby farm. If 
subdivision to facilitate this were allowed, the property was valued at $452 000.     





Christine Anderson (sub. 20) of Mayberry in Tasmania, Brian and Shirley Burns of 
Albany and Craig Underwood (trans.,  p.  353) of Jurien Bay, both in Western 
Australia, Rod Reedman (trans.,  p.  1034) of Pindi Pindi, the Shire of Cardwell 
(sub. DR231) and Agforce (sub. 54), all from Queensland, together with Timber 
Communities of Australia Grafton Branch (trans., p. 55) and WAFF (sub. DR287). 
As noted above, prices paid by landholders purchasing property once the impact of 
the regulations is well understood should reflect the negative effect of the 
restrictions — the seller will have suffered the impact of the regulations. The 
WA Government (sub. 151) argued that there was now only a small proportion of 
landholders in that State who had purchased before the tighter clearing controls 
were introduced, with expectations of being able to develop the vegetated land.13 
In most jurisdictions, there has been a gradual ‘ramping up’ over time of both the 
content and administration of native vegetation and biodiversity regulations. In 
addition, in a number of jurisdictions these regimes are relatively new and their 
exact impacts are uncertain. This has raised landholder concerns that, in future, their 
ability to clear native vegetation will be further restricted. A number of participants 
commented on the impact that this uncertainty has had on property values over and 
above the effect of existing regulations. 
The ACF (sub. 146) argued that this uncertainty was partially due to lobbying from 
the agricultural sector which has caused ongoing delays in introducing, what the 
ACF considered, were appropriate levels of clearing controls. 
It has also been suggested that landholders may benefit from native vegetation 
regulations because, in some areas, property values can be higher with some degree 
of native vegetation cover.14 Higher property values could reflect that: 
•  the property is in an area where the demand for ‘bush blocks’ has increased (for 
example, close to urban areas) — the Mitchell Environment Group (subs 65 and 
DR282) from Seymour in Victoria noted that, in its region, prices of blocks with 
trees seemed to be higher; or  
•  the property had been previously cleared to a level below its current privately 
‘optimal’ clearing level in terms of private production or consumption benefits 
(possibly due to earlier policy distortions, or developments in techniques or 
knowledge which increase the value of production benefits of native vegetation). 
                                              
13 Of course, although a new landholder may not bear losses does not mean that there are no 
economic costs being imposed by the regulations. 
14 The SA Government (sub. DR324) referred to a study which showed that property values could 
increase, decrease or remain the same as native vegetation cover increases, depending largely on 
the location and use of the land.     





However, it would be expected in such cases that normal market mechanisms — the 
expectation of profit — would encourage increased native vegetation without the 
need for regulation. Guy Fitzhardinge of Mandurama in New South Wales 
considered that property values could be increased by: 
… demand by more informed buyers for properties that have been properly managed, 
with set aside areas, riparian areas fenced off, trees planted and appropriately 
stocked/utilized. The property on which I live has about 30% excluded from grazing 
permanently, riparian areas fenced off, trees planted etc. The productivity of the 
property has not diminished, and the market value has increased to the extent where 
were I to sell the property it would capture a premium price ($1500 acre compared to 
$1200). The work I have done has been capitalized in asset value. (sub. DR225, p. 2) 
Simply because the values of some properties rise when native vegetation cover 
increases over some range is not an argument for regulation, nor does it demonstrate 
that the regulations are not imposing significant costs on other properties and 
overall. 
Native vegetation and biodiversity regulations have reduced the values of 
properties on which the income-earning potential has fallen because permission to 
clear native vegetation has been refused, or because there is uncertainty about the 
future ability to clear. 
Investment patterns and financier attitudes 
In general, negative impacts of the regulations on farm output and farm practices 
would be expected to reduce landholder demand and capacity for investment. In 
addition, the uncertainty created by the regulations will tend to encourage less 
capital-intensive techniques in order to avoid tying up capital that might not be 
recouped if regulation or its implementation changes further. Because significant 
changes to previously-understood property rights have been made without 
compensation, landholders with vegetation on their properties are likely to place 
higher rate-of-return hurdles on investment that could be affected by future 
regulatory changes. Gippsland Private Forestry (formerly Gippsland Farm 
Plantations) (trans., p. 524) considered that a risk premium would be attached to 
investing in plantations of native species in Victoria, because of uncertainty about 
future native vegetation controls. 
Access to finance is particularly important in many agricultural industries with their 
large capital requirements and significant fluctuations in returns over time. The 
Commission has received only limited information on the effect of the regulations 
on the attitude of finance providers to lending to landholders. No submissions have 
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been received from finance providers. NFF suggested that finance providers did not 
want to raise these issues publicly, but had intimated that uncleared land would be 
given a lower valuation: 
With vegetation they’re not coming out clearly and publicly yet but they’re certainly 
saying to us, in some cases, that there is going to be a distinct change in the value of 
property that is fully developed or significantly developed to that which is not. 
(trans., p. 261) 
A similar view was put by Jane Manchee of Moree in New South Wales: 
Finance providers should speak for themselves but seem reluctant. They certainly let us 
know the obvious, which is that land not farmed, in this district, is worth much less 
than that which is farmed. This has a big impact on the landholder’s ability to obtain 
finance. (sub. 83, p. 2) 
Factors such as drought and fluctuating commodity prices will also affect financier 
attitudes to lending to landholders. As with impacts on property values, it is difficult 
to disentangle the various factors that might influence attitudes to lending to 
landholders. Nonetheless, all else given, there are several reasons why native 
vegetation and biodiversity regulations may affect financier attitudes. Where the 
regulations reduce land values there will be a fall in the landholder’s equity in their 
property. This will reduce the security that they can provide for loans and, 
consequently, reduce the maximum amount financiers are willing to lend or 
increase the interest rate they charge. Denise Ward of Nyngan in New South Wales 
noted the importance of loans based on landholder equity: 
Into the 1990’s our finance providers secured our borrowings by Land Value, 
calculated on the basis of its development potential. ‘Equity Lending’ was widely 
accepted as a common practice. Many district farmers including ourselves, fine-tuned 
arrangements with their finance providers on an Equity basis … (sub. 196, p. 2) 
Ron and Jennifer Collins of Mount Barker in Western Australia argued:  
Native vegetation has no value to a lender; it is non-productive. A farmer’s ability to 
borrow is impacted by the ownership of a non-productive and valueless asset 
(sub. DR321, p. 4) 
The additional uncertainty of future income streams of properties on which 
vegetation clearance may be restricted will tend to increase the risk premium 
associated with them and hence increase interest rates on loans. A number of other 
submissions from landholders indicated that financiers were less willing to lend on 
properties with significant native vegetation. These included Peter Weston (sub. 56) 
of Nymagee in New South Wales, Jane Manchee (sub. 83) of Moree in New South 
Wales and Lynton Freeman (sub. 21) of Gladstone in Queensland.     






All else equal, reductions in property income-earning potential, and consequent 
declines in owner equity, mean that landholders restricted from clearing areas of 
native vegetation on their properties are less able to obtain finance or face higher 
interest rates. 
Compliance costs 
Complying with native vegetation and biodiversity regulations can impose large 
costs on landholders and governments. The often remote and dispersed location of 
the regulated vegetation creates significant costs in the interaction between 
landholders and regulators, particularly in the larger jurisdictions. Because 
government officials and departments do not have to meet the costs of compliance 
and delays, they may have limited incentive to restrict these costs to a level 
consistent with efficient administration of the legislation. Chapter 3 outlined some 
of the compliance costs faced by landholders, including costs associated with 
significant delays in decisions being made on their vegetation clearance 
applications.  
Other impacts 
There appear to have been many cases where the implementation of the regulations 
has led to a breakdown in landholders’ trust in dealing with government. For 
landholders this has meant reduced access to advice from government departments 
and, for governments, a reduction in the ability to use landholder goodwill to 
promote environmental goals (chapter 5). 
The Commission has received many submissions commenting on the personal stress 
created by the operation of the regulatory regimes. Augusta Saunders of 
Jerramungup in Western Australia stated: 
I have suffered considerable anxiety and stress trying to develop the farm, seeing our 
debts rise each year, especially in the past 6 years of frost and drought, wishing we 
could clear the remaining land. Not to be allowed to finish the job and dealing with the 
opposition that comes mainly from political considerations has added to the depression. 
Last year I finally sought help and will probably be on medication until we sell the 
farm. (sub. 19, p. 6) 
Other participants who cited significant personal stress included Ron and Jennifer 
Collins (sub. 182) of Mount Barker, Brian and Shirley Burns (sub. 202) of Albany, 
and Ken Harris (trans.,  p.  295) of Binnu, all in Western Australia, Clyde Cook 
(sub. 12) of Nyngan in New South Wales, Glen and Christine Anderson (sub. 20) of     





Mayberry in Tasmania, Helen Mahar (sub. 40) of Ceduna, Kevin and Neville Parker 
(trans., pp. 431–2) of Mantung and Gary Anderson (sub. 194) of Arno Bay, all in 
South Australia, Darren and Peter Hepburn (sub. 75) of Lower Bendoc, Peter Pacers 
(sub.  93) of Lower Gellibrand, and Ian and Sue Jack (trans.,  p.  1676) of 
Barnawartha, all in Victoria. Various producer organisations also provided 
examples of such problems.  
These submissions suggest that, at least in the cases concerned, these pressures 
reflected factors such as the significant impact the regulations have had on the 
viability of farms, a lack of flexibility in implementing the regulations, a loss of 
departmental personnel with knowledge of managing farms, the absence of clear 
environmental benefits from the restrictions and the sense that a previous right (to 
clear vegetation) had been taken without compensation. 
FINDING 6.4 
Those landholders most severely affected by the regulations have often suffered 
serious personal stress in the face of the resultant marginal viability, or even loss, 
of their property. 
Impact of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
The EPBC Act has been in operation since July 2000. The Department of the 
Environment and Heritage (DEH, sub.  190) considered that the overwhelming 
majority of agricultural activities will not trigger the Act, and even where they do, 
they will rarely meet the Act’s ‘significant impact’ test. In the first three years of the 
Act’s operation (to 31 July 2003), 27 actions involving the agriculture and forestry 
sectors have been referred and of these ten have required assessment.  
A number of primary producer organisations and individual landholders expressed 
concern about the potential impact of the EPBC Act. The main effects to date have 
been the uncertainty created among some landholders, often already concerned 
about the impact of State and Territory regimes. For landholders potentially affected 
by the Act, it represents another layer of possible expense, delay and uncertainty. 
DEH has undertaken a number of initiatives in an attempt to improve landholders’ 
understanding of the Act.  
Chapter 4 and appendix B consider the impacts of the EPBC Act on landholders in 
more detail.     






The terms of reference direct the Commission to examine positive impacts on 
landholders and, in particular, the impact of the relevant regulations on 
sustainability. 
Various participants suggested a number of positive impacts that native vegetation 
and biodiversity regulations may have on landholders. These benefits include 
providing shade and shelter for stock, providing windbreaks and facilitating a 
reduction in land and water degradation. For example, the Serpentine-Jarrahdale 
Land Conservation District Committee (sub. 66) observed a reduction in nutrient 
loads in waterways and a reduced spread of salinity and erosion as positive impacts 
for landholders in their district. The South Grafton Residents Progress Association 
(sub. 104) noted a greater awareness among canegrowers of environmental effects 
of their operations with resulting improvements in operating methods. D.M. McL. 
and J.A.  Stewart (sub.  77) of Lake Grace in Western Australia considered that 
vegetation they were unable to clear on their property provided benefits of lower 
salinity and erosion for neighbouring properties.  
The SA Government (sub. DR324) referred to surveys15 that show that a majority 
of landholders view native vegetation as important for farm stability and 
production. It also noted that ‘making productive use of the native vegetation is 
clearly the priority of landholders’ (sub. DR324, p. 31).16  
As noted above, for properties affected, the benefits from regionally-based 
programs for the prevention of erosion and salinity can be very significant. Where 
the benefits of retaining vegetation accrue largely on a regional basis rather than to 
an individual property, regulation is one means of achieving them. However, the 
across-the-board clearing controls operating in most jurisdictions are rather blunt 
instruments for dealing with these issues and, as discussed in chapter 5, sometimes 
have perverse environmental outcomes. The Australian Government Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry noted the complexity of dealing with salinity 
and the inter-relationship with other environmental problems. It argued: 
This suggests the level and type of actions undertaken should vary according to the 
biophysical characteristics of each region. A carefully designed scheme would ensure 
that trees were planted, or left uncleared, in areas where they would generate net 
salinity benefits. (sub. 218, pp. 7–8) 
                                              
15 Craig et al. (1983) and Marano (1999). 
16 However, the SA Government also presented analysis of several projects in South Australia 
indicating that a majority of benefits from protection of remnant vegetation in these areas 
accrued to the wider community rather than landholders (sub. DR324).     





The Pastoralists and Graziers’ Association of Western Australia (PGA) commented 
it was seeking a more flexible approach to addressing land degradation issues: 
PGA has been negotiating with the State Department of Agriculture to take a more 
positive approach in addressing the needs of landowners in WA with land affected by 
development bans. In some cases, even Departmental hydrologists and other salinity 
specialists concede that there is little or no risk of salinity or of serious damage to the 
environment by the sensible development of remnant vegetation. (sub. 91, p. 5) 
The Shire of Dandaragan in Western Australia argued that for its region: 
Certainly current and proposed regimes are effective in prevention of degradation, just 
as a sledge hammer is effective in cracking open peanuts. With close to 50 per cent of 
the Shire reserved from development, there is doubt as to the need for such all 
encompassing regulation. (sub. 191, p. 3) 
Regionally targeted revegetation programs, not necessarily involving the type of 
vegetation currently present (or, indeed, not necessarily involving native vegetation 
at all) are more likely to deliver higher net benefits for landholders. Because of their 
focus on broader environmental benefits, regulations involving across-the-board 
restrictions of native vegetation clearance are unlikely to be effective vehicles for 
delivering benefits of reduced soil degradation to landholders. Rather, as discussed 
in chapter 10, regionally-focussed community-based processes would seem better 
placed to address these issues. The National Land and Water Resources Audit 
observed: 
Options for managing dryland salinity will vary across Australia in response to 
environmental conditions and social and economic aspirations for the catchment. These 
communities will need to identify the level of salinity management they wish to 
achieve in conjunction with their other objectives. (NLWRA 2002, p. 81) 
To the extent that benefits of selected vegetation and biodiversity retention accrue 
to individual landholders, they would be expected to undertake these activities 
themselves if they were aware of the benefits involved. Generally speaking, 
landholders could be expected to assess the on-farm benefits and costs of retaining 
native vegetation adequately.  
A number of submissions have argued that native vegetation and biodiversity 
regulations have positive impacts for some landholders by providing them with 
information about these benefits. Denise Ward of Nyngan in New South Wales 
considered: 
There has been an ever increasing understanding of the importance of sustainable land 
management. Serious land managers were already embracing these concepts prior to 
any regulation, and now there has been a very wide general acceptance of these 
principles. (sub. 196, p. 1)     





While some information provision can also be a spin-off benefit of vegetation 
clearing regulations, if a significant lack of knowledge were the only factor leading 
to under provision of native vegetation by landholders, this would be best addressed 
by providing information directly through specific information dissemination 
programs (for example, as have occurred through the Landcare movement).  
Achievement of such information benefits would require appropriate resources. The 
Commission has received numerous submissions from both landholders and 
environmental groups noting the generally poor resourcing of the implementation of 
the regulations. Nillumbik Shire Council from Victoria considered that: 
… the amount of practical onground advice and/or assistance to adopt farming 
practices to meet the requirements of the regimes under review is very minimal to 
landholders in the Shire of Nillumbik. (sub. 174, p. 3) 
Dennis Toohey (trans., pp.  1307–8) of Albury in New South Wales — an 
agricultural consultant and previously a regional director in the NSW Department of 
Agriculture — considered that because of reductions in staff and a switch from the 
extension services approach to one of facilitating provision of private sector 
resources to landholders, state agencies did not have the capacity to deliver the 
educational programs that were needed to support native vegetation and biodiversity 
regulation. 
Some participants considered that the implementation of the regulations had made 
landholders less likely to obtain environmental information. The Country Women’s 
Association of New South Wales commented: 
Over the past years, the process that was adopted by government departments has 
created an agenda that put farmers against conservationists ... This conflict has had an 
extremely negative impact on farmers and discouraged them from seeking advice on 
land and vegetation management. (sub. 31, p. 2) 
Paul McGowan of Barnawartha in Victoria submitted: 
A lot of the small bureaucrats have got an enormous amount of power and they like to 
exercise the power … My personal experience of that is just horrible, even though I 
would be an example of a really good conservationist. But the contempt with which 
you are treated when you want to do something is unbearable. (trans., p. 1335) 
Many landholders considered that there had been a substantial decline in the quality 
of advice received from government departments — staff positions often being 
switched from offering advice that increased farm productivity, towards 
enforcement of environmental controls. These included Booth Associates (sub. 165) 
from Griffith, Russell Gillard (sub. 36) from Manildra and Jane Manchee (sub. 83) 
from Moree, all in New South Wales, Bruce Page (sub. 186) from Peachester and 
the Mulgrave Landcare Catchment Group (trans., p. 159), both of Queensland, Janet     





and Kevin Blake (trans.,  p.  628) from Barunah Park in Victoria and SAFF 
(sub. 140). WAFF argued: 
Government funding cut backs to Agencies over many years have resulted in regional 
extension services being withdrawn. One outcome of this occurrence has been the loss 
of local knowledge and an influx of recent (environmental science) graduates with 
limited practical experience of farming practices. (sub. 94, p. 5) 
FINDING 6.5 
There are positive impacts for many landholders in retaining selected vegetation 
and biodiversity on their own and surrounding properties. These benefits will be 
greater in areas prone to soil and water degradation. However, this does not mean 
that landholders necessarily will benefit from all of the native vegetation required 
to be retained by current regulations, or that benefits to them will outweigh the 
costs. 
6.2  Quantitative assessment of regional economic 
impacts 
The Commission examined impacts at a shire level to shed light on the factors 
driving possible future economic impacts on landholders from broadscale clearing 
restrictions.  
Two case studies were examined — the shires of Moree Plains in New South Wales 
and Murweh in south-west Queensland. Clearing in these areas is fairly typical of 
broadscale clearing in the New South Wales wheatbelt (Benson 1999) and central 
and western Queensland respectively (Swift and Skjemstad 2002). In Moree, 
clearing is being undertaken primarily to switch from grazing to cropping. In 
Murweh, clearing is undertaken (a) to facilitate the introduction of more productive 
perennial pasture species, which increase livestock carrying capacity and quality 
and (b) to offset the effects of vegetation thickening on areas currently grazed.  
The Commission’s estimates include the observed effects of clearing regulations 
introduced in 1995 in New South Wales and in 1999 in Queensland, together with 
potential long-term effects of recent announcements of stronger restrictions on 
broadscale clearing of remnant native vegetation in both States. While it is assumed 
that the restrictions affect clearing until 2030, impacts of the restrictions are 
assumed to flow though until 2040.  
Potential impacts of restrictions on the removal of paddock trees have not been 
assessed. Administrative costs incurred by landholders have also been ignored, as     





have any costs associated with maintaining protected native vegetation, such as 
fencing, pest and weed control and maintaining fire breaks.  
The estimates do not take into account the possibility of illegal clearing. To the 
extent that illegal clearing occurs, this would reduce the economic impacts of the 
restrictions (and the environmental benefits). In addition, of course, to the extent 
that any compensation is paid, costs imposed on landholders would be reduced 
commensurately, although the economic costs in terms of production forgone would 
remain. Payment of compensation would simply shift these costs to taxpayers.  
In February 2004, a workshop was held to discuss the preliminary estimates 
presented in the draft report (see appendix A for a list of attendees). Two 
commentators were asked to report on the Commission’s preliminary analysis — 
Dr  Geoff Slaughter (Queensland University) and Mr Sean Constable (Constable 
Consulting). Slaughter’s PhD thesis (Slaughter 2003) was based on a survey of 
more than 40 landholders in the Murweh district. Sean Constable had assessed 
impacts of clearing restrictions for the Moree Regional Vegetation Management 
Committee (Constable 2003). Their reports are available from the Commission’s 
website. Issues raised by participants at the workshop, and in submissions, are 
addressed in appendix K. 
The following sections briefly outline the approach and results. A more detailed 
explanation is contained in appendix K. In undertaking its analysis, the Commission 
used a wide range of data from various sources, including ABARE, CSIRO Land & 
Water and Devine Agribusiness. Data, including all consultants’ reports, are 
available from the Commission’s website. 
Approach  
The Commission has attempted to isolate the impacts of native vegetation clearing 
restrictions by first estimating future returns if clearing restrictions did not apply. 
This scenario incorporates estimates of potential returns per hectare and future 
annual rates of clearing. Estimates of potential returns incorporate estimates of 
current and future returns to cleared and uncleared land based on assumptions about 
future productivity growth, costs and prices. Estimated future annual clearing rates 
reflect historical ‘unconstrained’ clearing rates. Impacts of clearing restrictions are 
then measured as the difference between estimated aggregate returns with and 
without clearing restrictions.  
By using this approach, the Commission has sought to avoid some of the problems 
associated with approaches that consider observed changes in property values or     





farm returns. Observed values may be affected by other policy and market events, 
not just native vegetation regulations.  
All else given, the impacts on returns from clearing restrictions will be greater: 
•  the larger the number of hectares of land that would be cleared annually without 
clearing restrictions; and  
•  the greater the net returns from clearing a hectare of land (over and above returns 
from uncleared land and clearing costs). 
It should be noted that the ‘clearing without clearing restrictions’ scenario attempts 
to capture the private benefits accruing to landholders from retaining some native 
vegetation on their properties. Thus it is assumed that landholders voluntarily set 
aside the following areas for conservation:  
•  vegetation on steep slopes; 
•  vegetation on land with a high risk of soil salinity;  
•  vegetation along watercourses and lakes; and 
•  wetlands. 
These areas were estimated from data provided by CSIRO Land and Water. 
Moreover, because of the estimated annual clearing constraints, even without 
clearing restrictions, a significant amount of farmland would still be covered with 
remnant native vegetation at 2030 — 19 per cent and 33 per cent in Murweh and 
Moree respectively (compared with 63 per cent and 44 per cent remnant cover in 
2003). 
Results 
The results are highly sensitive to the assumptions made. They should be interpreted 
as providing an indication of orders of magnitude and not precise measures of likely 
impacts.  
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present the results for Murweh and Moree respectively. Different 
scenarios are estimated for each Shire. 
For Murweh, because future cattle prices are very uncertain, three scenarios are 
examined in which annual average real cattle prices decline by 1.5 per cent, by 
1.1 per cent and by 0.7 per cent. These declines are equivalent to assuming that 
average prices over the period 2003–2040 equal, respectively, average prices over 
the last 20 years, average prices over the last 10 years, and prices mid-way between 
current prices and average prices over the last 10 years.      





Under these scenarios, the present value of total impacts for Murweh for the period 
1999–2040 from clearing restrictions is estimated to range between $42.3 million 
and $76.3 million (2003 dollars), depending on assumed future real cattle prices. 
This equates to between $2.4 million and $4.4 million per year (2003 dollars) over 
the period.  
Potential additional impacts of restrictions in the presence of woodland thickening 
are also estimated. However, if cost-effective thinning of thickened remnant 
vegetation were permitted under the arrangements recently-introduced in 
Queensland, these additional costs would not be incurred.  
Table 6.1  Net present value of forgone future returns from clearing 
restrictions in Murweh Shire,a 1999–2040 
Assumed fall in average  
real beef prices, 2003–2040b  Without thickening With thickening
1.5 per cent a yearc $42.3m $81.3m
1.1 per cent a yeard $60.1m $103.9m
0.7 per cent a yeare $76.3m  $124.4m 
a All values in 2003 prices and are calculated using a constant real discount rate of 5 per cent. b Beef prices 
and terms of trade for beef are assumed to fall under all of these scenarios from 2003. c On average for 
2003–2040, prices are equal to the 20-year average price (ABARE 2003). d  On average for 2003–2040, 
prices are equal to the 10-year average price (ABARE 2003). e  On average for 2003–2040, prices are 
half-way between current real prices and average real prices over the last 10 years. 
In Moree, the present value of total impacts over the period 1995–2040 from 
clearing restrictions are estimated to range from $26.8  million to $83.9 million, 
depending on the yield and number of crops on newly-cleared land. This equates to 
between $1.5 million and $4.7 million per year over the period (2003 dollars). The 
different scenarios attempt to capture the possibility that land cleared in future (in 
the drier western part of the shire) may not be as productive as land that is already 
cleared.  
Table 6.2  Net present value of forgone future returns from clearing 
restrictions in Moree Plains Shire,a 1995–2040  
Yield and number of crops on newly cleared landb 
Per hectare yields are the same as previously cleared land 
8 crops in 10 years  $83.9m
6 crops in 10 years  $54.5m
Per hectare yields are 90 per cent of previously cleared land 
8 crops in 10 years  $47.0m
6 crops in 10 years  $26.8m
a All values in 2003 prices and are calculated using a constant real discount rate of 5 per cent. b For years 
where there are no crops, it is assumed that no inputs are added — the land is fallow.      





Some participants argued that many of the draft remnant native vegetation 
management plans included vegetation to be set aside for biodiversity protection. In 
ABARE and BRS (2003) these areas were treated as land that would be voluntarily 
set aside by landholders without financial assistance to the landholder. However, 
draft vegetation management plans have not been approved and it is not clear 
whether protecting these areas is conditional on financial assistance. For example, 
in the draft Mulga Lands Regional Vegetation Management Plan, there is a request 
for the: 
… provision of financial assistance to landholders and other stakeholders (such as 
traditional owners) who are inequitably affected by legislation controls or 
recommendations from this plan. (Mulga Lands Regional Vegetation Management 
Committee 2003, p. 6) 
Nonetheless, two scenarios have been estimated (table 6.3) in which it is assumed 
that landholders in Murweh clear at historical rates, but cease clearing once remnant 
vegetation comprises respectively 30 per cent and 40 per cent of farmland.17  
Table 6.3  Net present value of forgone future returns from clearing 
restrictions in Murweh Shire,a 1999–2040 
Alternative conservation scenarios 
 
Key assumptions 
Share of private land covered in remnant native 
vegetation, without clearing restrictionsb
 19  per  centc 30 per centd  40 per centd
Without thickening and cattle prices fall 
by 1.1 per cent a year, 2003–2040  $60.1m 
 
$55.9m $47.1m 
a All values in 2003 prices and are calculated using a constant real discount rate of 5 per cent. b Landholders 
are assumed to clear at historical rates until they reach their conservation targets. c No  prescribed 
conservation target (from table 6.1). d Prescribed conservation targets indicate the percentage of farmland set 
aside for conservation of remnant native vegetation. 
The effects on estimated losses are relatively small because even without clearing 
restrictions, it is estimated that 19 per cent of farm land would remain covered by 
remnant native vegetation at 2030 (compared with around 63 per cent in 2003). In 
other words, and perhaps not surprisingly, it is the impact of the proposed clearing 
ban in Queensland over the next 10–20 years that will constrain landholder 
operations most significantly. The assumed conservation targets would not be 
reached for some time, when forgone returns are heavily discounted.  
                                              
17 Proposals in the draft Mulga Lands Regional Vegetation Management Plan in Queensland 
included: increased protection of riparian forests and wildlife corridors, wetlands and springs 
and ‘of concern’ regional ecosystems; minimisation of salinity potential; and maintenance of 
30 per cent remnant vegetation in all surface and groundwater catchments.     





In the Moree case study, assuming continuation of historical annual clearing rates, 
more than 30 per cent of farmland would remain covered by native vegetation in 
2030 (compared with around 44 per cent in 2003), in the absence of clearing 
restrictions.  
Concluding remarks 
The case studies are intended to shed some light on the reasons why landholders in 
those regions seek to clear land and, therefore, the fundamental drivers of the 
magnitudes of potential impacts. Results for these two shires suggest that the 
economic impact of broadscale clearing restrictions could be significant under a 
range of scenarios, mainly because they represent large areas in which there is 
considerable scope for profitable changes in land use. Because such opportunities 
may not be available elsewhere on the same scale, results from the case studies 
should not be applied to other regions in the two States concerned, or indeed, to 
other States and Territories. 
Importantly, as noted above, the results are highly sensitive to the assumptions 
made. They should be interpreted as providing an indication of orders of magnitude 
and not precise measures of likely impacts.  
6.3  Impacts on regional communities and other 
industries 
Terms of reference 3(a) directs the Commission to report on the impact of native 
vegetation and biodiversity regulations on a range of non-agricultural activities and 
on the flow-on effects to regional communities.  
Impacts on regional communities 
While the relative importance of the agricultural sector in the Australian economy 
has been declining for many years, it has grown in absolute size and remains 
important for many regional centres. Agriculture, forestry or mining (all of which 
can be affected by regulation of native vegetation clearance and biodiversity 
conservation) can be critical for the survival of some small communities.  
This inquiry has received many examples, covering most jurisdictions, of 
significant long-term negative impacts of native vegetation and biodiversity 
regulations on the assets and the income of individual landholders. The extent that 
these effects on individuals result in discernable impacts on particular regional areas     





will depend on the number of individuals affected and their geographic 
concentration. The ACF considered that: 
… existing regulations will have had little impact even at the regional scale, with 
verifiable net impacts limited to individual properties with unusual or exceptional 
circumstances. (sub. 146, p. 17) 
Negative regional impacts can be generated if a sufficient number of landholders 
suffer significant income losses, reductions in asset values or, in the extreme, if 
farms become unviable. In these cases, losses of farm income, employment and 
investment have flow-on effects on regional towns and services. SAFF noted the 
difficulty in quantifying regional impacts but argued: 
However, at the very least it should be considered to be rather more than the region’s 
combined individual losses. The synergistic effects of such losses can only be measured 
in what has not occurred — secondary industries which have not sprung up as a result 
of regional prosperity. Perhaps the greatest indicator is the decline in a region’s 
population — particularly of younger people. (sub. 140, p. 5) 
Herbert River District Canegrowers (sub.  DR273) also argued that the effect of 
clearing restrictions on farm development and expansion would especially 
discourage young farmers and hence would create flow-on social effects to regional 
communities. 
In addition, the rate base is likely to decline as the value of agricultural land 
declines, leading to higher charges for other ratepayers and/or reduced services. 
Alternatively, the regulations may prevent expansion in agriculture that may have 
offset other factors which had been leading to regional decline. 
Queensland and New South Wales are the jurisdictions where there appears most 
scope for negative regional impacts due to the higher demand for clearing by 
landholders and the potential for regulations to restrict both clearing and the control 
of vegetation expansion and thickening. There was also fairly substantial clearing 
(in excess of 25 000 hectares per year) in Western Australia in the 1980s which now 
appears to have been constrained by the regulations. 
In other jurisdictions, the extent of past native vegetation clearance on private land 
means that there are fewer landholders wishing to undertake broadscale clearance. 
Nonetheless, in South Australia and Victoria, the clearing regulations are quite 
restrictive on landholders and hence can have substantial impacts in regions with 
concentrations of remnant and regrowth native vegetation.  
In the Northern Territory and Tasmania the extent of the regulations and their 
implementation appear to have been less constraining on landholders than in other 
jurisdictions.      





Agriculture is a very small part of the ACT economy, hence restrictions there will 
have little impact at the jurisdiction level. 
While the Commission has received numerous examples of significant negative 
impacts on individual landholders, for these to have discernable regional impacts 
there will need to be a concentration of affected landholders. A number of regions 
appear potentially to have such a concentration, particularly where significant 
changes in technology and land use are underway or proposed. However, the extent 
of regional impacts remains unclear. 
In Queensland some cane-growing areas are affected by restrictions on clearing 
vegetation. Some landholders need to clear vegetation to increase the size of their 
operations to a more viable scale. That said, regulation of the industry has also 
constrained the scale of operations. Canegrowers (sub. 101) considered that for the 
sugar industry regional impacts would be greatest in the Mackay area. Even so, it 
was considered that the impact would not be dramatic in the short term because the 
regional industry was not expanding at present. The Shire of Cardwell (sub. DR231) 
submitted that environmental and conservation issues were among a number of 
negative influences on the sugar industry which were having significant adverse 
impacts on that region’s economy. 
An AgForce (sub. 54) survey of Queensland shire councils indicated that regional 
impacts were often uncertain at present but respondents considered these would 
become clearer in the near future. The Inland Burnett Regional Vegetation 
Management Committee in Queensland noted that: 
Local governments in the Inland Burnett believe this Act [the Vegetation Management 
Act] is a threat to their sustainability and long-term economic and social viability. 
(sub. 139, p. 6) 
Jeff Bucknell (sub.  25) of the Northern Desert Uplands region of Queensland 
considered that preventing the relatively small clearing planned for that highly 
vegetated region would severely affect rural communities in northern Queensland. 
Ben Rees (sub.  210) of Miles in Queensland considered that a blanket ban on 
clearing remnant vegetation would cause significant dislocation to rural 
communities, especially in areas dependent on traditional grazing industries and 
underdeveloped dryland farming enterprises. 
The Northern Land Council expressed concern about the potential impacts on 
Indigenous communities of land-clearing regulations in the Northern Territory: 
Clumsy application of land clearing regulations may particularly disadvantage 
Indigenous people who have only recently re-acquired land. There is a risk that they 
may be denied the economic and social benefits enjoyed by other Australians, in part to 
redress damage done by those other land users. (sub. 221, p. 8)     





Many Indigenous people in the Northern Territory live in small isolated 
communities where agricultural activities — including possible commercial 
development of native plants and animals — represent one of the few opportunities 
for employment. Hence, there is potential for native vegetation and biodiversity 
regulation to have negative impacts on the prospects for development in these 
regional communities that have only recently obtained title over their land. 
The District Council of Elliston (sub. 120) noted that it was one of the few areas of 
South Australia with a significant share of remnant vegetation remaining 
(60 per cent of the original 60 per cent cover). Hence, significant areas have been 
set aside as conservation reserves or covered by Native Vegetation Heritage 
Agreements and are not rateable, increasing the burden on other ratepayers. Because 
of clearing restrictions, some farms in the area have become marginal and been sold 
to a neighbour, thus families are lost to the district. SAFF (sub. 140) noted that 
many landholders in the south-east of South Australia still had several thousand 
acres of native vegetation on their properties. 
In some cases, clearing restrictions may have significant effects on small 
communities that rely heavily on agriculture. West Wimmera Shire Council 
(sub. 110) in Victoria considered there would be impacts on small communities in 
its area, while the Baradine Progress Association (sub. 130) and the NSW Forest 
Products Association (sub.  DR243) in New South Wales indicated that several 
small communities in central New South Wales would be under severe threat if the 
local timber industry contracted. 
Compensation to affected landholders, even if fully covering the negative impacts 
on their farm returns, is unlikely to remove impacts on regions. Payment of ongoing 
compensation for lost income, or as a lump sum to reflect the reduction in property 
values, should not alter the impacts of the regulations on output, investment and 
employment and on rating capacity for councils. However, if contracts are entered 
or financial assistance is provided for landholders to manage native vegetation, then 
employment and investment could be created in this alternative activity which may 
make up some or all of the losses in agricultural activities.  
A number of submissions observed that increased tourism from retaining native 
vegetation and preserving biodiversity may benefit some regions. ACF (sub. 146) 
noted that north Queensland would benefit from restrictions on vegetation clearance 
which had positive impacts on the condition of the Great Barrier Reef. The 
Commission’s study of the impacts on water quality in the Great Barrier Reef 
catchment (PC 2003a) concluded that blanket native vegetation controls would be     





neither necessary nor cost effective in reducing the soil and nutrient loss that is 
reducing water quality and threatening the reef.18  
The ACF (sub.  146) and the Environment Centre Northern Territory (sub.  147) 
considered that vegetation clearing in the Daly Basin of the Northern Territory 
would be detrimental to the tourism and recreation areas relying on the Daly River 
and estuary ecosystems. In November 2003, the NT Government halted further 
approvals for subdivision or vegetation clearing in the Daly region until a 
sustainable land-use plan is developed in 2004. 
Regions close to capital cities may obtain greater tourism if environmental 
amenities are maintained. Gingin Shire just north of Perth commented: 
The unique natural attributes of the Shire, including the coastal environment, river 
environs and diverse and dynamic rural landscapes, are economic assets worthy of 
management. (sub. 37, p. 3) 
The Shire of Dandaragan (sub. 191), 130 kilometres north of Perth, noted that the 
parks in the shire contained a world-class range of flora and fauna and that 
eco-tourism was already important and growing. The Nillumbik Shire Council 
(sub. 174), 25 kilometres north-east of Melbourne, indicated that its ‘Green Wedge’ 
status attracted a large number of visitors. The Pacific Palms Community 
Association (sub. 64) from New South Wales considered that clearing restrictions 
needed to be extended to non-agricultural land in order to preserve the region’s 
passive recreation qualities. 
While tourism benefits may provide little, if any, benefit for landholders facing 
clearing restrictions, the net impact on affected regions can be significant. However, 
in those areas affected, only some of the restrictions imposed by native vegetation 
and biodiversity regulations are likely to be needed to generate optimal net benefits 
from tourism. As with land and water degradation, any benefits of retaining native 
vegetation for tourism would usually accrue from only part of the vegetation in an 
area, and hence would require selective retention and revegetation rather than 
blanket restrictions on clearing. Such retention would be efficient only up to the 
point where the marginal benefits (from tourism and other sources) exceeded the 
marginal costs of retention. 
Many regions will not receive significant offsetting tourism benefits of this kind. 
The Bush Users Group (sub.  155) of Castlemaine in Victoria, R. W. Sheaffe 
(sub.  30) of Booligal in New South Wales and the Pastoralists and Graziers’ 
Association of Western Australia (sub. 91) were among those who did not consider 
                                              
18 Some participants to the current inquiry (for example, Bob Katter MP, trans., p. 118) questioned 
whether retaining woody vegetation was the best means of reducing runoffs.      





that retaining native vegetation would provide worthwhile tourism benefits in their 
regions. A landholder in AgForce’s member survey considered eco-tourism would 
not work for him: 
If I can’t get it cleared before they declare it remnant vegetation I will have to look at 
ecotourism. However, I don’t think anybody would like to come to a place where they 
can’t see more than 100 yards in front of them or they can’t access the place because 
the tracks are overgrown because I can’t clear either side of the gullies and creeks. 
(sub. 54, p. 29) 
The District Council of Elliston in South Australia felt that achieving eco-tourism 
benefits required more than simply retaining vegetation: 
There is opportunity for some benefit to the community relating to tourism values of 
native vegetation areas. Regretfully the Government of SA has more ‘conservation 
land’ than it can effectively manage. Thus the land is unmanaged and without 
appropriate management plans the State Conservation areas are not promoted for and 
not conducive to tourism. (sub. 120, p. 3) 
Some of the tourism benefits of native vegetation and biodiversity retention can be 
achieved by market mechanisms. Individuals can purchase properties for the 
establishment of nature parks and some landholders have combined agricultural 
production with tourism by promoting on-farm holidays. 
Potential regional impacts: Moree and Murweh Shires 
In the jurisdictions with the largest amounts of uncleared vegetation, the 
regulations, until recently, have not restricted significantly the amounts of 
vegetation that could be cleared. The proposed cessation of broadscale remnant 
vegetation clearance in New South Wales and Queensland would be likely to lead to 
more significant regional impacts as indicated in section 6.2. 
In the case of Moree Shire, because a potential change of land use from grazing to 
higher value cropping is involved, the impact of such restrictions per hectare would 
be particularly severe. However, the existing land use is, for the moment, profitable, 
and hence the impact on the region is most likely to be somewhat slower growth 
rather than an absolute decline. In the longer term, the failure to take advantage of 
potentially more profitable land use, with greater potential for future productivity 
growth, may be more detrimental to the region. 
In Murweh Shire, the progressive thickening of remnant vegetation, if unchecked, 
would result in ongoing declines in productivity and would threaten the viability of 
affected properties, leading to more immediate reductions in regional output and 
employment.     





Impacts on other industries 
Forest industries make significant use of native trees from both state-owned land 
and private properties. In most jurisdictions the area of state land made available for 
timber harvesting has declined, often reflecting concerns for protecting native 
vegetation and threatened fauna, and there has been greater reliance on older 
regrowth or plantation timber on private land. In some cases, this has led to 
additional costs (for example, greater transport costs to mills from private forests). 
Even when timber is sourced from private properties there is often uncertainty 
concerning future access to this resource.19 Timber Towns Victoria (the peak body 
for Victorian local government on forestry policy and development) considered:  
There is anxiety among landholders, investors and operators that current regulations in 
Victoria may prevent a landholder from harvesting his/her timber because, under the 
Native Vegetation Framework (2003), native vegetation in excess of 10 years old is 
considered to be remnant vegetation. Without clear guidelines for Victoria’s Native 
Vegetation Framework this concern will persist. (sub. DR263, p. 6) 
Gippsland Private Forestry (formerly Gippsland Farm Plantations) (sub. 92) noted 
that, based on developments over the past decade, landholders in Victoria were 
concerned that by the time plantations were ready to be harvested, the legislation or 
its implementation may have changed adversely for them. 
Similarly, for New South Wales, Blue Chip Forestry Services argued: 
… landholders whose future timber harvest rights are uncertain have no incentive to 
invest in silviculture which conserves or improves the long-term productive condition 
of their forests. Regulation creates a perverse incentive to cut and get out. 
(sub. DR248, p. 1) 
Even where access to forests is allowed, the costs of complying with native 
vegetation and biodiversity regulation can be significant for forest industries. The 
NSW Forest Products Association (sub. DR243) argued that surveys required under 
the NSW Threatened Species Act 1995 before logging licences could be granted for 
state forests in the Brigalow Belt South Bioregion, meant that State Forests of New 
South Wales employed fewer resources in management of the forests. Blue Chip 
Forest Services (sub. DR248) considered that while changes to NSW legislation 
governing farm forestry may improve the certainty of harvesting rights, they would 
                                              
19 An example of such impacts of changes in native vegetation regulation on farm forestry was 
provided by Darren and Peter Hepburn (sub. 75) who borrowed $300 000 to purchase a property 
in New South Wales in 1993 after assurances from various government departments that they 
would be able to harvest the timber on the property. The introduction of SEPP 46 in 1995 
resulted in refusal of permission to clear the timber leading to a significant ongoing interest 
burden on the debt and a substantial decline in the property’s value.     





increase operating and compliance costs and occupational health and safety risks. 
The NSW Forest Products Association (sub. DR276) also expressed concern that 
excessive compliance costs, particularly those associated with threatened species 
legislation, could provide a significant disincentive to farm forestry. 
The Commission received few submissions from landholders or land users outside 
the farming, grazing and forestry industries. Nonetheless, native vegetation and 
biodiversity regulations do impose some costs on other industries. As with 
agricultural industries, these costs would need to be compared with the benefits of 
vegetation clearance and biodiversity regulations to assess the overall impact of the 
regulations. It is also desirable to minimise the costs imposed in achieving any 
desired level of environmental benefits. 
Mining usually generates very high value added per hectare of land used. Hence 
requirements related to vegetation clearance, often imposed via offset and 
revegetation policies, although expensive, usually do not threaten the viability of 
large mining ventures. However, because miners usually do not commence 
exploration until they have examined the costs of land use restrictions, projects 
which have been deterred by vegetation clearing restrictions will often not be 
obvious as they will never commence.  
Native vegetation aspects of mining activities have traditionally been regulated 
under State and Territory mining legislation administered by mines departments.20 
The operation and impacts of this system appear to have been largely accepted by 
mining companies. Nonetheless, the Queensland Resources Council noted that the 
costs of complying with biodiversity regulation could be high: 
Although it is likely that mining companies are better placed to work through the 
biodiversity legislative maze compared with individual landowners, it can still be a 
prolonged process with significant direct and holding costs. The frustration and 
confusion noted by primary producers is understood. (sub. DR311, p. 2) 
The Commission has received no other submissions from large mining companies 
or their associations. 
Smaller, more marginal deposits are often mined most efficiently by small operators 
with low overheads. The Prospectors and Miners Association of Victoria (sub. 117) 
considered that native vegetation regulation was a major contributor to the large 
decline in applications for small (five hectares or less) mining licences in Victoria 
over the past decade. For small exploration and mining operations, the costs of 
meeting various regulatory requirements, including the native vegetation and 
                                              
20 The WA Government (sub. DR290) noted that mineral exploration and production in that State 
required approvals under a range of environmental legislation, as well as the Mining Act 1978.     





biodiversity regimes, are a greater proportion of costs and can potentially influence 
the viability of some projects.  
In some jurisdictions, infrastructure industries may be given exemptions from 
vegetation clearing controls. The Commission has not received any submissions 
from infrastructure providers. Nonetheless, there will clearly be some impacts on 
them in complying with native vegetation and biodiversity regulations, particularly 
as roadside verges are often the cheapest and most convenient route for 
infrastructure. Ian and Sue Jack of Barnawartha in Victoria (sub. 141) noted that in 
their area, Telstra had to place lines through private land as the council would not 
allow any disturbance to wattle regrowth on the road reserve. As with large-scale 
mining, the high value added and relatively low land requirements of infrastructure 
industries usually will mean that the impact of vegetation clearance and biodiversity 
regulations is likely to be minor relative to the size of the enterprise. Nonetheless, 
the absolute size of the impacts can be substantial for the projects concerned. 
Vegetation at the side of roads is often one of the few opportunities for vegetation 
corridors and hence can be highly prized for its environmental benefits. In South 
Australia this vegetation is protected, and Sally McKay (sub. 78) of One Tree Hill 
in South Australia noted the costs of poor drainage and the undermining of roads by 
tree roots. In Victoria vegetation clearance (including removal of branches) for road 
construction and maintenance is covered by the Planning and Environment 
Act 1987 and if clearing is allowed, offsets are usually required from the 
constructing authority. VFF (sub.  149) noted that considerable expense was 
involved in moving the route of the Craigieburn bypass to protect rare species of 
flora and fauna. A number of submissions commented on the additional costs in 
clearing and maintaining roadside verges as a result of restrictions on clearing 
vegetation. Robin Weatherald (sub.  DR271) of Strathbogie Shire in Victoria 
indicated that tree management was the largest item in the cost of road resealing in 
that shire. 
North Grampians Shire Council in Victoria was concerned that safety of road users 
would be compromised by restrictions on clearing trees. 
A road’s purpose is primarily for public traffic and for another level of government to 
put restrictions on public safety through environmental controls is not acceptable. 
Alternatively the roads’ budget is funding net gain at the detriment to road safety. 
(sub. 150, p. 1) 
Kloeden et al. (1999) estimated that 23 per cent of deaths and 17 per cent of serious 
injuries to car occupants in South Australia between 1985 and 1996 were the result 
of vehicles colliding with trees. They recommended roadside tree planting policies 
of road authorities and councils be reviewed to avoid plantings in hazardous     





locations and rectify dangers posed by trees located within nine metres of rural 
roads and one metre of urban roads.  
Trees on roadsides and median strips pre-date regulations restricting vegetation 
clearance. However, to the extent that road authorities or councils are constrained 
from appropriately clearing or managing roadside vegetation, the cost of 
maintaining road safety will be increased or safety will tend to be compromised.  
The Wildflower Society of Western Australia (sub. 33) noted that salinity can cause 
damage to roads, rail lines and buildings. The WA Government (sub. 151) estimated 
that salinity increased repair and maintenance costs for the State’s roads by $505 
million per year and for railways by $11 million per year. In areas suffering from, or 
prone to, salinity in which targeted vegetation retention would reduce these 
problems, there could be benefits from the regulations for expenditure on 
infrastructure.21 The WA Government (sub.  DR290) also noted declines in the 
quality of public drinking water due to salinity caused by excessive vegetation 
clearing. 
In certain regions, tourism based on environmental features will benefit from 
retention of some (but not necessarily all) environmental amenities in the region. 
This may involve direct protection of the amenity concerned or the control of 
processes that might endanger it. No submissions have been received from 
eco-tourism operators, but as discussed above, environmental organisations and 
several shire councils have pointed out benefits to tourism from native vegetation 
and biodiversity retention.  
The apiculture industry benefits from retention of native vegetation (especially 
eucalypt woodlands) on agricultural properties.22 Conversely, honeybee pollination 
of crops provides increased crop yields for landholders (Victorian Apiarists 
Association, sub.  DR297). While regulations protecting native vegetation will 
provide some benefits to both the apiculture and agriculture industries, market 
mechanisms are available for apiarists and landholders to negotiate the levels of 
native vegetation provision on private land to efficiently attain these benefits. 
                                              
21 These benefits are not the current costs of salinity damage, but rather are the reduction in future 
costs due to native vegetation retained or added as a result of the regulations. Only some of this 
extra vegetation will contribute to salinity reduction. These costs savings will be long term in 
nature and hence need to be discounted back to current values. 
22 The apiculture industry also has a significant interest in access to native vegetation on crown 
land but these issues are beyond the terms of reference of this inquiry.      






Regional impacts of the regulations appear to have been limited to date, although 
impacts on some smaller communities may have been more serious. Controls on 
broadscale clearing are likely to have more significant impacts on regions with 
significant native vegetation cover. 
The regulations may have imposed costs on forest industries in some jurisdictions, 
especially by creating uncertainty about future rights to harvest native timber 
planted on private land. The regulations also impose costs on some mining and 
infrastructure projects, although often these will be small relative to the size of the 
project. In some cases, native vegetation regulations have added substantially to the 
costs of road construction and maintenance.  
6.4  Government measures to mitigate negative impacts 
The Commission is required to report (terms of reference 3(a)(iv)) on the extent to 
which existing government measures are mitigating any negative impacts of the 
regulations. In some jurisdictions such measures are contained in parts of the 
regulatory framework being considered but, in most cases, they are part of broader 
environmental programs. 
Direct measures 
In the past, in most jurisdictions, there has been only limited government assistance 
to landholders directly related to regulations restricting native vegetation clearance 
or protecting biodiversity. This, at least partly, reflects the potentially significant 
cost of compensating landholders for the impact of these regulations. The ACF 
(2002 p. 5) noted:  
The payment of compensation for regulating land use or water access would be an 
unreasonable burden on the public purse. The high cost of compensation would leave 
governments in a position where they could no longer afford to enforce environmental 
laws or social responsibilities. 
Where compensation is payable (for example, the Victorian Flora and Fauna 
Guarantee Act 1988), the regulations tend to be used sparingly. 
Some of the reluctance to provide compensation may also reflect the fact that some 
benefits of retaining selected native vegetation will accrue to landholders     





individually and/or as a group.23 If such benefits are greater than the negative 
impacts on landholders of retaining the vegetation concerned, government 
assistance would normally not be appropriate and in many cases regulatory 
intervention would not be necessary.24  
A number of jurisdictions provide some funds to landholders affected by land 
clearing and biodiversity regulations, especially under endangered flora and fauna 
legislation. Regulations protecting rare and endangered taxa affect far fewer 
landholders than vegetation clearance controls. Some jurisdictions provide 
assistance with maintenance of environmentally-sensitive areas. For example, 
Anthony O’Halloran (sub. 80) of Binnaway New South Wales, noted that he had 
received funds under the NSW Threatened Species Conservation Act to fence off 
creek lines on his property. 
In some cases, compensation has involved purchasing all or part of a property 
regarded as being of particular environmental value to the community. Some 
participants claimed that the prices offered for their properties were well below 
market value. 
Introduction of legislation controlling native vegetation clearance has often meant 
that these compensation arrangements do not need to be used by government 
because habitat protection is achieved by clearing restrictions. Potentially broader 
schemes such as the Western Australian Natural Resource Adjustment Scheme have 
been discontinued. More details of these schemes are provided in appendixes C–J. 
Environment ACT (sub. 17) has a policy of facilitating a shift to 99-year leases on 
rural properties, incorporating land management agreements identifying special 
conservation areas and setting out management measures required to achieve agreed 
conservation outcomes. The ACT taxpayer effectively compensates leaseholders for 
these restrictions and requirements as the valuation for lease purposes reflects the 
land’s reduced stock-carrying capacity and then a further discount is applied to that 
valuation to allow for the costs of ongoing management of the protected vegetation. 
The WA Government (sub. DR290) indicated that it intended to identify those who 
had been worst affected by the introduction of clearing controls and determine ways 
to provide assistance to them.  
                                              
23 To the extent that the benefits accruing to a landholder from retaining or restoring vegetation are 
greater than the costs of doing so, a landholder would be expected to voluntarily undertake such 
action, and neither regulation nor compensation would be necessary. 
24 Where the benefits from retaining or restoring vegetation accrue to a group of landholders but 
the costs of vegetation retention are spread unevenly between them, there may be a role for 
government to facilitate cooperation and to achieve an efficient sharing of the costs.     





In Queensland and New South Wales, the two jurisdictions with the greatest rates of 
recent woody vegetation clearance, funding packages are now being developed that 
will be directly linked to at least some of the proposed tighter restrictions on 
vegetation clearance to be imposed on landholders. The New South Wales and 
Australian Governments have announced a joint $406 million package (from 
National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality (NAPSWQ) and Natural 
Heritage Trust (NHT) funds) to end broadscale vegetation clearing and promote 
good landcare practices. In May 2003, the Australian and Queensland Governments 
announced a planned adjustment assistance package of around $150 million as part 
of a proposal to eliminate broadscale clearing in Queensland by the end of 2006. 
The Queensland Government has since indicated that it will fund this package from 
its own resources (Queensland Legislative Assembly, 18 March 2004). Details of 
both the New South Wales and Queensland packages are currently being finalised. 
Indirect measures 
Most government measures that mitigate or offset the impacts of native vegetation 
and biodiversity regulation are part of broader environmental programs. These 
measures are not compensation for lost production, but rather provide assistance for 
additional maintenance and for management actions such as planting and fencing of 
revegetation areas or maintenance of riparian strips. They are not directly linked to 
mitigating the impacts on landholders of the regulations examined in this inquiry. 
Natural Heritage Trust  
The NHT was established in 1997 to help restore and conserve Australia’s 
environment and natural resources. It incorporates the Landcare and Bushcare 
programs. NHT funds are provided for a wide range of environmental activities 
including vegetation management and reduction of land degradation. The NHT has 
now been extended to 2006-07 with additional funding of one billion dollars. For 
regional level programs, State and Territory Governments have agreed in principle 
to match Australian Government funding. 
While funding and related voluntary community involvement under such programs 
can be of assistance to landholders, it will usually not cover landholders’ costs (less 
any associated benefits) incurred in retaining and managing native vegetation.  
Murray Irrigation Ltd from New South Wales noted: 
NHT incentives available to landholders ($1500/km for fencing) do not reflect a 
reasonable share of the true cost of the work to the landholder. Most incentives 
established eight to ten years ago are now out dated and do not reflect the time and     





money outlaid by the landholder to undertake vegetation works. Vegetation incentives 
do not even account for the cost of materials to erect the fence let alone labour and 
management costs for weeds and vermin control. The economic opportunity cost of lost 
production by setting aside land for vegetation activities is also not considered. 
(sub. 79, p. 2) 
Similarly the Serpentine–Jarrahdale Land Conservation District Committee 
(sub. 66) from Western Australia noted that grants are available from various NHT 
p r o g r a m s  t o  g o  t o w a r d s  s o m e  o f  t h e  costs of retaining and managing native 
vegetation, but observed that these only met part of the cost. For example, while 
fencing costs around $3500 per kilometre, typically grants are $1000–$1500 per 
kilometre. 
The Tasmanian Conservation Trust considered that much NHT money provided to 
Tasmania did not increase total government funding for land conservation: 
A significant proportion of what money has been contributed by the Commonwealth 
for NHT 1, and Landcare before it, has been shamelessly misappropriated by State 
agencies through cost-shifting. (sub. 84, p. 8) 
In those cases where projects provide some production or amenity benefits to 
landholders, only partial funding may be sufficient to cover net costs to landholders. 
A number of environmental groups, including Wetland Care Australia (sub. 59), 
noted that small amounts of catalytic funding from such sources could promote 
significant community and landholder involvement in conservation activities. 
National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality 
The Council of Australian Governments endorsed the NAPSWQ in November 2000 
and all jurisdictions have committed to a total funding package of $1.4 billion over 
7  years. The aim of the NAPSWQ is to prevent, stabilise and reverse the most 
urgent of Australia’s salinity and water quality problems. The NAPSWQ focuses on 
developing regional plans and objectives in close consultation with communities in 
all highly affected regions. 
The types of projects funded by NAPSWQ include development of integrated 
catchment management plans, provision of technical and scientific support for 
communities and landholders and assistance for selected revegetation, and for 
rehabilitation and maintenance of existing vegetation.  
Many NAPSWQ projects will provide benefits to landholders as a result of 
vegetation management on their own or other landholders’ properties. However, 
only those projects that fund the management of vegetation retained because of     





native vegetation or biodiversity conservation regulations will mitigate the effects 
of those regulations on landholders. 
Local government 
The limited revenue base of local government together with the often high cost of 
fencing and managing native vegetation, limits the extent of expenditure it can 
undertake on environmental programs. Janet and Kevin Blake from Shelford in 
Victoria noted the difficulties facing rural shires: 
As a [local government] Councillor in a small rural municipality I know that it is very 
difficult to adequately recompense people for their public good conservation 
particularly when it comes to the broad acre farms. This is compounded when the 
municipality has many properties with similar issues/ assets/ liabilities and a low rate 
base to provide rate relief whilst maintaining essential infrastructure such as roads. 
(sub. 188, p. 8) 
However, in a number of cases, jurisdiction-wide rules for targeted rate rebates are 
applied. In addition, some local councils, particularly those with a significant 
non-agricultural rate base, provide assistance and encouragement in managing 
native vegetation or give rate rebates on rural land that is not cleared.  
In New South Wales, councils are required under the Local Government Act 1993 to 
provide rate rebates where landholders have entered into voluntary conservation 
agreements. Similarly, in South Australia, land on which Native Vegetation 
Heritage Agreements apply is valued at zero for rating purposes. In Western 
Australia land that cannot be cleared, or that is subject to other restriction, is subject 
to a rate reduction or exemption. However, the Western Australian Local 
Government Association (sub. DR260) noted that land located near metropolitan 
areas, if placed under a conservation covenant and hence no longer in agricultural 
use, can be valued at its urban potential, thereby, in some cases, attracting land 
taxes greater than the saving in rates. 
A number of Victorian councils provide rate rebates or cash grants where land is set 
aside (sometimes under covenant) for environmental purposes. For example, 
Nillumbik Shire Council (sub. 174)  provides  20 per cent rate rebates for 
undertaking specified works including protection of remnant vegetation and 
revegetation using indigenous species on agricultural properties over 30 hectares. 
Similarly, some Queensland local councils (for example, Mackay) provide rate 
rebates for covenanted land.     






Government measures to mitigate negative impacts of the regulations on 
landholders have been limited and have not been available to all affected 
landholders. Any payments typically cover only a small portion of the negative 
impacts of the regulations. 
6.5 Summary 
The regulation of native vegetation clearance and biodiversity conservation has had 
a range of significant negative impacts on those landholders affected by them. At 
their most basic, these effects have involved a reduction in the area of land available 
for agricultural production. But often they also have imposed significant restrictions 
on the normal operations of agricultural enterprises, preventing many landholders 
from implementing innovation in technology and farming methods and increases in 
scale necessary to achieve the productivity improvements required to remain viable. 
In the longer term, the entry of new younger farmers is likely to be discouraged 
because of the significant restrictions on any development of new or existing 
properties which involves clearing native vegetation. 
Restrictions on clearing vegetation that has regrown or on controlling existing 
vegetation by thinning or lopping branches appear to have been particularly onerous 
(for example, in restricting rotation and fallowing of land), often for little apparent 
environmental benefit and at times leading to environmental harm (chapter 5). 
The Commission’s analysis of the likely impacts of preventing broadscale clearing 
in the Moree and Murweh Shires, together with information obtained from 
submissions and visits to landholders, indicates that for landholders as a group, 
aggregate Australia-wide negative impacts of the regulations will be large although 
the distribution of costs among landholders is very uneven. 
Reflecting reduced income-earning potential, the values of significantly affected 
properties have fallen substantially. The ability of landholders to obtain finance has 
also declined or the cost of finance has increased. 
Landholders without significant areas of native vegetation, often neighbours of 
those adversely affected, have largely escaped these negative impacts. Somewhat 
perversely, the negative impacts tend to fall heaviest on those who have taken a 
greater interest in retaining native vegetation in the past.  
There are positive impacts for many landholders in having native vegetation on 
their properties. However, much of this vegetation will be retained or planted     





voluntarily for the net private benefits it provides. In the case of regional 
externalities (for example, salinity and erosion) landholders will benefit from some, 
but not all, of the native vegetation retained because of current regulations.  
A variety of measures (some now discontinued) have been provided by all levels of 
government that partially mitigate some of the negative impacts on some 
landholders. However, in general, these measures offset only a small portion of 
landholders’ costs, particularly for those severely affected by the regulations. 
There are some negative impacts on non-agricultural industries, but generally these 
activities are much less land intensive and therefore impacts comprise a smaller 
share of costs. Small-scale mining appears an exception. In certain areas, tourism 
may have received positive benefits from the retention of additional native 
vegetation and biodiversity. 
Broader regional impacts appear to have been limited to date, although smaller 
communities in heavily vegetated areas may be more affected.      




7  Assessment of current regimes 
The analysis presented in the preceding chapters, and the descriptions of the current 
regimes presented in appendixes B–J, are drawn together in this chapter to present 
an overall assessment of the operation of those regimes. 
The preceding analysis suggests that there is a range of problems with the current 
regimes in many jurisdictions which have resulted in unnecessary costs being 
imposed on landholders and the community. It is unclear how effective the regimes 
have been in achieving their environmental objectives, — there is mixed evidence 
of some achievements, but also of perverse environmental outcomes.  
In this chapter, characteristics of ‘good’ regulation are first outlined to provide a 
framework for assessing the operation of the current regimes. Particular emphasis is 
placed on identifying possible reforms to improve the current regimes in order to 
minimise their costs while increasing the probability of achieving their 
environmental objectives. Possible alternatives to the current regulatory 
arrangements are discussed in the next chapter.  
7.1  A framework for assessing regulation 
In order to achieve their objectives at minimum cost to the community, regulation 
must be well designed and implemented. The OECD suggests that in general: 
There is little doubt that most governments can substantially reduce regulatory costs, 
while increasing benefits, by making wiser regulatory decisions. A wide range of 
anecdotal and analytical evidence supports the conclusion that governments often 
regulate badly, with too little understanding of the consequences of their decisions, and 
with little or no assessment of any alternatives other than traditional forms of law and 
regulations. (quoted in Argy and Johnson 2003, p. 5) 
The analysis in the preceding chapters suggests that there is significant scope for 
improvement in many of the current regimes.      





Characteristics of ‘good’ regulation 
The general characteristics of good regulation are summarised in box 7.1. They 
provide a reference point against which the current native vegetation and 
biodiversity regulations in the various jurisdictions can be assessed. The 
characteristics are similar (but not the same) to the regulation impact statement 
(RIS) process criteria discussed in chapter 1. Preparation of a RIS when formulating 
legislation will help ensure that the resulting legislation embodies many of these 
characteristics.  
Importantly, the characteristics of good regulation should be considered not only 
when designing new regulations, but should also guide the assessment and reform 
of existing regulations. Argy and Johnson (2003, p. 7) argue that: 
The principles in the checklist need to be applied not only when designing new 
regulations, but also when reviewing existing regulation. Even well designed regulation 
must be reviewed and updated over time. With changing technology and social and 
economic conditions, regulation can become less relevant, ineffective or inefficient.  
 
Box 7.1 Characteristics  of ‘good’ regulation 
The general characteristics of good regulation — regulation which is both effective in 
addressing an identified problem and efficient at minimising costs — are that it is: 
•  the minimum necessary to achieve its objectives — it should avoid unnecessary 
restrictions and be targeted to the problem it is trying to alleviate; 
•  not unduly prescriptive — it should, where possible, be outcome-focused and have 
some flexibility for agents to determine the best way to comply; 
•  assessable, transparent and accountable — the regulation should be reasonably 
easy to understand for those required to comply with it and should also be fairly and 
consistently enforced and be open to appeal; 
•  integrated and consistent with other laws — it should avoid unnecessary duplication 
or conflict with other legislation; 
•  communicated effectively — written in ‘plain language’ and be as clear and concise 
as possible; 
•  mindful of the compliance burden imposed — it should be proportionate to the 
problem it addresses and avoid the imposition of unnecessary costs; and 
•  enforceable — it should provide the minimum incentives to ensure reasonable 
compliance and be monitored and policed effectively. 
Sources: Argy and Johnson (2003); Coghlan (2000).  
 
     




7.2  Achieving environmental goals 
A key characteristic of good regulation is that it is the minimum level of 
intervention necessary to achieve its objectives and that the regulatory instruments 
are well targeted to the objective. To determine whether the current regimes are the 
minimum necessary intervention to achieve environmental goals, feasible 
alternative instruments must be assessed. These are discussed in chapter 9. This 
section considers the effectiveness of current regulatory regimes in targeting their 
stated objectives.  
Specification and clarity of objectives  
The objectives of legislation regulating the clearing of native vegetation and 
promoting the conservation of biodiversity are diverse. In some cases, the 
legislation has no stated objective. In other instances, the objectives are very broad 
and not well defined, while some legislation has well-specified objectives 
(chapter  5). The Office of Regulation Review suggests that the objectives of 
government action: 
… should be clear, concise and as specific as possible. It should be specified broadly 
enough to allow consideration of all relevant alternative solutions, but should not be so 
broad or general that the range of alternatives becomes too large to assess, or the extent 
to which the objective has been met becomes too hard to establish. (ORR 1998, p. D3) 
It is important that the objectives of the regimes be clearly stated so that landholders 
and the community understand what the regimes are intending to achieve. The 
performance of a particular regime, in terms of how well it is achieving its 
objectives, can also be assessed in a transparent manner.  
Even when objectives are explicitly stated, if they are poorly specified, they may 
lead to the use of instruments that are not adequately targeted to dealing with the 
problem the regulation is intended to address (chapter 5). (Of course the problem is 
likely to be even greater if the objectives are not explicitly stated.) This may 
increase uncertainty, add to compliance costs (borne by both landholders and 
government agencies) and hinder the attainment of desired environmental 
outcomes. 
The effectiveness of regimes to protect native vegetation and conserve biodiversity 
would be enhanced if the objectives of the regimes were clearly specified. 
FINDING 7.1     






Good regulation should be targeted to the underlying problem it is trying to 
alleviate, and not just treat symptoms of the problem. Many of the current regimes 
(even when objectives are stated) tend to regulate clearing of native vegetation as an 
end in itself rather than promote improved environmental outcomes (chapter 5).  
Management of native vegetation and biodiversity 
In general, regimes currently impose a permit system on those wishing to clear 
native vegetation. The relevant agency may refuse permission for the clearing to 
take place, or approve it with or without conditions. In some jurisdictions, the 
conditions may involve planting offsetting native vegetation, fencing-off remnant 
vegetation on the property or protecting existing native vegetation through a legal 
covenant (chapter 3).  
This approach, while nominally protecting native vegetation and biodiversity, 
provides the landholder with no further incentive to manage the area for which 
permission to clear has been denied and which may have consequently been set 
aside (chapter 5).  
It is possible that, although a condition of a permit is that other native vegetation be 
protected, the environmental value of this vegetation may decline over time, as it is 
progressively degraded through lack of management. There may be on-going 
problems of weed invasion and degradation of environmental values through feral 
animal infestation.  
Fragmentation of native vegetation holdings 
The existing arrangements may prevent the clearing of native vegetation and may 
require offsets in cases when clearing of an area is approved. However, this 
approach may lead to the fragmentation of native vegetation holdings with 
relatively small isolated areas of native vegetation being preserved in the midst of a 
largely cleared landscape.  
Such fragmented pockets of native vegetation may be of relatively limited 
environmental value (especially if there are large areas of similar vegetation nearby, 
for example in a national park). The relatively lower value of creating these small 
areas of native vegetation could be considered as part of the assessment of offsets 
required when other areas are cleared.      




Triggering the regimes 
An additional disadvantage of the permit type system is that it is only activated if 
landholders apply to clear native vegetation.  
An implication of this is that the regimes impose no pressure or generate no 
incentives for those landholders who have no desire to clear any further land on 
their farms to conserve native vegetation or plant more native vegetation. The costs 
of the preservation of native vegetation will be borne by those who have substantial 
areas of native vegetation left on their land.  
The regimes therefore rely on affecting a relatively small number of landholders in 
order to achieve their environmental objectives. The opportunity to generate 
additional environmental values from the remaining landholders is lost (or relies on 
the use of other instruments).  
FINDING 7.2 
Permit systems to regulate clearing of native vegetation:  
•  do not provide on-going incentives for the voluntary management of remnant 
native vegetation; 
•  may encourage the fragmentation of native vegetation holdings; and 
•  affect only those who apply to, or intend to, clear native vegetation. 
7.3  Prescription and flexibility 
Good regulation should not be unduly prescriptive, especially not to the point where 
it constrains the choice of instruments that can be used to achieve its objectives. 
Good regulation should focus on specifying outcomes and allow flexibility in how 
those objectives are achieved, particularly to take account of regional and local 
factors when developing processes and policy instruments.  
Definition of regrowth  
The definition of regrowth is an issue in most, if not all, jurisdictions. In general, 
landholders are able to clear regrowth without applying for approval. However, 
once regrowth reaches a certain age or height (depending upon the jurisdiction) it is 
defined as remnant and permission must be sought to clear it (chapter 3). The 
definition adopted in most jurisdictions is arbitrary and allows for little flexibility in 
its application.     





The current arrangements provide an unintended incentive for landholders to clear 
regrowth before there is a requirement to apply for a clearing permit. In some cases, 
this has led to pre-emptive clearing and reduced the period of time (consistent with 
past agricultural practice) that landholders leave land fallow. Other examples of the 
perverse outcomes resulting from current definitions of regrowth are discussed in 
chapter 5.  
The definition of regrowth must balance the need for administrative simplicity and 
ease of understanding with the need to minimise undesired adverse impacts on 
landholders and, indeed, the environment.  
Simplicity and ease of understanding appear to have been the overriding criteria for 
most jurisdictions. Simplicity may help reduce the administrative costs imposed on 
government agencies, but a simple rule, such as age or height, ignores the diversity 
of situations that may occur within a jurisdiction (chapter 3).  
One approach is to permit the clearing of regrowth without restriction. While 
administratively simple, this removes the option to regulate the clearing of regrowth 
in areas where it is of high environmental value. Another option is to permit the 
clearing of regrowth (without the need to seek approval) where the proposed 
clearing is consistent with past agricultural practices. This approach, while avoiding 
the need to strictly define regrowth, would still require determination of what is 
consistent with past practices, and may not enable the protection of high 
conservation value regrowth.  
Another option is to provide for flexibility in the definition of regrowth. By 
avoiding a strict definition of regrowth, and providing the opportunity for regional 
bodies to provide input, a flexible definition can reflect the differing environmental 
value of regrowth across regions and different agricultural practices and 
requirements.   
New South Wales has adopted a more flexible definition of regrowth in the Native 
Vegetation Act 2003. Regrowth is defined as all native vegetation that has grown 
since 1990 (or since 1983 in the Western Division). In addition, native vegetation 
may also be considered regrowth in instances when it has grown after a date 
specified in a Property Vegetation Plan — the date being based on existing 
rotational farming practices. Under the Act, approval is not required to clear 
regrowth native vegetation.  
FINDING 7.3 
A flexible definition of regrowth — for example, reflecting regional differences and 
objectives — would reduce the disruption to established patterns of agricultural 
production and facilitate improved environmental outcomes.     





In a number of jurisdictions, regional committees have been established to prepare 
management plans for their area and to provide advice on clearing and biodiversity 
issues. These committees provide an opportunity for local knowledge and 
experience to be considered in the operation of native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation regimes.  
Overall, the success of these committees has varied. In some cases, the committees 
have taken a long time to develop regional vegetation management plans and in 
other cases plans have not yet been finalised (for example in New South Wales). In 
some cases, when plans have been established they have been overridden by 
jurisdiction-wide policies (such as the moratorium on further clearing in 
Queensland) (chapter 3).  
There is significant regional variation throughout each of the jurisdictions within 
Australia, and regional committees or bodies are likely to be well-placed to take 
account of specific local factors when formulating management plans.  
Flexible regimes able to accommodate the contribution of regional committees and 
to take account of regional differences are likely to promote better environmental 
outcomes. 
7.4  Accessibility, transparency and accountability 
Efficient and effective administration and implementation can reduce the costs 
borne by landholders and facilitate the attainment of a regime’s environmental 
objectives.  
Accessibility 
The effective operation of the regimes requires that landholders understand what is 
required of them by the regulations. The Commission has received evidence that 
some landholders are unsure of their obligations and where to seek information 
about them. This problem is exacerbated by the often poorly-specified objectives of 
the regimes (section 7.2), the multiplicity of legislation (section 7.5) and occasional 
conflicting advice from government agencies (chapter 3).  
As part of the program to inform landholders about their obligations under the 
Australian Government’s Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
FINDING 7.4     





Act 1999 (EPBC Act), an information officer from the Department of the 
Environment and Heritage has been seconded full-time to the National Farmers’ 
Federation (NFF) to assist landholders and others to understand the operation of the 
Act (sub. 190). 
Extension officers located in rural areas can also assist in explaining the obligations 
of landholders and can provide information on how to manage native vegetation. 
Extension officers can also provide a conduit through which information and ideas 
from landholders can flow to government and be incorporated into the policy-
making process. However, there appears to have been a reduction in extension 
services to rural landholders and a change in the focus of their work 
(chapters 5 and 6).  
Appropriately-trained extension officers and the placement of departmental staff 
with representative organisations would facilitate landholder understanding of their 
obligations and facilitate the operation of the regimes. 
Transparency and accountability 
Transparency is important in ensuring the accountability of those responsible for 
administering the regime and making decisions. Accountability and transparency 
also require that decisions are made in a timely manner and that there are avenues 
for appeal if there is concern that due processes have not been followed.  
A number of participants have commented on the lack of transparency in the 
assessment process (chapter 3). The apparent lack of transparency has contributed 
to a perception in some cases that the regulations are being applied inconsistently, 
and that individual departmental officers are given too much discretion in the 
decision making process (chapter 3).  
Some jurisdictions have attempted to facilitate transparency by publishing 
guidelines that provide information on how applications will be assessed. This is an 
important step in ensuring transparency and accountability of the decision-making 
process.  
However, the publication of guidelines alone is not sufficient to ensure full 
transparency and accountability. The decision-making process must be seen to be 
consistent with the guidelines. It is the lack of transparency at this stage that is of 
particular concern to landholders. They feel unable to reconcile the decision with 
the guidelines (in those jurisdictions that have them) and are not given enough 
information as to why a particular decision has been made.  
FINDING 7.5     





Transparency and accountability of the assessment process would be enhanced if 
the agency making the decision is required to make its reasons available. This 
would include a statement of any conditions attached to the clearing permit and the 
reasons why these conditions have been imposed. 
Timeliness of decisions 
Applications to clear native vegetation should be assessed and a decision made in a 
timely manner (while not adversely impacting on the quality of the assessment 
process). A range of factors can affect the timeliness of decisions, such as the 
complexity of the issue, the efficiency of the regulatory agency and whether the 
applicant has supplied all necessary supporting information.  
However, excessive delays in making decisions impose direct financial costs on 
government agencies and landholders and also generate uncertainty and disrupt 
landholders’ commercial plans.  
In some cases, decisions appear to have been made within their statutory 
timeframes, for example under the EPBC Act (chapter 4). In contrast, the Audit 
Office of New South Wales (AONSW 2002) found that the time taken to assess 
clearing applications was often considerably longer than the 40-day period 
recommended in the administering agency’s service guarantee (chapter 3).  
The inclusion of statutory time-frames within legislation would provide an objective 
standard against which the performance of the regulatory agencies can be assessed. 
Assessment of costs and benefits 
The Commission received evidence that, in most jurisdictions, the costs and benefits 
of the proposed land clearing were not taken into account in the decision to allow or 
refuse clearing (chapter 3). In fact, it appears that, while the benefits of retaining 
native vegetation are assumed to always be positive, there is often no account taken 
of the costs imposed on landholders (or the wider community).  
In cases where a permit application is refused on environmental grounds, a 
reassessment of the application could take into account the economic and social 
costs of the decision on the landholder and the community.  
FINDING 7.7     






Transparency and accountability of the assessment process would be improved if 
the economic and social cost to landholders and the community of rejected clearing 
applications were explicitly considered. 
Dispute-resolution arrangements 
In most jurisdictions, appeals against decisions relating to clearing of native 
vegetation are heard in courts or tribunals that hear general planning disputes. In 
some jurisdictions, such as Western Australia and the Northern Territory (in relation 
to clearing on freehold land), there are currently limited opportunities to appeal 
decisions (chapter  3). However, recent amendments to the Environmental 
Protection Act 1986 in Western Australia will introduce an independent appeals 
process (appendix G).   
A number of participants noted that the costs (both financial and time) may dissuade 
landholders from appealing clearing decisions (chapter 3). Participants were also 
concerned about limited opportunities for appeal in cases where they believed that 
government officials had exceeded their prescribed powers (chapter 3).  
FINDING 7.9 
Access to fair and impartial dispute-resolution processes is important for promoting 
the transparency and accountability of the assessment process. 
7.5  Integration and consistency with other regulations 
In all jurisdictions, there are numerous pieces of legislation that have an impact on 
the protection of native vegetation and the conservation of biodiversity. This is a 
problem because different legislation may have differing or conflicting objectives 
(chapter 5).  
In some jurisdictions, there is overlapping legislation with different environmental 
or planning objectives that affects the clearing of native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation. There may be issues regarding the appropriate operation of each piece 
of legislation but, taken together, the result is confusing for landholders (chapters 3 
and 5).  
The multiplicity of legislation and agencies involved adds to uncertainty and 
compliance costs. The NFF stated that, with regulation at the State, local and 
national level:     




There is a mass or a myriad of complex levels of regulations that result, in a lot of 
cases, in an unacceptable uncertainty in terms of development potential for farmers 
across the country. (trans., p. 253) 
Uncertainty can disrupt and delay investment plans and farm development. This 
imposes costs on landholders, because the returns from investment are delayed, and 
the community also bears costs in the form of forgone production.  
The WA Government has indicated that recent changes to its regime will 
‘streamline the approval process’ and will ‘allow landowners to seek most 
environmental approvals from a single Department’ (sub. DR290, p. 14).  
FINDING 7.10 
A reduction in the number of legislative instruments in some jurisdictions may 
improve the integration and the consistency of various elements of the jurisdiction’s 
environmental protection regimes. 
7.6 Effective  communication 
Good regulation is characterised by being written in ‘plain language’, and by being 
as clear and concise as possible. The preparation of a RIS prior to legislation being 
passed by parliament can provide an opportunity for government agencies and other 
interested parties to comment on the proposed legislation. Regulatory best practice 
requires that the RIS be prepared for the relevant decision maker (for example, 
Cabinet or the relevant Minister) as well as being tabled in parliament.  
A well prepared RIS is an essential element of the policy-making process. It is at 
this stage that the language used in the legislation, the requirements imposed on 
landholders and other elements of the regime can be examined closely. In particular, 
it provides an opportunity to assess whether regulation is the best response to the 
problem being addressed.  
In most jurisdictions, legislation creating native vegetation or biodiversity 
conservation regimes was enacted without a formal RIS being undertaken 
(chapter 3).1 A RIS was prepared prior to the introduction of the Australian 
Government’s EPBC Act but the costs for industry from the potential restrictions 
the Act might place on their activities were not considered as part of the process 
(chapter 4). 
                                              
1 Native vegetation and biodiversity legislation was first enacted before all jurisdictions 
undertook RIS processes. All jurisdictions, except Western Australia, now have RIS 
requirements for new legislation.      






Preparation of a comprehensive regulation impact statement can improve the 
quality and effectiveness of the regulation. 
7.7 Compliance  burden 
Regulation can impose significant compliance costs on those involved. However, in 
the case of good regulation, the compliance costs imposed should be proportionate 
to the size of the problem addressed and avoid imposing unnecessary costs.  
Participants argued that the current regimes in a number of jurisdictions can impose 
very significant compliance costs on landholders (chapter  3). These costs were 
largely due to the requirement in a number of jurisdictions to commission (at the 
landholder’s expense) independent assessments of the impact of clearing.  
Some participants expressed concern that these reports were not necessary and were 
simply a ‘fishing trip’ by government agencies hoping to find a reason to refuse the 
clearing permit.  
FINDING 7.12  
Governments should be mindful of the compliance costs imposed on landholders by 
requirements for them to provide information in support of permit applications. 
7.8  Monitoring and enforcement  
Effective monitoring and enforcement of regulations are essential if regulatory 
regimes are to achieve their objectives.  
Ongoing consultation 
Each government and agency administering the regimes should be receptive to 
feedback from landholders — landholders are well placed to provide information on 
the performance and effectiveness of the regime. The Institute of Public Affairs 
argued that a purely scientific approach to policy formulation, while providing some 
factual basis for the policy: 
… has less to offer on the questions of practical management of the environment at the 
farm and regional level than the advice of the farmer and forester. Scientists and 
bureaucrats have no experience in managing the land or in handling the risks that are 
involved. Much more practical input to policy is required. (sub. 135, p. 13)     




Individual landholders often have an intimate knowledge of their land and local 
area, and good regulation should provide an avenue for this information and 
experience to be considered in the on-going refinement of the regime.  
In some cases, individuals (and their representative organisations) have been able to 
provide input on legislative regimes. However, there is a widespread dissatisfaction 
among landholders that there has been a lack of consultation (chapter 3). The NFF 
argued that the lack of consultation with landholders over the operation of the 
regimes has: 
… reduced the ‘on-ground’ effectiveness of the native vegetation management regimes 
through failing to engage and utilise the local land management knowledge and 
experience of farmers. (sub. 128, p. 27) 
FINDING 7.13 
Many of the current regimes intended to protect native vegetation and conserve 
biodiversity appear not to utilise the knowledge and experiences of individual 
landholders. 
Information and mapping 
The Commission received evidence from landholders in several jurisdictions 
indicating that the maps and information used by the authorities to assess the extent 
of native vegetation coverage and clearing were inaccurate. Accurate maps and 
information on native vegetation coverage are essential for informed decision 
making and if there is to be effective monitoring and enforcement of clearing 
controls and biodiversity conservation. The extent of the problem is exacerbated by 
the difficulty in revising maps and rectifying known errors (chapter 3).  
It may be unavoidable that errors will appear given the need to map large areas 
based on aerial photographs or satellite imagery. However, given the crucial role 
that this information plays in the management of native vegetation and biodiversity, 
it is important that the data be as accurate as possible.  
FINDING 7.14 
It is important that there are mechanisms that enable mapping errors to be 
corrected when better information is available. Landholders themselves can be a 
key source of information.     





Performance monitoring and review 
Effective and efficient regulatory regimes should ensure that there is on-going 
monitoring to make certain that the regime remains relevant in changing situations. 
The regimes can be ‘fine-tuned’ during their operation to deal with any unexpected 
problems or issues that may arise once they have been in operation for some time.  
In addition, the regimes should be reviewed periodically to ensure that they are still 
the most appropriate method for achieving the jurisdiction’s environmental 
objectives. The EPBC Act contains a requirement for review 10 years after its 
introduction. In Western Australia, the recently passed Environment Protection 
Amendment Act 2003 requires that the Act be reviewed every five years (WA 
Government, sub. DR290). In New South Wales, the Native Vegetation Act 2003 
also has a provision requiring the Act to be reviewed after 5  years and for the 
review to be tabled in both houses of Parliament. Accurate data and good 
monitoring will be critical to inform these reviews.  
FINDING 7.15 
A legislative requirement to monitor the performance of the regimes and to subject 
them to periodic review can help ensure that the best instruments are being used to 
address the underlying problem and provide transparency and accountability. 
7.9  Overall assessment and reform of current 
arrangements  
This inquiry was not asked, nor has it attempted to determine, whether the benefits 
of the current regimes regulating the clearing of native vegetation and conservation 
of biodiversity outweigh the costs imposed on landholders and the community. 
However, the analysis presented in the preceding chapters and drawn together in 
this chapter, shows that there is significant scope for improvement in the current 
regimes. While all regimes have, or will have, some characteristics of good 
regulation, none are entirely satisfactory in this respect. Reforming the regimes so 
that they embody more of the characteristics of good regulation would reduce the 
costs imposed by the regimes, while improving environmental outcomes.  
Some recent amendments to existing regimes in Western Australia and New South 
Wales appear to have made progress in the right direction. However, much of the 
detail is yet to be announced, and it is too early to assess how the new regimes will 
operate in practice.      




However, even if the regimes were significantly reformed, it is not clear that they 
would provide the minimum (and least cost) level of intervention necessary to 
achieve the community’s environmental objectives. Other policy instruments must 
be considered before this assessment is made. The advantages and disadvantages of 
these instruments are discussed in chapter  9, and the Commission’s overall 
assessment is presented in chapter 10.     
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8  Criteria for policy selection 
The terms of reference for this inquiry  (3(g)) ask the Commission to make 
recommendations of a regulatory or non-regulatory nature that governments could 
consider to achieve desired environmental outcomes, while minimising the adverse 
impacts of the regulatory regimes. The first part of this report focused on the 
regulatory arrangements in place across Australia for native vegetation and 
biodiversity conservation. In this, and the next chapter, some other options for 
promoting native vegetation and biodiversity outcomes are discussed.  
Choosing the best policy option for native vegetation and biodiversity conservation 
depends on the nature of the problem being addressed (section 8.1). It also requires 
a clear understanding of the objective or ultimate outcome sought and the context in 
which the policy will be applied (sections 8.2 and 8.3). Criteria for assessing policy 
options, such as efficiency, are also discussed in this chapter (section  8.4). The 
potential advantages and disadvantages of various regulatory and non-regulatory 
options for native vegetation and biodiversity conservation are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
8.1  Characteristics of the policy problem 
The underlying ‘problem’ that has prompted the regulatory regimes that are the 
focus of this inquiry is a perception that landholders provide too little native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation on their land. That is, current agricultural 
and other land uses have failed to satisfy demand for environmental conservation. 
Several possible reasons for this have been canvassed (chapter 2): 
•  some landholders, for various reasons, may not take full advantage of the private 
benefits of retaining native vegetation, thus affecting environmental outcomes on 
individual properties; 
•  local externalities (which reduce incentives for landholders to take into account 
the full costs of environmental harm, or the full benefits of providing 
environmental services) may lead to insufficient retention of native vegetation 
with implications for the environment at a regional level; and     





•  conservation of native vegetation for biodiversity or greenhouse purposes 
displays characteristics of a pure public good, resulting in under-provision of 
native vegetation from a community-wide perspective. 
Regulation, and some other policy options, have been implemented by governments 
Australia-wide to address the perceived problem of insufficient native vegetation 
and biodiversity conservation on private land. However, several factors complicate 
the decision on whether, and how, governments should act to address this.  
First, while it may be possible to discern a general increase in awareness of 
environmental issues, and increased demand for conservation, it is difficult to gauge 
more precisely the level of that demand. Specifically, it is difficult to determine how 
much society would be willing to pay (through lost agricultural production or 
through funds diverted from health and education programs for example) to satisfy 
demands for environmental conservation. Information about demand is usually 
revealed through market transactions, but as markets for public goods such as 
biodiversity do not operate well, a key difficulty for policy design is valuing 
demand for native vegetation and biodiversity conservation. 
Secondly, the reasons for conserving or re-establishing native vegetation on private 
land will depend on issues such as how much native vegetation exists, what habitat 
or other services it provides, and what key objectives are being pursued (for 
example, salinity, climate change or biodiversity objectives). This implies that the 
benefits of native vegetation conservation vary by region or location, as do the 
costs, for example, in terms of forgone agricultural production.  
Thirdly, the lack of information and understanding of biodiversity processes is 
substantial — for example, new discoveries of species are still being made. 
Therefore, there is considerable uncertainty about how actions taken to promote 
biodiversity conservation will affect environmental outcomes (Gunningham and 
Young 1997). As the causes of biodiversity loss can be diffuse, it may also be 
difficult to attribute biodiversity loss to particular individuals.  
Lastly, unless a government (the principal) acquires and manages private properties, 
it has to rely on landholders (as its agents) to promote biodiversity conservation 
outcomes on their properties, raising potential principal-agent and information-
asymmetry issues. 
These factors imply that, even though there may be a shortfall between the level 
and/or quality of native vegetation provided on private land and the socially-optimal 
level, the costs of policy action may outweigh environmental benefits in some 
cases. At a minimum, these factors indicate that policy action should be based on 
careful analysis of the problem, and of the expected benefits and costs of addressing 
it. They also indicate a need to monitor and review actual costs and benefits post-    
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implementation so that policies can be adapted or refined over time in response to 
new information and understanding of environmental issues.  
A judgement on the likely effectiveness and efficiency of one policy option for 
native vegetation and biodiversity conservation over another depends on the 
problem to be addressed. For example, if little conservation occurs on private land 
because landholders are not taking advantage of the private benefits of native 
vegetation, an information and education approach to demonstrate these benefits 
may be sufficient to bring about a significant increase in conservation.  
The task of increasing biodiversity conservation on private land involves protecting 
remnant native vegetation from a range of threats including (Bowers 1999): 
•  intentional acts by the landholder; 
•  neglect by the landholder; or 
•  actions (or omissions) on adjacent land that are outside the landholder’s control.  
Policy options vary in their effectiveness in protecting remnant vegetation against 
these different risks. For instance, regulation may result in the protection of remnant 
vegetation against intentional damage, such as broadscale clearing, but is less likely 
to be effective for protecting it against neglect by landholders (Bowers 1999). 
Bowers (1999) contends that the risk of neglect is the more important factor in 
policy design because neglect is difficult to control, and because the likelihood of 
neglect increases as the cost of managing remnant vegetation increases, unless the 
vegetation provides private benefits. If this is the case, policy options that give 
landholders an incentive to protect native vegetation from destruction through 
neglect may deliver better environmental outcomes than policies that merely 
prohibit intentional acts, such as removal of native vegetation. As outlined in 
chapter  5, a comprehensive policy on native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation would also embrace management of native vegetation which is not 
targeted for clearance, and rehabilitation/restoration of degraded lands, rather than 
focusing solely on removal of native vegetation by those aspiring to change their 
land use. 
8.2 Objectives   
Before choosing among policy options, it is necessary to demonstrate the need for 
policy action by clearly defining the problem at hand and the ultimate objectives. 
Importantly, these objectives are likely to differ by region because environmental 
problems differ by region.      





The Northern Land Council (Northern Territory) considered that:  
… regulatory provisions and practices are often poorly matched to putative objectives. 
This has led to approaches to conservation that are demonstrably ineffective, expensive, 
and often counterproductive … (sub. 221, p. 7) 
A lack of clear and measurable objectives was identified as a shortcoming of many 
of the regulatory regimes examined in this report (chapter 5).  
Key questions to be answered, even tentatively, include how much, what type of, 
and where is native vegetation required to achieve desired environmental outcomes. 
This relies on satisfactory maps and information about the existing state of the 
environment. The exercise of setting clear and measurable objectives will help 
policy makers identify conservation priorities, which can reduce the likelihood of 
pursuing policy actions in situations where the expected benefits do not justify the 
costs of action. Some participants noted the importance of setting conservation 
priorities to guide the investment of funds and resources to areas where the 
environmental benefits or pay-offs are expected to be the highest. For example, the 
Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry said: 
Given the large cost involved with fixing all of the resource degradation, it may not be 
in society’s best interests to repair all of the degradation. Instead, it will be important to 
determine a framework for prioritising and focusing efforts in areas where the benefits 
of repairing damage exceed the costs. This will ensure that the benefits from the public 
investments being undertaken are maximised. (sub. 218, pp. 1–2) 
And Dennis Toohey (New South Wales) observed: 
… we can’t achieve biodiversity outcomes of equal standing across the whole of the 
Australian landscape … There have to be choices made about where we will achieve 
high-quality outcomes, and in others we recognise that we’ll get very little 
environmental outcome off it, because we’re going to try and optimise the productive 
capacity … I don’t think the outcomes that we are trying to achieve are well enough 
understood … (trans., p. 1314)  
Clarification of policy objectives also has a bearing on which policy option or 
options will be most effective for promoting conservation — a policy option well-
suited to achieving one objective may be ill-suited to achieving a different 
objective. For example, a policy suited to Queensland, where objectives may focus 
on addressing broadscale clearing, may not be effective or efficient in South 
Australia, where the objective may be to protect isolated trees or small clumps of 
trees. Without clear objectives, it is also practically impossible to assess whether 
policies are effective, or how they can be improved.      
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8.3 Context 
Once clear and specific policy objectives have been set, the task is to identify which 
options to use ‘when and where’. In making this decision, the context in which the 
option will operate is important.  
‘Context’ refers to factors such as the state of the environment in a given region, 
landholder characteristics and socio-economic issues that can affect the benefits and 
costs of the policy options available (and their distribution). Environmental benefits 
can vary because different areas have different environmental sensitivities and 
because demands for the environment differ across areas (Latacz-Lohmann 2001). 
Thus, it cannot be assumed that a practice that produces environmental benefits in 
one location will produce the same benefits in other locations. For example, as 
observed by Timber Towns Victoria (sub.  DR263), in some areas, revegetation 
using indigenous grasses or shrubs may be more appropriate than revegetation using 
trees. Costs can vary due to differences in land productivity and the income that can 
be produced through other land uses, such as agriculture. The net benefits of native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation are not homogeneous, yet policy choices 
such as regulation, often implicitly assume that this is the case.  
Variations in benefits and costs suggest that targeting conservation requirements 
could potentially increase the net benefits of conservation actions. However, there is 
a trade-off between increased administrative costs incurred by governments in 
identifying and setting priorities and reductions in costs incurred by landholders 
from targeting requirements (see below).  
Careful identification of the policy problem, the objectives sought, and 
consideration of the context in which a policy option will be applied, are important 
for choosing the best policy options to promote native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation on private land. 
8.4  Criteria for evaluating policy options 
The following criteria provide a basis for comparing and evaluating the suitability 
of different policy options for promoting native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation objectives (Latacz-Lohmann 2001): 
•  economic efficiency and cost effectiveness; 
•  incentives for innovation; 
•  enforceability;  
FINDING 8.1     





•  equity or fairness; and 
•  compatibility with other policies.  
Efficiency and cost effectiveness 
Policy action should only be undertaken if the resulting benefits exceed the costs. 
As discussed in chapter 2 (box 2.4), the anticipated extra benefits of implementing a 
given environmental policy should be compared to the anticipated costs. For 
example, regulating land clearing on highly-productive agricultural areas is likely to 
impose high costs on landholders which would need to be justified by the 
environmental benefits generated. Similarly, if governments are paying landholders 
for providing environmental services, it is efficient to provide higher incentives to 
landholders providing higher benefits and lower payments to those providing fewer 
benefits (Latacz-Lohmann 2001). Where the additional costs of supplying native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation equal the additional benefits generated, 
this is the ‘optimal’ or ideal level of native vegetation and biodiversity conservation 
(chapter 2).  
Less information about benefits is required to use the cost effectiveness criterion to 
guide environmental policy decisions (Latacz-Lohmann  2001). This criterion 
requires environmental benefits to be achieved for the lowest-possible cost. Costs 
include the opportunity costs of forgone production and transaction costs (including 
the costs of developing, administering and enforcing the program).  
There is often a trade-off between the costs incurred by landholders and the costs 
incurred by governments. For example, a policy that applies uniformly across all 
landholders may impose fewer administrative costs than a tailored and targeted 
policy. However, a uniform approach is likely to be associated with higher overall 
economic costs as the costs of complying with policy requirements differ across 
landholders (Latacz-Lohmann 2001). Moreover, a uniform policy that imposes high 
costs on some landholders may encourage non-compliance, thus necessitating 
greater monitoring and enforcement. 
The requirement for efficiency implies that policy options that can adapt to 
variations in costs and benefits across different locations would be preferred. 
While a quantity regulation (such as a ban on all land clearing) does not allow 
individuals to respond flexibly to achieve a given environmental objective in the 
most cost-effective way, some mechanisms automatically vary their application of 
the policy ‘dose’ (Latacz-Lohmann 2001) according to location or individual. For 
example, market-based mechanisms or government payments to landholders for 
conservation, can vary according to location or individual.      
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Ideally, policy makers should aim to design policies that encourage conservation by 
landholders where expected net environmental benefits are maximised (Latacz-
Lohmann 2001).  
Incentives for innovation 
Policy options that provide incentives for landholders to search for new and lower-
cost ways to achieve environmental objectives would help reduce the costs of 
achieving those objectives over time.  
Policies that prescribe how each individual is to achieve a given objective, such as 
bans on land clearing, do not provide incentives for innovation. Market-based 
policies provide incentives for landholders to search for low-cost means of 
delivering environmental benefits, just as landholders have an incentive to deliver 
other market products at the lowest cost to increase their profits. Depending on 
contract design, government payments to landholders for environmental services 
could also provide incentives for landholders to seek out low-cost means of 
promoting environmental objectives.  
Enforceability 
Most policy approaches require monitoring and enforcement to ensure they promote 
their environmental objectives, but monitoring and enforcement increase the 
transaction costs of the agency. Therefore issues surrounding enforceability can 
affect the choice of environmental policy option. 
While the effects of some policy options are less costly to monitor and enforce than 
others, there can be a trade-off between the costs of enforcing policy and the costs 
incurred by landholders. For example, it may be easier to monitor and enforce 
landholder compliance with a complete ban on native vegetation clearance than it is 
to enforce compliance with a ban that applies only to certain types (species, age or 
size) of native vegetation. However, a complete ban would increase costs for 
landholders. For a policy that provides payments to landholders on the basis of the 
environmental outcomes delivered, there is more incentive and scope for 
landholders to innovate and find low-cost means of delivering environmental 
outcomes. However the agency’s costs of monitoring outcomes (to determine 
payment) are likely to be higher than the costs of monitoring production processes 
or inputs (Latacz-Lohmann 2001). 
Some policy options, such as education and information approaches, may reduce 
enforcement costs if they increase landholder acceptance and understanding of the     





need for native vegetation and biodiversity conservation. Policies that are widely 
accepted are less likely to be ignored than policies that are considered unnecessary 
or excessive. Paul McGowan (Victoria) said: 
… we should be giving far more attention to education than regulation — far more 
attention … In Victoria we’ve got a very very good Landcare movement … There’s 
been no regulation with that. There’s been education and encouragement, and it is 
absolutely amazing, the number of native trees that have been planted in our area, just 
by encouraging them to do it, and with a tiny bit of incentive … (trans., p. 1341) 
Fairness 
The fairness of the distribution of benefits and costs that result from environmental 
policies will be perceived differently by different individuals. However, policy 
approaches that are broadly considered unfair or unreasonable by those directly 
affected, and by the community more generally, would be expected to result in 
higher enforcement costs. Hence, perceived fairness can be another factor in 
choosing between policy options for native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation. Several participants considered that the current regulatory approach to 
native vegetation and biodiversity conservation imposed an unfair burden on 
landholders who have retained and managed native vegetation.  
Perceptions of fairness in relation to implementation processes (Latacz-
Lohmann 2001), such as the processes followed in assessing individual applications 
to clear land, can also be important. If individuals lack faith in the fairness of the 
processes adopted, compliance levels and achievement of ultimate environmental 
objectives may be adversely affected.  
Transparency in setting and communicating objectives in processes used to 
implement the policy, and in evaluating or reviewing a policy approach, can also 
help promote its acceptance (Latacz-Lohmann 2001).  
Compatibility with other policies 
A final issue that affects policy choice and design is the extent to which the policy 
option is compatible with other existing or proposed policies. Where policies are 
compatible, or where there are synergies between them, there is scope for policies to 
be mutually reinforcing (Latacz-Lohmann  2001). In other cases, policies may 
conflict and therefore undermine each other. For example, subsidies to maintain 
agricultural production in areas where it is not economically feasible may 
undermine, or increase the costs of, policies designed to conserve native vegetation 
and biodiversity.      
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9  Policy options for native vegetation 
and biodiversity conservation 
As discussed in chapter 8, the best policy options for promoting native vegetation 
and biodiversity conservation depend on the specific nature of the problem being 
addressed and the objectives sought. In this chapter, some potential advantages and 
disadvantages of regulatory and non-regulatory options for promoting native 
vegetation and biodiversity objectives are discussed. 
The policy options available to enhance native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation can be categorised in several ways. Options for promoting 
conservation range from those that rely solely on the private sector (such as 
altruistic conservation by individuals or groups) to options that can be implemented 
only by governments (such as taxes or regulation). In between are options that may 
(or may not) involve governments (for example, direct payments to landholders for 
environmental services). In this chapter, options are discussed under three broad 
headings — non-market; market; and government approaches (table 9.1). 
Table 9.1  Mechanisms for promoting conservation goals 
Non-market approaches  Market approaches   Government approaches  
Altruistic conservation 
by individuals or groups 
Consumer and investor preferences 
for environmentally certified goods  
Removal of existing regulatory 
impediments to conservation 
  Information provision and education  Information provision and education
  Existing markets (eg eco-tourism, 
‘bush blocks’, native seed products) 
Taxes and subsidies 
  Creation of new markets for native 
vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation (eg biodiversity 
credits) 
Creation of new markets for native 
vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation 
  Direct payments to landholders for 
conservation services 
Direct payments to landholders for 
conservation services 
  Acquisition of all or part of a 
property 
Acquisition of all or part of a 
property 
  Industry self-regulation  Duty of care 
    Regulation — prohibitions and rules    




9.1  Non-market approaches  
Landholders help promote biodiversity conservation outcomes through voluntary 
activities on their own properties and through group initiatives.  
Altruistic conservation 
Many individuals, interested in native vegetation and biodiversity conservation for 
various reasons, undertake conservation for no monetary reward, and in the absence 
of compulsion. The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF, sub. DR302, p. 13) 
considered that ‘when viewed broadly, this is a surprisingly large market’. 
Individuals, companies, non-government organisations and community or 
landholder groups have discretion to choose whether or not, and how, they will 
participate in conservation activities. Several participants in this inquiry described 
voluntary conservation efforts (box 9.1).  
 
Box 9.1  Voluntary conservation by landholders  
The Victorian Farmers Federation provided an example of voluntary conservation:  
Tripod farmers have been leading participants in voluntary conservation and sustainable 
land management practices … they have voluntarily removed boxthorn, willows and other 
noxious weeds that were choking rivers adjoining their property at a cost of 4 full time people 
for 2 weeks. Tripod farmers have provided the local council with a further $3,000.00 to 
continue this management program.  
These conservation … programs … have been achieved without either direction or support 
from DNRE [Department of Natural Resources and Environment]. (sub. 149, p. 25) 
Janet and Kevin Blake, also from Victoria, submitted that: 
Through our own efforts and with minimal assistance we have developed wetlands, 
protected grasslands, planted some 40,000 trees and woodlots, been the custodians of 
brolgas, dunnarts, dolma impa, agrosti adamsoni as well as hunting the rabbits, hares and 
foxes … We have recognized the most significant areas and have made a conscious effort 
to maintain and enhance them where ever it remains viable but at an equally significant 
$ cost. (sub. 188, pp. 2–3) 
While Gary Orr from New South Wales said: 
The grazing leases were taken on by us, at a cost, in order to prevent grazing on the land 
that we recognised as high conservation value. (sub. 136, p. 1) 
 
 
Apart from independent efforts by individuals and groups, several schemes such as 
Land for Wildlife and Trust for Nature (box  9.2) help landholders voluntarily 
maintain native vegetation on their properties.     
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Box 9.2  Land for Wildlife and Trust for Nature (Victoria) 
For over 20 years, Land for Wildlife has supported landholders providing wildlife habitat 
on their properties. The scheme offers help with property assessments but does not 
provide financial incentives to encourage conservation. The scheme establishes 
voluntary, non-binding agreements with landholders to manage land for biodiversity 
conservation. In Victoria over 4900 properties, covering more than 125 000 hectares of 
habitat, are involved. The scheme also provides extension and education services, 
emphasising the practical benefits of nature conservation to landholders.  
Trust for Nature runs a conservation covenant program. Landholders place permanent 
covenants on parts of their land to protect it from clearing or other activities. Covenants 
are entered into voluntarily, but are legally binding on current and future owners of the 
land. Trust for Nature does not offer financial incentives to landholders for adopting a 
covenant, other than covering the legal costs of registering the covenant (around 
$3500 per property). Legal costs are covered by a Stewardship Fund, which is partially 
community funded. Once a covenant is registered, a Trust for Nature representative 
meets with the landholder to discuss future management actions and periodically visits 
the landholder to assess the condition of the environment on the covenanted land, the 
potential threats to species on the land, and to review the landholder’s management 
actions in order to recommend future management guidelines. 
Currently 500 covenants are registered, protecting over 20  000 hectares of largely 
threatened habitat on working farms, lifestyle ‘bush blocks’ and on rural/urban fringe 
properties. A further 300 covenants, representing another 15 000 hectares, have been 
approved by the Board of Trust for Nature and are awaiting final registration. Trust for 
Nature estimates that covenanters provide approximately $1  million of in-kind 
management of habitat across Victoria per year; approximately $150 million worth of 
property that would otherwise have to be purchased on the open market; and advice to 
other landholders on the need for nature conservation on private land. 
Sources: Stoneham et al. (2000); Trust for Nature (sub. 129); Trust for Nature (2003); Victorian Catchment 
Management Council and Department of Sustainability and Environment (2003). 
 
 
Advantages and disadvantages  
A key advantage of voluntary approaches is that they involve individuals and 
organisations committed to conservation. Hence, these mechanisms have relatively 
high levels of community acceptance and raise fewer enforcement and equity 
concerns than approaches that compel landholders to undertake activities that may 
not interest them (Gunningham and Young 1997).      




Voluntary conservation efforts can make a significant contribution to biodiversity 
conservation. Maria Weeding and Helen Geard from Tasmania considered that: 
Far more is achieved through raising awareness, consultation and voluntary 
management. This is demonstrated through the landcare movement that has continued 
to grow in popularity every year since its inception. (sub. 162, p. 4) 
However, the scope of voluntary conservation is likely to be limited. When there is 
a substantial gap between private and public conservation benefits, reliance on 
voluntary actions is unlikely to deliver governments’ biodiversity conservation 
goals, particularly where landholders are economically marginal (unless external 
assistance is available (Gunningham and Young 1997)).  
From a public policy perspective, a disadvantage of relying on voluntary 
conservation is that it is difficult to predict conservation outcomes and, hence, 
whether biodiversity conservation objectives will be met. However, if the objectives 
of native vegetation conservation were clarified and priorities set, voluntary efforts 
may be sufficient in some areas to solve local problems where groups of 
landholders can jointly determine solutions. 
Moreover, government involvement in biodiversity conservation, whether through 
regulation or payments for conservation, may ‘crowd out’ voluntary activities so 
that, overall, there is little change in conservation. Some participants said that the 
methods chosen by governments to promote conservation have discouraged existing 
conservation efforts. For example, Dennis Toohey (trans., p. 1308) and Bryan Ward 
(trans., p. 1354), both from New South Wales, observed that the enthusiasm for 
conservation activities wanes in response to increased bureaucracy. The Victorian 
Farmers Federation said:  
The adversarial process has meant that many landowners now feel a disincentive to 
protect native vegetation. Farmers such as Murray Davis & John Croft … probably 
wonder why they bothered fencing out their creeks and maintaining the quality of 
native vegetation on their farms when Councils and the Department won’t recognise 
the voluntary environmental management activities they have done or attempt to strike 
a balance that recognises both retention of environmental values and the maximisation 
of economic potential of the land. (sub. 149, pp. 8–9) 
The NSW Farmers’ Association (NSWFA) stated that: 
… the regulation itself didn’t provide an opportunity to build on that natural inherent 
goodwill that’s in most people about their surrounds. It went against that. I think that’s 
one of the prime failings of the native vegetation legislation and, to a lesser extent, the 
threatened species legislation. (trans., p. 875)     
  POLICY OPTIONS  189
 
FINDING 9.1 
Many individuals and organisations voluntarily provide conservation services. An 
advantage of relying on these efforts is that they have relatively high levels of 
community acceptance and raise fewer enforcement and equity concerns than 
approaches that compel landholders to undertake conservation. However, while the 
altruistic conservation efforts of individuals and groups can contribute to achieving 
community conservation objectives, they are unlikely to be sufficient on their own to 
achieve significant increases in conservation on a broad scale. 
9.2 Market  approaches   
Market approaches deliver financial reward to landholders for providing native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation. In essence, native vegetation and 
biodiversity conservation ‘services’ are supplied and bought like any other service 
or commodity. Market-based approaches can encourage conservation by a broader 
spectrum of landholders, and can promote achievement of biodiversity cost-
effectively (Victorian Government, sub. 185).  
However, because of market failures and existing policy impediments, there may be 
a role for governments to encourage or facilitate the creation and development of 
markets that could promote native vegetation retention or conservation of aspects of 
biodiversity (chapter 2).  
This section discusses:  
•  how markets can reflect consumer demand for environmentally-certified 
production; 
•  how existing markets can promote conservation outcomes; and 
•  the creation of new markets for biodiversity. 
Consumer preferences for environmentally-certified goods  
Consumer preferences, expressed through purchasing decisions, can provide signals 
of the value that consumers place on the environment, which can alter the financial 
incentives faced by landholders making production decisions. This option could 
involve the use of marketing campaigns emphasising environmental credentials 
(box 9.3), or product labelling and accreditation schemes for products produced 
using ‘sustainable’ practices, endorsed by governments or reputable accreditation 
organisations. Apart from labelling or certification of consumption items, such as 
food, environmental labelling of investment vehicles, such as managed investment     




funds, also allows individuals to express their preferences for environmentally-
sustainable production. 
 
Box 9.3 Banrock  Station  wines 
Banrock Station is a winery in South Australia’s Riverland region. A large part of the 
property comprises native bushland and wetlands. In its marketing, Banrock Station 
emphasises environmental issues, stating that it donates a part of its proceeds from 
wine sales to environmental schemes around Australia. Banrock Station is also 
involved in international wetland restoration projects in nine countries.  
Sources: Banrock Station (2003); Sharley (2002). 
 
 
Suppliers might use initiatives such as product labelling to gain access to niche or 
emerging markets (box 9.4), to compete in existing markets by differentiating 
themselves from other suppliers, or to charge a premium. For example, in Denmark 
a study of producers participating in the government certified Nordic Swan 
environmental labelling program, indicated that they were able to charge a premium 
of up to 17% for their products (Bjorner et al. 2002). These initiatives might also be 
developed by an individual supplier, a group of suppliers (or an industry peak 
body), or a non-government body which, for example, allows its label to be used 
under licence. Alternatively, governments might impose a requirement on producers 
to supply consumers with information about environmental aspects of their product.  
 
Box 9.4  Tesco’s Nature’s Choice Quality Assurance Scheme 
Tesco is a large British supermarket chain. It operates an international quality 
assurance program, the ‘Nature’s Choice Quality Assurance Scheme’, to guide 
purchases of fresh produce from its suppliers. Under this scheme, Tesco accredits 
producers on the basis of the ecological sustainability of farm practices through the 
‘wildlife and landscape conservation component’ of the quality assurance scheme. 
To supply Tesco’s and, therefore, to access this export market, Field Fresh onion 
farmers in Tasmania had to satisfy the requirements of the quality assurance scheme. 
Greening Australia helped farmers implement conservation management plans to meet 
the scheme’s environmental requirements.  




Prompted by factors such as consumer demand for ‘green’ products, rising 
community expectations with respect to the environment and the scope for cost     
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savings, various industries have developed mechanisms (such as codes of conduct) 
to improve their environmental practices and outcomes. For example, the 
Ricegrowers’ Association of Australia (sub.  113, p.  6) considered that there are 
many potential benefits to growers from participating in the Environmental 
Champions program it has recently developed (box 9.5) such as: 
•  more efficient practices, leading to cost savings on-farm; 
•  access to natural resources in the future; 
•  recognition as a leading commodity industry; and 
•  improvements in industry standing in the eyes of the public and in the 
international market place.  
 
Box 9.5  Ricegrowers’ Association Environmental Champions Program 
Development of the voluntary Environmental Champions Program was driven by rice 
growers. The program aims to reward growers for environmental stewardship at 
property and regional levels and to demonstrate the link between environmental 
stewardship and improved business productivity. The program contains five levels of 
environmental stewardship requiring different actions for credit for each level — level 1 
(minimum compliance) through to level  5 (regional sustainability). Level  5 involves 
farmers working together to achieve environmental outcomes for the whole region, not 
just on-farm. Activities may include considering land-use options on a regional scale, 
engaging in carbon and salinity trades and addressing landscape and river issues. 
The Environmental Champions Program was developed over the last two years and is 
ready for a trial of the first three levels. The aim is for 50 per cent of growers to have 
achieved level 1 of the program by the end of 2004. 
Source: Ricegrowers’ Association of Australia (sub. 113, pp. 6–7). 
 
 
The Australian Cotton Industry has a Best Management Practices (BMP) manual to 
help landholders comply with their legal environmental responsibilities and to help 
them identify environmentally-friendly ways of improving their operations. The 
BMP process includes certification of landholders, underpinned by auditing of 
landholders’ compliance with BMP requirements. Participation in the scheme is 
voluntary but encouraged by the Australian Cotton Industry as it believes 
compliance will result in private benefits, such as more efficient farm operations, 
better relationships with the community and government and, ultimately, premium 
prices for BMP cotton (Cotton Australia 2003). 
Some individuals and industries are trialling the use of Environmental Management 
Systems (EMS) as a means to meet environmental standards in agricultural     




practices (AFFA, sub.  204, p.  5). For example, Canegrowers (Queensland) is 
planning development of an EMS: 
… although we have developed a code of practice and a training package called 
Compass, we need to go further. We’re in the process now of planning the development 
of an EMS framework for the industry, and I’m relatively confident that in a couple of 
years time we will have that up and running and approved, and our target will be, over 
the next five years, to get something like 80 per cent of our growers involved in that 
sort of program … of evaluation and improvement in key areas, of sustainability, both 
environmentally and economic. (trans., p. 94) 
An EMS provides a management framework for continuous environmental 
improvement through a ‘plan, do, check, act’ cycle (AFFA 2003). The Australian 
Government has established a National Environment Management Systems pilot 
program that provides funding to industries for developing EMS. For example, the 
Rice Champions Program has received some funding under the pilot program and 
funding will also be used to expand the Cotton Industry’s BMP program 
(Troeth 2003a, 2003b). 
Existing markets  
The use of market mechanisms to promote native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation can include taking advantage of existing markets for goods and 
services such as: 
•  recreation, eco-tourism or private sanctuaries;  
•  native seed production, for example, for re-vegetation projects;  
•  native timber products and cut flower production from native plants;  
•  ‘bush foods’; 
•  Indigenous arts and crafts that use native plant and animal materials for media; 
and  
•  ‘bush blocks’ or lifestyle properties.  
Some participants commented on the potential role of existing markets. For 
example, Gippsland Private Forestry Inc (sub. 92) considered that private forestry 
could improve native vegetation outcomes through a commercial incentive for the 
private sector to re-vegetate on a significant scale. The ACF (sub. DR302) noted the 
example of Earth Sanctuaries (a publicly listed company that operates sanctuaries 
for conservation and tourism purposes) as well as several other existing markets, 
such as those listed above, that might contribute to promoting native vegetation and 
biodiversity conservation outcomes.      
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Rochelle van Santen (sub. 26) said that allowing landholders to excise a portion of 
vegetated land for sale as a ‘bush block’ delivers benefits because the land is 
transferred to those interested in managing the vegetation while the farmer no 
longer has to maintain land of limited use. Bush Brokers (WA), a joint venture of 
the World Wildlife Fund, the Real Estate Institute of Western Australia and the Soil 
and Land Conservation Council, aims to match buyers and sellers of bush to 
facilitate conservation. Landholders can advertise ‘bush blocks’ on the Bush 
Brokers website and obtain a free manual outlining guidelines for purchasing bush 
properties, the benefits of owning bush land, the legal responsibilities of the 
landholder, and suggested management practices. Bush Brokers recently launched a 
campaign to increase awareness of the website (Clow 2004).  
Some participants commented on the trading of native flora and fauna as a way to 
increase incentives for conservation by the private sector. Various views were 
presented. For example, Gilbert Tippett thought that:  
No plant, animal, bird or reptile will ever become extinct if it has or acquires a 
commercial value and is farmed. (sub. 52, p. 1) 
Similarly, the Western Australian Farmers Federation submitted that: 
… owners of private land should be encouraged to commercialise local biodiversity 
and while subject to licence and regulation these should not be onerous. 
Commercialisation will put an ‘economic’ value on local biodiversity and therefore 
assist its propagation and protection. A shift in land use from production of exotic 
species to species that have adapted to our local environment and landscape would have 
a positive impact on sustaining our land resource. (sub. 94, p. 14) 
The Northern Land Council (NLC) (Northern Territory) said that for Indigenous 
communities to pursue their interest in developing businesses based on sustainable 
use of native flora and fauna would require: 
… abandonment of the apparent ‘default’ position: that direct uses of native species, 
despite comprehensive safeguards, are too hazardous to be seriously contemplated, 
while the unintended consequences for those same species from use of land for other 
purposes are treated, unjustifiably, as routinely manageable. (sub. 221, p. 2)  
The NLC (sub.  221) also provided information about a draft management plan 
(prepared by the NT Parks and Wildlife Service) for Australian species of cycads 
that allows trial harvests.  
Mr Fern Pty Ltd (sub. 46, p. 2) described resistance to sustainable use of native 
flora and fauna as a ‘cultural blockage’. And the NLC observed: 
… there has been no direct Federal Government support for a large-scale trial of the 
potential to substitute use of native species for other more orthodox and frequently 
damaging land use options.     




An especially important objective for Aboriginal landholders is to develop novel forms 
of resource use in areas that are clearly marginal for orthodox production. In the 
absence of opportunities to use native species commercially, Indigenous landowners 
will be left with few options but to leave their lands or to turn them over to more 
intensive forms of land use. History shows that both responses will create conservation 
problems. (sub. 221, p. 14) 
However, in contrast, the ACF opposed trading in wildlife because it ‘has been 
known to cause severe declines in biodiversity’ (sub. 146, p. 23). In addition, 
Tambourine Mountain Landcare (sub.  DR240, p.  2) observed that sustainable 
commercial uses of native vegetation nonetheless ‘involve ecosystem interference 
and often degradation’ and that some of these industries are ‘minor’. 
Commercial use of native flora and fauna has been explored in several inquiries (for 
example, Environment and Natural Resources Committee 2000; Senate Rural and 
Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee 1998). Careful use of flora 
and fauna could potentially contribute to promoting biodiversity conservation 
objectives by providing incentives for landholders to sustainably manage native 
vegetation as an asset, rather than a liability. These industries may also involve less 
environmental disturbance than some alternative land uses. However, the 
requirements for sustainable use are complex, and it is likely that such markets 
would be regulated, for example, to prevent harvesting of plants and animals from 
public lands. Nonetheless, rejecting this option out of hand removes potential 
opportunities to seek complementarity between earning an income from private land 
and achieving conservation goals. As observed by the NLC: 
Very few of Australia’s many conservation and environmental management problems 
can be attributed to direct use of native animals, whether for commerce, recreation or 
subsistence. (sub. 221, p. 9) 
One option may be to establish trials of sustainable use of some species. For 
example, the Australian Government’s Rural Industries Research and Development 
Corporation is proposing trials of sustainable wildlife enterprises to diversify 
landholder businesses, while also increasing restoration and conservation of the 
environment (RIRDC 2004). 
Creating new markets in native vegetation and biodiversity  
In addition to using existing markets, another option for encouraging native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation is to ‘create’ new markets for 
environmental services. ‘Ecosystem services’ such as amenity values, clean air and 
water, and absorption and breakdown of wastes are currently largely considered 
‘free’ because these services are not priced in markets. Thus landholders have little     
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incentive to produce such services in place of using environmental resources to 
produce marketable products, such as food and fibre. The concept of creating new 
markets for biodiversity is similar to proposals for markets in carbon credits to 
address climate change.  
The task of creating a new market for biodiversity credits is more complex than 
using or further developing existing markets for environmental goods and services. 
Markets for native vegetation and biodiversity are largely untested, although some 
pilot schemes are underway (AFFA, sub. 203). Various design issues need to be 
addressed, including: how to create a well-defined and enforceable property right 
for biodiversity — what exactly will the owner of a biodiversity credit have? — that 
will enable voluntary exchange on the basis of continually changing information 
about supply and demand.  
Other issues to be resolved are how, and to whom, to allocate initial rights or units 
of biodiversity. It is also not clear whether there would be sufficient buyers (the 
most obvious being governments and some conservation groups) to sustain a market 
in biodiversity units.  
Pannell (2001)  and  Murtough  et al. (2002) have observed that the potential to 
develop new markets to solve environmental problems has been overstated at times, 
unduly inflating expectations as to their role. Moreover, the purchase of 
environmental services, for example, conservation or re-vegetation of catchments to 
protect water storages, does not necessarily require the government to create new 
‘units’ of biodiversity for exchange in a ‘new’ market for biodiversity. Individuals 
or companies requiring specific environmental services are not necessarily 
precluded from negotiating directly with potential suppliers for the supply of these 
services now.  
A more feasible variation on a market for biodiversity credits may be a market in 
transferable clearing rights, because it focuses on controlling only one variable that 
can affect biodiversity outcomes — land clearing. The ACF opposed this option: 
… because of a range of difficulties surrounding the definition, transferability and 
irreplaceability of biodiversity values inherent in native vegetation ... In any case, 
transferable clearing rights imply substantial continued land clearing, and this is not 
acceptable to ACF. (sub. 146, p. 24) 
The Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices (sub.  131) and 
Mitchell Environment Group (sub. 65) also opposed markets in transferable clearing 
rights. 
Transferable clearing rights can operate in a similar manner to offset requirements 
that have been made transferable. Offset requirements currently apply in New South     




Wales, Victoria and South Australia. They allow a landholder to clear native 
vegetation provided it is ‘replaced’ with other native vegetation so that ‘no net loss’ 
(or a ‘net gain’ in Victoria) in native vegetation results overall. Offset arrangements 
could involve trading — a landholder wishing to clear could purchase an offset 
from another landholder, or an ‘offset bank’, instead of undertaking the re-
vegetation themselves at the time of clearing. Alternatively, the landholder could 
‘bank’ credits for vegetation planted before the need to remove native vegetation 
(Ron Hawkins, Victoria, sub. 111).  
Offset arrangements have been used for some time in the United States to manage 
wetlands through the Wetland Mitigation Banking program. This program allows 
landholders undertaking development in a wetland area to offset adverse 
environmental impacts of their actions by purchasing credits in existing wetland 
banks. More than 100 wetland banks currently operate in the US. However, the 
offsets for wetlands or biodiversity have been criticised due to difficulties of 
offsetting ‘like with like’ (Godden and Vernon 2003, Whitten et al. 2003).  
An alternative to creating a market for biodiversity credits or transferable clearing 
rights is to use a market mechanism, such as an auction, to reveal information about 
the supply and demand characteristics of conservation. This approach has been used 
in the United States and Victoria and is discussed in section 9.4. 
Advantages and disadvantages of market-based approaches  
The key advantage of using market-based approaches is that they reflect 
individuals’ voluntary decisions and cost-benefit trade-offs. Thus markets promote 
achievement of native vegetation and biodiversity conservation at least cost and 
promote innovative solutions over time as individuals have an incentive to identify 
cost-effective solutions. In this way, markets also deal with site-specific 
environmental problems and with variations in the benefits and costs of supplying 
conservation services across the country. In addition, as new information about 
supply and demand is continually revealed through prices, individuals can respond 
quickly to changing circumstances and to new understanding of native vegetation 
benefits or of the costs of supplying it. 
Voluntary decisions made through markets also provide some information about the 
level of demand for the environment, that is, how much the community is willing to 
pay to achieve native vegetation and biodiversity conservation outcomes. Obtaining 
information about how much the community values biodiversity conservation, 
relative to other goods and services such as health and education, is a key difficulty 
of designing many other policy options (such as government payments to 
landholders for conservation).      
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Another advantage of market approaches is that they could reward those who have 
not cleared native vegetation in the past. Landholders could ‘profit from the 
retention of biodiversity, rather than from its destruction’ (ACF, sub. DR302, p. 7) 
Payments could arise for both those repairing the landscape, through activities such 
as re-vegetation, and those maintaining landscapes by not initially clearing native 
vegetation. Some participants considered that current regulatory arrangements 
unfairly penalise those who have not cleared, while those who have cleared face no 
regulatory burden:  
For the lucky farmers who have cleared their land, the regulations are at worst a 
nuisance. For the majority, they’re a many-headed hydra. There’s a clear inequity here. 
If you’re cleared, you’re home free. (Institute of Public Affairs, trans., p. 816) 
Market-based approaches can also reduce reliance on governments managing the 
environment, thereby increasing the role of individuals, businesses (including those 
engaged in land-uses other than traditional agriculture or those adopting 
environmentally sustainable farming) and non-government organisations. Dennis 
Toohey from New South Wales observed: 
While ever the government commands-controls the environment debate then the private 
sector will be at the margins. We have to bring the private sector in centre stage into 
conservation and biodiversity and we have to keep them there. (trans., p. 1309) 
A potential disadvantage of relying solely on market-based approaches to protect 
native vegetation and biodiversity is that ‘gaps’ in conservation may arise. For 
example, eco-tourism may result in protection of only the most charismatic species 
and areas (as their aesthetic appeal would be easier to market to visitors) 
(Gunningham and Young 1997). Others are critical of activities such as harvesting 
of native forest products because over-harvesting, or the cultivation of particular 
plants at the expense of broader biodiversity, may occur (Ferraro and 
Simpson 2001).  
A gap can also arise because consumers may believe that others will continue to 
purchase environmentally harmful goods so that their efforts (including perhaps 
paying higher prices), of purchasing ‘environmentally-friendly’ alternatives are 
pointless (Doremus 2003). In addition, consumers may rely on others to purchase 
the environmental product. This ‘free riding’ could result in insufficient 
conservation (chapter 2).  
Another characteristic of any market-based approach is that it may be difficult to 
predict conservation outcomes as they would depend on consumer preferences and 
market conditions. For instance, conservation may be considered ‘too low’ or 
adoption rates ‘too slow’. Some may perceive the inability to foresee outcomes 
(sometimes described as a lack of ‘dependability’) as a disadvantage.      





Market-based policy approaches to encourage native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation offer several advantages, such as flexibility, the ability to deliver 
outcomes at least cost and incentives for innovation. There is scope for existing 
markets in native vegetation and biodiversity products to contribute to promoting 
conservation objectives.  
9.3 Government  approaches 
There is a broad range of options available to governments to promote native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation — from no specific action in some 
situations at one extreme, to options that are compulsory for all landholders, such as 
regulation, at the other. In between are options that allow landholders to choose how 
they will be involved (for example, education programs).  
Removing impediments 
An option often overlooked is that of governments not implementing any new 
policy option to change native vegetation or biodiversity conservation outcomes in 
certain areas. Even if governments take no action to increase native vegetation and 
biodiversity conservation on private land, a range of other market mechanisms (as 
discussed above) will bring about some level of conservation. While this option is 
unlikely to be adopted by governments as an overall approach to biodiversity 
conservation, it may be the most appropriate option for some issues in some 
locations, such as cases where: 
•  there is insufficient information (at this point in time) to know what action is 
required to solve or address a specific problem;  
•  there is no viable action that would address the problem; or 
•  the costs of taking action outweigh the benefits of doing so, for example, where 
environmental assets of relatively low value occur in areas of high agricultural 
productivity (Pannell 2001).  
In some situations, the most appropriate government response can be considering 
whether existing policy settings are having perverse or unintended effects that 
create or add to environmental problems, and whether these policy settings can be 
changed or removed. For example, existing regulatory arrangements to protect the 
environment may stifle emerging new uses of native plants and animals that may be 
more environmentally sustainable than existing uses (NLC, sub. 221) and policy     
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settings for leasehold land and taxation may inadvertently deter conservation efforts 
by the private sector. 
In Australia, most private land is held under pastoral leases that offer limited scope 
to alter the primary purpose of the lease from pastoralism to other activities, such as 
conservation (PC 2001a). In some cases, lease conditions may actually encourage 
native vegetation clearing (for example, some arrangements in the Northern 
Territory (ACF, sub. 146; Environment Centre Northern Territory, sub. 147)). 
Potential impediments to conservation by the private sector may also arise through 
tax anomalies. For example, the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITA Act) 
provides special tax concessions for entities that carry out a primary production 
business (Divs. 385, 387). These include deductions for expenditure on water 
facilities, provisions allowing spreading or deferral of taxable income and greater 
depreciation rates on capital. A primary producer converting to managing the land 
for conservation may lose these concessions (PC  2001a). The SA Government 
(sub.  DR324) argued that current income tax arrangements effectively penalised 
landholders in jurisdictions where clearing controls applied because they were 
unable to claim income losses, compared with landholders who conserved 
vegetation voluntarily.  
In some States, concessions that apply to land tax payable by primary producers 
may be lost if conservation is pursued. For example, the Serpentine-Jarrahdale Land 
Conservation District Committee of Western Australia (sub.  66) described a 
landholder who lost primary producer benefits when land was de-stocked to re-zone 
it as a conservation zone (this aspect of land tax legislation is now under review 
(Western Australian Government, sub. 151)).  
Different tax treatment of donations for conservation and donations for other 
purposes may also deter conservation (PC  2001a). While the ITA Act allows 
income tax deductions for gifts of cash, property and (in some cases) land to eligible 
organisations (Div. 30), donations to those who value environmental services (in the 
form of landholders entering conservation covenants) did not give rise to a 
deduction until recently. However, the deduction is only available to landholders 
who have received no financial consideration for signing a covenant agreement, and 
not to landholders who have received a token payment for the covenant. 
In its study of the Great Barrier Reef Catchment (PC 2003a), the Commission found 
that exceptional circumstances assistance may also affect environmental outcomes 
by encouraging higher stocking rates during drought years, and by impeding farm 
rationalisation. Prices for water or other inputs that do not fully reflect social 
opportunity costs and which consequently distort production decisions may also 
have adverse impacts on the private provision of conservation services.      




FINDING 9.3  
Government policies in areas other than the environment may be inadvertently 
compromising government objectives with respect to native vegetation and 
biodiversity conservation. 
Information provision, education and motivational approaches 
Information and education provision should underpin the design and 
implementation of all policy options. For example, information is necessary to 
establish regulatory targets. However, information and education provision can be 
pursued as a native vegetation and biodiversity conservation strategy itself. By 
encouraging the diffusion of ideas, these measures can accelerate adoption of 
practices that complement native vegetation and biodiversity objectives. They can 
also produce benefits by helping landholders understand the private benefits of 
biodiversity conservation (Gunningham and Young 1997).  
This approach encompasses a broad range of activities for exchanging and sharing 
information among landholders, consumers, governments and others. Examples 
include provision of practical and technical advice through publications, forums, 
field days, extension networks and officers, newsletters and the media. 
Governments can act as, or provide funding to other providers to act as, information 
brokers or as ‘one-stop-shops’ to provide landholders with quick and low-cost 
access to the information and know-how required to undertake native vegetation 
and biodiversity conservation. Non-government organisations can also play an 
important role in delivering education or information, as can individuals: 
… our Landcare efforts, right through the Ovens Valley, have made a big difference in 
the last 10 years and that is communities learning from communities and working with 
communities … our state and national governments can help us learn as communities 
and improve the way we manage the land. (Jack Jones, Victoria, trans., pp. 1364–5) 
Information and education mechanisms can also involve (non-monetary) 
motivational tools, such as awards or prizes for ‘best land management’, to 
encourage adoption of environmentally-sustainable land management practices. 
Recognition from the local community through designations such as ‘landholder of 
the year’ can motivate those landholders who may be relatively less interested in 
monetary rewards (Doremus 2003). The use of awards and prizes does not have to 
rely on governments; non-government organisations or communities may initiate 
and deliver these awards. 
Information and education programs could be directed at potential suppliers of 
biodiversity conservation, such as landholders, or at consumers to inform their     
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spending habits, which can change environmental outcomes through the expression 
of consumer preferences. Continuing education of all stakeholders in the 
conservation debate may also ease conflict between those with opposing views by 
improving understanding of others’ perspectives and priorities on these issues 
(Tambourine Mountain Landcare, sub. DR240).  
Information and education programs may be delivered by different levels of 
government or by non-government bodies (box 9.6). Where information is specific 
to a particular area, a local group or local government may have advantages in 
targeting the audience because of local knowledge and credibility (Gunningham and 
Young 1997). For example, WWF Australia said: 
The differentiating factor was that we had far greater trust in the community than a 
central government agency, and consequently we were able to be far more effective in 
working with land-holders to set aside voluntary areas for conservation. I think it's a 
question of, at an institutional level, which organisations you invest resources into to 
work in partnership with land-holders and others. (trans., p. 850) 
Credibility, trust and goodwill can also promote two-way information flow between 
landholders and governments. This is important because landholders may possess 
better information than governments about environmental features on their own 
properties, and about the methods and costs of protecting them. In addition, 
mechanisms that reveal and improve information flow about the benefits and costs 
of biodiversity conservation will enhance any biodiversity conservation policy.  
 
Box 9.6  Education initiatives of Wetland Care Australia  
Wetland Care Australia (WCA) is a not-for-profit organisation involved in on-ground 
action to repair wetlands. WCA operates a network of regional wetland specialists to 
provide extension support, and organises field days and conferences to educate 
landholders about wetland conservation practices. WCA recognises conservation 
achievements of individual landholders by publishing the names of ‘Wetland 
Guardians’ and ‘Landholder Champions’. WCA provides a forum for landholders to 
share their experiences and practices with the rest of the community, which WCA 
believes is effective for influencing landholder adoption of more sustainable practices: 
The community will follow the lead of a local champion by demonstration much more 
effectively than responding to direction and restriction through regulations. (sub. 59, p. 2). 
Sources: Wetland Care Australia (2003; sub. 59). 
 
 
Information or education programs can include general or very specific content. 
General education is primarily directed at changing attitudes towards the 
environment, whereas specific education targets issues such as how to implement a 
certain practice that will improve conservation outcomes (Cary et al. 2002). Specific     




education could include assisting farmers with farm business planning or providing 
them with information on their land capability and specific environmental concerns 
in the region and on their individual farms. Paul McGarva from Victoria suggested 
that: 
… people could be made aware of the environmental status of their properties with 
their rate notices and the various avenues they have to access government information 
etc. (sub. 76, pp. 1–2) 
Several participants said that more information about ways to address 
environmental problems is needed. For example, the Mitchell Environment Group 
(sub.  65) said that constant education and information is required, including 
disseminating information on the economic benefits of conservation more broadly 
in the community. It also considered that more extension officers and coordinators 
are required.  
Advantages and disadvantages  
A key advantage of information and education approaches is that they are amongst 
the ‘least intrusive’ policy options for biodiversity conservation (Doremus 2003). 
Also, these approaches can increase conservation at relatively low cost. Apart from 
helping landholders understand why policies are being introduced, the provision of 
(scientific) information to landholders about biodiversity helps them contribute to 
identifying solutions (AFFA, sub. 204). 
Information and education approaches are well-suited to encouraging landholders to 
take advantage of the private benefits of conservation. These approaches can more 
directly and cost-effectively address shortfalls in conservation on private land 
caused by an absence of information than can using other approaches such as 
regulation. Furthermore, information provision, education or training on the causes 
of land degradation and biodiversity loss may prevent future problems, reducing the 
need to repair degradation after it has occurred (AFFA, sub. 204). 
However, relying on education and information to deliver (public good) 
conservation on a broad scale is unlikely to achieve government objectives. 
Conservation outcomes would rely on the ‘pro-environmental’ values of 
landholders which may have a weak effect on decisions in the presence of other 
strong incentives, or disincentives, for conservation, such as high costs relative to 
private benefits (Cary et al. 2002).  
A further potential disadvantage of these approaches is their ‘dependability’, that is, 
the extent to which biodiversity outcomes are guaranteed. Possession of information 
or understanding of a problem is not always sufficient to induce action to address it.      
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These factors suggest that education and information approaches would play an 
important, but largely supportive, role in promoting conservation on private land. In 
some situations these approaches may be sufficient to bring about increases, 
especially where conservation would be in the landholder’s own interests and an 
information shortcoming is addressed. But where there is a significant gap between 
private and public benefits, these approaches alone are unlikely to significantly 
change outcomes (Gunningham and Young 1997). Nonetheless, in all situations, 
education and information approaches provide important ‘back up’ to other policy 
approaches.  
FINDING 9.4 
Accurate and up-to-date information and education are critical for the success of 
any policy option to promote native vegetation and biodiversity conservation 
objectives. Information and education approaches can also be pursued in their own 
right to promote these objectives. In particular, when poor conservation outcomes 
are due to a lack of information about the benefits and costs of conservation, 
specific information and education, tailored to an individual’s or a region’s 
problems, are likely to be most beneficial for achieving change ‘on the ground’. 
Taxes and subsidies 
By increasing the cost of certain practices, taxes levied on landholders who clear (or 
who undertake other activities deemed to harm the environment) could be used to 
alter landholder behaviour thus controlling threats to native vegetation and 
biodiversity. Alternatively, subsidies could be paid to encourage certain practices. 
However, designing jurisdiction-wide production taxes or subsidies that directly 
target conservation of native vegetation and biodiversity production would be 
problematic. To reduce environmental services to measurable, comparable units, 
they would have to apply to observable actions, such as tree clearing (or retention), 
rather than environmental outcomes. (In this regard, broad-based taxes or subsidies 
are similar to regulation which also necessarily focuses on proxy targets rather than 
environmental outcomes). The ‘correct’ rate of tax or subsidy that encourages the 
desired level of the targeted activity would also have to be determined.  
That said, production taxes and subsidies (or tax rebates) may be effective in 
promoting specific, observable actions that indirectly promote ultimate 
environmental objectives. For example, Belgium, Finland, Norway and Sweden 
employ taxes on agricultural inputs, such as fertilisers or pesticides, to reduce the 
environmental effects of intensive agriculture (OECD 2003).      




The Victorian Government noted that subsidies on inputs could be cost-effective:  
The advantage of flat-rate subsidies on inputs is that they are generally administratively 
simple and can be successful at assisting key sectors of the private landholder audience 
deliver biodiversity outcomes.  
Their relative cost-effectiveness depends on the program’s ability to identify and 
address priority biodiversity and native vegetation protection and management issues 
across the spectrum of private landholders. (sub. 185, p. 20) 
For example, flat-rate subsidies to cover the costs of fencing protected areas or 
rebates on local government rates for conservation actions (for example, for setting 
aside land) may be cost-effective.  
Taxes or subsidies that target specific, assessable actions by landholders may be 
efficient instruments for promoting some specific environmental objectives. 
However, because they necessarily focus on inputs rather than environmental 
outcomes, taxes and subsidies are unlikely to be efficient instruments for promoting 
complex objectives such as biodiversity.  
Direct payments to landholders for conservation services  
Governments may pursue conservation objectives by purchasing entire properties 
(or parts of properties) from landholders (discussed below) but this can involve 
more financial outlay and can be less flexible than paying individuals, or groups of 
landholders, to provide conservation on their own properties. For example, the NLC 
(sub.  221) observed that in the sparsely populated Northern Territory, 
environmental management cannot be pursued effectively from distant 
administrative centres without the support of people present on the land to detect 
and deal with problems.  
Contracts with landholders for the provision of conservation services represent the 
dominant policy instrument in most OECD countries with contract coverage 
reaching 20 per cent of European Union farmland (OECD 2003). However, this 
option remains relatively unexplored in Australia. The ACF considered that: 
… stewardship payments can have a role to play … where (for example) very high cost 
management is necessary, entailing little if any private return, to retain the presence of 
very high conservation values. (sub. DR302, p. 8) 
Several participants argued that landholder provision of conservation services is 
cost effective because landholders require only marginal incentives, reflecting the 
scope for joint production of private and public benefits.  
FINDING 9.5     
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Wetland Care Australia noted that: 
For the outlay of very minor funding to encourage good land stewardship, landholders 
and community groups could bring value-adding factors of more than ten times the 
investment for sustainable land management on the local scale. Incentives schemes and 
small devolved grants are much more effective than penalties, which are expensive to 
enforce effectively. (sub. 59, p. 2) 
Similarly, the NSWFA noted:  
… by putting just sufficient — just marginal incentives in front of people so that it gets 
them to the point of saying, ‘Yes, this makes sense for me’, you’ll get a turnaround in 
some of these more intractable environmental problems, much more cheaply than you 
can ever do it by regulation … (trans., p. 893) 
Landholder provision of conservation services can also be preferable if landholders 
possess local expert knowledge. The South Australian Farmers’ Federation (trans., 
p.  493) argued that ‘… many of the landholders … would fight tooth and nail 
against losing that management right, because they believe they do a better job’.  
There are several ways that governments could deliver payments to landholders for 
conservation services. These include fixed cash payments for a standard service, 
auctions of conservation contracts to landholders or individually-negotiated 
payment rates (box 9.7). Payment can be delivered as a once-off up-front payment 
for an activity, such as fencing, or may involve a stream of regular payments under 
a contract (management agreement or conservation covenant) between the 
landholder (or group of landholders) and the government.  
Payments to landholders for conservation services can also be delivered through 
market mechanisms (discussed above) or by bodies other than governments. For 
example, WWF Australia said that it was ‘heavily involved in testing some of the 
market instruments’ and that it was willing to bring in money to pay for 
environmental outcomes in a trial conservation auction in the Liverpool Plains 
(New South Wales) (trans., p. 841). 
In the past, government payments for conservation have often been provided on the 
basis of inputs (such as weed control and fencing of remnant vegetation) which act 
as proxies for environmental outcomes. This approach is not ideal, but is often the 
most cost-effective way to approximate actual landholder performance (Stoneham 
et al. 2002, pp. 9–10). Ideally, payments would be made conditional on landholders’ 
performance, which would give landholders the incentive and flexibility to achieve 
conservation outcomes more efficiently. However, the trade-off is increased 
transaction costs as performance-related payments would be more complicated and 
costly to administer. In fact, scientific uncertainty and random external factors often 
make accurate assessment of landholder performance impossible.      





Box 9.7  Conservation agreements — basis for payment 
Fixed-rate payments for a standard service 
The government (or other entity) pays landholders a fixed amount for a standard 
service. The payment, and the service, are determined by government independently 
of the landholder. This approach is used often in agri-environmental schemes in the EU 
(eg Environmentally Sensitive Areas in the UK). It is transparent, offers landholders 
certainty of payment rate, and administration costs are relatively low. However, it is 
inflexible as key aspects of the transaction are centrally determined and fixed.  
Individually-negotiated agreements 
The government negotiates individual agreements with landholders (eg Private Forest 
Reserve Program, Tasmania). This approach is flexible as agreements are site-specific 
but there is a trade-off between flexibility and transparency and contracting costs. 
Administrative costs of assessing, negotiating and preparing agreements as well as 
monitoring and dispute resolution can be high for governments. This approach may be 
suitable for remote locations, or for land with unique features, where subjecting 
landholders to competition for provision of the conservation service is not feasible.  
Auctions 
Auctioning contracts for conservation services introduces a market mechanism that 
requires landholders to compete directly for funds. Through their bids, landholders 
reveal some of their information about the value of the service, and the costs of 
providing it. For a given budget, a well-designed auction can generate more 
conservation than fixed-rate payments for standard services.  
Conservation auctions are used extensively in the United States where the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) has been operating since  1985. The 
BushTender trial in Victoria is another example of a conservation auction scheme. 
Since environmental services are heterogeneous, a common index is required to 
compare bids. The CRP uses an Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) to measure 
variables like wildlife and erosion benefits enduring beyond the contract period. Bids 
are compared on the basis of EBI score per dollar of payment. BushTender uses a 
Biodiversity Benefits Index, a composite of the conservation value of the site and the 
value of services offered by the landholder per dollar of payment.  
Auctions are best suited to widescale purchase of conservation. If there were only few 
bidders, this would increase the risk of bidder collusion, which may undermine 
competitive benefits, while retaining the high administrative costs of running an auction. 
Source: Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort (1997). 
 
 
Agreements with landholders can be either for a fixed term (for example, 
BushTender) or in perpetuity (for example, the Tasmanian Private Forestry Reserve 
Program) so there can be some targeting of requirements when using this option. A 
fixed-term management agreement requires fewer incentives to attract landholders,     
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and would be attractive to those reluctant to make a long-term commitment 
(Binning and Young 1997). At the end of the term, there is also an opportunity to 
refine (and, if desirable, re-enter) the contract in response to new information about 
conservation needs and demands. On the other hand, perpetual agreements may 
provide greater long-term security that a conservation outcome will be sustained.  
As noted by Greening Australia (Tasmania), a range of agreement terms should be 
available to attract a wide range of participants: 
These should range from low entry such as Land for Wildlife, to protection of 
ecological assets for an extended period of time i.e. 10 years progressing up to full 
covenanting. There must be good networking and information support to the various 
programs that need to be tailored to suit the participating landowners. (sub. 134, p. 2) 
A key aspect of any contract is also follow-up action in scrutinising and monitoring 
conservation outcomes and contract performance.  
Advantages and disadvantages  
By providing a reward for conservation effort, payments can provide closer 
alignment between landholders’ incentives and governments’ objectives for native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation. Payments can be tailored or targeted to 
different situations and, depending on the design of the scheme, payments can allow 
for landholder flexibility and innovation in identifying low-cost means to deliver 
biodiversity outcomes sought by governments. In addition, as the decision to enter 
into a conservation contract is usually voluntary, and as a payment is provided, this 
option may be perceived as fairer than some other options, such as regulation. If this 
enhances compliance levels, it could improve the overall effectiveness of 
biodiversity conservation efforts. 
An auction approach can be particularly effective for revealing some of the 
information held by landholders on biodiversity assets and on the costs of managing 
them. Moreover, to select bids, governments are required to set explicit objectives 
and priorities for native vegetation and biodiversity conservation. Thus, auctions 
allow governments to potentially acquire more, or better, conservation outcomes for 
a given budget.  
Another advantage of direct payments to landholders for conservation is that the 
costs of conservation are made more transparent to the community. The Institute of 
Public Affairs observed: 
… [it] would force the government to consider the cost of its actions and trade them off 
against all its spending priorities’. (sub. 135, p. 17)     




Neil Kerr noted: 
So as it [regulation] costs the taxpayer nothing, more excuses will be made to lock up 
more and more land. However, if private land owners received fair compensation for 
the use of their land, only that land with important habitat or species would be 
involved. (sub. 154, p. 1) 
Conservation contracts also may provide additional conservation through an 
educative effect. For example, studies of the UK Countryside Stewardship Scheme 
indicate that landholders changed their practices on non-agreement land as they 
learnt more about environmental benefits (Cary et al. 2000; Wilson and Hart 2002).  
However, several potential disadvantages of conservation contracts have been 
identified. For instance, there is a risk that these programs may be used as income 
support. Some programs have been criticised as subsidising basic environmental 
maintenance practices that should have been carried out at landholders’ expense 
(OECD 2003). To address this, the UK and Germany have employed agricultural 
codes of practice which set the benchmark against which payments to landholders 
are defined. Payments are made for practices extending beyond the requirements of 
the code of practice (Latacz-Lohmann and Hodge 2003; Osterburg 2001).  
A key potential disadvantage of environmental contracts can be their administrative 
costs. A study of these costs in eight European states showed that administrative 
costs may significantly constrain the total level of landholder payments — costs 
were 87% of total payments to landholders in one case (Falconer and Whitby 1999).  
A key criticism of European programs has been their inability to formulate specific 
objectives. Most of the schemes pursue multiple and often vague objectives such as 
general conservation of biodiversity. The European Court of Auditors (2000) argued 
that this led to a failure to develop quantifiable indicators for monitoring and 
evaluating and, ultimately, the inefficient operation of the programs.  
Program targeting may also pose difficulties, particularly for programs offering 
standardised contracts to a wide range of landholders. There is a risk that payments 
may poorly match environmental benefits generated (OECD 2003). Targeting can 
be improved by introducing selection criteria to assess the environmental benefit 
generated by each landholder, as occurs in the CRP and BushTender programs. 
However, this increases complexity and administrative costs.  
Another potential disadvantage concerns the temporary nature of many conservation 
contracts and, hence, the ‘reversibility’ of benefits after the contract expires. For 
example, an evaluation of the Environmentally Sensitive Areas program in 
Denmark found that 10  per cent of lapsed ESA land had undergone negative 
environmental changes after the contract expired (Heritage Council 1999).     
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However, society gains even if protection of something it values is of limited 
duration. There is also the option of renewing environmental contracts if that is 
advantageous to society and to the provider of the environmental services. Indeed, 
in the presence of uncertainty about future demands for, and supply of, 
environmental services it may be preferable for contracts to cover a limited period 
than to be in perpetuity.  
Many of the difficulties associated with environmental contracts arise from 
information differences or ‘asymmetries’ between the government and the 
participating landholder. For example, some schemes provide payments based on 
landholder effort, which is not readily observable by government. These 
information difficulties are common to other approaches for conserving native 
vegetation and biodiversity such as regulation. Information asymmetries create 
scope for what are known as ‘moral hazard’ and ‘adverse selection’ (box 9.8).  
 
Box 9.8  Information problems — contract design for environmental 
services 
In this case, moral hazard refers to landholders modifying their behaviour to exploit 
their information advantage over the government agency. Landholder non-compliance 
with their obligations, where their actions are not observable by the government, is an 
example of moral hazard. One study found that about 24  per cent of the farmers 
participating in the Countryside Stewardship Scheme (UK) were not meeting all of their 
obligations (Land Use Consultants 1995). Another study reported that about a third of 
farmers participating in a German nature conservation scheme were not fulfilling their 
obligations (Latacz-Lohmann 2000). Latacz-Lohmann (2000) suggests that non-
compliance could be significantly reduced by self-policing among landholders. This 
could be promoted by familiarising all landholders within the region with the contracts. 
Another example of moral hazard is landholders’ incentive to overstate the payment 
required to provide a conservation service. Auctions, if collusion can be ruled out, can 
reduce this problem. A further example, observed under the US Conservation Reserve 
Program, involves landholders ceasing their existing conservation practices temporarily 
in order to qualify for program payments (Babcock et al. 2001). 
Adverse selection refers to the risk of systematic bias in the landholders chosen by the 
government for contracts. For example, as their costs may be lower, lower 
environmental value-adding landholders may have a greater incentive to sign a 
conservation contract than landholders who could deliver greater benefits. A study of 
the uptake of environmental schemes in Germany showed that participation was 
highest in less favoured areas – regions with poor soils and lower intensity of land-use 
(Osterburg and Nieberg 1999). 
The risk of adverse selection can be reduced if the government has information 
allowing it to distinguish between the attractiveness of different potential contractees.  
 
     





Government purchase of environmental services from landholders, on a voluntary 
basis, offers several potential advantages, including:  
•  flexibility and scope for innovation in identifying ways of promoting 
environmental objectives;  
•  a requirement for specification and prioritisation of environmental objectives;  
•  closer alignment between landholders’ incentives and governments’ objectives 
for native vegetation and biodiversity conservation;  
•  greater certainty for, and acceptability amongst, landholders than compulsory 
policy instruments; and 
•  increased transparency of the costs of conservation, relative to some other 
approaches, which can impose some discipline on government and community 
demands for conservation. 
However, different approaches must be developed for particular circumstances and, 
consequently, the approach can be resource-intensive in terms of program design 
and contract monitoring. 
Duty of care 
‘Duty of care’ is a concept that means different things to different people (box 9.9). 
For some, a duty of care might require a landholder to refrain from undertaking 
certain activities, or may impose obligations to undertake certain actions. It can 
sometimes be used to define a level of environmental performance that all 
landholders are expected to reach at their expense (Tasmanian Conservation Trust, 
sub.  84). Although a duty of care typically does not specify in detail what is 
required of the duty holder, the Victorian Government (sub. 185) considered that 
native vegetation regulations operating in that State prescribe landholders’ 
environmental duty.  
Duty of care in this section essentially refers to a situation where landholders are 
held liable for environmental damage they may cause, unless they can demonstrate 
that they have exercised a reasonable duty of care. This is not the same as a 
mandatory minimum standard, although the term is often used in this sense. 
Landholders are free to choose whether or not they take any action to prevent 
damage and the nature of any such action.  
A duty of care may exist in common law or in statute law. At common law, a duty 
of care may be owed to people but not to the environment per se (Bates 2001). It 
has been suggested that an environmental duty of care requiring all landholders to     
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take ‘reasonable’ action to protect the environment should be reflected in 
legislation. Court judgements would play an important role in determining what is 
‘reasonable’; moreover, interpretation could evolve through time.  
 
Box 9.9  Participants’ views on ‘duty of care’ 
Murray Irrigation Ltd from New South Wales submitted that: 
Landholders do have a duty of care to maintain and protect their natural resources. To go 
beyond this requires significant resources – capital, knowledge and financial. If the broader 
community is after benefits that go beyond this ‘duty of care’, then the broader community 
needs to actively contribute. (sub. 79, p. 2) 
Maria Weeding and Helen Geard from Tasmania commented:  
In regard to the ‘duty of care’, there must be an upper limit …  
… [there may be] significant restraints through existing/future legislation that impact and 
would go well beyond the reasonable ‘duty of care’ factor. (sub. 162, pp. 3–4) 
According to the Tasmanian Conservation Trust: 
Duty of Care should be used as a concept to reflect the ‘bottom line’ of performance that 
every landholder is expected to reach and should be underwritten by regulation. In other 
words, there must be penalties for non-compliance with one’s duty of care — and a 
reasonable expectation of enforcement. (sub. 84, p. 5) 
The Victorian Government expressed a stronger view:  
In Victoria’s case, the legislative and regulatory framework for native vegetation defines, in 
effect, a landholder’s 'duty of care' for biodiversity on their land. For example, the initiation of 
native vegetation retention controls in Victoria, under Planning Schemes, weakened 
landholders’ property rights to native vegetation in some instances, transferring power from 
landholders to the community. (sub. 185, pp. 18–19) 
 
 
In contrast to prescriptive approaches often taken in legislation, a statutory duty of 
care is usually described as a requirement for duty holders to take all reasonable and 
practical steps to prevent the prescribed harm arising from their activities. Codes of 
practice (see above) are another way of expressing the duty. To the extent that duty 
holders would be able to choose how they comply, the focus on outcomes, rather 
than prescribing means of achieving outcomes, could reduce the costs of 
compliance with a duty of care relative to the costs of complying with command 
and control regulation (IC 1998).  
A duty of care usually is applied in situations where the parties to which the duty 
applies are in the best position to control and ascertain the impacts of their actions 
(and identify all affected parties) and to deliver desirable outcomes at least cost. For 
example, professional service providers have a duty of care to their clients, and 
employers have a duty to provide a safe working environment for their employees. 
Thus, while a potential advantage of a duty of care is the flexibility it gives those     




responsible to meet their duty, it would be expecting too much of individual 
landholders to determine whether or not they were meeting a duty of care to the 
environment where that duty included delivery of public goods such as biodiversity. 
They simply do not have the requisite information. For example, how could 
landholders determine whether the removal of some trees on their property would 
significantly affect regional biodiversity outcomes? Would it be reasonable or 
efficient to expect landholders to know or to ascertain this? Is it reasonable to 
expect them to bear the costs?  
Making individual landholders responsible for biodiversity and other public-good 
outcomes is unlikely to be efficient when delivery of desired outcomes requires 
knowledge of scientific data as well as whole-of-community preferences. In other 
words, governments are likely to have a better understanding of the environmental 
services required in the public interest than individual landholders, which suggests 
that those demands and requirements would need to be more clearly specified than a 
simple requirement for landholders to prevent environmental harm. 
FINDING 9.7 
Imposition of a duty of care may be efficient where actions by individual 
landholders have a direct, observable impact that is well understood by them and 
where there is broad acceptance of the level of responsibility implied by the duty. 
However, imposition of a statutory duty of care on landholders, beyond their ability 
and knowledge to deliver the required duty efficiently, as in the case of provision of 
public-good native vegetation and biodiversity services, is unlikely to be an efficient 
policy instrument.  
Regulation — prohibitions and rules  
Many policy options comprise a regulatory or legislative component, for example, 
to provide an institutional framework to facilitate private sector conservation. 
However, this section deals specifically with regulation that restricts certain 
activities, such as land clearing, or that requires certain activities to occur, such as 
weed and pest management. The performance and impacts of current regulatory 
regimes for native vegetation and biodiversity conservation are assessed in 
chapters 3–7; this section explores arguments for and against regulation as a policy 
instrument.  
Advantages and disadvantages  
Some participants argued that regulation is essential for native vegetation and 
biodiversity management because it provides a ‘safety net’ or minimum standard     
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that supports other policy mechanisms. It was argued that any other ‘positive’ 
incentives (for example, payments for conservation services) should be ‘nested’ in 
regulation. It was also argued that regulatory prohibitions should be used where 
native vegetation and biodiversity are particularly at risk. WWF Australia 
commented that regulation:  
… can provide the safe minimum standard to ensure that those who are recalcitrant to 
other incentive types can be persuaded to ensure that there’s no irreversible loss of 
biodiversity. On top of that, you can build a whole range of other incentives — 
instruments that are market based, voluntary or motivational. (trans., p. 841) 
The ACF noted that they:  
… are not aware of anywhere in Australia or overseas where native vegetation clearing 
particularly has been reversed or halted without a regulatory approach. (trans., p. 560) 
Although, in principle, regulation could be used to set a minimum standard, its 
effectiveness and efficiency in practice will depend on: 
•  how efficiently it targets environmental objectives; and 
•  how well it is accepted, particularly amongst landholders who have knowledge 
of the ‘protected’ native vegetation and who retain ownership of the land on 
which it is located. 
While regulation may play a role as ‘the stick in the cupboard’ (Dennis Toohey, 
New South Wales, trans., p.  1310) to be used as required against recalcitrant 
landholders, a heavy focus on negative incentives to increase conservation may 
prove counterproductive if it alienates those who are already conserving native 
vegetation, or who are trying to do so. For example, Wally Peart from Queensland 
observed: 
When the Landcare movement started there was enormous good will and determination 
to farm sustainably and leave enough habitat areas for wild life to thrive. Hundreds of 
branches were formed throughout Australia and great progress was made. We felt that 
through education and understanding and demonstration we could achieve 90% of what 
needed to be done and perhaps some regulation would eventually be required to bring 
the remaining 10% into line. With the latest ‘jack boot’ approach by government with 
many regulations that only impact on the people who have done the correct thing and 
left some trees, etc., we feel deceived and betrayed. The good will we nurtured has 
disappeared … (sub. DR304, p. 1) 
A key disadvantage of regulation is that it often reflects an assumption that there 
will be standard benefits arising from policy action across all those regulated 
(Chaudhri  2003) and that the costs of promoting biodiversity will be the same 
across regions and individual properties. However, both benefits and costs of 
conservation can vary markedly across properties and regions. For example, LeFroy 
and Stone (sub. 193) observed that the threshold rules often used for vegetation     




planning, such as 30 per cent vegetation cover, do not necessarily transfer from one 
place to another, or from one species to another. The NLC said:  
Slavish application of conservation principles and practice designed for highly 
modified and densely populated parts of the world, generate perverse outcomes when 
applied uncritically to sparsely populated, remote northern Australia. (sub. 221, p. 1) 
As regulations typically specify actions that must, or must not, be undertaken (that 
is, they control inputs) rather than outcomes that must be delivered, they often allow 
little flexibility or adaptability from landholders in terms of their response. This can 
stifle innovative solutions to problems and thus increase the costs of achieving 
biodiversity objectives (although costs may be reduced for some landholders if 
offsets, rather than a complete ban for example, are allowed). This implies that 
command and control regulation may not be particularly suitable for addressing 
complex problems such as biodiversity conservation as the inputs targeted by 
regulation may or may not be good proxies for achieving the ultimate 
environmental outcomes sought. In addition, broad regulation cannot be specified in 
a way that requires a particular person to manage remnant native vegetation 
appropriately or to restore a degraded remnant.  
Greening Australia (Tasmania) considered that: 
Regulation on its own will not achieve long-term, constructive environmental 
outcomes. Voluntary conservation on private land provides by far the best long-term 
outcome. The reasons for this are that it ensures landowner ownership and personal 
knowledge of the assets being protected. (sub. 134, p. 1) 
AFFA (sub.  204) stated that, in addition to high administrative and monitoring 
costs, the possibility of changes in regulations contributes to investment risk faced 
by landholders. There is also a risk that landholders will disengage from the 
process: 
One of the by-products of that command-control approach that has been applied is that 
we have now got substantial areas of the countryside where farmers are suspicious, 
concerned, wary, about actions and motives of government … from a person who grew 
up in an area where government was seen as supportive … helping facilitate change … 
provid[ing] educational and suasive sort of actions — we have now got suspicion and 
wariness. (Dennis Toohey, trans., pp. 1306–7). 
A potential advantage of regulation, according to Gunningham and Young (1997), 
is that it is less likely to be ignored than other measures as penalties for non-
compliance are ‘far more compelling’ than compliance measures available to other 
instruments. However, the extent of compliance with regulations depends on factors 
such as community acceptance of the regulation, as well as severity of penalties, 
and the likelihood that breaches will be detected and successfully prosecuted. For 
example, Victor Eddy of Victoria observed that:     
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It appears to be assumed [by regulators] that if the law says a tree must not be removed, 
that tree is safe. In fact if the landholder sees that tree as a liability, there is a 
probability that tree will disappear with little or no risk of the landholder being 
prosecuted. (sub. DR255, p. 2) 
Further, there does not appear to be any in-principle reason why a financial 
disincentive would generate greater compliance than a financial incentive of 
equivalent absolute value. 
In the case of native vegetation and biodiversity conservation, the assets protected 
by regulations are widely dispersed and difficult to monitor. Consequently, 
regulations may fail to achieve their objectives if agencies’ enforcement budgets are 
under-resourced, or if there is a lack of political will to enforce them. In addition, 
several participants indicated that in some areas, landholders consider the 
regulations neither reasonable nor sensible for pursuing conservation objectives 
(chapter 5). Resistance and lack of support from those required to implement native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation ‘on the ground’ are likely to compromise 
achievement of regulatory objectives or, at the very least, increase the costs of 
enforcing regulations. 
Stoneham et al.  (2003) suggest that current regulatory approaches to native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation may be efficient because governments, in 
assuming ‘ownership’ of the native vegetation resource, are relieved of the task of 
seeking information from landholders about native vegetation on their properties. 
The onus instead is placed on landholders to demonstrate why they should be 
permitted to ‘use’ native vegetation. Importantly, however, current regulations also 
prescribe how that vegetation can and cannot be used, apparently with little regard 
for the (implicit) cost-benefit trade-off. If the change in ownership of the resource 
promoted bargains between landholders and governments which, in turn, promoted 
efficient retention and use of native vegetation, regulation could be efficient. In 
addition, as acknowledged by Stoneham et al. (2003) the assertion of government 
ownership of a formerly private resource, without public debate or without payment 
of compensation, raises the prospect of non-compliance.  
The issues of fairness and compensation were raised by many participants. Some 
observed that the burden for meeting native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation objectives falls most heavily on those who have retained native 
vegetation. It was also argued that regulation is inequitable because it forces 
landholders to bear the costs of native vegetation and biodiversity conservation on 
behalf of the wider community. The NLC argued that a one-size-fits-all approach to 
regulation of clearing: 
… may particularly disadvantage Indigenous people who have only recently re-
acquired land. There is a risk that they may be denied the economic and social benefits     




enjoyed by other Australians, in part to redress damage done by those other land users. 
It is difficult to imagine a more perverse outcome than requiring economically-
disadvantaged Indigenous landowners to bear the costs of environmental detriment 
caused by those who reaped the benefits. (sub. 221, p. 7) 
Using regulation as a means of ‘taking’ private property may prove counter-
productive if landholders defy or undermine the regulation by clearing illegally or 
by allowing native vegetation to degrade over time. Strong penalties and monitoring 
may reduce illegal clearing to some extent (albeit at cost to governments). 
Compensating landholders for the impacts of native vegetation regulations could 
improve compliance and make the costs of regulation more transparent. However, 
assessing compensation is a difficult exercise at the aggregate, let alone at the 
property level (box 9.10). Nor would compensation for the impact of clearing 
restrictions encourage appropriate management of remnant vegetation — in this 
sense, it mirrors the limitations of regulation in bringing about good environmental 
outcomes over time.  
 
Box 9.10  Compensating for the impacts of regulation 
A rule of thumb for estimating losses per hectare for purposes of compensation, all 
else equal, would be the fall in the value of uncleared land relative to the value of 
cleared land in the same region following the introduction of restrictions. For land with 
similar productive potential, the difference between the value of a cleared block and an 
uncleared block, in the absence of clearing restrictions, would be the cost of initial 
clearing. The price of uncleared land would capture its development potential. With the 
introduction of clearing restrictions, the price of uncleared land would be expected to 
fall towards its value in its uncleared state (for example, for grazing on native pasture). 
This change in the price gap would roughly capture the expected impact of clearing 
restrictions (including any positive impacts accruing to landholders). 
Issues arise if a property has been sold since the introduction of restrictions. In this 
case, the new owner should have factored in the impact of the restrictions and paid a 
commensurately lower purchase price. On the other hand, if a compensation package 
had been announced, this expectation may have inflated the purchase price. 
In addition to losses in land values which roughly capture forgone profits, landholders 
and others employed in agriculture could also incur adjustment costs if alternative 
employment is not readily available.  
 
 
In particular, given that effective native vegetation and biodiversity conservation 
relies on the discovery of information about factors such as the location and status 
of species, the adversarial nature of regulation is likely to hinder achievement of 
biodiversity outcomes, particularly in the long term. Revelation and sharing of 
information is more likely to occur under cooperative and voluntary approaches 
where governments’ and landholders’ incentives are more closely matched.     
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FINDING 9.8 
Regulations can be efficient where the environmental objective is targeted directly 
and the regulations are broadly accepted and complied with.  
The effectiveness and efficiency of regulation in promoting public-good native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation goals appears limited because: 
•  the problem is too complex, dynamic and geographically heterogeneous for 
jurisdiction-wide rules that necessarily focus on achievement of proxy targets;  
•  potentially lower-cost, innovative solutions to environmental problems are 
precluded; and  
•  achievement of environmental goals may be undermined if landholders regard 
regulations as imposing an unfair burden on them and governments neither 
compensate for regulatory takings, nor assume responsibility for effective 
management of protected remnants on private land. 
Acquisition of all or part of the property  
Governments can pursue their conservation objectives through outright purchase of 
private land from landholders. Properties could be acquired on a voluntary basis, 
through donations or through purchase at a mutually agreed price, or the 
government may force the sale at a ‘fair price’ (Doremus  2003). Alternatively, 
governments may engage in ‘land swaps’ where government land of low 
conservation value is swapped for private land of high conservation value.  
Outright purchases of properties by government would effectively result in the 
creation of, or addition to, conservation reserves. Some participants suggested that 
governments should purchase private properties on which they wished conservation 
objectives to be pursued (for example, Shire of Dandaragan, sub. 191). Tambourine 
Mountain Landcare (sub.  DR240) suggested that this option could be used for 
properties that cannot sustain farming. 
However, while purchase of an entire property may remove land clearing threats, it 
raises other issues, namely how will the property be managed against other threats 
to biodiversity, such as pests and weeds, and by whom? In addition, it is not clear 
that government purchase and management of properties for conservation is more 
cost effective than contracting and paying the current landholder to provide a 
stewardship service on the property. As noted in chapter 2, conservation can be 
provided more efficiently on private land than in public reserves, if the private land 
can continue to be used for private and commercial purposes as well as public good 
conservation, and/or if the landholder can provide required management services at 
lower cost.     




The purchase of whole properties may also represent a less flexible solution than 
some other policy options. The property will only contribute to government 
conservation objectives to the extent that it will serve the needs of the targeted flora 
or fauna at the time that it is acquired as well as into the future (Doremus 2003), 
although the land could always be re-sold.  
Apart from purchases by government, others such as conservation groups (for 
example, Australian Bush Heritage Fund and Birds Australia (box  9.11)) may 
purchase entire properties from landholders to protect environmental assets. 
Similarly, the Trust for Nature (Victoria) operates a ‘revolving fund’ for the 
purchase and resale of properties for conservation, in addition to the properties it 
purchases and retains under its own management. 
A revolving fund scheme involves an organisation purchasing land to place a 
perpetual conservation covenant on the land for re-sale to a new landholder. When 
used by governments, revolving funds require less government outlay than 
permanent acquisition of land to achieve a change in activities that occur on the 
land. Re-sale of covenanted properties can also be effective for matching land 
targeted for conservation with sympathetic landholders, as it is more likely that a 
landholder committed to conservation will purchase land encumbered with a 
conservation covenant. However, the environmental effectiveness of revolving 
funds depends on the ability to purchase the parcels of land necessary to achieve 
environmental objectives and to subsequently sell them to new landholders. 
 
Box 9.11  Purchase of land by private conservation groups  
Australian Bush Heritage Fund 
The Australian Bush Heritage Fund is a private non-profit conservation group that 
protects highly threatened and ecologically significant examples of Australia’s wildlife 
habitats by purchasing properties and by receiving bequests of private land. It is 
funded mainly through public donations. In  2003, the Fund purchased the Charles 
Darwin Reserve, a 68 600 hectare property in Western Australia, to help protect seven 
significant ecological communities and five species at risk. 
Birds Australia 
Birds Australia is a private non-profit conservation group which aims to contribute to 
the conservation, study and enjoyment of Australia’s native birds and their habitats. It is 
funded mainly through public donations, but has also received funding through the 
Natural Heritage Trust. Birds Australia holds lessee rights to two pastoral leases — 
Gluepot Station, a 54 390 hectare property in South Australia, and Newhaven Station, 
a 262 200 hectare property in the Northern Territory — and manages both properties 
as conservation reserves. 
Sources: Australian Bush Heritage Fund (2003); Birds Australia (2001a; 2001b). 
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FINDING 9.9 
Where environmental values of land are high relative to alternative uses, and public 
management of the land would be more cost-effective than private stewardship, 
government purchase of entire properties (or part thereof) may be efficient. 
However, it is likely that, for a majority of agricultural land, it will be more efficient 
to leave land in private ownership and encourage joint production of environmental 
services and commercial outputs. 
9.4 Conclusions 
Governments have placed strong emphasis on regulation (although other policy 
options are also used) to achieve native vegetation and biodiversity conservation 
objectives. However, a heavy emphasis on regulation is unlikely to be the most 
effective way to pursue conservation objectives in all cases, and into the long term. 
Regulation often applies broad-brush prescriptive solutions that are inflexible and, 
therefore, can impose high costs. Regulation also does not align landholders’ 
incentives with government objectives. Under a regulatory approach, landholders 
have an incentive to remove native vegetation, to reduce its quality through neglect 
or intentional acts, or to hide information about special biodiversity features in order 
to deflect regulatory attention which generally implies prohibitions, or at minimum, 
interference and additional cost in land management decisions.  
While no policy instrument will completely align landholder and government 
objectives, some mechanisms are more effective at increasing incentives for 
conservation by turning native vegetation and biodiversity into assets for the 
landholder. If conservation can be increasingly turned into an activity that is in the 
landholder’s interest, it would be expected to contribute to conservation outcomes 
with reduced costs for monitoring and enforcing conservation requirements. 
The shortcomings of regulation as a dominant approach for promoting conservation 
imply that other policy options should be explored more thoroughly by governments 
before they turn to regulation. As discussed in this chapter, each option possesses 
strengths and weaknesses, making each more or less suitable for addressing specific 
problems and objectives.      





10  Conclusions and recommendations  
Drawing on the evidence and analysis in previous chapters, the Commission’s 
conclusions and recommendations are presented in this chapter. Specifically, the 
Commission is asked to make:  
… recommendations (of a regulatory or non-regulatory nature) that governments could 
consider to minimise the adverse impacts of the above regimes, while achieving the 
desired environmental outcomes, including measures to clarify the responsibilities and 
rights of resource users. (Terms of Reference, para. 3(g)) 
The recommendations therefore focus on ways of reducing adverse impacts of the 
regimes, and policy approaches for efficiently, effectively and equitably promoting 
desired environmental objectives. Because of the breadth of regulatory 
arrangements reviewed in this inquiry, the recommendations are deliberately broad 
so that, to a greater or lesser degree, they are applicable to all jurisdictions.  
The recommendations are silent on the question of how much conservation effort, 
where and of what type, should be pursued. Nonetheless, a major aim of the 
recommendations is to make the cost-benefit trade-offs involved in achieving 
various environmental objectives more transparent, so that optimal policy choices 
are made.  
The recommendations are presented in three parts: the first sets out general 
principles of good policy process and ways that existing regulatory regimes could 
be improved; the second focuses on ways of encouraging greater private 
conservation effort; the third sets out more fundamental reforms of native 
vegetation and biodiversity policy which the Commission considers necessary for 
the achievement of desired environmental outcomes in the long term.  
Step 1: Implement regulatory best practice  
While there are many differences across State, Territory and Commonwealth levels 
of government, in the Commission’s view, current regulatory approaches in most 
jurisdictions have been imposed with insufficient consideration of all or some of the 
following: 
•  the nature and causes of the problem being addressed;      






•  desired environmental outcomes; and 
•  the social costs and benefits of regulation relative to other policy options.  
A major focus of the recommendations therefore is to promote greater exposure of 
the costs and benefits of conservation effort, to clarify environmental objectives and 
to establish a process for determining agreed landholder and community 
responsibilities for achieving those objectives.  
Whether or not the Commission’s other recommendations are accepted, all 
jurisdictions should follow transparent and thorough processes when developing 
environmental policy, processes (such as regulation impact assessments) that seem 
to be well accepted and frequently applied in other areas of policy development.  
Before introducing new or amending existing native vegetation and biodiversity 
policy, a comprehensive regulation impact statement or its equivalent should be 
prepared that includes an assessment of the problem being targeted, expected 
costs and benefits of the proposed policy, and an assessment of alternative 
instruments. This assessment should be made public. 
All native vegetation and biodiversity policies should be subject to ongoing 
monitoring and regular independent reviews of all costs and benefits in the light 
of articulated objectives. Reviews of performance should be published. 
There is also a fundamental requirement to ensure that policy intervention is based 
on accurate, verifiable and up-to-date data and information. The accuracy of native 
vegetation mapping based on satellite imagery was criticised by many participants. 
The environmental benefits of some restrictions were also questioned. 
Ongoing efforts are required to improve the quality of data and science on which 
native vegetation and biodiversity policy decisions are based, particularly ‘on-the-
ground’ assessments to test the accuracy of vegetation mapping based on satellite 
imagery. 
Improve existing regulatory regimes  
As discussed in chapter  7, there are several ways to improve current regulatory 
regimes in line with principles of good regulation.  
RECOMMENDATION 10.1 
RECOMMENDATION 10.2 
RECOMMENDATION 10.3      





Although the Commission considers that more fundamental change is warranted 
over time (see below), existing regulatory approaches should be amended and 
refined to meet best-practice regulatory standards as soon as possible. While there is 
significant variation across regimes, with some regimes performing better than 
others, and several States introducing potentially beneficial legislative reforms 
during this inquiry, no regime at the State or Territory level as far as the 
Commission has been able to ascertain, meets all criteria for good regulation.  
In particular, in most jurisdictions there is a pressing need to enhance the 
transparency, consistency and accountability of decision making. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.4 
Current regulatory approaches should comply with good regulatory practice, 
including: 
•  clear specification of objectives of the legislation so that guidelines and 
decisions clearly link back to these objectives, and performance of the regimes 
can be monitored and assessed; 
•  minimisation of duplication and inconsistency by amalgamating and 
simplifying regulations and permit requirements, for example, by rationalising 
legislation and regulation within each State and Territory and/or by 
coordination between agencies; 
•  assistance to, and education of, landholders to meet and to understand their 
responsibilities by providing accessible information about those 
responsibilities, and how they relate to sustainable land-management practices 
and environmental problems; 
•  statutory time-frames for assessing permit applications;  
•  consideration of economic and social factors where applications to clear 
otherwise would be rejected on environmental grounds (a ‘triple bottom line’ 
approach), with reasons for decisions to be given and reported; and 
•  provision of accessible, timely and impartial appeals and dispute-resolution 
mechanisms. 
In addition, the Commission considers that the negative impacts of regimes would 
be reduced significantly, and environmental outcomes enhanced, if regional bodies 
which already exist in most States were allowed greater flexibility to determine 
appropriate guidelines and practices reflecting regional circumstances, particularly 
guidelines and practices applying to native vegetation regrowth.      







Greater flexibility should be introduced within existing regulatory regimes to 
allow variation in requirements at a regional level. To this end:  
•  greater use should be made of the extensive knowledge of landholders and 
local communities;  
•  regional committees and bodies should be given greater autonomy (and 
support) to develop appropriate requirements; and  
•  some across-the-board rules, particularly those currently applying to native 
vegetation regrowth, could be relaxed and replaced with requirements that 
meet environmental objectives but which reflect regional environmental 
characteristics and agricultural practices.  
If implemented, these changes could significantly reduce compliance costs of 
regulation to landholders and the community overall, while not detracting from, and 
most probably enhancing, environmental outcomes. However, landholders would 
still bear the costs of supplying many community-wide benefits, and State-wide 
regulation of native vegetation clearing would remain the principal instrument for 
bringing about desired environmental services. 
Limits of regulation  
The Commission considers that even if current regulatory approaches were 
improved as recommended above, there are several key underlying factors limiting 
their efficiency and effectiveness in promoting the delivery of the community’s 
native vegetation and biodiversity goals on private land. 
1.  Regulation of native vegetation clearing prescribes the means of achieving a 
range of environmental goals across different regions. However:  
(a)  there are likely to be other means of achieving at least some desired 
environmental outcomes at less cost (for example, well-managed pastures 
may also reduce soil erosion). Moreover, because the costs of regulation are 
largely borne by landholders, the cost-benefit trade-off is obscured.  
(b)  environmental problems are complex, dynamic and geographically 
heterogeneous and will require innovative and adaptive solutions drawing 
on local as well as scientific knowledge. Across-the-board requirements for 
retention of native vegetation are rigid and preclude innovation. Indeed, 
retention of native vegetation in some areas perversely appears to be 
exacerbating some environmental problems; and      





(c)  ongoing management of native vegetation is essential to ensure its health 
and regeneration, but regulation of clearing focuses only on preventing its 
deliberate removal.  
2.  Regulation of native vegetation clearing on private property effectively asserts 
public ownership of remnant native vegetation while leaving its ongoing day-to-
day management in the hands of the (uncompensated) landholder. From the 
landholder’s perspective, native vegetation loses much of its private value and 
becomes a liability. Incentives for landholders to care for, conserve or regenerate 
native vegetation voluntarily are undermined. When regulation reduces the 
private value to landholders of native vegetation, incentives to care for it are 
reduced. The prospective private loss also creates an incentive to circumvent the 
regulations (after taking into account the risks of being caught and penalised), or 
to bring forward clearing as insurance against possible strengthening of 
regulations in future. This prompts the introduction of ever stronger regulations 
and stricter enforcement provisions. 
These conclusions reflect the Commission’s observations and its analysis of the 
incentive structure provided by current regulation, as well as evidence presented to 
this inquiry. They also are consistent with a large body of economic literature (see 
chapters 8 and 9) and findings of previous Commission studies. For example, in its 
research report into pollution threats to the Great Barrier Reef Catchment, the 
Commission concluded that:  
Prescription is not the answer. Because of the complexity, heterogeneity and dispersion 
of the diffuse sources, and the inability to monitor them, governments cannot prescribe 
land management practices that are both viable and cost-effective. (PC 2003a, p. xxii)  
Poor incentives for landholders to comply with current regulatory arrangements 
could be addressed to some extent by compensating landholders for their losses. 
Payment of compensation would also make the costs of regulation more transparent 
to the community, facilitating comparison with environmental benefits. However, 
the Commission does not recommend simply compensating landholders for the 
impacts of existing compulsory regulatory regimes. This is not only because of the 
numerous difficulties in assessing appropriate farm-level compensation (chapter 9), 
but because continued reliance on regulation to achieve a range of broadly-defined 
environmental goals appears unlikely to be the most effective, least-cost option 
from a whole-of-community perspective. In this case, compensation would merely 
shift an unnecessarily large cost burden from landholders to taxpayers.      






Step 2: Encourage private conservation effort 
Effective policy intervention requires an understanding of the underlying causes, 
and not simply the symptoms, of a problem. Commenting on current regulatory 
arrangements, Gippsland Private Forestry Inc (Victoria) observed: 
There is insufficient focus on the fundamental drivers that will influence the behaviour 
of private landowners in order to achieve sustainable improved outcomes with respect 
to native vegetation management. (sub. 92, p. 2) 
In particular, underlying the current approach to conservation of native vegetation 
seems to be a view that private landholders cannot be trusted to care for the land. 
This may be an understandable (if misconceived) reaction to past practices that have 
resulted in the loss of species, as well as salinity and soil and water quality 
problems in some regions.  
Although mistakes have been and will continue to be made — partly due to the 
limited knowledge and understanding of landholders, governments and other parties 
— landholders generally have an interest in identifying and rectifying mistakes 
where the productivity of their own land and, hence, its market value, can be 
increased. Landholders will seek to increase their profits by adopting cost-saving 
technologies or by finding higher-valued uses of their land. If conservation of native 
vegetation can be made compatible with increasing landholder benefits, then more 
conservation will be provided voluntarily.  
As discussed in chapters 2 and 9, there is ample evidence that many landholders 
increasingly are implementing more sustainable agricultural practices. This occurs 
not only where these practices improve the productivity of their land now and over 
time, but also because landholders derive some private benefits such as visual and 
recreational amenity from native vegetation. Many regard themselves as stewards of 
the land. In addition, as discussed in chapter 9, there are numerous market and non-
market private mechanisms that by increasing potential returns, could encourage 
individual landholders to provide more environmental services. These include:  
•  consumer demand for environmentally-sustainable products (for example, ‘green 
labelling’), eco-tourism, or ‘green’ investments; 
•  individuals, corporations, or organisations with an interest in the environment 
(such as the Australian Bush Heritage Fund, the Australian Wildlife 
Conservancy and the Trust for Nature) either buying land or contracting with 
landholders to deliver environmental services; and  
•  groups of local landholders engaging voluntarily in cooperative efforts to 
address local environmental problems (for example, Landcare and the NSW     





Tilbuster Commons Project), possibly assisted by environmental organisations 
such as Greening Australia.  
A major advantage of private or voluntary mechanisms is that the outcome 
generally will enhance community welfare because the transaction or activity will 
occur only if the benefits to those paying for services exceed the costs. In addition, 
suppliers of the environmental services, landholders, will seek out efficient and 
innovative ways of delivering services in order to maximise profits or, in the case of 
community actions, net community gains. 
Private incentives to provide conservation services may be constrained for many 
reasons (chapters 2 and 9), including a lack of information, regulatory distortions 
and constraints and the absence of markets for ‘public-good’ environmental 
services. The variety of causes of under-provision of environmental services on 
private land suggests that targeting responses at particular constraints is likely to be 
more effective and efficient than ‘one-shoe-fits-all’ regulation.  
In many cases, the most effective role for government will be to remove regulatory 
or other policy distortions (for example, to remove impediments to efficient farm 
rationalisation and, hence, viability, or to price irrigation water efficiently). Indeed, 
removal of regulatory or policy distortions that discourage voluntary conservation 
or that encourage poor land-management practices should be addressed as a matter 
of priority, before intervening to promote or impose increased conservation effort.  
Governments could also take a more active role facilitating increased private effort, 
for example, by promoting dissemination of information and research into the 
benefits of native vegetation, and by exploring potential sustainable commercial 
uses of native vegetation and biodiversity.  
As a matter of priority, governments should seek to remove impediments to, and 
facilitate, increased private provision of environmental services. Actions could 
include: 
•  removal of tax distortions or lease conditions that discourage conservation 
activity relative to other activities;  
•  removal of impediments to efficient farm rationalisation and/or management 
and operation; 
•  research into, and facilitation of, sustainable commercial uses of native 
vegetation and biodiversity; and  
•  enhanced provision of education and extension services to demonstrate to 
landholders the private benefits of sustainable practices. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.6      






Externalities and public goods 
Where private under-provision of conservation occurs because benefits principally 
accrue ‘off-site’, governments potentially have a more direct role to play. 
Nonetheless, where negative ‘spill-over’ effects and their solutions are contained 
within defined areas, voluntary solutions may still be feasible. Government may 
have a role facilitating community solutions to community problems, for example, 
by providing resources and information and, in some cases, by facilitating or 
enforcing appropriate practices where free-riding would otherwise undermine 
achievement of objectives (as has occurred for many years in the case of pest and 
weed control). 
Even in the case of environmental public goods, such as biodiversity or carbon 
sequestration, private provision of native vegetation for personal benefit will often 
simultaneously generate these public benefits, which the rest of the community can 
enjoy free of charge. Direct or indirect purchase of conservation effort by 
individuals or non-government organisations may also provide these wider public 
benefits. 
However, precisely because the benefits of public goods are available to everybody 
(whether they want them or not) and cannot be charged for, landholders are unlikely 
to provide sufficient native vegetation and biodiversity from a whole-of-community 
perspective. At some point, the private provision of native vegetation and the 
production of goods for profit (or utility) will stop being complementary and will 
begin to compete. Beyond this point, native vegetation conserved for public-good 
purposes means that the landholder is losing income because the land could be put 
to more privately-profitable uses. Two issues then arise — which policy instruments 
are likely to be efficient in achieving this additional conservation, and who should 
pay for it. 
Step 3: Clarify landholder and community responsibilities  
The view that costs of native vegetation and biodiversity conservation need to be 
shared seems to be widely supported in principle (box 10.1). In practice, there are 
divergent views as to which actions constitute public-good conservation and which 
constitute the landholder’s responsibility (referred to by some as landholders’ ‘duty 
of care’1). According to the Tasmanian Farmers’ and Graziers’ Association:  
                                              
1  As discussed in chapter 9, the term ‘duty of care’ means different things to different people. In 
the Commission’s view, in the context of native vegetation, the term is not especially 
illuminating in clarifying responsibilities of landholders.      





There is a marked tendency for Government to put as many conservation measures as it 
can into the ‘duty of care’ category, because it effectively secures conservation benefits 
at no cost to itself. (sub. 160, p. 9) 
Under current regulatory arrangements, landholders are made responsible for 
providing virtually all services associated with retaining native vegetation on their 
properties, more often than not at their own expense.  
 
Box 10.1  Participants’ views on cost-sharing  
The costs of retaining native vegetation [should] be shared amongst the beneficiaries in 
proportion to the level of the benefit that they receive (eg landholder, local community and/or 
wider community) and that these proportions [should] be determined through the application 
of an agreed cost sharing formula. (SA Government, DR324, p. 41) 
[The] Public good must be supported by appropriate support from the public purse. (ACT 
Sustainable Rural Lands Group, sub. 125, p. 1) 
As a taxpayer I would expect and no doubt do, pay for public good actions wherever they 
happen, in areas other than the environment but do not see that we [landholders] should 
bear almost all the cost of this [environmental] public good. (T.J. Price (Western Australia), 
sub. 38, p. 2) 
The entire community should help bear the cost of public good activities. (Greening Australia 
(Tasmania), sub. 134, p. 2) 
There is also a greater requirement to identify the ‘public versus private good’ of protection 
of native vegetation and the biodiversity it supports. Landholders do have a duty of care to 
maintain and protect their natural resources. To go beyond this requires significant 
resources — capital, knowledge and financial. If the broader community is after benefits that 
go beyond this ‘duty of care’, then the broader community needs to actively contribute. 
(Murray Irrigation Ltd (New South Wales), sub. 79, p. 2) 
Best Practice … should reflect the wider community’s aspirations for natural resource 
management outcomes. Ensuring landholders contribute appropriately to achieving such 
outcomes, however, should be a matter for ‘incentivation’ not regulation … (Tasmanian 
Conservation Trust, sub. 84, p. 5) 
… legitimate equity concerns demand a ‘cost-sharing’ solution … the cost of which should 
be funded on the following principles: 
•  Application of the ‘polluter’ or ‘impactor’ pays principle, reflecting the sustainability 
responsibilities of landholders to manage both on-farm and off-farm impacts. 
•  Contributions of public funds from both Commonwealth and state governments … where 
regulations impact beyond private sustainability obligations to benefit the wider national 
interest. (Australian Conservation Foundation, sub. 146, attachment 1, p. 2) 
 
 
This allocation of costs often has sometimes been justified on the grounds that these 
landholders are major beneficiaries of the regulations. As discussed in chapter 6, in 
the Commission’s assessment, this argument is not robust because landholders 
generally will have an incentive to devise least-cost solutions to environmental 
problems that affect their own operations. Given sufficient knowledge, they will     






voluntarily retain at least that level of native vegetation and biodiversity that is good 
for them. Native vegetation regulations that prescribe how these environmental 
services will be produced, and at what levels, by restricting landholders’ options for 
achieving such benefits, will tend to impose net costs on them rather than bring 
them net benefits (even if there are benefits to the wider community). 
Some participants expressed the view that although some financial incentives for 
landholders may be justified, governments should only ‘buy’ environmental 
services above the existing regulated minimum. For example, the Victorian 
Government (sub. 185) considered that current regulations in that State prescribed 
landholders’ ‘duty of care’. The implication is that landholders should not be 
‘rewarded’ for not clearing vegetation, but payments for ‘positive’ actions such as 
managing or regenerating vegetation for the public good may be warranted. Similar 
views were expressed by the WA Government (sub. DR290) and the Australian 
Conservation Foundation (ACF, sub. DR302).  
However, in both cases, landholders would incur opportunity costs (in the case of 
not removing a tree, the net value of production forgone; in the case of planting a 
tree, the net value of production forgone plus the cost of planting the tree). In both 
cases, an environmental service demanded and valued by the community would be 
produced. It is not obvious on efficiency or equity grounds why the first action 
would not warrant payment (or, put another way, compensation for costs incurred) 
but the other could. Indeed, it is those landholders who have native vegetation on 
their properties who will forfeit profits, not their neighbours whose properties have 
been cleared in the past. From the Commission’s perspective, it would be more 
useful to define landholder responsibilities in terms of the environmental services 
provided and who benefits, and not in terms of a particular action (or whether that 
action is inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’). 
A way forward? 
Existing jurisdiction-wide regulation muddies the issue of landholder and 
community responsibility. The challenge lies in establishing an agreed process for 
clarifying environmental responsibilities. 
Landholders’ responsibilities 
In the Commission’s view, it is reasonable to expect landholders, in the aggregate, 
to bear the costs of actions that directly contribute to sustainable resource use and, 
hence, the long-term viability of agricultural and other land-based productive 
operations.      





Thus actions and mechanisms, including native vegetation retention and 
management, to ‘internalise’ what could be broadly described as externalities 
occurring within and between regions — vegetation clearing affecting soil and 
water quality, for example — would constitute the responsibility of landholders 
individually and/or as a group. This approach does not mean that individual 
landholders should only be expected to undertake what is in their private interests 
— it implies a broader responsibility to their neighbours and communities and, 
indeed, where actions have broader impacts, surrounding communities. As 
discussed below, there is a range of mechanisms that could be used to address such 
externalities. How the costs (and benefits) of actions are distributed among 
landholders will depend on the particular mechanism used.  
Society’s responsibilities 
In the Commission’s assessment, the wider public should bear the costs of retaining 
and managing native vegetation to promote ‘public-good’ environmental services 
— such as biodiversity, habitat preservation and greenhouse gas abatement — that 
it apparently demands, and which are likely to impinge significantly on the capacity 
of landholders to utilise their land for production. A similar conclusion was reached 
by the Industry Commission in an inquiry into ecologically-sustainable land 
management: 
The ‘in principle’ role for government is in determining and organising demand for the 
public good. That is, in identifying who benefits from the public good and raising, 
through taxation or similar compulsory charges, the cost of the provision of that good 
from those who benefit. (IC 1998, p. 78) 
Importantly, the Commission’s assessment is not simply based on some notion of 
fairness (although perceived fairness is not irrelevant when landholders are being 
relied upon to provide the environmental services demanded by the wider 
community). It is based on the reality that achieving the environmental outcomes on 
private land that society demands as efficiently and effectively as possible will 
require: 
•  clear enunciation and specification of the environmental outcomes demanded; 
and 
•  the knowledge and ongoing cooperation and effort of landholders who ultimately 
must deliver those outcomes on their land.  
As noted above, several participants put the view that landholders should not be 
‘rewarded’ for not clearing native vegetation. But ‘impacter pays’ is not inherently 
more efficient or equitable than other parties buying the services they value. A 
major efficiency problem in making landholders bear all the costs of not clearing     






native vegetation on their properties, including the costs of providing public good 
conservation, is that this virtually necessitates compulsory regulation. Yet 
prescriptive regulation is unlikely to promote the focus on environmental outcomes 
and the landholder cooperation required to achieve those outcomes. Nor is making a 
subset of landholders bear the costs of providing services that benefit the rest of 
society particularly fair, especially as many other landholders, often at the behest of 
governments, have been responsible for large-scale clearing in the past.  
Having governments act on behalf of the wider community as a buyer of public-
good environmental services (even, in some cases, buying up parts of or entire 
properties) would mimic private, voluntary transactions driven by the prospect of 
gains from trade accruing to both parties. This has several advantages over 
regulation for promoting additional conservation on private land:  
•  a process of buying services will require clear specification of the environmental 
outcomes demanded; 
•  agreements can be flexible, taking account of local variations, utilising local 
knowledge and encouraging innovative and cost-effective solutions. Therefore, a 
given level of environmental services is more likely to be provided at minimum 
cost; 
•  a requirement to pay will place some discipline on the community’s demand for 
environmental services and compel prioritisation of environmental demands. It is 
more likely (though certainly not guaranteed) that the community’s willingness 
to pay will be tested and the cost–benefit trade-off revealed in the aggregate and 
for individual projects. With uncompensated regulation, retention of native 
vegetation on private land essentially is a ‘free good’ for most in the community;  
•  contract terms and conditions can be designed to provide certainty to landholders 
and provide positive incentives for them to retain and manage native vegetation 
appropriately in the long term. For those who have retained native vegetation, 
that vegetation would become an asset rather than a liability.  
Such an approach has been trialled in Victoria and used extensively in Tasmania 
and overseas with promising results.2 It is not without costs or potential problems. 
Criteria have to be developed for prioritising society’s environmental objectives and 
for assessing environmental outcomes. Methods of eliciting ‘competitive’ contract 
prices (such as auctions) for desired environmental outcomes need to be developed. 
Contracts need to be designed, monitored and enforced. Because it requires case-by-
case assessment, the approach can be resource-intensive.  
                                              
2  This option encompasses the situation in the Australian Capital Territory where leaseholders 
factor in the cost of environmental requirements in the amount they bid for leases. The 
budgetary impact is reflected in lower lease revenue.      





Importantly, however, prioritisation and clear specification of environmental 
objectives, the discovery of least-cost solutions and monitoring of outcomes so that 
performance of the intervention can be assessed and improved over time, should be 
undertaken for any policy intervention, including regulation. 
In some cases, it is feasible that regulation to promote some public-good objectives 
may be efficient — for example, where a simple rule is more efficient than 
negotiations or auctions at property or regional levels. Importantly, however, if a 
transfer of rights implied by a regulatory rule is considered to be efficient, this does 
not preclude the payment of compensation to the landholders affected. The efficacy 
of regulation should not rest on the uncompensated transfer of long-accepted — and 
bought — rights. 
The cost-sharing approach outlined would shift some, though not all, costs of native 
vegetation clearing restrictions currently incurred by landholders to taxpayers. 
Although some may regard the potential budgetary impact as a major disadvantage, 
possibly limiting conservation effort, the appropriate objective of policy should be 
maximising net community benefits, not minimising budgetary outlays. 
Stewardship or other payments for providing public good conservation would not 
have to be paid in lump-sum form. Indeed, there are strong arguments for them to 
be paid periodically in line with the level and quality of services delivered.  
Institutional framework  
To the extent that landholders and local communities are expected to bear the costs 
of addressing resource degradation problems (such as containing dryland salinity 
and soil and water quality problems) themselves, there is a strong case for allowing 
them greater flexibility and authority to devise effective and efficient ways of doing 
so — and not simply imposing solutions from above, ostensibly for the landholders’ 
benefit.  
Importantly, efficient solutions to regional environmental issues may or may not 
involve retention of native vegetation, at least not to the level demanded by the 
public at large. For example, in Western Australian the principal stated reason for 
imposing clearing restrictions has been the need to contain salinity. While salinity 
undoubtedly is a major problem in that State, some have suggested other approaches 
such as deep-rooted, perennial commercial crops. It is not within the Commission’s 
expertise to say what the precise solutions will be, but the current regulatory 
approach effectively precludes exploration of and experimentation with potentially 
lower-cost options that would still achieve environmental objectives. Of course, to 
the extent that native vegetation is retained in order to solve environmental     






externalities, the rest of the community can ‘free-ride’ on any biodiversity or other 
services delivered.  
Several jurisdictions have established regional processes that have led, in some 
cases, to the successful development of environmental management strategies. 
However, the implementation of these strategies typically has been overridden by 
jurisdiction-wide regulations (for example, no net loss or net gain or vegetation 
targets), in order to meet the demands of the wider community for environmental 
services.  
The Commission is proposing that regional bodies be given greater autonomy to 
devise integrated solutions to environmental problems, including primary 
responsibility for determining what, if any, intervention is required to achieve those 
solutions as efficiently as possible and how the costs should be distributed amongst 
landholders and others. Possible mechanisms include commercial or market-based 
instruments, voluntary efforts, codes of practice, education or even regulations 
stipulating certain practices. (Where the environmental benefits to landholders are 
direct and clear, regulations and rules may be appropriate and more likely to be 
accepted and complied with.)  
Property-based levies (which have been used in South Australia to fund 
landholders’ contribution to salinity programs) or other redistributive mechanisms 
may be appropriate in some instances to share costs among landholders. For 
example, in Western Australia, currently only those landholders with remnant 
native vegetation on their properties bear the costs of clearing regulations which, 
among other things, are aimed at controlling salinity caused largely by past clearing 
on other properties.  
As outlined in box 10.2, there are several design aspects of regional bodies that 
must be addressed. The Commission is not recommending a particular regional 
institutional structure. Regional vegetation committees, catchment or other bodies 
may be appropriate forums for promoting regional environmental objectives, 
depending on the nature and extent of the latter. That said, geographic boundaries 
probably should not exceed the catchment level. 
In the Commission’s view, the most important design features are that institutions 
provide for genuine regional consultation and decision making and that they are 
delegated sufficient flexibility, authority and resources to implement their decisions. 
Representation should reflect the regional population and a range of viewpoints and 
interests, with the scope for input and guidance from government departments. 
Building trust and a sense of ‘ownership’ appear critical for success.      





As Marshall observes:  
The benefit stream  …  arises if and when communities come to comply more 
voluntarily with their cost-sharing commitments  …  so that transaction (including 
political) costs of enforcing these commitments are avoided in some degree. 
(2002, p. 111)  
 
Box 10.2  Designing regional institutions  
•  Geographic boundaries — boundaries should broadly match geographic boundaries 
of the major environmental externalities being targeted. Thus, ideally regions would 
encompass an area within which costs and benefits of externalities, and the actions 
to address them, accrue. 
•  Representation — should be representative of the population of the region. A major 
question is whether government agencies should be voting members or only 
available to provide guidance and support. 
•  Resourcing — should be adequate for building ‘community capacity’ and access to 
technical support. If bodies are responsible for policy-making and delivery 
(especially of wider community objectives), they will need resources to perform 
these functions. 
•  Responsibilities and authority — in order to determine and implement policy 
measures, regional bodies will require legislative authority as well as clear 
specification of their environmental responsibilities. 
•  Accountability and governance — transparent processes to ensure responsible use 
of public monies, including audits and reviews and monitoring of outcomes. 
•  Relationship with other levels of government — issues include: how to link regional, 
State and Commonwealth objectives in order to avoid inconsistency and overlap 
and to promote cost-effective ‘joint’ production of environmental services; 




However, because there are few precedents for how responsibility might be 
devolved under regional approaches, there may need to be a process of ‘cultural 
change, experimentation and adaptation’ (Musgrave 2002, p. 158), building on the 
many promising, albeit embryonic, examples of landholders coming together to 
identify and solve environmental problem in their regions (box 10.3). 
The Commission notes that the NSW Government (DIPNR 2003a) has announced 
new regional institutional arrangements based on catchment areas that seek to 
address perceived deficiencies — such as a lack of funding and external 
representation — in regional vegetation management committees established under 
the previous regime in that State.     






Over and above designated landholder responsibilities, the public-good 
conservation desired by the wider community (for example, to meet biodiversity, 
threatened species and greenhouse objectives), should be purchased from individual 
or groups of landholders. These objectives, developed and agreed at national and 
State and Territory levels, ideally should be fed through regional institutions to 
promote coordination and consistency of approaches and, ultimately, least-cost 
‘joint’ solutions. 
 
Box 10.3  Examples of regional approaches to environmental problems 
There are many examples of landholders developing vegetation management plans to 
address a range of environmental problems through regional vegetation management 
processes and through catchment management authorities. Typically, these plans 
identify both actions that landholders would undertake voluntarily and those that they 
regard as public-good actions requiring some external funding.  
•  Through the Condamine Alliance (supported by the Queensland and Australian 
Governments), landholders in the Darling Downs have developed a draft 
management plan with a range of short- and long-term environmental targets 
including containing salinity, achieving at least 30 per cent native vegetation forest 
and grassland cover in most districts by 2018, and protecting endangered and ‘of 
concern’ ecosystems. Some funding would be required to increase vegetation cover 
in some districts.  
•  The draft Mulga Lands Regional Vegetation Management Plan in Queensland 
proposed: increased protection of riparian forests and wildlife corridors, wetlands 
and springs and ‘of concern’ regional ecosystems; minimisation of salinity potential; 
and maintenance of 30 per cent remnant vegetation in all surface and groundwater 
catchments. The plan also called for incentives and adjustment assistance for 
landholders disproportionately affected. 




Thus there would be a ‘nested’ hierarchy of planning and outcome-focussed 
objectives, with responsibility for devising ways of delivering objectives in an 
efficient manner devolved to regional bodies (figure 1 in the overview provides a 
stylised diagrammatic illustration). An illustration of how proposed cost-sharing 
arrangements might work in practice is outlined in box 10.4. Another example of 
cost-sharing among landholders, local communities and the wider community is the 
Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Project in South 
Australia (SA Government, sub.  DR324). As noted by the SA Government ‘the 
amount and ratio of public and private benefits varies within any given catchment 
depending on the management option selected’ (sub. DR324, p. 23).      






Box 10.4  Illustrative example of cost-sharing arrangements  
At the regional level, prevention of salinity and soil and water degradation may require 
all landholders (private and public) in a region to adopt certain practices including: 
•  retention and/or regeneration and management (for example, fencing off) of native 
vegetation on slopes and in riparian areas and in areas prone to salinity; 
•  appropriate control of pest species; and 
•  adoption of appropriate farm management practices (such as appropriate stocking 
rates, minimum tillage, timing of use of fertilisers) to minimise salinity, soil erosion 
and acidity, leaching etc. 
It may be efficient to require all landholders in the region to meet certain obligations — 
for example, they may be required to submit for approval farm management plans 
specifying how they propose to meet their obligations. Where requirements fall more 
heavily on some landholders than others (for example, retention of native vegetation 
for salinity prevention purposes), redistributive mechanisms may be desirable (such as 
a property-based levy). If a region adopted a native vegetation target of, say, 20 per 
cent, a system of tradeable credits could spread the burden amongst landholders in 
the region, reward the contribution of those who have retained native vegetation, while 
allowing higher-valued agriculture to proceed.  
If society demanded additional native vegetation conservation — say minimum levels 
of 30 per cent native vegetation to promote biodiversity objectives — then payments 
would be made to landholders for the incremental costs of achieving these higher 
targets. If many landholders potentially could provide the desired vegetation, a 
competitive auction is likely to be the most effective means of eliciting the least-cost 
provision.  
Alternatively, if a tradeable credit scheme operated in the region, governments could 
buy conservation credits and, by forcing up the price, landholders would have 
incentives to retain or regenerate native vegetation. If desired environmental outcomes 
(for example, protection of habitat of an endangered species, or wetlands) are linked to 
a particular area or property, the vegetation on that land and the management services 
of the landholder, or the land itself, may need to be bought, unless the area of 
vegetation delivers regional benefits and is already protected under the regional plan.  
Where society’s objective is to stop all further clearing and development (for example, 
to promote greenhouse commitments), the same principles should apply. If land is not 
bought outright, then annual payments could be made to landholders, reflecting the 
opportunity costs of not using the land for production as well as the costs of managing 
native vegetation. Annual payments have the advantage that they can be made 
conditional on appropriate management of the vegetation.  
 
 
Several participants (including, AgForce, trans., p.  1127 and ACF, sub.  DR302) 
suggested a COAG or National Competition Policy (NCP) approach, with 
Australian Government funding dependent on States and Territories meeting agreed     






obligations. Kingma and Musgrave (2001) propose a National Natural Resources 
Investment Strategy building on the COAG and NCP models. The SA Government 
recommended that:  
The Commonwealth Government, in partnership with landholders, the community and 
Local, State and Territory Governments, negotiate cost-sharing frameworks that cover 
the wider community benefits and costs associated with the conservation and 
management of native vegetation and biodiversity resources on private land. 
(sub. DR324, p. iv) 
The Commission sees some value in developing an agreed set of broad principles 
and objectives (along the lines of the recommendations in this chapter) to guide 
development of consistent approaches to native vegetation management at the 
national, state and regional levels. 
Concluding remarks 
Over the past twenty years or so, legislation to prevent clearing of native vegetation 
on private land has been relied upon heavily to achieve biodiversity and other 
environmental objectives. The current evaluation suggests that this approach has 
serious design and implementation deficiencies, in many cases leading to 
inefficient, ineffective and inequitable outcomes.  
Progressive implementation of the reforms outlined, by building on private effort 
and landholder knowledge and goodwill, could reduce the need for government 
intervention over time, would better clarify landholder and community 
responsibilities, provide better incentives for landholders to retain and manage 
native vegetation, and introduce greater policy variety and flexibility, accountability 
and transparency.  
A crucial thrust of the Commission’s recommendations is that policies that fail to 
engage the cooperation of landholders will themselves ultimately fail. In addition, 
greater transparency about the cost–benefit trade-offs involved in providing desired 
environmental services would facilitate better policy choices.  
RECOMMENDATION 10.7 
Landholders individually, or as a group, should bear the cost of actions that 
directly contribute to sustainable resource use (including, for example, land and 
water quality) and, hence, the long-term viability of agriculture and other land-
based operations. Redistributive mechanisms may be appropriate in some 
instances to share costs among landholders and regional communities.     






Regional institutions should be further developed and charged with addressing 
regional and inter-regional resource sustainability issues within broad 
parameters determined at national, State and Territory levels. Regional bodies 
should provide for genuine regional consultation, representation and decision 
making and be granted sufficient flexibility, authority and resources to implement 
their decisions.  
Over and above agreed landholder responsibilities, additional conservation 
apparently demanded by society (for example, to achieve biodiversity, threatened 
species and greenhouse objectives), should be purchased from landholders where 
intervention is deemed cost-effective. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.10 
Public-good native vegetation and biodiversity objectives ideally should be fed 
through regional institutions to promote coordination and consistency of 
approaches and, therefore, least-cost ‘joint’ solutions. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.9  
 
APPENDIXES     




A Public  consultation 
A.1  List of submissions 
Participant Submission  no.
ACT Sustainable Rural Lands Group Inc.  125, DR258
AgForce Queensland  54, DR272
Anderson, G. & C.  20
Anderson, Gary  194, DR291
Australian Conservation Foundation  146, DR302
Australian Fisheries Management Authority (Australian Government)  198
Australian Honey Bee Industry Council  DR310
Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices  131, DR235
Baradine Progress Association Inc.  130
Bartlett, Andrew   168
Berger, Harry  DR251
Bester, Matthew   212
Blake, Janet & Kevin  188
Blue Chip Forestry Services  DR248
Boardman, Allan  145
Boardman, J. & M.  39
Booth Associates  165
Brinsmean, C.  107
Brisbane City Council  161
Brisbane Region Environment Council  132
Bucknell, Jeff   25
Burnett, V.D.  DR296
Burns, B.J. & S.L.  202
Bush Users Group – Indigo Region  67
Bush Users Group – Victoria  155
Campbell, Keith G.  DR278
Campbell, Kevin & Sue  11
Canegrowers  101
Canegrowers & CSR Sugar - Herbert River District  164
Canegrowers Herbert River District  DR273
Cardwell Shire Council  123, DR231
Central Victorian Apiarists Association Inc.  DR268
Chapman, Eric  DR309
Chinchilla Shire Council  88
Clarke, W.R.  24
     





Participant Submission  no.
Coach Road Ferns  73
Cole, Kevin  28, DR228
Collins, Ron & Jennifer  182, DR321
Conservation Council of Western Australia Inc.  189, DR285
Constance, Ernie  29
Constitutional Property Rights Committee  51, 55, DR224, DR301
Cook, Clyde  12
Coolum District Coast Care Group  DR252
Corangamite Shire Council  DR236
Country Fire Authority of Victoria  138
Country Women's Association of NSW  31
Dalrymple Landcare Committee Inc.  DR256
Davies, Graham  9
Davis, Edward  23
Davis, Murray  103
Dean, Geoff  49, DR247
Dennis E. Toohey & Associates  DR281
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (Australian Government)  204, 218
Department of Defence (Australian Government)  42
Department of the Environment and Heritage (Australian Government)  190
Dickens, R.K.   68
Dickson, Roy  163
District Council of Elliston  120
Dival, John   137
Drury, Mark   217
Duden, Eva & Arnfried   57
Dumbleyung Landcare Office  DR264
East End Mine Action Group  16, 102, 169, 219, DR239, DR292, DR322
East Gippsland District Council – VFF  187
Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council  DR261
Eddy, Victor  DR255
Environment ACT  17
Environment Centre Northern Territory, The  147
Environment Network  156
Euroka Station Partnership  167, DR294
Fearnside, Geoff  DR275
Ferguson, Kenneison & Associates  142, DR280, DR308
Fitzhardinge, Guy  DR225
Flanagan, Gerard   1
Forests & Forest Industry Council of Tasmania  47
Freeman, Lynton  21
Friends of the Earth  DR293
Gailey, Drew   97
Galeano, Joe  35, DR244
Gallagher, P.A. & E.G.  70
Gecko – Gold Coast & Hinterland Environment Council  127
     




Participant Submission  no.
Gillard, Russell  36
Gingin Shire  37
Gippsland Private Forestry Inc. (formally Gippsland Farm Plantations Inc.)  92, DR250
Goodworth, Robert  199
Goodworth, Robert & Newling, Steve  200
Greening Australia (Tasmania)  134
Gunnedah Chamber of Commerce and Industry  116
Habchi, Walter   209
Hall, Alan & Shirley  74, DR237
Hamill, M.K.  176
Harris, Graeme  DR299
Harris, P.J.  DR320
Hawkins, Ron  111
Hepburn, Darren & Peter  75
Hespe, F.S.  62, DR233
Holt, Reginald  87
Horton, David  DR234
Humane Society International – Australia  126
Huon Valley Council  DR230
Hutchins, Stewart & Jenny  DR266
ICM Agribusiness  4
Inland Burnett Regional Vegetation Management Committee  139
Institute of Public Affairs  135, DR279
Jack, Ian & Sue  141
Jones, Evan  152
Kasper, Wolfgang   13
Katter, Bob MP  DR253
Kempsey Shire Council  3
Kena, Michael   8
Kerr, Neil   154
Land & Environment Planning  2
Landholders Institute Inc., The  207, 208, DR232, DR300
Lawson, Steven   157
Lefroy, Ted & Stone, Peter  193
Lennon, Nita   82
Leucaena Network Association Inc., The  180
Leverton Pastoral Company Pty Ltd  96
Local Government Association & Shires Association of NSW  178
Logue, Jarrod   215
Mahar, Helen  40, DR238
Manchee, Jane   83
Mansour, Joseph   206
McArdle, Gerald   53
McDonald, D.R. & C.C.  85
McFarland, Derek  124
McGarva, Paul   76, 192
     





Participant Submission  no.
McKay, Sally & McDowall, Jim  78, DR270
McKindlay, John   114
McPherson, Faye   173
McShane, Don  DR274
Mesibov, Robert   22
Meyer, Bruce  112
Milbrook Ellis & Co  14
Mills, Joseph   216
Miriam Vale Rural Science & Landcare Society  105
Mitchell Environment Group  65, DR282
Moss, Helen  DR257
Moyne Shire Council  DR229
Mr Fern Pty Ltd  46, 175
Munmurra Landholder Action Group  69
Murdoch, Russell   118
Murphy, Timothy   213
Murray Darling Basin Lippia Working Group  170
Murray Irrigation Ltd  79
Murrumbidgee Irrigation  DR262
Murton, John   45
Narrandera Shire Council  72
National Association of Forest Industries  90
National Farmers’ Federation  128, DR295
Nature Conservation Council of NSW  109
Nillumbik Shire Council  174
Nixon, Murray  148, DR242
Northern Grampians Shire Council  150
Northern Land Council  221
Northern Midlands Council  DR288
Nott, Dixie   184
NSW Department of Infrastructure, Planning & Natural Resources  122
NSW Farmers’ Association – Bega Branch  81
NSW Forests Products Association Ltd  DR243, DR276
NSW National Party  115
NSW Native Vegetation Advisory Council  121
Nuggetty Landcare Protection Group Inc  71
O’Donnell, Carol  133
O’Halloran, Anthony  80
Oldaker, John  DR283
O’Neill, Jim & Evellyn  172
O’Regan, Bevan  153, DR249
Overmars, Frances   18
Pacers, Peter   93
Pacific Palms Community Association  64
Page, Bruce  186, DR305
Page, Warren  58, DR269
     




Participant Submission  no.
Pape, Bryan  7
Pastoralists and Graziers Association of WA  91, DR289, DR313
Peart, Wally  DR304
Perkins, Raymond  86
Phelan, Thomas  61
Potter, Graham  183
Price, T.J.  38
Property Rights Australia  171, 203
Prospectors & Miners Association of Victoria  117
Queensland Farmers’ Federation  177
Queensland Resources Council  DR311
Rambutan and Tropical Exotic Growers Association Inc.  179
Rees, Ben  210, DR227
Regional Vegetation Management Committees: South-West Queensland  158
Reynolds, Charles  48, DR245
Ricegrowers Association of Australia  113
Rural Conservation Service  136
Saunders, Augusta  19
Sebire, Geoff  DR319
Serpentine–Jarrahdale Land Conservation District Committee  66
Sheaffe, R.W.   30
Shire of Dandaragan  191
Shoalhaven City Council  98
Sinden, Jack   15
South Australian Farmers’ Federation  140
South Australian Government  DR324
South East NSW Horticultural Producers Association  32
South Grafton Residents Progress Association Inc.  104
Southern Midlands Council  166, 197, DR306
St James – Devenish Branch – VFF  99
State Council of Rural Lands Protection Boards  95
Stewart, D.M.McL. & J.A.  77
Stubbs, David   214
Sutherland, Michael   159
Tamborine Mountain Landcare  5, DR240
Tasmanian Conservation Trust  84, DR286
Tasmanian Farmers & Graziers Association  160, 195, DR277
Tasmanian Government  201
Tatiara District Council  60
Threatened Species Scientific Committee  DR223
Timber Communities of Australia Grafton Branch  100
Timber Towns Victoria  DR263
Tippett, Gilbert  52, DR307
Tomlinson, Elizabeth  DR246
Tonna, Aaron   205
Trust for Nature (Victoria)  129
     





Participant Submission  no.
Turkington, Russell  50, DR241 
Vallance, Jack  6, DR222
Van Santen, Rochelle   26
Victorian Apiarists Association  220, DR297, DR298
Victorian Catchment Management Council  DR312
Victorian Farmers Federation  149, DR284
Victorian Government  185, DR323
Wait, Anthony  43
Ward, Denise  196
Waterford, Jim  41
Waugh, Anne   106
Weatherald, Robin  DR271
Weeding, Maria & Geard, Helen  162
West Gippsland Catchment Management Authority  63
West Wimmera Shire Council  110, DR265
Western Australian Farmers Federation  94, DR287
Western Australian Government  151, DR290
Western Australian Local Government Association  DR260
Western, Dave  DR316, DR317, DR318
Weston, Peter  56
Wetland Care Australia  59
Wheatley, Len  10, 144, 181, DR226, DR314
Wilderness Society  89, DR315
Wildflower Society of Western Australia  33, DR259
Wills, Ray & the Ecological Society of Australia  DR267
Wilson, Bruce  DR254
Wilson, Mel & Kay  44
Witham, Anthony  34
Wood, Murray  211
Wren, Peter  119, DR303
Wroth, J.C. & C.M.  143
WWF Australia  108
Young, Rod  27
     




The NSW Farmers’ Association forwarded a submission template to its members in 
response to our issues paper. Seventeen template submissions were received by the 
Commission, which are listed below. Sixteen additional template submissions were 
also forwarded from the NSW Farmers’ Association but without names or contact 
addresses. 
Participant  Template submission no.
Baglisin Pty Ltd  TS02
Brunt, Alan   TS04
Campbell, K. & S.   TS12
Charles Mills (Uardry) Pty Ltd & Yanga Pty Ltd  TS15
Cloros, D. & S.  TS17
Constance, Ernie   TS05
Crittenden, R.   TS13
Hall, A.G. & S.A.   TS07
Hall, D.H. & T.L.  TS10
Hamblin, Ian   TS06
JMC Woodside Trading  TS03
Kilmartin, Gary   TS16
Muirhead, J.   TS01
Peadon, T.R., P.J. & R.T.  TS11
Reid, Nerida   TS14
Webb, John   TS08
Wilson, T.J. & K.S.   TS09
A.2 Visits 
New South Wales 
NSW Farmers’ Association 
Wetland Care Australia 
WWF Australia 
NSW regional visits: Deniliquin, Tottenham, Wagga Wagga 
Victoria 
Australian Conservation Foundation 
Victorian Farmers Federation 
Victorian Government 
Victorian regional visits: Bairnsdale, Omeo     







Chinchilla Shire Council 
Queensland Conservation Council 
Queensland Farmers’ Federation 
Queensland Government 
Queensland regional visits: Charleville, Mt Garnet, Tully 
South Australia 
Conservation Council of South Australia  
Local Government Association of South Australia 
Nature Conservation Society of South Australia 
South Australian Chamber of Mines and Energy 
South Australian Farmers’ Federation 
South Australian Government 
Western Australia 
Alcoa World Alumina Australia 
Bradby, Keith 
Conservation Council of Western Australia Inc. 
CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems (Australian Government) 
Davies, Graham 
Green Skills Inc. 
Nindethana Seed Service 
Pastoralists and Graziers Association of WA 
SCRIPT (South Coast Regional Initiative Planning Team) 
Western Australian Farmers Federation 
Western Australian Government 
Western Australian regional visit: Albany 
Northern Territory 
Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Environment 
Environment Centre of the Northern Territory 
Northern Land Council     




Northern Territory Cattlemen’s Association 
Northern Territory regional visit: Douglas-Daly Region 
Tasmania 
Australian Bush Heritage Fund 
Private Forest Reserve Program 
Tasmanian Conservation Trust 
Tasmanian Farmers & Graziers Association 
Tasmanian Government 
Tasmanian regional visit: Midlands 
Australian Capital Territory 
Australian Aluminium Council 
Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics (Australian Government) 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (Australian Government) 
Department of the Environment and Heritage (Australian Government) 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australian Government) 
Environment ACT 
Minerals Council of Australia 
National Farmers’ Federation 
The Treasury (Australian Government) 
A.3  Initial public hearings 
Brisbane, 28 July 2003 
AgForce Queensland 
Brisbane Region Environment Council 
Canegrowers 
East End Mine Action Group 
Flanagan, Gerard  
Freeman, Lynton  
Fritz, William  
Gecko – Gold Coast & Hinterland Environment Council 
Timber Communities of Australia Grafton Branch     





Cairns, 31 July 2003 
Bauer, Bonny 
Burtenshaw, Roz  
Canegrowers Innisfail 
Johnstone River Catchment Association Inc. 
Katter, Bob MP 
Longan Association Australia 
Mulgrave Landcare Catchment Group 
Natural Resource Management Board (Wet Tropics) Inc. 
Sing, Robert  
Canberra, 4 August 2003 
Constitutional Property Rights Committee 
D’Arcy, John 
Greening Australia 
National Association of Forest Industries 
National Farmers’ Federation 
Page, Warren 
Rural Conservation Service 
Wheatley, Len 
Perth, 7 August 2003 
Collins, Ron  
Conservation Council of Western Australia Inc. 
Dival, John  
Ferguson, Kenneison & Associates 
Landcare Services 
O’Dea, John 
Pastoralists and Graziers Association of WA 
Underwood, Craig  
Western Australian Farmers Federation 
Western Australian Government     




Adelaide, 8 August 2003 
Davis, Edward  
McKay, Sally & McDowell, Jim  
Parker, Kevin & Neville  
South Australian Farmers’ Federation 
Tatiara District Council 
Melbourne, 14 August 2003 
Australian Conservation Foundation 
Gippsland Farm Plantations Inc. 
Jack, Ian  
Mr Fern Pty Ltd 
Pacers, Peter  
Wait, Anthony  
West Wimmera Shire Council 
Melbourne, 15 August 2003 
Blake, Janet & Kevin  
Canegrowers & CSR Sugar – Herbert River District 
Davis, Murray  
Holt, Reginald  
Tippett, Gilbert  
Victorian Apiarists Association 
Victorian Farmers Federation 
Hobart, 18 August 2003 
Forests & Forest Industry Council of Tasmania 
Reserve Design & Management 
Southern Midlands Council 
Tasmanian Conservation Trust 
Tasmanian Farmers & Graziers Association     





Sydney, 19 August 2003 
Hespe, F.S.  
Institute of Public Affairs 
NSW Farmers’ Association 
Ricegrowers Association of Australia 
Wilderness Society 
WWF Australia 
Moree, 20 August 2003 
Boardman, Allan  
Country Women’s Association of NSW 
Leverton Pastoral Company Pty Ltd 
Mills, Denzil  
Moree Plains Shire Council 
Murray Darling Basin Lippia Working Group 
O'Regan, Bevan  
Pape, Bryan  
Schmidt, Andrew & Kathy  
Sinden, Jack  
Voller, Peter  
Young, Rod  
A.4  Draft report public hearings 
Mackay, 2 February 2004 
Ashburner, Bern 
Dalrymple Landcare Committee Inc. 
Greaves, Ray 
Heit, Sandy 
Mackay Conservation Group 
Reedman, R.K. 
Smith, Harold 
Sunfish Mackay Regional Branch     




Wildlife Preservation Society of Queensland 
Toowoomba, 3 February 2004 
AgForce Queensland 
Boonah Shire Council 
Clift, Colin 
Tamborine Mountain Landcare 
Turkington, Russell 
Sydney, 4 February 2004 
Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices 
Campbell, Keith G. 
Hespe, F.S. 
NSW Forest Products Association Ltd 
Dubbo, 5 February 2004 
Arnott, Doug 
Brewarrina Regional Vegetation Committee 
Cook, Clyde 
Edwards, Jim 
Hall, Alan & Shirley 
Menzies, Doug 






Albury, 11 February 2004 
Dennis E. Toohey & Associates 
Euroka Station Partnership 
Jones, Jack 
Lucas, Geoff     











Northern Midlands Council 
Oldaker, John 
Southern Midlands Council 
Swan, Denise 
Tasmanian Conservation Trust 
Tasmanian Farmers & Graziers Association 
Perth, 17 February 2004 
Conservation Council of Western Australia Inc. 
Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council 
Ferguson, Kenneison & Associates 
Nixon, Murray 
Pastoralists and Graziers Association of WA 
Western Australian Farmers Federation 
Western Australian Government 
Melbourne, 23 February 2004 
Australian Conservation Foundation 
Sebire, Geoff 
Weatherald, Robin 
Melbourne, 24 February 2004 
Davis, Murray 
Jack, Ian & Sue 
McKay, Sally & McDowall, Jim 
South Australian Farmers’ Federation 
Threatened Species Scientific Committee     




Timber Towns Victoria 
Tippett, Gilbert 
Victorian Farmers Federation 
Geraldton, 18 February 2004 (Roundtable discussion) 
Carr, Dick 










A.5 Modelling  workshop 
Melbourne, 27 February 2004 
ABARE (Australian Government) 
Australian Greenhouse Office (Australian Government) 
Ian Beale, Devine Agribusiness 
Sean Constable, Constable Consulting 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (Australian Government) 
Department of the Environment and Heritage (Australian Government) 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australian Government) 
Department of Transport and Regional Services (Australian Government) 
Graham Kenny, Devine Agribusiness 
NSW Farmers’ Association 
Geoff Slaughter, University of Queensland     
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B  Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act  
B.1 Introduction 
The key legislation addressing native vegetation and biodiversity conservation at 
the Australian Government level is the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act). The EPBC Act commenced on 16 July 2000. It 
comprises:  
•  arrangements for environmental impact assessment, and approval, of certain 
actions that affect the environment; and  
•  mechanisms to conserve biodiversity and heritage.  
In addition, a new national heritage system commenced operation on 
1 January 2004. One of its key features is a National Heritage List which will be 
maintained under the EPBC Act. The list will include natural, historic and 
Indigenous places of outstanding heritage value to all Australians. The listed 
heritage values, not necessarily the place itself, will be protected under the EPBC 
Act (DEH 2004a).  
By replacing seven acts, including the Environment Protection (Impact of 
Proposals) Act 1974 (Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act) and the 
Endangered Species Protection Act 1982, the EPBC Act consolidated and updated 
the Australian Government’s regulatory regime for the environment, but also 
expanded its direct regulation of environmental matters (Scanlon and Dyson 2001). 
Through the EPBC Act, the Australian Government enacted Australia’s obligations 
under several international treaties such as the United Nations World Heritage 
Treaty, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Ramsar Convention on 
Wetlands. 
In addition to administering the EPBC Act, the Australian Government plays other 
roles in biodiversity conservation and environmental management by: 
•  coordinating national policies, adopted by all States and Territories, such as the 
National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity;     





•  providing significant funding, through vehicles such as the Natural Heritage 
Trust and the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, for projects 
that protect or enhance the environment; and  
•  funding research on environmental issues through programs such as the National 
Land and Water Resources Audit and the Australian Biological Resources 
Study. 
B.2  Description of the regulatory regime 
The EPBC Act implements key aspects of the Council of Australian Governments’ 
Agreement on Commonwealth/State Roles and Responsibilities for the 
Environment (COAG 1997). The objects of the Act are re-produced in box B.1.  
 
Box B.1  Objects of the EPBC Act  
•  To provide for the protection of the environment, especially aspects of the 
environment that are matters of national environmental significance.  
•  To promote ecologically sustainable development through the conservation and 
ecologically sustainable use of natural resources. 
•  To promote the conservation of biodiversity.  
•  To provide for the protection and conservation of heritage. 
•  To promote a co-operative approach to the protection and management of the 
environment involving governments, the community, landholders and Indigenous 
peoples. 
•  To assist in the co-operative implementation of Australia's international 
environmental responsibilities. 
•  To recognise the role of Indigenous people in the conservation and ecologically 
sustainable use of Australia's biodiversity.  
•  To promote the use of Indigenous peoples’ knowledge of biodiversity with the 
involvement of, and in co-operation with, the owners of the knowledge.  
Source: EPBC Act (s. 3). 
 
 
Under the EPBC Act, certain ‘actions’ — projects, developments, undertakings, 
activities or a series of activities, or an alteration to any of these (s. 523) — require 
approval from the Australian Government Environment Minister. Actions that may 
‘trigger’ assessment and approval under the EPBC Act include those that have, will 
have or are likely to have a significant impact on: 
•  a ‘matter of national environmental significance’; or      
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•  the environment1 on Commonwealth land even if the action is taken outside 
Commonwealth land and on the environment in general if the action is taken on 
Commonwealth land; or  
•  the environment inside or outside Australian jurisdiction, where the actions are 
undertaken by the Australian Government or its agencies.  
The definition of ‘actions’ in the Act is very broad. However, environmental 
assessment and approval is required only for ‘new’ actions and not for actions that 
were authorised before commencement of the Act or that represent a lawful 
continuation of land use started before the Act’s commencement, unless such 
actions are enlarged, expanded or intensified (ss  43A–43B). Decisions by 
government bodies on grant funding, and government decisions authorising others 
to undertake actions, are also specifically excluded as ‘actions’ under the Act 
(s. 524). There are several other cases where actions do not require assessment and 
approval under the EPBC Act, such as: 
•  those covered by a bilateral agreement (see below) or Ministerial declaration 
(which allows the Australian Government Environment Minister (Environment 
Minister) to delegate assessment and/or approval to another Australian 
Government body); 
•  forestry operations undertaken in accordance with a Regional Forest Agreement 
process (unless they occur in World Heritage properties or in Ramsar wetlands 
or if the action is incidental to another action which does not have a primary 
purpose related to forestry); and  
•  actions in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park authorised under the Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park Act 1975. (EPBC Act, ss 29–43) 
The Environment Minister may also exempt an action from assessment and 
approval if it is in ‘the national interest’ to do so, such as for defence or security 
reasons (s. 158). 
Matters of national environmental significance  
As outlined above, assessment and approval may be required under the EPBC Act 
for an action with a ‘significant impact’ on a matter of national environmental 
significance. The Act currently lists seven of these matters: 
•  World Heritage properties; 
•  National Heritage places (from 1 January 2004); 
                                              
1  Amongst other things, the definition of ‘environment’ under the Act includes ecosystems and 
their parts, natural and physical resources and the heritage values of places (s. 528).     





•  wetlands of international importance (Ramsar wetlands); 
•  listed threatened species and ecological communities; 
•  internationally protected listed migratory species; 
•  Commonwealth marine areas; and 
•  nuclear actions.  
There is scope for the Environment Minister to add additional matters to this list 
through regulations (for example, introduction of a greenhouse trigger has been 
proposed). Before doing so, the Minister must consult with the States/Territories, 
although their agreement is not necessary. The Minister is also required to report 
every five years on whether additional matters of national environmental 
significance should be added to the Act.  
Significant impact 
As stated above, the requirement to undergo assessment and approval under the 
EPBC Act applies when an action has a ‘significant impact’ in certain cases (for 
example, on matters of national environmental significance). Despite its importance 
in the regulatory regime, the term ‘significant impact’ is not defined in the EPBC 
Act or its regulations. However, the Department of the Environment and Heritage 
(DEH) has produced EPBC Act Administrative Guidelines on Significance 
(EA 2000), which set out criteria for judging whether the impact is likely to be 
significant. While the Guidelines provide examples of actions that are, and are not, 
likely to have a significant impact, they are not exhaustive or definitive. For 
example, the Guidelines state that an action is likely to have a significant impact on 
a critically endangered or endangered species when it:  
•  leads to a long-term decrease in the size of a population; or  
•  reduces the area of occupancy of the species; or  
•  fragments an existing population into two or more populations; or  
•  adversely affects habitat critical to the survival of a species; or  
•  disrupts the breeding cycle of a population (EA 2000).  
Supplements to the Administrative Guidelines have been produced for some 
individual species, such as the Bluegrass ecological communities, Spectacled 
Flying-fox and the Grey-headed Flying-fox. While the Administrative Guidelines     
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provide some advice to those regulated, they are not legally binding.2 The 
Guidelines are currently being reviewed by DEH. 
Assessment and approval processes 
Actions that trigger the EPBC Act must undergo the environmental assessment and 
approval process contained in the Act. The process involves three broad stages: 
referral by the proponent; assessment; and approval. 
Referral  
The EPBC Act (s. 68) requires those proposing to take an action that they think is, 
or may be, covered by the Act to refer a proposal to the Australian Government 
Environment Minister for a decision on whether the action is a ‘controlled action’ 
under the Act. A State/Territory agency with administrative responsibilities relating 
to a proposed action may also refer the action (s. 69) and the Environment Minister 
may request a person or a State/Territory agency to refer a proposal (s. 70).  
The EPBC regulations require those submitting referrals to provide a description of 
the proposed action, the nature and extent of its likely impacts, and a statement on 
whether the proponent considers the action to be a controlled action under the Act. 
On the basis of the referral, the Environment Minister decides whether the proposal 
is a controlled action under the Act, and which of the controlling provisions apply. 
This decision must be made within 20 business days of receiving the referral 
(10 business days if the referral states that the proponent considers it a controlled 
action (s.  75)). Only controlled actions proceed to the assessment stage of the 
assessment and approval process.  
In deciding whether an action is a controlled action, the Environment Minister must 
invite comment from other Ministers with administrative responsibilities relating to 
the proposal. The Minister must also publish the referral on the internet and invite 
public comment. However, these consultation requirements do not apply if the 
referral states that the proponent considers the action to be a controlled action.  
                                              
2  Advice provided by the legal firm, Deacons, to the National Farmers’ Federation (sub. 128, 
p. 13).     






For controlled actions, the Environment Minister must choose how the impacts of 
the proposed action will be assessed. The following assessment options are 
available under the EPBC Act (s. 87): 
•  an accredited assessment process — a bilateral agreement or Ministerial 
declaration; 
•  assessment on the basis of preliminary documentation; 
•  a public environment report; 
•  an environmental impact statement; or 
•  a public inquiry.  
The Environment Minister must invite comment from the State/Territory where the 
proposed action will occur before determining which assessment approach to apply. 
Each assessment method includes opportunities for the public to comment on the 
information presented. 
Regardless of the assessment method used, usually the only impacts relevant for 
assessment are those the action has, will have, or is likely to have on the 
‘controlling provision’ (for example, the matter of national environmental 
significance that has triggered the approval process) (s. 82). 
Bilateral agreements  
A bilateral agreement, available under the EPBC Act, between the Australian 
Government and a State/Territory Government would allow the Australian 
Government to accredit the environmental assessment and/or approval processes in 
the State/Territory (or vice versa). The objective of bilateral agreements is to 
minimise duplication in assessment and approval processes and to promote 
efficiency, timeliness and effectiveness of processes (s. 44). In effect, a bilateral 
agreement allows the Australian Government to delegate its assessment and/or 
approval role to the State/Territory, as actions which would have been assessed by 
the Australian Government under the EPBC Act would instead be assessed and/or 
approved by the State/Territory (similarly ‘Ministerial declarations’ that accredit 
other assessment processes of the Australian Government allow actions to be 
assessed under those processes, rather than under the EPBC Act). 
The public is given an opportunity to comment on all draft bilateral agreements and 
final versions of bilateral agreements must be published, including a statement of     
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reasons for entering into them. Bilateral agreements are valid for up to five years 
and must be reviewed before expiry. 
Assessment bilateral agreements set out the assessment method to be followed by 
each State/Territory. The assessment method must comply with criteria in the Act 
and regulations that are intended to set a minimum standard for assessment of 
environmental impacts. For approval bilateral agreements, an accredited 
management plan must be tabled in both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament 
where it can be disallowed by either House.  
Bilateral agreements may contain provisions for auditing, monitoring, and reporting 
on the operation and effectiveness of the agreement. Anyone can alert the 
Environment Minister to a potential contravention of a bilateral agreement, and the 
Minister can suspend or cancel an agreement if the State/Territory has failed, or will 
fail, to comply.  
To date, the Australian Government has only entered into assessment bilateral 
agreements. Under these agreements, the Australian Government Environment 
Minister retains the role of making approval decisions (DEH 2003, p. 170). Bilateral 
agreements have been signed with Tasmania (2000), the Northern Territory (2002) 
and Western Australia  (2002). And, according to DEH (sub.  190), the bilateral 
agreement with Queensland is well-advanced.  
Where there is no bilateral agreement, case-by-case accreditation of assessment 
processes are used to reduce inter-governmental duplication (DEH 2003, p. 165).  
Approval 
On the basis of a completed assessment, the Environment Minister generally has 
30 business days (at least 40 business days after a public inquiry) to decide whether 
or not to approve the action (with or without conditions). Prior to deciding, the 
Minister must receive a notice from the relevant State/Territory Government that 
the impacts of the action on matters, other than those of national environmental 
significance, have been assessed to the ‘greatest extent practicable’(s. 130). Apart 
from some exemptions, such as for nuclear actions or actions on Commonwealth 
land, the Minister cannot approve an action until that notice has been received 
(s. 133).  
In deciding whether to grant an approval, the Environment Minister must consider 
economic and social matters as well as relevant environmental matters (s. 136). The 
Minister must take into account: the assessment report or statement; the principles 
of ecologically sustainable development; and relevant comments received from     





other ministers invited to comment (s.  136). The Minister may also consider a 
proponent’s personal history with regard to environmental matters.  
In 2002-03, approval was refused for the first time. Approval was denied by the 
Environment Minister because the proposal to take or destroy approximately 5500 
Spectacled Flying-foxes (in the period November to December 2002) to protect a 
lychee orchard would have a significant impact on World Heritage values of a 
declared World Heritage property. Statistics on the operation of the Act are 
discussed in section B.4.  
Conditions  
The Environment Minister may attach any condition to an approval to protect, or to 
mitigate, or repair damage to a matter covered by the Act, whether the damage is 
caused by the action or not. Examples of conditions include requiring: 
•  the proponent to supply a bond, guarantee or cash deposit;  
•  periodic independent environmental audits of the action; 
•  implementation of an approved (by the Minister) plan for managing the impacts 
of the action; 
•  environmental monitoring or testing; and 
•  compliance with a specified industry standard or code of practice. (s. 134) 
Conditions, such as avoiding activities at certain times, re-locating populations of 
species and preparing detailed plans to reduce impacts on the environment, were 
attached to most of the approvals made in 2001-02. Almost all approvals made in 
2002-03 also were conditional. DEH (sub.  190) advised that the conditions are 
‘outcome-focused’, where possible, to allow proponents to choose the most cost-
effective means of complying with them. 
Biodiversity conservation  
As well as listing threatened species and ecological communities as matters of 
national environmental significance, chapter  5 of the EPBC Act contains other 
mechanisms for biodiversity conservation (some are outlined below). In many 
cases, only Australian Government agencies are required to comply, or compliance 
is required only for Commonwealth areas. However, some non-coercive provisions, 
such as conservation agreements, may apply to the private sector.      
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Listings of threatened species, ecological communities and key threatening 
processes  
The EPBC Act requires the Environment Minister to establish a list of threatened 
(native) species that includes the following categories: 
•  extinct;  
•  extinct in the wild;  
•  critically endangered;  
•  endangered;  
•  vulnerable; and  
•  conservation dependent (ss 178–80).  
The Act also requires the Minister to establish a list of threatened ecological 
communities in the categories of ‘critically endangered’, ‘endangered’ and 
‘vulnerable’ (ss 181–2).  
In  2002-03, seventeen additions were made to these lists and one species was 
de-listed (DEH 2003). At 30 June 2003, the total number of listings were: 
•  threatened species — 1611; and 
•  threatened ecological communities — 29 (DEH 2003, p. 216).  
The Minister seeks the advice of the Threatened Species Scientific Committee 
(TSSC) before amending the threatened species or ecological communities lists, but 
in making changes to either of these lists, the Minister must not consider any matter 
that does not relate to the survival of the native species (s. 186) or the ecological 
community concerned (s. 187).  
Changes to the threatened species and ecological communities lists can be the 
source of vigorous debate. In particular, the listing of Bluegrass dominant 
grasslands of the Brigalow Belt Bioregions (North and South) and the Brigalow 
ecological communities made in April 2001 generated controversy as these occur in 
productive agricultural areas.  
Under the Act, the Environment Minister must also establish a list of ‘key 
threatening processes’ (s. 183). This list contained 13 key threatening processes at 
30  June  2003 (DEH  2003, p.  216). This list includes ‘land clearance’ (effective 
4 April 2001)  which  refers  to the destruction of native vegetation — vegetation 
where native species constitute more than 70  per cent of plant cover or other 
vegetation containing populations of species listed under the EPBC Act — and its 
substantial replacement with non-local species or human artefacts (TSSC  2001).     





Land clearing includes clearance of native vegetation for crops, pasture, plantations, 
gardens, houses, mines, buildings and roads. It does not include activities, such as 
grazing which can also change native vegetation composition and structure 
(TSSC 2001). 
A threatening process is defined as a process which ‘threatens, or may threaten, the 
survival, abundance or evolutionary development of a native species or ecological 
community’ (s. 183). A process is eligible for listing if:  
•  it could cause a native species or ecological community to become eligible for 
listing in any category (listed above), other than ‘conservation dependent’; 
•  it could cause a species/ecological community already listed to become eligible 
for listing under a more endangered category; or  
•  it adversely affects at least two listed threatened species (other than conservation 
dependent) or at least two listed threatened ecological communities (s. 188).  
While the Minister must ‘take all reasonably practical steps’ to ensure that all of the 
eligible threatened species and ecological communities are listed under the Act 
(s. 185), this requirement does not apply to the list of threatening processes.  
Any person may nominate a native species, ecological community or threatening 
process for listing under the Act. Nominations are forwarded to the TSSC for 
advice, unless the Minister is satisfied the nomination is ‘vexatious, frivolous or not 
made in good faith’ (s. 191). The Committee generally has 12 months to provide its 
assessment to the Minister (s. 189). All of the lists maintained under the Act must 
be available to the public (s. 194) and, while there is no statutory requirement to call 
for public comments on nominations, the Minister has been doing so 
(Macintosh 2002). 
Recovery plans and threat abatement plans  
The EPBC Act requires a ‘recovery plan’ to be in place, within a certain timeframe, 
for each listed threatened species (except for extinct and conservation dependent 
species) and for each ecological community. The Environment Minister must 
consult with the appropriate State/Territory Ministers, and the public, and must 
consider the advice of the TSSC when making or amending recovery plans.  
In contrast to a recovery plan, a ‘threat abatement plan’ is required (within a certain 
timeframe) for a key threatening process only if the Environment Minister decides 
that it is a ‘feasible, effective and efficient way to abate the process’ (s. 270A). For 
example, there is no threat abatement plan for land clearance. Again, the Act 
imposes consultation requirements on the Minister.      
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Any group can write a recovery plan (or wildlife conservation plan) and the Act 
allows provision of government funding for this purpose.  
Recovery plans remain in force while the species remain on the threatened list. 
Recovery plans and threat abatement plans bind the Australian Government and its 
agencies (s. 268). All plans must be publicly available and must be reviewed at least 
every five years (s. 279). As at February 2004, almost 170 recovery plans were in 
force (DEH 2004b).  
Register of critical habitat 
The EPBC Act requires the Environment Minister to establish a publicly available 
‘register of critical habitat’, which includes habitat ‘critical to the survival of a listed 
threatened species or listed threatened ecological community’ (s. 207A). It is an 
offence to take an action in the knowledge that it will significantly damage critical 
habitat in a Commonwealth area (s.  207B). The Act requires the Australian 
Government to place a covenant on critical habitat, to ensure its protection, if 
Commonwealth land is sold or leased to someone else (s. 207C).  
The Minister is under no obligation to include places on the register of critical 
habitat. However, if a recovery plan is made, it must identify habitat critical to the 
survival of a threatened species or community and, when making a recovery plan, 
the Minister must consider whether the habitat should be included on the register 
(EPBC reg. 7.09(2)). There is no public nomination process for inclusion of places 
on the register of critical habitat and the Minister must take reasonable steps to 
consult with the owner of the place before including it on the register. 
As at 31  December 2002, the habitats (all offshore) of only three species were 
included on the Register — Macquarie Island (Wandering Albatross and Grey-
headed Albatross) and Albatross Island (Shy Albatross). 
Conservation agreements 
The EPBC Act allows for legally binding conservation agreements between the 
Australian Government and others for the primary purpose of enhancing 
conservation of biodiversity and/or of the heritage values of declared World 
Heritage properties, National Heritage places or Commonwealth Heritage places 
(s.  304). Conservation agreements may relate to private or public land (but not 
Commonwealth reserves) or marine areas and may involve Australian Government 
funding (or other assistance) to the other party bound by the agreement. The 
conservation agreement may require the other party to undertake certain activities, 
or to restrict certain activities, to promote conservation of biodiversity or heritage     





values (s.  306). The Environment Minister must maintain an up-to-date list of 
conservation agreements in force and make the agreements available to the public 
(unless this would result in harm to biodiversity or heritage values, or it would 
reveal commercial-in-confidence material). As at 31 December 2003, there were no 
conservation agreements in force. 
Other biodiversity conservation provisions  
The Australian Government may provide financial or other assistance to anyone for 
activities such as identifying and monitoring biodiversity and for assessing 
biodiversity needs and priorities (s. 171). 
The Australian Government may prepare bioregional plans for Commonwealth 
areas, or cooperate with a State/Territory or others to prepare plans for bioregions 
not wholly within Commonwealth areas (s. 176). Bioregional plans may include 
biodiversity objectives and strategies for achieving them. They may also include 
provisions about heritage values.  In making decisions under the Act, the 
Environment Minister must have regard to bioregional plans where they exist.  
The Minister may also make conservation orders to protect listed threatened species 
or ecological communities in Commonwealth areas (s.  464). The Minister must 
consider social and economic matters when making conservation orders and must 
consult with each Australian Government agency that may be affected by the order. 
It is an offence to contravene a conservation order. Conservation orders must be 
reviewed at least every five years, and the orders must be publicised.  
Under the Act, the Minister may make wildlife conservation plans to protect, 
conserve and manage listed migratory species, listed marine species, cetaceans that 
occur in the Australian Whale Sanctuary, or a conservation dependent species 
(s. 285). These plans must be prepared in cooperation with the States/Territories 
where the species occurs unless the species occurs only in Commonwealth areas. 
Australian Government agencies must take ‘all reasonable steps’ to act in 
accordance with a wildlife conservation plan (s.  286). The Minister can give 
financial or other assistance to anyone to implement a wildlife conservation plan 
(s. 296). 
The Act allows the Australian Government to declare reserves and to assign a IUCN 
(International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources) category to 
them. The Environment Minister may also make plans for managing biosphere 
reserves included in the World Network of Biosphere Reserves by the UNESCO 
International Coordinating Council of Man and the Biosphere.     
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The Act establishes a system for regulating international trade in wildlife to ensure 
Australia complies with its obligations under the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and Convention on 
Biological Diversity (Part 13A).  
Other notable provisions 
Precautionary principle 
When making many decisions under the Act, the Environment Minister must ‘take 
account’ of the precautionary principle ‘to the extent he or she can do so 
consistently with the other provisions’ (s. 391). Examples of decisions in which the 
precautionary principle must be considered include:  
•  whether or not an action is a controlled action; 
•  whether to approve an action; 
•  whether to grant a permit for taking or harming a listed threatened species, 
ecological community or a migratory species; 
•  how to make or vary recovery plans (which are compulsory for listed threatened 
species and listed ecological communities); and 
•  whether to have, or vary, a threat abatement plan for a key threatening process. 
Under s. 391, the precautionary principle means that ‘lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing a measure to prevent degradation of 
the environment where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental 
damage’. 
Opportunities for public involvement  
The Act provides opportunities for public comment and consultation on various 
issues, and requires dissemination of information to the public. Amongst other 
things, members of the public may: 
•  comment on referrals and assessments; 
•  comment on the development and operation of bilateral agreements; 
•  nominate species, ecological communities or threatening processes for listing; 
•  prepare recovery plans and wildlife conservation plans and submit them to DEH 
for approval; and 
•  comment on draft recovery plans, wildlife conservation plans and threat 
abatement plans.     





To request public comment, DEH uses the public notifications page of the EPBC 
website, and also publishes weekly notices in the Australian Government Gazette 
(DEH  2002). Sections  170A and  515A list the type of information that must be 
published on the internet every week, such as:  
•  all permits issued in the immediately preceding week; 
•  the Minister’s intention to develop a draft bilateral agreement; 
•  referrals received by the Minister in the immediately preceding week; 
•  each decision in the immediately preceding week of actions deemed to be 
controlled actions; 
•  each decision about assessment processes for controlled actions; and 
•  each draft or finalised report or statement published in the immediately 
preceding week and the availability of those reports.  
In 2002-03, DEH received comments on 80 referrals. In its annual report, DEH said 
that it places a high priority on increasing awareness of the Act (DEH 2003). 
Enforcement mechanisms  
Part  17 of the Act deals with enforcement. It provides for the appointment of 
wardens, rangers and inspectors and their monitoring and search powers and powers 
to seize goods. The Act also allows the Environment Minister to require the holder 
of an environmental authority (an approval or permit given under the Act) to carry 
out an environmental audit if the Minister suspects that the Act has been 
contravened, or is likely to be contravened (s. 458). The Act provides for a civil 
penalty of up to $550  000 for individuals, and up to $5.5  million for bodies 
corporate, or a criminal penalty of up to seven years imprisonment and/or a fine of 
up to $46 200 for unlawful actions which have a significant impact on a matter of 
national environmental significance. The civil and criminal penalties are lower for 
breaches in relation to the environment on Commonwealth land or for actions by the 
Australian Government. 
In addition, the Act allows an ‘interested person’ to apply to the Federal Court for 
an injunction, or interim injunction, restraining a person from engaging in conduct 
that contravenes the legislation (s. 475). The Act defines an interested person as an 
individual: 
•  who is a citizen or resident of Australia; and 
•  whose interests are, have been or would be affected by the conduct or proposed 
conduct; or     
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•  who, at any time in the two years immediately preceding the conduct or 
proposed conduct that is the subject of complaint, was engaged in environmental 
protection activities or conducted research into environmental issues (s. 475).  
The Court may also order the person to repair or mitigate damage to the 
environment if an injunction is granted. The usual common law obligation to 
provide an undertaking as to damages when seeking an interim injunction has been 
removed.  
The Act specifically creates a duty for the proponents of actions to provide accurate 
information for the assessment and approval process and creates offences for 
deliberately or negligently providing false or misleading information to obtain an 
approval or permit, or in response to a condition on an approval or permit (s. 489). 
The Act also creates civil penalties and criminal liability for executive officers of 
bodies corporate in relation to false and misleading information (ss 494–5).  
Advisory Committees 
The Act establishes three committees to advise the Environment Minister on the 
Act: 
•  TSSC, primarily to advise the Minister on the listing of threatened species and 
ecological communities, recovery plans and threat abatement plans (ss 502–3); 
•  Biological Diversity Advisory Committee, primarily to advise the Minister on 
conservation and ecologically sustainable development issues (ss 504–5); and  
•  Indigenous Advisory Committee to advise the Minister on the operation of the 
Act, taking into account indigenous knowledge of land management, 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity (s. 505A–505B). 
The Minister may establish further advisory committees if necessary (s. 511). 
Reporting requirements  
Each year, a report on the operation of the Act must be laid before each House of 
Parliament (s. 516). Section 516A requires all Australian Government Departments 
to report on how their department’s activities accord with the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development in their annual reports and Section  516B 
requires state of the environment reports to be laid before each House of Parliament 
every five years. The next state of the environment report is due in 2006. 
The Act must be independently reviewed at least every 10 years (s. 522A).      





B.3  Development of the regime 
In its  1996 pre-election environment policy statement, Saving Our Natural 
Heritage, the Coalition Government had outlined its intention to reform 
environmental legislation. A review of the roles of the Australian Government and 
the States/Territories with respect to environmental management resulted in the 
COAG Heads of Agreement on Commonwealth/State Roles and Responsibilities for 
the Environment in 1997. Implementation of some aspects of the COAG Agreement 
required reform of environmental regulation at the national level.  
In February 1998, the Australian Government released a consultation paper, Reform 
of Commonwealth Environment Legislation, for public comment. Over 
300  submissions were made on the consultation paper (SECITA  1999). The 
consultation paper foreshadowed three new Commonwealth Acts: 
•  an environment protection act — dealing with environmental impact assessment 
and approval processes; 
•  a biodiversity conservation act — to promote the conservation and sustainable 
use of Australia’s biodiversity; and 
•  new heritage legislation. 
The Bill presented to Parliament differed from the proposal in the consultation 
paper as it combined environment protection and biodiversity conservation in one 
piece of legislation. The Bill did not include heritage issues as these were to be 
deferred until the National Heritage Places Strategy was finalised. Heritage 
legislation was passed by the Australian Parliament in September 2003 and a new 
national heritage system started on 1 January 2004 (DEH 2004a). Some heritage 
values will be protected under the EPBC Act. 
In July 1998, the Senate referred the Bill to the (then) Environment, Recreation, 
Communication and the Arts Legislation Committee for report by October 1998. 
The Committee’s report was tabled in late April  1999 (with the delay due to a 
Federal election). The Senate Committee received over 600 submissions. The Act 
was debated and passed by both houses of Parliament two months later 
(SECITA 1999).  
Around the time of the Act’s commencement, DEH gave presentations about the 
Act to State and local governments, peak industry groups, professional associations, 
environmental lawyers and members of the public. It also provided more detailed 
workshops for environmental consultants and Australian Government Departments. 
The Australian Network of Environmental Defender’s Offices (sub. 131) considered     
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that there was sufficient consultation with stakeholders in the lead up to the Act’s 
introduction. 
Comments received during consultations prior to enactment of the EPBC Act 
indicated wide acceptance of the need to reform existing environmental legislation, 
but concerns were raised in several areas such as:  
•  triggers for environmental approval processes — considered either too broad or 
too narrow; 
•  bilateral agreements — concern that they may represent a ‘hand over’ of 
responsibilities to the States/Territories, particularly in the case of approval 
bilateral agreements; and 
•  public consultation — considered inadequate given the scale and significance of 
the reforms (SECITA 1999). 
Regulation impact statement  
In the regulation impact statement (RIS) contained in the Explanatory 
Memorandum, the objectives of reviewing Commonwealth environmental 
legislation were described as: 
… to more effectively implement the [Intergovernmental Agreement on the 
Environment], put in place Commonwealth environmental law which operates more 
effectively and efficiently, and, most importantly, deliver better environmental 
outcomes. (Senate 1998, p. 7), 
Two options for achieving the Government’s objectives were outlined in the RIS — 
reform, or do not reform, existing environmental legislation.  
The impact analysis in the RIS focused on potential benefits to governments and 
industry from reforming environmental legislation, through greater clarity and 
certainty regarding when the Australian Government would be involved in 
regulating environmental matters, and from streamlining assessment and approval 
processes. In the RIS, the costs to governments and industry of revising procedures 
for environmental assessment and approval, and from the need to become familiar 
with new arrangements, were raised but it was considered these ‘should be small’ 
(Senate 1998, p. 16).  
Likely costs for industry from potential restrictions the Act might place on 
activities, for example through the listing of threatened species and ecological 
communities, were not discussed in the impact analysis.      





The RIS noted that distribution of 5000 copies of a consultation paper was the main 
mechanism for consultation on the proposed reforms (Senate 1998, p. 17). The RIS 
also stated that the operation and effectiveness of many aspects of the Act would be 
subjected to regular evaluation and review, but details as to timing were not 
provided (Senate 1998, p. 18).  
B.4  Promotion of environmental goals  
The objects of the EPBC Act are outlined in box B.1. These are very broad. The Act 
has given the Australian Government greater legislative power to regulate directly 
(some) activities that affect the environment and has also expanded its role in 
environmental assessment and approval. By defining the Australian Government’s 
role with regard to the environment (restricting it to matters of national 
environmental significance and matters affecting the Australian Government or 
undertaken by the Australian Government) the Act has, to some extent, clarified the 
Australian Government’s environmental objectives. However, despite DEH’s 
efforts to inform and assist stakeholders in understanding their responsibilities, there 
appears to be considerable uncertainty about the extent to which the Act will affect 
agriculture. For example, it is not necessarily clear when an action will have a 
‘significant impact’ and hence it is not always clear what actions are likely to be 
regulated under the EPBC Act.  
Some of the shortcomings of previous environmental legislation have been 
addressed by the EPBC Act (SECITA 1999). For example, the Act has: 
•  updated Commonwealth environmental legislation (most of which was passed in 
the 1970s) and consolidated it into a single act thus simplifying, in some 
respects, the regulatory regime at the Commonwealth level; 
•  replaced indirect mechanisms (such as foreign investment, export controls and 
funding decisions) for Australian Government involvement in environmental 
assessment and approval, with a set of specific situations (and processes) for its 
involvement, thereby potentially reducing uncertainty for industry and 
potentially resulting in more effective regulation of environmental issues;  
•  provided a mechanism (bilateral agreements) to reduce duplication in 
environmental assessment and/or approval processes between the Australian 
Government and State/Territory Governments;  
•  implemented international treaties that had not been fully implemented 
previously (for example, protection of biodiversity is now directly addressed);  
•  enhanced the capacity of the Environment Minister to make decisions on 
environmental assessments and approvals (previously the Environment Minister     
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only provided advice to the ‘Action Minister’ who was responsible for making 
the final decision about the need for assessment and approval); and  
•  updated regulation to reflect relatively recent principles such as ‘ecologically-
sustainable development’ and the ‘precautionary principle’ (SECITA 1999). 
The Environmental Defender’s Office (sub. 131, p. 7) also noted that the EPBC Act 
‘provides for much greater transparency’ than the (replaced) Environment 
Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act.  
Despite these changes, several participants expressed concerns about the operation 
and scope of the Act. For example, the National Farmers’ Federation (NFF) 
(sub. 128, appendix A, p. xxxiv) thought that ‘the EPBC Act potentially applies to 
virtually anything a land holder might do on his or her land holding’. The Victorian 
Farmers Federation (VFF) (sub. 149, p. 7) considered it ‘extremely complicated to 
read and interpret’ and that it ‘imposes complex and confusing obligations on 
landowners’. Canegrowers (sub.  101) also found the Act particularly confusing, 
while the National Association of Forest Industries considered that: 
In most cases, there is no clear path for investors to have their projects referred for 
assessment under the EPBC Act and prior to the assessment process, there is no clear 
indication of the requirements that proponents will have to address. (sub. 90, p. 9) 
The Northern Land Council considered that implementation of international treaties 
through the Act: 
… has been highly selective and has consequently created extraordinarily confused 
policy settings for environmental management and commercial use of native species. 
(sub. 221, p. 9) 
Others were concerned that the Act is failing to protect matters of national 
environmental significance adequately. For example, The Humane Society 
International — Australia (sub.  126) considered that threatened species and 
ecological communities listings were not comprehensive. This was because the 
EPBC Act listed only 29 threatened ecological communities (mostly carried over 
from previous legislation) while State lists were more extensive and the National 
Terrestrial Biodiversity Assessment had found that almost 2900 ecological 
communities are threatened. 
The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF, sub. 146) considered that the Act 
has had little impact on biodiversity protection (or on landholders) overall and that 
it requires a land clearing trigger to help protect Australia’s biodiversity and native 
vegetation.  
As the legislation is relatively new, it is difficult to judge conclusively the Act’s 
success in achieving its environmental objectives. However, in its most recent     





annual report, DEH considered that the Act is resulting in fewer environmental 
impacts: 
The operation of the Act has resulted in improved environmental outcomes from a 
range of activities such as mining developments, offshore seismic surveys, urban 
development, infrastructure projects and energy production. In part, these improved 
outcomes have resulted from the Act causing a change in behaviour of many 
proponents who have discussed their proposals with the Department and developed 
them to avoid, as far as possible, impacts on matters of national environmental 
significance. (DEH 2003, p. 54) 
An examination of statistics reflecting operation of the Act to June  2003 also 
provides insights into the likelihood that the Act will be effective in promoting its 
objectives. Some of the statistics reported by DEH on the operation of the Act are 
summarised below. 
Operation of the Act to June 2003  
Table B.1 shows referrals and approvals for the years 2000–2003. 
Table B.1  Referrals and approvalsa 
16 July 2000 to 30 June 2003 






Total referrals received  294  309  337  940
Approval not required — no conditions  161  196  175  532
Approval not required because action 
undertaken in a particular manner 
30 17  75  122
Approval required — controlled actions  72  95  75  242
Approved — no conditions  2  4  1  7
Approved with conditions  6  22  24  52
Approval denied   0  0  1  1
a Some referrals lapsed/withdrawn before decision made. Some referrals/assessments in progress at 
30 June. 
Source: DEH (2003, p. 208). 
As shown in the table, 337 proposals were referred under the Act in 2002-03 (up on 
previous years). About 20  per cent (75) were deemed ‘controlled actions’, and 
required assessment and approval under the Act. The proportion of actions requiring 
approval in 2003 was lower than in previous years. Twenty-five actions in total 
were approved during the year, 24 with conditions and 1 without. For the first time, 
an action (operation of an electric grid on a lychee farm) was denied approval 
(DEH 2003).      
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As at 31 July 2003, of 958 referrals since the Act’s commencement: 
•  27 related to the ‘agriculture and forestry’ sector;  
•  10 of these were controlled actions, and therefore required assessment and 
approval; and 
•   three actions were approved, one was rejected, five were undergoing assessment 
and one was withdrawn (DEH, sub. 190, p. 3). 
All ‘agriculture and forestry’ controlled actions to 31  July  2003 are listed in 
Table B.2.  
Table B.2  Controlled actions in the ‘agriculture and forestry’ sector 
16 July 2000 to 31 July 2003 
Proposal Location  Assessment  method  Decision 
Expand an area of irrigated 
cotton to 810 hectares 
Central NSW  Public environment 
report 
Proposal refused by 
NSW 
Develop and operate 
expanded facilities (1 030 700 






Construct and operate a rotary 
dairy shed and effluent 
management system 
Central Victoria   Preliminary 
documentation 
Approved 
Remove existing vegetation 
and plant 26 000 hectares of 
hardwood plantation 
Tiwi Islands  Preliminary 
documentation 
Approved 
Use an electric grid to 
take/destroy approximately 
5 500 Spectacled Flying-foxes 






Clear about 90 Buloke trees to 
install centre-pivot irrigation 






(awaiting notice from 
State under 
s. 130(1B) 
Undertake an annual 





information from the 
proponent 
 
Convert broadacre dryland 
cereal production across 





of State process) 
Proponent preparing 
environmental 
impact statement  
Harvest about 6 000 Red 
Gums in an area of 1 600 
hectares to replant with a Red 




information from the 
proponent 
 
Source: DEH (sub. 190, p. 5). 
‘Listed threatened species and ecological communities’ was the matter of national 
environmental significance that triggered the assessment and approval process most 
often in 2002-03 (triggered 61 times) followed by ‘listed migratory species’     





(triggered 28 times). These were also the most common triggers in the Act’s first 
two years of operation. Almost 40 per cent of actions requiring approval in 2002-03 
triggered more than one matter of national environmental significance (DEH 2001; 
2002; 2003). 
Table B.3 outlines referrals by industry sector. Most referrals in 2002-03 arose from 
new urban and commercial development (23  per cent) followed by energy 
generation and supply (10  per cent), tourism, recreation and conservation 
management (10 per cent) and mining (9 per cent). A large number of land-based 
actions affecting threatened species and ecological communities in that year arose 
from property developments along the Queensland coast where there is a 
concentration of nationally significant environmental values (DEH 2003). In the 
previous year, most referrals also related to urban and commercial development, 
land transport, and tourism, recreation and conservation management. Most 
referrals in 2001-2002 related to south-east Queensland and the urban fringes of 
Sydney, Melbourne and Perth where urban development is encroaching on 
significant wildlife habitat (DEH 2002).  
Table B.3  Referrals and approvals by activity in 2002-03a 
Activity  Referrals received  Approval required 
New urban and commercial development   77  15
Energy generation and supply  35  7
Tourism, recreation and conservation management  34  7
Mining   32  17
Exploration (mineral, oil, gas)  27  3
Land transport  22  9
Water management and use  18  1
Agriculture and forestry  13  4
a Some activities omitted. 
Source: DEH (2003). 
In 2002-2003, only 13 referrals (4  per cent) related to agriculture and forestry 
activities; 4 of these were deemed ‘controlled actions’. Referrals from the 
agricultural sector were also low in 2001-2002 (a total of nine referrals). Table B.4 
lists a selection of referrals from the agriculture and forestry sector.     
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Table B.4  Selected ‘agriculture and forestry’ referralsa 
Proposed action  Location  Approval required?  Approval granted?
Cattle feedlot development  Rangers Valley, NSW  No  na 
Clearing for centre-pivot 
irrigation  
Minimay, Vic  No, if undertaken in 
specified manner 
na 
Dairy facility  Gannawarra, Vic  Yes  Yes 
Viticulture development   Cornella, Vic  No  na 
Clearing for pineapple 
plantation 
Childers, Qld  No  na 
Electrocution of Spectacled 
Flying-foxes 
Kennedy, Qld  Yes  No 
Cattle feedlot development   Milang, SA   Yes  Undecided 
Mill and timberyard  Smithton, Tas  No  na 
Red-footed Booby Bird harvest  Cocos (Keeling) 
Islands 
Yes Undecided 
a As at 31 July 2003, there have been four referrals involving either clearing of Brigalow or Bluegrass. In all of 
these cases, approval was not required.  
Source: Senator Bartlett (sub. 168, pp. 7–8). 
On a jurisdictional basis (table B.5), most referrals in 2002-03 concerned proposals 
in New South Wales (25 per cent), Queensland (24 per cent) and Victoria (20 per 
cent). This was broadly consistent with previous years. 
Table B.5  Referrals and approvals by jurisdiction in 2002-03 
Jurisdiction  Referrals received  Approval required 
NSW 84  17
Queensland   80  22
Victoria 66  14
Western Australia  26  6
South Australia   24  5
Tasmania 10  1
ACT 15  0
Northern Territory  8  3
External territories  4  3
Commonwealth marine areas  17  4
Source: DEH (2003). 
While most controlled actions in 2002-03 were required to undergo assessment on 
the basis of preliminary documentation, or through an accredited process, some 
actions were assessed through an environmental impact statement or public 
environment report. Table  B.6 provides a sample of the types of actions being 
assessed through these latter processes in 2002-03.      





Table B.6  Sample of major assessments underway at 30 June 2003 
Environmental impact assessments   
Department of Defence  Headquarters Australian Theatre, NSW 
Dept of Industry, Science & Resources   National low level radioactive waste repository, SA 
Epic Energy  Darwin to Moomba gas pipeline 
Powerlink Queensland   High voltage electricity transmission line, QLD 
Shell Development (Aust) Pty Limited  Floating liquefied natural gas facility, Timor Sea 
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company   2-D seismic survey, QLD 
Woodside Energy Ltd  Petroleum mining, full field development, WA 
Public environment reports   
Cooloola Shire Council  Waste management, construction of new landfill, QLD
Coral Coast Marina Development Pty Ltd  Mauds Landing Marina, WA 
Cultus Timor Sea Pty Ltd  Petroleum mining, Timor Sea 
DR Developments (Queensland) Pty Ltd  Castaway Beach Resort, QLD 
Phosphate Resources Limited  Exploration for mineable phosphate, Christmas Island
Sudaw Developments Ltd   Water management and use, Nathan Dam, QLD 
Waterman Agriculture Pty Ltd  Irrigated cotton development expansion, NSW 
Source: DEH (2003, pp. 214–5).  
An examination of statistics reported by DEH highlights some issues for judging the 
overall effectiveness of the EPBC Act in achieving its objectives. Some of these 
issues are outlined below, followed by a discussion of mechanisms to monitor and 
enforce the Act. 
Key issues  
Number of referrals 
There is insufficient information available to judge whether all of the proposed 
actions that fall under the scope of the Act are actually being referred and hence to 
assess to what extent there is non-compliance with the Act. It may be possible that 
awareness of the Act ‘on the ground’ amongst landholders and other stakeholders is 
still relatively low given the Act’s relatively recent commencement. For instance, 
the Australian National Audit Office considered that DEH had made efforts to 
educate stakeholders about the Act but that there were ‘further opportunities to 
ensure that actions that should be referred are, in fact, referred’ (ANAO  2003, 
p. 85). 
Referrals deemed ‘not controlled actions’ and approvals rejected 
A large number of referred actions do not require approval and may be undertaken 
without conditions or, more likely, in a particular manner. As at 30 June 2003, only     
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one approval had been rejected. There may be many explanations why the bulk of 
referrals do not need to undergo the assessment and approval process. For example, 
there may be a lack of understanding of the Act’s scope so that actions are referred 
unnecessarily, proponents may intentionally (cautiously) refer more actions than 
necessary, or DEH may be encouraging proponents to modify their proposals (to 
reduce environmental impacts) so that they can proceed without approval. 
Depending on the reasons for it, the absence of assessment and approval for many 
referred actions may undermine achievement of the Act’s objectives. 
Low level of referrals from the agricultural sector  
The clearance of native vegetation was identified as the most significant threat to 
terrestrial biodiversity in both the 1996 and 2001 State of the Environment reports 
(NLWRA 2002), hence the low level of referrals from the agriculture and forestry 
sector warrants further examination. The low level of referrals may be partly 
explained by the exemption for ‘existing use’ (or by other exemptions), or by a lack 
of awareness or understanding of the Act’s requirements amongst landholders, 
particularly small landholders. For example, some landholders may believe that 
only State regulatory regimes apply to land management. Alternatively, it may be 
possible that actions on individual properties are ‘too small’ to have a significant 
impact on a matter of national environmental significance, even though their 
cumulative impact may be significant. The location of agricultural activities, such as 
land clearing, may also not always coincide with the occurrence of matters of 
national environmental significance, however this would vary by region.  
The reasons explaining why there are few referrals from the agricultural sector may 
warrant further examination by DEH to assess whether the Act’s objectives are 
being undermined.  
Few referrals from the Australian Government  
The Act places more onerous requirements on the Australian Government and its 
agencies than on the private sector. Hence, proposals involving the Australian 
Government could be expected to trigger the Act more often than was the case, for 
example, in 2002-03 (8 cases). The ANAO (2003) also found that activities by the 
Australian Government accounted for most of the exemptions from assessment and 
approval granted under the Act (such as the exemption for the immigration 
processing centre on Christmas Island). The relatively low level of referrals from 
this sector may warrant further examination to determine whether it undermines 
achievement of the Act’s objectives.      





Monitoring and enforcement  
The EPBC Act’s potential to affect environmental outcomes depends partly on 
whether, and how, it is enforced. Broadly speaking, there are two main avenues for 
enforcement: 
•  enforcement by DEH; and 
•  enforcement by ‘interested parties’. 
Enforcement by DEH  
In its audit of the quality and timeliness of environmental assessments and 
approvals under the Act, the ANAO (2003) recommended that DEH strengthen its 
monitoring and compliance activities. In response, DEH implemented a 
‘Compliance and Enforcement Policy’ outlining the general framework used to 
achieve compliance with all the laws that it administers, including the EPBC Act. 
The enforcement measures outlined range from ‘light-handed’ approaches such as 
communication, education, cooperative assistance and the provision of timely 
information and advice, through to penalties (of escalating severity) such as 
suspension or cancellation of permits, injunctions, remediation orders, pecuniary 
penalties and potential punishments imposed through criminal prosecution.  
The policy sets out the factors DEH considers when determining its response to 
contraventions, including whether legal proceedings will be pursued. Relevant 
factors include: 
•  the objectives of the legislation and its specific penalty provisions; 
•  the seriousness of the harm caused to individuals or the environment and the cost 
to the Australian Government or general community from the contravention; 
•  the level of malice or culpability of the suspect; 
•  the likelihood that the contravention will continue, or be repeated; 
•  public perceptions of the breach and of how it has been dealt with; 
•  the cost of the proposed response compared to its benefits; and 
•  whether use of a particular response would set a desirable precedent, or whether 
it could be counter-productive for maximising compliance with the legislation.  
In 2001-02, members of the public informed DEH of 120 possible breaches of the 
Act. Many of these concerned listed threatened species and most were occurring 
along the coastline of Queensland, in central coastal areas of New South Wales and 
in areas around Melbourne (DEH 2002). When impacts are likely to be significant,     
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DEH encourages the proponent to make a referral; about 8 per cent of referrals 
received in 2002-03 occurred as a result of compliance action (DEH 2003).  
DEH has generally focused on using education, awareness raising and/or warnings 
to encourage compliance with the Act. In 2001-02, DEH judged that 58 per cent of 
reported possible breaches required a low level response (such as sending a letter to 
raise awareness of the Act) and only five per cent warranted detailed examination 
(ANAO  2003, pp.  80–81). Under the ‘Compliance and Enforcement Policy’, 
education and/or warnings are used as the first response to a contravention, and for 
less serious contraventions. More severe penalties are reserved for contraventions 
that are serious or continuing. Penalties for breaching the EPBC Act are stronger 
than those that applied under previous legislation (ANAO 2003, p. 20). 
However, Senator Bartlett noted that: 
… only two enforcement proceedings have been commenced … None … have 
concerned Australian citizens or residents and none have related to land management 
issues. (sub. 168, p. 16)  
In 2002-03, the masters of some Indonesian fishing vessels were sentenced under 
the Act for illegal killing of dolphins in Australian waters (DEH  2003, p.  166). 
Enforcement proceedings against some individuals for failing to obtain approval for 
actions with a significant impact on a declared Ramsar wetland have commenced, 
with action in the Federal Court continuing (Taberner et al. 2004).  
Senator Bartlett further considered that: 
… the Commonwealth’s reluctance to take enforcement action have ensured the Act 
has had little or no impact on our environmental problems. It has also diminished the 
incentive for landholders to comply with the Act’s obligations. This must be rectified if 
the objectives of the EPBC Act and the potential benefits to landholders and the 
broader community are to be realised. (sub. 168, pp. 16–17) 
In its recent audit of assessment and approval processes under the EPBC Act, the 
ANAO (2003, p. 14) noted that, while department planning for the monitoring of 
approved actions was well underway, implementation was still ‘at an early stage’, 
and that DEH was not monitoring the progress of approved actions. The 
ANAO  (2003, p.  90) observed that there were only eight staff dedicated to 
compliance and enforcement in DEH, four of whom were fully trained as inspectors 
for the EPBC Act. The Humane Society International — Australia commented that: 
… Environment Australia is in need of significantly increased resources to fulfil the 
EPBCA [EPBC Act] potential to protect Matters of National Environmental 
Significance, to consult effectively with landholders to develop environmentally and 
socially satisfactory solutions that uphold the law, and to carry out effective 
implementation and enforcement. (sub. 126, p. 3)     





In response to the ANAO audit, DEH acknowledged that compliance, enforcement 
and auditing functions had been under-resourced (ANAO 2003, p. 97). DEH will 
establish a central Environment Investigations Unit in  2003-04 to improve 
enforcement of legislation where legal action is required (DEH 2003).  
Reflecting the Act’s relatively recent commencement, the ANAO found that the 
lack of progress by DEH on monitoring was largely due to its focus on 
administrative implementation issues, and awareness raising, and that overall 
compliance with the Act is adequate (ANAO  2003). However, it also noted the 
concerns expressed by some stakeholders that there is an increasing perception that 
DEH is unwilling to take enforcement action and that this is creating a culture of 
non-compliance in some industries (ANAO 2003). 
Enforcement by ‘interested persons’ 
As stated earlier, the EPBC Act specifically provides ‘standing’ to certain persons 
to promote compliance with the Act. These provisions will likely increase 
opportunities for public interest litigation to protect the environment, though not to 
the same extent that might occur under ‘open standing’.3 The Australian Network of 
Environmental Defender’s Offices submitted that: 
Given that only 4 actions have been commenced in the three years, and the lack of 
enforcement by EA, it is possible that opening the standing requirements may allow for 
more effective enforcement of the legislation … (sub. 131, p. 9) 
Interested persons have commenced proceedings in several cases under the Act.  
The first application (Booth v. Bosworth [2000] FCA 1878 (13 December 2000)) by 
an ‘interested person’ for an injunction against an alleged breach of the Act 
occurred in December 2000. In this case, Booth sought an injunction to prevent a 
lychee farmer using electric grids to keep Spectacled Flying-foxes away from his 
lychee crop, on the grounds that electrocution of the flying foxes would have a 
significant impact on the world heritage values of the Wet Tropics World Heritage 
area. The injunction was granted by the Federal Court. The case demonstrated that 
actions undertaken offsite could be captured by the Act if those actions had a 
significant impact on a World Heritage Property.  
Subsequent cases have included Schneiders v. The State of Queensland [2001] FCA 
553 (4 May 2001), Jones v. The State of Queensland [2001] FCA 756 (15 June 
                                              
3  Standing refers to a person’s or body’s right to take a matter to court. Usually only those with a 
private material interest in a matter have standing. Legislation may confer standing on parties to 
bring court actions, for example, standing may be conferred on ‘persons aggrieved’. With ‘open 
standing’ any person has the right to be heard in court.      
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2001),  Humane Society International Inc v. Minister for the Environment and 
Heritage [2003] FCA 64 (12 February 2003), Mees v. Roads Corporation [2003] 
FCA 306 (8 April 2003) and Queensland Conservation Council Inc v Minister for 
the Environment and Heritage [2003] FCA 1463 (19 December 2003).  
B.5  Administration and implementation 
Although there have been some disputes, DEH considers that industry has generally 
reacted positively to administration of the Act because it provides ‘greater certainty 
and a more streamlined approach than the previous ad hoc regime’ (DEH 2002, 
p.  170). However, DEH also acknowledged in its annual report (2002) that the 
farming sector and the aquaculture industry are concerned about the operation of the 
Act.  
Timeliness  
Under the EPBC Act, statutory timeframes apply to the referral, assessment and 
approval process. These timeframes are summarised in table B.7. 
Table B.7  Statutory timeframes for the assessment and approval process 
Stage Statutory  timeframe 
Initial screening of referral to determine if it is 
a controlled action  
10 or 20 days 
Decision on assessment approach  20 days after proponent provides preliminary 
information  
Assessment   Timing determined by proponent 
Approval  30 or 40 days 
Source: DEH (2002, p. 179). 
In 2002-03, statutory timeframes were met in more than 90  per cent of cases 
(DEH  2003). In its audit of the quality and timeliness of the assessment and 
approval process under the EPBC Act, the ANAO (2003) found that overall 
statutory timeframes were met, and that they have improved over time, although the 
timeliness of providing proponents with the reasons why a proposal was designated 
a controlled action could be improved.  
Submissions received by the ANAO during its recent audit indicated that 
stakeholders were generally satisfied with the timeliness of the assessment and 
approval process (ANAO  2003). The Australian Government Department of 
Defence considered that the EPBC Act ‘provides greater certainty and timeliness of     





process than previous regulations’ (sub.  42, p.  1). In contrast, the National 
Association of Forest Industries considered that: 
In some cases, … the EPBC Act approvals process is not clearly identified, thereby 
adding a considerable degree of cost, time and uncertainty to project assessments. 
(sub. 90, p. 3) 
When the statutory timeframes are not met, the Act requires the Environment 
Minister to report the reasons for this in its annual report to Parliament. Reported 
reasons for past delays have included: 
•  the need to obtain legal advice, or other advice, on complex decisions; 
•  prolonged consultation with proponents regarding approval conditions; and 
•  delays caused by the absence, or travel, of decision makers (DEH 2002).  
Bilateral agreements and other accredited processes, such as accreditation of 
State/Territory processes on a case-by-case basis, are the main mechanisms for 
improving the efficiency of the assessment process. Use of accredited processes 
increased from 18 per cent 2000-2001 to 38 per cent in 2001-02 (DEH 2002) but it 
is not clear whether their use is expediting the assessment and approval process:  
At present there is little evidence that bilateral agreements and accredited assessments 
improve timeliness, as there are so few bilateral agreements in place. (ANAO 2003, 
p. 18) 
Education and provision of information by DEH may also reduce the administrative 
burden associated with complying with the Act. For example, information to assist 
proponents making referrals, such as application forms and access to an interactive 
map of listed species and ecological communities, is available on DEH’s EPBC 
website. In addition to funding a full-time staff position at the NFF for a 
departmental officer to assist farmers in understanding the Act, DEH recently added 
a section to the website specifically for the agricultural sector (DEH, sub. 190). 
DEH also provides some funding to other groups, such as the ‘EPBC Unit’, to help 
conservation groups, and the public, increase their understanding of the Act 
(Humane Society International — Australia, sub.  126) and prepares numerous 
publications to provide information on the operation of the Act.  
Assessment process 
Reflecting the nature of a proposed activity, and its likely impacts, the Act allows 
the Environment Minister to require the proponent of a controlled action to undergo 
one of five types of environmental assessment (see above). The assessment options 
available to the Minister vary in terms of the information requirements they impose 
on the proponent. Hence, the proponent’s costs would vary depending on the     
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assessment method chosen, particularly as the costs of some information 
requirements, such as flora and fauna surveys are very high.  
As shown in table B.8, most assessments in 2002-03 were made on the basis of 
preliminary documentation or an accredited process. Assessment on the basis of 
preliminary documentation would likely impose lower information collection and 
project delay costs on proponents, relative to the other assessment methods 
available under the Act. However, in some circumstances, this approach may not 
provide sufficient information to adequately address the environmental, social and 
economic consequences of the action. 
Table B.8  Assessment method used for controlled actions, 2002-03 
 
Assessment method 
Assessment in progress 





Bilateral agreement   4  1  0
Other accredited assessment   34  8  6
Preliminary documentation  9  21  14
Environmental impact statement   8  5  4
Public environment report  7  1  1
Source: DEH (2003, p. 213). 
B.6  Impacts on landholders, other economic activities 
and regional communities 
Impacts on landholders and regional communities 
Evidence presented in several submissions from the agricultural sector suggested 
that the Act has not had a significant effect on landholders’ current activities. For 
example, Ferguson, Kenneison and Associates, a legal firm representing several 
landholders in Western Australia, stated that the EPBC Act ‘although implemented, 
has had little effect to date in the assessment process in Western Australia’ 
(sub. 142, p. 20). 
Similarly, the South Australian Farmers’ Federation (sub. 140) focused on South 
Australian legislation ‘as the Federal Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act (1999) has had little impact in this state’.     





However, the NFF stressed that: 
… the small number of referrals [under the EPBC Act] is unrepresentative of the real 
effect of the Act in producing both real and perceived uncertainty within the farming 
sector. (sub. 128, p. 12) 
Some environmental organisations considered that the Act has to date had a limited 
impact on landholders’ activities or returns. For example, WWF Australia stated: 
To date, the evidence strongly suggests that the EPBC Act has had no or very little 
impact on rural landholders, with only seven referrals having been submitted on land 
clearing proposals since inception of the Act. (sub. 108, p. 3) (emphasis in original) 
In a speech to a NFF Conference on 5  June  2003, the Australian Government 
Environment Minister said that: 
It is important to understand that the Act simply doesn’t apply to most farming activity 
— only those actions which are likely to have a significant impact in one of the six 
matters of national environmental significance …  
In terms of farmers, only four of these six matters have any relevance … (Kemp 2003a) 
In general terms, the key impacts of the Act on landholders include that they may: 
•  need to undergo Australian Government assessment and approval for their 
actions, if those actions impact on a matter of national environmental 
significance or on the environment on Commonwealth land (even if the actions 
are undertaken elsewhere); 
•  enter into conservation agreements with the Australian Government for 
biodiversity conservation on their properties, in exchange for technical or 
financial assistance; and 
•  be able to access financial and technical assistance under the Act for activities 
such as monitoring the components of biodiversity or for developing of recovery 
plans and wildlife conservation plans (EPBC Unit 2002). 
Apart from these impacts, some farming organisations expressed concern about 
potential future impacts of the Act, and the uncertainty this creates.  
Uncertainty and potential future impacts 
Potential future impacts of the EPBC Act appear to be of greater concern than the 
current impacts of the legislation. The NFF observed that the provisions of the Act: 
… and the lack of consistency between and integration of Commonwealth, State and 
intra-state native vegetation and biodiversity regulations are resulting in unacceptable 
development uncertainties for farmers. (sub. 128, p. 4)     
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High levels of stakeholder and public awareness and understanding of the Act’s 
requirements should reduce uncertainty about the operation of the Act and its 
potential impacts. However, general education and awareness about the Act’s 
existence and requirements can only go so far in reducing uncertainty for those 
affected by the legislation. While the ANAO (2003, p. 21) found that there is a 
‘reasonable degree of awareness’ of the Act, where the environment is a major 
business focus, there is a lack of understanding of what specifically needs to be 
referred.  
However, DEH noted that feedback from clients and users of the EPBC website, as 
well as information supplied by the ANAO report, suggests that the Act has 
improved certainty for stakeholders regarding the environmental assessment and 
approval process (DEH 2003).  
A source of uncertainty for stakeholders is likely to be how the concept of 
‘significant impact’ will be interpreted, and thus what actions have a significant 
impact and need to be referred. Several participants commented on this. For 
instance, the VFF said: 
There are only very broad guidelines about what constitutes a ‘significant impact’ or an 
‘action’ that would require a landowner to seek a permit from EA [Environment 
Australia/Department of the Environment and Heritage]. (sub. 149, pp. 7–8) 
The uncertainty created for landholders by this term in the legislation is important 
because of the prospect of heavy penalties for failing to comply with the Act. The 
ANAO (2003, p. 37) noted that assessing ‘significant impact’ may be particularly 
difficult for smaller businesses, such as some farming enterprises, or for new 
businesses such as aquaculture or windfarm operations. While DEH has released 
Administrative Guidelines on Significance, more specific guidance may be required 
for individual industry sectors (including government) to reduce uncertainty and 
costs. DEH is currently reviewing the Administrative Guidelines and 
Supplementary Guidelines (DEH, sub. 190).  
Another source of uncertainty, and cause for concern about potential impacts, arises 
because the Act’s scope to affect farming practices largely depends on what is 
included in the list of matters of national environmental significance, such as the list 
of threatened species and threatened ecological communities. The Act allows the 
Environment Minister to expand the existing lists of threatened species and 
ecological communities and to add ‘new’ matters of national environmental 
significance (after consultation with the States/Territories).  
Farming organisations are particularly concerned about the possibility of frivolous 
nominations for additions to the lists of threatened species and ecological 
communities, as nominations can be made by any member of the public.     





Nominations impose costs on those opposed to the nomination because they must 
‘disprove’ the need for nomination as opposed to requiring the nominator to make 
the case for listing (VFF, sub. 149). Also of concern is the fact that nominations for 
listing are assessed on the basis of factors that affect the survival of the species or 
ecological community alone, and that nomination assessments do not consider the 
social or economic costs that may be imposed on the community as a consequence 
of listing. The VFF (sub. 149, p. 7) labelled this ‘conserve at all costs’ legislation. 
However, DEH (sub. 190, p. 11) noted that, even though the Environment Minister 
cannot consider social and economic issues at the listing stage, information on these 
issues is still invited through public consultation and that this information is used by 
DEH for activities such as identifying stakeholders potentially affected and 
communicating listing requirements. 
However, the Act specifically requires the Environment Minister to take social and 
economic factors into account when making approval decisions. In addition, the 
Minister has been calling for public comments on nominations before the TSSC has 
submitted its assessment, even though there is no statutory requirement to do so 
(EPBC Unit 2002). This information could be relevant for individual assessment 
and approval decisions under the Act. DEH (sub. 190) also said that it uses the 
information collected through this process to develop communication strategies to 
explain the implications of listing, to facilitate compliance with listing 
requirements, and to allay concerns of those who may be potentially affected by the 
listing. 
The potential for duplication between lists of threatened species and ecological 
communities at the Australian Government level and at State level was also raised 
by the VFF (sub.  149). For example, the Grey-headed Flying-fox is listed as 
‘vulnerable’ under both the EPBC Act and the NSW Threatened Species 
Conservation Act  1995 (South East NSW Horticultural Producers Association, 
sub. 32) and the Cumberland Plain Woodland is also listed under both of these Acts 
(Nature Conservation Council of NSW, sub. 109).  
According to the VFF:  
Too often, a listing under the Federal EPBC adds another level of regulation to protect 
a species or ecosystem that is already legislated for under the State legislation. In these 
instances, there is no additional environmental benefits from federal intervention, but 
inevitably there is more cost. (sub. 149, p. 8) 
Dissatisfaction about the general requirement to obtain approval from two separate 
levels of government was raised in some submissions (for example, AgForce 
Queensland, sub.  54). In contrast, the Western Australian Farmers Federation 
(sub. 94) considered that Commonwealth and State environmental legislation were 
generally ‘complementary’ and Senator Bartlett (sub.  168) considered that     
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sometimes duplication is necessary so that the Australian Government can regulate 
activities of international, national or transboundary importance. 
Current impacts 
The EPBC Act may affect landholders’ activities by potentially preventing the 
activity from going ahead, by placing conditions on the activity, and by imposing 
administrative costs of complying with the legislation. There is also the prospect of 
heavy penalties for breaches of the Act. However, the ACF (sub. 146,  p. 6) 
contended that ‘in reality, these acts are only very rarely used to prevent an action 
from occurring’. An examination of statistics on the operation of the Act to date 
(section B.4) seems to support this interpretation, suggesting that the EPBC Act is 
currently having very little direct impact on farming activities.  
Despite the apparently low current impact on farming activities, the agricultural 
sector is concerned about the EPBC Act and, in particular, about the listing of land 
clearing as a key threatening process and by the listing of the Bluegrass ecological 
communities of the Brigalow Belt region (from inland New South Wales to parts of 
central Queensland) as endangered ecological communities. Both of these listings 
were strongly opposed by the agricultural sector on the grounds that there had been 
inadequate consultation and because of the burden they were expected to impose.  
The effect of the listing of the Bluegrass ecological communities is that farming 
activities likely to have a significant impact on a bluegrass ecological community 
will need to be assessed and approved under the Act. A supplement to the 
Administrative Guidelines on Significance is available for the Bluegrass ecological 
community. The Guidelines list activities that are likely to have a significant impact 
on the listed Bluegrass and those that are not. For example, the supplement states 
that approval under the Act is not needed for the lawful continuation of a land use 
(such as many farming and land management activities) or for grasslands that are 
currently in poor condition (grasslands comprising more than 50 per cent weeds do 
not form a part of the listed community). Canegrowers (sub. 101) noted that, as a 
result of the rules, the burden of protecting these ecological communities will fall 
most heavily on those who have looked after their properties. Chinchilla Shire 
Council (sub. 88) observed that there is little incentive for landholders to control the 
invasion of exotic grass species in the Bluegrass communities (control of exotic 
grass species, unlike the control of weeds, is not regulated).  
The guidelines specify that activities resulting in permanent loss of small areas 
(such as less than 20  hectares or less than five per cent of the patch) of the 
Bluegrass community will not be significant. Nor will activities that result in a     





temporary and reversible impact on the condition of the Bluegrass listed ecological 
community.  
Another concern expressed by farmers with respect to the Bluegrass and Brigalow 
listings is that requirements, and definitions of the regulated ecological 
communities, differ under the EPBC Act and the Queensland Vegetation 
Management Act 1999, thus adding to confusion and uncertainty as well as to the 
costs of assessment. For example, under the Queensland legislation, the clearing of 
remnant brigalow is regulated but the clearing of re-growth is not, whereas the 
action may be regulated in either case under the EPBC Act, if the action results in a 
significant impact on the ecological community (NFF, sub. 128, p. 14).  
Chinchilla Shire Council raised concerns about the accuracy of mapping on which 
the decision to list the species was likely to be based and the accessibility of 
mapping to users: 
The ability of public data sets to establish whether an area is accurately mapped, 
whether it is in fact regrowth and, if regrowth, whether State and Commonwealth 
criteria are met is questionable. Unlike soil and land resource maps which have an 
informative extension and education content as well as technical content, vegetation 
mapping is not reported or presented in such user accessible formats ...  
Many of the concerns with the accuracy of mapping which apply to Brigalow also 
apply to the Bluegrass community … As in the case of Brigalow, listing and the 
preparation of management guidelines has proceeded in the absence of such critical 
data. (sub. 88, p. 7) 
The recent nomination to list the Western Basalt Plains Natural Temperate 
Grasslands in Victoria as a threatened ecological community under the Act also 
raised concerns for the VFF which was strongly opposed due to potential 
restrictions listing might pose for farm businesses in the region (sub. 149, p. 16). 
In addition to the impacts of listings of threatened species and ecological 
communities, the Federal Court case, Booth v. Bosworth (outlined earlier), 
illustrated that even actions outside World Heritage areas could affect World 
Heritage values and hence could fall under the ambit of the Act. Thus landholders 
on properties near World Heritage properties will need to consider whether the 
activities on their property may affect the World Heritage values of World Heritage 
properties nearby.  
According to the Northern Land Council (NT) (sub. 221), the EPBC Act is also 
having an effect on Indigenous communities interested in developing enterprises 
based on sustainable use of native plants and animals. This is particularly important 
in situations where communities have few other viable income sources. The Council 
argued that implementation of international treaties, such as the Convention on     
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International Trade in Endangered Species of Would Fauna and Flora (CITES), 
through the Act has resulted in restrictions on trade that ‘go well beyond the 
requirements of CITES’.  
B.7 Summary   
The EPBC Act, which commenced operation in 2000, updated and consolidated the 
Australian Government’s regulatory regime for the environment.  
The Act focuses the Australian Government’s role on matters of national 
environmental significance, on activities affecting the environment on 
Commonwealth land and on the activities of Australian Government agencies that 
affect the environment. By defining the Australian Government’s role with respect 
to the environment, the Act was designed, in part, to reduce uncertainty and 
duplication in the regulation of environmental issues. 
Despite this, parts of the agricultural sector have expressed strong concerns about 
the impacts of the Act on the sector, including that it creates uncertainty for farmers. 
The statistics reflecting operation of the Act suggest that to date it has had little 
direct impact on the agricultural sector overall, in terms of denying approval for 
activities, or in terms of requiring activities to undergo the environmental 
assessment process. DEH has also put in place mechanisms to increase the 
agricultural sector’s understanding of the Act which may reduce the extent of 
uncertainty in the future.  
The Act itself also provides opportunities for general public involvement and 
consultation on a range of matters, such as aspects of the assessment and approval 
process and nominations for the lists of threatened species and ecological 
communities. Information about the scope and operation of the Act is relatively 
easy to obtain via the EPBC website and DEH’s annual reports on operation of the 
Act.     
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C New  South  Wales 
C.1 Introduction 
Comprehensive regulation of the clearing of native vegetation was first introduced 
in New South Wales in the mid 1990s. Clearing controls appear to have been 
introduced in response to a number of environmental issues including soil erosion, 
declining water quality in rivers, contaminated groundwater and the loss of native 
plant and animal species (DLWC 1997). 
New South Wales has been assessed to have around 67 per cent of pre-1800 native 
vegetation remaining (NLWRA 2002a).1 The main causes of changes to native 
vegetation include clearing for cropping and grazing by stock, grazing by feral 
animals, logging, weed invasion and mining. The highest degree of clearing has 
tended to be on the western slopes and western plains of the Central Division and 
the flatter parts of the tablelands — for example, it has been estimated that around 
70 per cent of pre-1800 native vegetation was cleared from the Central Division2 
wheat/sheep zone (NVAC 1999). Current estimates of vegetation clearance vary 
widely, from 15 000 to 80 000 hectares a year (Smith 2003), probably reflecting 
widely different definitions of ‘clearance’. 
The Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NVC Act) currently underpins the 
legislative framework for native vegetation management in New South Wales. The 
NVC Act is implemented in conjunction with the Threatened Species Conservation 
Act 1995 (TSC Act). 
The NVC Act provides for a regional approach to native vegetation management. 
Initially, vegetation management was to be based on Regional Vegetation 
Management Plans (RVMPs). Community-based Regional Vegetation Committees 
(RVCs) were to develop RVMPs for 22 designated regions throughout New South 
Wales. However, there were considerable delays in the implementation of the 
                                              
1  Native vegetation in the intensively-used zone — see figure 3.1. 
2  For land-management purposes, New South Wales is divided into Western, Central and Eastern 
Divisions. Clearing of native vegetation on leasehold land in the Western Division was 
regulated prior to the introduction of the State-wide regulation in 1999. Approximately 51 per 
cent of land is freehold, and 39 per cent is leasehold in New South Wales.     




regime envisaged under the Act. By late 2003, five years after the introduction of 
the Act and when the process was suspended, only two RVMPs had been finalised. 
Since its introduction, the NVC Act has been subject to some criticism, including 
that it was inequitable and costly for landholders and that it failed to achieve 
adequate environmental outcomes.  
In December 2003, the NSW Parliament passed legislation reforming natural 
resource management. The legislation provides for repeal of the NVC Act and for 
the establishment of a regulatory regime based primarily on the Native Vegetation 
Act 2003. The new regime is expected to be operational by mid 2004, once the 
required supporting regulations (which contain much of the detail of the regime), 
have been developed and implemented. 
The new regime is intended to end broadscale clearing of remnant vegetation and to 
‘deliver improved systems for managing native vegetation and a better deal for 
everyone involved in caring for the land’ (DIPNR 2003a, p. 1). Proposed changes 
include restructuring the regional vegetation management framework, and 
increasing funding to encourage landholders to ‘actively manage and restore 
vegetation’ (DIPNR 2003a, p. 2). 
This appendix discusses the current system of native vegetation management in 
New South Wales, namely that implemented under the NVC Act and the TSC Act, 
as well as the proposed regime. 
C.2  Description of the regulatory regime 
The regulatory regime established under the NVC Act is intended to provide 
guidance on areas of native vegetation that can be cleared without application, the 
circumstances in which an application to clear is necessary, and how such 
applications are to be assessed. The operation of the NVC Act is linked directly to 
the TSC Act and the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EPA Act).  
Native Vegetation Conservation Act  
The NVC Act applies to native vegetation on most private land in New South 
Wales.3 The NVC Act came into force on 1 January 1998, replacing State 
                                              
3  The NVC Act incorporates native vegetation clearing controls previously contained in the Soil 
Conservation Act 1938, the Western Lands Act 1901, the Crown Lands (Continued Tenures) 
Act 1989 and the Forestry Act 1916.     
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Environmental Planning Policy No. 46 (SEPP 46), an interim native vegetation 
management measure introduced in 1995. 
Under the NVC Act, vegetation management planning was intended to be 
implemented at the regional level through RVMPs (developed by RVCs — 
box C.1), which were to promote ‘partnerships between government, landholders, 
industry and the community’ (DLWC 1998a, p. 1).  
 
Box C.1  Regional Vegetation Committees 
Regional Vegetation Committees (RVCs) were appointed by the Minister for Land and 
Water Conservation to prepare Regional Vegetation Management Plans (RVMPs). The 
Committees consisted of: 
•  four representatives of rural interests, at least two of whom are nominated by the 
NSW Farmers’ Association; 
•  two representatives of conservation interests nominated by the Nature Conservation 
Council of New South Wales; 
•  one non-government member of a Catchment Management Board or Committee; 
•  one relevant Landcare group member; 
•  one local government nominee; 
•  two representatives of Aboriginal interests nominated by the NSW Aboriginal Land 
Council; 
•  one representative each of the Department of Land and Water Conservation 
(DLWC), NSW Agriculture and the National Parks and Wildlife Service; and 
•  one scientific expert in an area relating to native vegetation conservation and 
management. 
Wherever possible, RVCs were to adopt a consensus approach to decision making, 
rather than majority voting. DLWC considered the consensus approach to be ‘a 
powerful mechanism, which can involve a level of compromise by all members to try 
and arrive at a draft plan, which is supported by the committee as a whole’ (DLWC 
2002b, p. 2). 
While consensus was strongly preferred, there was provision for voting when 
consensus could not be reached. In these instances, members of committees were 
able to submit a minority report where they did not agree with the majority view. RVCs 
also were responsible for reviewing and monitoring a RVMP.  
Sources: DLWC (2002b); NVC Act. 
 
 
RVMPs also were intended to provide certainty to landholders by specifying the 
circumstances when development consent was required to remove vegetation, as     




well as detailing measures for the protection of high conservation value vegetation, 
and strategies to meet the objects of the NVC Act (DLWC 2002b).  
The development of RVMPs was intended to follow an extensive process to allow 
for adequate community consultation and to ensure that environmental concerns 
associated with vegetation clearance were taken into account. Community-based 
RVCs were responsible for developing draft RVMPs. In preparing a draft RVMP, 
the follow matters were required to be taken into consideration: 
•  matters relating to the conservation of native vegetation and native species 
(particularly threatened species) and their habitats; 
•  matters relating to the conservation of soil and water resources, and of 
archaeologically, geologically or anthropologically sensitive or significant areas of 
land, as they relate to native vegetation management; 
•  matters relating to the social and economic aspects as they relate to native 
vegetation management; 
•  any instrument made under an Act (including any environmental planning 
instrument …) that applies to the regions … (NVC Act, s. 27) 
Applications to clear native vegetation 
In most circumstances landholders are required to apply to the Department of 
Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (DIPNR)4 for development consent 
to remove native vegetation. Consent is not required where the proposed clearing is 
subject to an exemption; where the activity is in accordance with a RVMP; or where 
the activity is in accordance with a native vegetation code of practice.  
All applications for development consent require a pre-application site visit from a 
DIPNR officer to determine whether development consent is required and, if it is, to 
clarify and provide advice on the application. Information required to be submitted 
with an application varies according to the amount of native vegetation proposed for 
clearing. Information to be submitted might include analysis of the likely social and 
economic impacts of the clearing, and the implications of the activity on threatened 
species of flora and fauna. 
The NVC Act provides for a range of exemptions from the need to obtain 
development consent (including 34 exemptions carried over from previous land- 
clearing regimes), which are intended primarily to allow for day-to-day farm 
management activities (box C.2). At the time of the introduction of the NVC Act, 
                                              
4  The DIPNR was formed in May 2003 through the integration of the Department of Land and 
Water Conservation (DLWC) and Planning NSW. Prior to this, the DLWC was responsible for 
administering the NVC Act.     
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many of these exemptions were intended to be interim measures until either a new 
suite of exemptions was drafted, or until RVMPs were in place.  
 
Box C.2  Exemptions from previous regimes carried forward under the 
Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 
Different exemptions relate to leasehold land in the Western Division, and land in the 
Eastern and Central Divisions. On Western Division leasehold (under the Western 
Lands Act 1901) land exemptions include: 
•  clearing of land (not more than 40 metres wide) for fencing; and 
•  clearing of land (not more than 30 metres wide) for, among other things, an access 
trail, telephone line or cable. 
On land, other than State protected land or Western Division leasehold, the following 
clearing is exempt from the need to obtain development consent: 
•  minimal clearing — the clearing of up to two hectares per year for any contiguous 
landholding in the same ownership; 
•  minimal tree cutting — the cutting of no more than seven trees per hectare in any 
period of one year for on-farm uses, including fenceposts and firewood;  
•  stock fodder — the lopping of native vegetation for stock fodder in any period of 
declared drought if the continued health of the vegetation is not affected; and 
•  regrowth — the removal of native vegetation, whether seedlings or regrowth less 
than 10 years of age if the land has been previously cleared for cultivation. 
Sources: DLWC (1998a); NVC Act. 
 
 
Generally, exemptions apply to the clearing of native vegetation for the purposes of 
maintaining and constructing fencing and other farm infrastructure. In some areas of 
the State, the removal of regrowth was exempt from the need to obtain development 
consent if the regrowth was less than 10 years of age and was on land that had been 
cleared previously for cultivation.5 
Property agreements  
As well as providing for the regulation of clearing of native vegetation on 
landholders’ properties, the NVC Act also provides financial and technical 
                                              
5  Exemptions include those exemptions that applied under SEPP 46, the Soil Conservation 
Act 1938 and Schedule 4 of the Western Lands Act 1901 (carried forward under the savings and 
transitional provisions of the NVC Act (Schedule 4)). As such, exemptions differ depending on 
the classification of the land. For example, different exemptions relate to leasehold land in the 
Western Division, and land in the Eastern and Central Divisions.     




assistance to landholders to manage and improve the existing level of native 
vegetation through property agreements.  
Funding for property agreements is sourced from the Native Vegetation 
Management Fund. In addition to funding associated with property agreements, 
landholders can apply for grants of up to $10  000 to carry out simple native 
vegetation management work such as fencing, weed control or revegetating. There 
are currently 556 property agreements covering over 59 000 hectares (Bartel 2003). 
Threatened Species Conservation Act  
The TSC Act came into force in June 1996 and was intended to streamline existing 
regulatory procedures under the EPA Act and the National Parks and Wildlife 
Act 1974. The intention was to allow for the integration of threatened species 
assessment into the State’s planning system and to remove the requirement to obtain 
a separate approval from the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) for 
actions that also required consent under the EPA Act.  
The TSC Act provides for listing and de-listing of species, populations or ecological 
communities as either endangered or vulnerable, and the preparation of recovery 
and threat abatement plans (box C.3). 
The TSC Act also contains provisions for the listing of key threatening process.6 
Once a species is listed, any government authority charged with approving a 
development or activity that may have a significant impact on the species or 
population is required to seek the approval of the NPWS or the Minister before 
allowing the development or activity to proceed. 
Listing of species, populations or ecological communities under the TSC Act 
triggers a range of processes determined by the category of listing. For example, the 
Director-General of the NPWS is required to prepare a recovery plan for an 
endangered species, population or ecological community as soon as practicable after 
it is listed (TSC Act, s. 56). Under certain circumstances, a threat abatement plan to 
address key threatening processes may be required (TSC Act, s. 74). 
In September 2001, the clearing of native vegetation was listed as a key threatening 
process under the TSC Act. NPWS has yet to complete a threat abatement plan for 
native vegetation clearing, but is required to do so by 2004 (AONSW 2002).  
                                              
6  A process ‘that threatens, or may have the capability to threaten, the survival or evolutionary 
development of species, populations or ecological communities.’ (TSC Act, s. 4)     
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Box C.3  Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 
The  Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (TSC Act) came into force in 
June 1996. The objects of the Act (s. 3) include to: 
•  conserve biological diversity and promote ecologically sustainable development; 
•  prevent the extinction and promote the recovery of threatened species, populations 
and ecological communities;  
•  protect the critical habitat of those threatened species, populations and ecological 
communities that are endangered. 
To pursue these objects, several processes are set out in the TSC Act for the 
identification, protection and management of threatened species, populations and 
ecological communities and their habitats. This includes the development of Recovery 
Plans (under Part 4) and Threat Abatement Plans (under Part 5).  
Recovery Plans 
Recovery Plans are developed for particular threatened species, populations or 
ecological communities, and identify any critical habitat or threatening processes. They 
are required to specify what must be done to ensure the recovery of the 
species/population/community, what must be done to protect critical habitat, and who is 
to implement the plan. Plans include measures to minimise adverse social and 
economic consequences of implementation. The Native Vegetation Conservation 
Act 1997 specifically requires that Regional Vegetation Management Plans include the 
provisions of any relevant recovery plans. 
Threat Abatement Plans 
Threat Abatement Plans aim to manage each threatening process identified in 
schedules to the TSC Act so that the adverse effects on the threatened 
species/population/community are abated, ameliorated, or eliminated.  
Sources: NVAC (2000a); TSC Act. 
 
 
Removal of native vegetation, which may be exempt under the NVC Act and is not 
controlled by any Environmental Planning Instrument under the EPA Act, may still 
require an approval under Part 5 of the EPA Act or a licence under the TSC Act if it 
is likely to harm or damage the habitat of a threatened species, population or 
ecological community (NVAC 2000a). 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act  
The EPA Act (box C.4) provides the planning framework to implement the clearing 
controls implemented through the NVC Act and, once it commences, the Native 
Vegetation Act. Where development consent is required to remove native     




vegetation, this needs to be obtained from the Minister under Part 4 of the EPA Act. 
The EPA Act provides for penalties of up to $1.1 million for clearing without a 
development consent. 
 
Box C.4  Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 
The Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EPA Act) provides the broad 
framework for land-use planning in New South Wales. Objects of the Act (s. 5) include 
to encourage: 
the proper management, development and conservation of natural and artificial resources, 
including agricultural land … 
the protection of the environment, including the protection and conservation of native 
animals and plants, including threatened species, populations and ecological communities, 
and their habitats; and  
ecologically sustainable development. 
The EPA Act establishes a process for land-use planning at three levels: State, 
regional and local. It does this through the creation and adoption of Environmental 
Planning Instruments which guide and direct the types of land use which can and 
cannot occur in particular areas. 
The EPA Act also allows for State Environmental Planning Policies (SEPPs) to address 
issues of State-wide significance. SEPPs relevant to native vegetation include: 
•  SEPP 14 Coastal Wetlands, which applies to developments within areas mapped as 
coastal wetlands. Development consent is required for land clearing, levelling, 
draining and filling. 
•  SEPP 19 Bushland in Urban Areas, which applies to a limited number of local 
government districts in metropolitan areas. Development consent must be obtained 
before bushland (zoned or reserved for public open space) can be disturbed. 
•  SEPP 44 Koala Habitat, which provides a mechanism for the identification and 
protection of koala habitat. 
SEPP 46 Protection and Management of Native Vegetation 
•  SEPP 46 was introduced in August 1995 and was repealed when the Native 
Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 was introduced. SEPP 46 introduced clearing 
controls for the first time for rural landholdings in the Central and Eastern Divisions 
of the State (there were some clearing controls for the Western Division of the 
State). 
Sources: DLWC (1997); EPA Act; NVAC (2000a). 
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Other legislation 
There is a range of other legislation that may affect landholders’ ability to manage 
native vegetation on their properties.  
•  Heritage Act 1997 
–  The Heritage Act enables listing, on the recommendations of the Heritage 
Council of New South Wales, of environmental heritage items of State 
significance on the State Heritage Register. Approval may be required from a 
local council or the Heritage Council before undertaking activities that affect 
areas or items listed. 
•  National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 
–  This Act is concerned with the establishment, preservation and management 
of national parks, historic sites, State conservation areas and the protection of 
certain fauna, native plants and Aboriginal objects. As such, the Act enables 
the Director-General of the NPWS to place certain restrictions (such as stop-
work orders) on activities that are likely to have a significant effect on listed 
areas of land and species. For the same purposes, the Director-General may 
place interim protection orders on certain areas of land.  
•  Rural Fires Act 1997 
–  This Act provides for the designated local authority to issue an order 
requiring a landholder to carry out specified bushfire reduction work. Also 
specified in the Act are the conditions for when a permit is required for the 
burning of vegetation for clearance purposes.  
•  Plantation and Re-afforestation Act 1999 
–  The Act provides for the regulation of forestry plantation establishment, 
management and harvesting activities on private lands and lands managed by 
State Forests in New South Wales. Under the Act, authorisation is required 
for activities associated with establishing, harvesting and managing a 
plantation. Although the Act applies to plantation operations on what is 
essentially cleared land, approval is required for the incidental removal of 
native vegetation associated with the establishment and management of 
plantations.  
C.3  Natural resource management reform 
In December 2003, the NSW Parliament passed legislation to reform natural 
resource management in the State. Part of the reforms include replacement of the 
NVC Act with the Native Vegetation Act. The Native Vegetation Act will come     




into effect once the required supporting regulations have been developed, which is 
expected to be by mid 2004. In addition to the Native Vegetation Act, the NSW 
Parliament also passed the Natural Resources Commission Act 2003 (NRC Act) and 
the Catchment Management Authorities Act 2003 (CMA Act).  
In announcing the reforms, the NSW Government considered that the regime 
implemented through the NVC Act ‘was overly complicated and couldn’t deliver on 
agricultural and conservation outcomes’ (DIPNR 2003b,  p. 1).  Approximately 
$406 million has been made available to implement the reform package, funded 
jointly from the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality (NAPSWQ) 
and the Natural Heritage Trust (NHT). 
The new legislation does not repeal the TSC Act and hence the requirement to 
assess likely impacts on threatened species remains a part of the new consent 
process for clearing native vegetation. A review of the TSC Act is to be undertaken 
by the Minister of the Environment to examine whether any changes are necessary 
in ‘light of the extensive changes to natural resource management arrangements 
embodied in these [Acts]’ (NSW Legislative Assembly 2003, 12 November, 
p. 4898).  
Natural Resources Commission Act  
The NRC Act establishes the Natural Resource Commission (NRC) as an 
independent, statutory authority to provide the State Government with advice on 
natural resource management issues. The NRC is to make recommendations on 
natural resource management targets and standards for the State related to issues 
such as salinity, water quality, soil conservation and biodiversity. The NRC may 
conduct inquiries on specific issues as directed by the Government and recommend 
to the Government accreditation of Catchment Action Plans developed by 
Catchment Management Authorities (CMAs).  
Catchment Management Authorities Act 
The CMA Act establishes 13 regional authorities to deliver natural resource 
management at the catchment level. The CMAs are to replace 72 natural resource 
management committees — comprising 19 Catchment Management Boards, 
20 Regional  Vegetation  Committees  and 33 Water Management Committees. 
Specific functions of CMAs include: 
•  preparing catchment management plans and associated investment strategies;     
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•  recommending and managing incentive programs to implement catchment 
management plans and maximise environmental outcomes; 
•  providing landholders with access to data needed to develop Property Vegetation 
Plans (PVPs); 
•  allocating funds to support development of PVPs and PVP-incentive based 
programs; and  
•  certifying or facilitating certification of PVPs (DIPNR 2004b).  
Under the CMA Act, CMAs are constituted as statutory bodies, with a board 
comprising 5–7 members appointed by the Minister. Board members are to have, in 
the opinion of the Minister, skills and knowledge in the areas of primary production, 
environmental, social and economic analysis, State and local government 
administration, negotiation and consultation, community leadership, cultural 
heritage and water quality. As far as practicable, board members are to reside in the 
area of operations of the authority. 
Native Vegetation Act 
In the second reading speech for the Native Vegetation Act, the Minister stated that 
the objects of the Act ‘reflect the Government’s commitment to end broadscale 
clearing and maintain productive landscapes’ (NSW Legislative Assembly 2003, 
12 November, p. 4891). The objects include to: 
•  provide for, encourage and promote the management of native vegetation on a 
regional basis in the social, economic and environmental interests of the State; 
•  prevent broadscale clearing unless it improves or maintains environmental 
outcomes; 
•  protect native vegetation of high conservation value having regard to its 
contribution to such matters as water quality, biodiversity or the prevention of 
salinity or land degradation; 
•  improve the condition of existing native vegetation, particularly where it has high 
conservation value; and 
•  encourage the revegetation of land, and the rehabilitation of land, with appropriate 
native vegetation. (Native Vegetation Act, s. 3)  
The Act is intended to provide for ‘agreed definitions for terms that have been a 
constant source of contention for years, such as remnant native vegetation, 
regrowth, protected regrowth, and broadscale clearing’ (NSW Legislative Assembly 
2003, 12 November, p. 4891). The definitions are to be incorporated into guidelines 
for the management of native vegetation (box C.5).      





Box C.5  Key definitions included in the Native Vegetation Act 2003  
The Native Vegetation Act provides definitions of a number of key concepts, some of 
these are listed below. 
Native vegetation includes indigenous trees (including any sapling or shrub, or any 
scrub), understorey plants, groundcover (any type of herbaceous vegetation) and 
plants occurring in a wetland. Vegetation is considered indigenous if it is of a species 
of vegetation, or if it comprises species of vegetation, that existed in the State before 
European settlement. For the purposes of the Act, native vegetation does not include 
any mangroves, seagrasses or any other type of marine vegetation to which 
section 205 of the Fisheries Management Act 1994 applies.  
Clearing of native vegetation means any one or more of the following: 
•  cutting down, felling, thinning, logging or removing native vegetation; and 
•  killing, destroying, poisoning, ringbarking, uprooting or burning native vegetation. 
Broadscale clearing of native vegetation means the clearing of any remnant native 
vegetation or protected regrowth. 
Remnant native vegetation means any native vegetation other than regrowth. 
Regrowth means all native vegetation that has grown since 1990, or since 1983 in the 
Western Division. Native vegetation may also be considered regrowth in instances 
when it has grown after a date specified in a Property Vegetation Plan (PVP) — the 
date being based on existing rotational farming practices. Regrowth does not include 
any vegetation that has regrown following unlawful clearing of native vegetation or 
following clearing of remnant vegetation caused by bushfire, flood, drought or other 
natural cause.  
Existing rotational farming practices mean those farming practices that are 
reasonable and in accordance with accepted farming practices, and that have been in 
place since the date specified in a PVP.  
Protected regrowth means any native vegetation that is regrowth and that is identified 
as protected regrowth in a PVP, an environmental planning instrument, a natural 
resource management plan of a kind prescribed by the regulations, or an interim 
protection order under the Native Vegetation Act. Protected regrowth also includes any 
native vegetation that has been grown or preserved with the assistance of public funds 
granted for biodiversity conservation purposes. 
Routine agricultural management activities mean any of the following activities 
carried out by, or on behalf of, the landholder: 
•  the construction, operation and maintenance of rural infrastructure, including dams, 
permanent fences, buildings, bores, air strips (in the Western Division), stockyards 
and farm roads (the definition does not apply to rural infrastructure in areas zoned 
as rural-residential under environmental planning instruments or on small holdings 
— as defined in the regulations); 
(Continued next page) 
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Box C.5  (continued) 
•  the removal of noxious weeds under the Noxious Weeds Act 1993; 
•  the control of noxious animals under the Rural Lands Protection Act 1998; 
•  the collection of firewood (except for commercial purposes); 
•  the harvesting or other clearing of native vegetation planted for commercial 
purposes; 
•  the lopping of native vegetation for stock fodder (including the uprooting of Mulga in 
the Western Division in areas officially declared to be drought affected); 
•  traditional Aboriginal cultural activities (except commercial activities); 
•  the maintenance of public utilities (such as those associated with the transmission 
of electricity or the supply of water); and 
•  any activity reasonably considered necessary to remove or reduce an imminent risk 
of serious personal injury or damage to property. 
Regulations may make provisions for, or with respect to, extending, limiting, or varying 
the activities that are routine agricultural management activities.  
Source: Native Vegetation Act (Part 2). 
 
 
Applications to clear native vegetation 
Under the Native Vegetation Act, approval is not required to clear regrowth native 
vegetation. As described in box C.5, regrowth is classified as vegetation that has 
grown after a certain date (the date either specified in the Native Vegetation Act or 
contained in an approved PVP). Landholders are also exempt from the need to gain 
regulatory approval to clear native vegetation in the course of undertaking routine 
agricultural activities. 
In some circumstances, clearing of groundcover that comprises some native 
vegetation is permitted without the requirement to obtain approval (Native 
Vegetation Act, s.  20). Clearing of native vegetation that comprises only 
groundcover is permitted if the vegetation comprises less than 50 per cent native 
vegetation, and not less than 10 per cent of the area is covered with vegetation 
(whether dead or alive). The method for calculating these percentages is to be 
provided in the supporting regulations. 
Those wishing to clear native vegetation have two options: submitting a 
development application to the DIPNR, or submitting a PVP to the relevant CMA 
for certification. Development consent is not to be granted by the Minister unless 
the clearing concerned ‘will improve or maintain environmental outcomes’ (Native     




Vegetation Act, s. 14). In the second reading speech for the Native Vegetation Act 
the Minister stated that: 
… approval to clear remnant vegetation and protected regrowth will not be granted 
unless I am convinced that the clearing concerned will improve or maintain 
environmental outcomes. For example, in the Western Division of the State some 
native shrubs, such as narrowleaf hopbush, grow so thickly that they overwhelm other 
native species. At times landholders wish to control these species to encourage native 
groundcover, and this provision will allow a PVP that included such a control program 
and clearing to be undertaken. (NSW Legislative Assembly 2003, 12 November, 
p. 4897) 
The supporting regulations for the Native Vegetation Act may make provisions for 
determining whether or not broadscale clearing is to be regarded as improving or 
maintaining environmental outcomes (Native Vegetation Act, s. 15).  
The Native Vegetation Act provides for three categories of PVPs:  
•  to accredit existing native vegetation management practices in accordance with 
current laws;  
•  to provide access to incentives for on-farm conservation of native vegetation; or 
•  to give approval for landholders seeking to change their land management in a 
way that involves clearing protected vegetation or regrowth. 
In some cases, a PVP may be used to classify regrowth as protected regrowth. In 
these instances, consideration is to be given to the social and economic implications 
of such a classification. 
PVPs may be prepared by an individual landholder or a group of landholders. A 
PVP becomes valid only if approved by the Minister. However, under section 48 of 
the Native Vegetation Act, the Minister may delegate this authority to a CMA or 
other government agency. A PVP can have effect for any period specified in the 
plan up to a maximum of 15 years (the supporting regulations may make provision 
for reviews of PVPs after 10 years). PVPs apply to the land and not the landholders, 
and so continue to apply after any changes in ownership of the land concerned.  
Compliance 
Measures are to be implemented under the Native Vegetation Act to strengthen the 
compliance framework. The new approach is based on: 
… a risk management approach to prioritising investigation of alleged breaches; 
encouraging voluntary compliance through education and incentive programs; 
providing adequate resources to ensure effective compliance and enforcement; and     
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systematic monitoring of changes in native vegetation cover rather than ad hoc 
investigations. (NSW Legislative Assembly 2003, 12 November, p. 4898) 
The NSW Government has indicated that satellite monitoring is to play a more 
prominent role in the monitoring of native vegetation clearance.  
Private native forestry 
Forestry operations on State land are excluded from the provisions of the Native 
Vegetation Act. However, the operation of private native forestry operations will 
require a PVP. PVPs for private forestry operations will be granted in instances 
where the Minister or relevant CMA is satisfied that the harvesting will maintain or 
improve environmental outcomes. Guidance as to whether operations ‘will maintain 
or improve environmental outcomes’ is to be provided in a Code of Practice for 
private native forestry activities, which is currently being developed by the DIPNR 
(DIPNR 2004a).  
C.4  Development of the regulatory regime 
There appear to have been different approaches used in the development of the three 
major native vegetation management instruments implemented in New South Wales 
over the last 10 years. SEPP 46, as an interim measure, was introduced with 
minimal public consultation — possibly to reduce the risk of pre-emptive clearing. 
The introduction of the NVC Act followed an extensive process of public 
consultation, whereas development of the Native Vegetation Act focussed on 
consultation with key interest groups.  
Native Vegetation Conservation Act  
Following the introduction of SEPP 46, the NSW Vegetation Forum was formed 
(comprising representatives of key stakeholder groups) to review the operation of 
the policy, and to present the views of the community on the possible ‘future 
options and directions to achieve the long-term sustainable management of native 
vegetation’ (NSWVF 1996, p. 1). In developing its recommendations, more than 
160 meetings were held and 246 submissions were received.  
The Forum’s recommendations formed the basis of a White Paper that outlined the 
NSW Government’s proposed model for native vegetation management in the State 
(DLWC 1997) — that is, the proposed NVC Act. The White Paper was released in     




1997 to elicit public comment and more than 340 submissions were received in 
response. 
Native Vegetation Conservation Act and the Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Act 
A number of participants argued that in certain circumstances, the NSW 
Government did not have the legislative authority to regulate native vegetation 
clearance on private land. These participants considered this occurred where 
agricultural activities could be considered an ‘existing use’ of the land. They argued 
that when agriculture is an ‘existing use’ of the land, application of Common Law 
principles, and the provisions of the EPA Act, exempted landholders from the 
requirement to obtain a development consent to undertake activities consistent with 
agricultural production. For example, they considered that changing land use from 
grazing to cropping should not require a development consent, as the activity would 
still be consistent with using the land for agricultural activities. In terms of 
determining what is ‘existing use’ of land, Len Wheatley argued that: 
… local government is the responsible body for determining existing use rights … 
[and] that existing use rights controlled by local governments overrule state legislation. 
… existing use rights and property rights on land and water and their ecosystems must 
be clearly identified by local government before native vegetation and biodiversity 
decisions can be made. (trans., p. 197) 
Other participants who provided information on this argument to the Commission 
included the Constitutional Property Rights Committee (trans., pp.  235–52 and 
pp. 977–87) and Warren Page (sub. 58).  
Threatened Species Conservation Act 
There appears to have been little public consultation associated with the 
introduction of the TSC Act. In the second reading speech for the Bill in 1995, the 
Minister acknowledged that there was a lack of time to undertake adequate 
consultation because the existing threatened species legislation, the Endangered 
Fauna (Interim Protection) Act 1991, was due to expire and new legislation needed 
to be introduced urgently. The Minister stated that:  
… intensive effort has gone into the development of new legislation and a detailed 
scheme was delineated. Inevitably, however, there has not been time available for full 
consultation with industry or with conservation interests. We knew that this would be 
the case. Having given a preliminary briefing on the new scheme to key stakeholders in 
recent days, it was obvious that both conservation and industry interests had 
concerns …     
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In these circumstances the Government has undertaken additional finetuning of the 
legislative scheme giving better recognition — where possible — to the concerns that 
had been raised with us. (NSW Legislative Assembly 1995, 7 December, p. 4483) 
Formal regulatory impact assessments do not appear to have been undertaken for 
either the NVC Act or the TSC Act.  
Native Vegetation Act 
In February 2003, the Wentworth Group released a report addressing some of the 
issues associated with the implementation of the NVC Act and, in doing so, 
proposed a ‘radically new way of managing native vegetation in New South Wales’ 
(Wentworth Group 2003, p. 4). In response, the NSW Government appointed the 
Native Vegetation Reform Implementation Group (NVRIG) to identify ways to 
improve native vegetation management. The NVRIG comprised members of the 
NSW Farmers’ Association (NSWFA), peak environmental interests, the 
Wentworth Group and representatives of State government agencies. 
The NVRIG’s report (NVRIG 2003), formed the basis of reforms to native 
vegetation management announced by the NSW Government in October 2003 
(DIPNR 2003a). 
C.5  Promoting environmental goals  
This section assesses the effectiveness of the NVC Act in promoting its 
environmental objectives and describes some of the features of the reforms 
introduced in December 2003 in relation to pursuing environmental objectives.  
There has been considerable debate about the effectiveness of the NVC Act in 
achieving its environmental objectives. As discussed below, the debate is difficult to 
resolve because of a lack of objective indicators to assess how well the regulatory 
regime has performed. Generally, however, there was some agreement among 
participants that the regulatory regime implemented under the NVC Act was not as 
effective as it might have been in achieving environmental objectives. There was 
less agreement as to the reasons why the objectives have not been met.      




Objectives of the regimes 
Native Vegetation Conservation Act 
While the objectives of the NVC Act centre on the achievement of environmental 
goals, the objectives also acknowledge the need to consider the economic 
consequences of pursuing these objectives, particularly for landholders with 
remnant native vegetation on their properties and for regional communities 
(NVC Act, s. 3). 
Threatened Species Conservation Act and the Environmental Planning 
Assessment Act 
The TSC Act and the EPA Act that, together with the NVC Act, form the mainstay 
of native vegetation and biodiversity regulation in the State also have explicit 
environmental objectives. For instance, objects of the TSC Act (box C.3) include to 
‘prevent the extinction and promote the recovery of threatened species, populations 
and ecological communities’ (TSC Act, s. 3). Objects under the EPA Act (box C.4) 
include ‘the protection of the environment including the protection of native 
animals and plants’ (EPA Act, s.  5). Both Acts have in their objects that 
consideration be given to the principles of ecologically sustainable development. 
Comparing objectives between regimes  
While the objectives of the three Acts appear to be broadly consistent, there does 
seem to be a potential for conflict between the objectives of the NVC Act and the 
TSC Act. The NVC Act directs that social and economic aspects be considered in 
the regulation of native vegetation management. While there is no explicit direction 
to consider economic and social aspects under the TSC Act, there is the requirement 
to promote ecologically sustainable development. 
Understanding of the objectives 
Considerable information has been provided to promote the objectives and general 
understanding of the regulatory regime established under the NVC Act. For 
example, a number of guidelines and factsheets were made available by the DLWC 
on the objects and operation of the regime. In addition, the public consultation 
undertaken in developing the NVC Act might have been expected to raise 
community awareness of its provisions. An important part of the community     
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consultation process were the RVCs, which provided a mechanism for 
disseminating information on the operation of the Act at a local level.  
The requirement to have a DLWC officer attend a property to determine whether a 
landholder is required to apply for a development consent also may have aided 
landholders’ understanding of how the regime works.  
While considerable information has been provided on the objects of the NVC Act, 
there has been ongoing debate about the appropriateness of the objectives. The 
NSWFA (2003b) considered that the objectives were poorly defined. The focus on 
the conservation of native vegetation, above all other aspects, such as the 
sustainable use of resources, was seen as a major weakness of the regime. NSWFA  
argued that: 
… the objectives of the [NVC Act] have never been clear beyond a desire to preserve 
native vegetation on private land. The failure of the Act to clearly consider vegetation 
management in the context of a productive, viable and functioning landscape has led to 
many of the problems and much of the conflict that has occurred. (2003b, p. 6) 
Despite the information provided by government agencies on the operation of the 
NVC Act, difficulties in understanding the complexities of its practical application 
may have affected compliance (section C.6).  
Achieving objectives  
The principal objective of the NVC Act is ‘to provide for the conservation and 
management of native vegetation on a regional basis’ (NVC Act, s. 3). The Act was 
not expressly intended to impose blanket restrictions on the removal of native 
vegetation, but rather was intended to: 
… prevent further inappropriate clearance [of native vegetation] through development 
of [RVMPs] and the requirement for Development Consent for land clearing where the 
land is not otherwise exempted. (DLWC 1998b, p. 2) (emphasis added)  
Clearly-specified objectives for native vegetation management were intended to be 
a feature of the regulatory regime implemented under the NVC Act. For instance, 
guidelines and targets were to have been provided in RVMPs. Targets and 
objectives for the conservation of native vegetation also were intended to be 
contained in a native vegetation conservation strategy developed by the Native 
Vegetation Advisory Council (NVAC). While a draft strategy was released in 2000 
for public consultation, a final report has not been released (NVAC 2000a). The 
Nature Conservation Council of New South Wales observed that the Act: 
… promotes the development of regional vegetation management plans and a native 
vegetation conservation strategy, however it fails to provide guidance for the     




conservation of vegetation in unambiguous terms, by way of clear objectives, targets, 
strategies and benchmark plans, five years after its implementation. (sub. 109, p. 2) 
The case for the development of targets and standards has been acknowledged in the 
proposed reforms of the native vegetation regulatory regime:  
Clearly defined environmental standards, targets and native vegetation categories will 
increase understanding among stakeholders and land managers and allow vegetation to 
be managed according to its significance. (DIPNR 2003a, p. 2) 
A Natural Resources Commission will be responsible for recommending State-wide 
environmental standards and targets, with these targets to be implemented at a 
regional level to allow for ‘monitoring of practical natural resource management’ 
(DIPNR 2003a, p. 2). 
Native vegetation clearance under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act  
One indicator of the effectiveness of the regime is the rate of native vegetation 
clearance that has occurred since the introduction of the NVC Act. The DIPNR 
currently monitors the clearance of native vegetation in two ways: satellite mapping 
and monitoring of clearing approvals.  
Based on satellite mapping techniques, clearing of native ‘woody vegetation’ over 
the period 1991–95 was approximately 50  000 hectares per year. After the 
introduction of vegetation clearing controls in 1995 (SEPP  46), clearing fell to 
around 30  000 hectares a year over the period 1995–97. On the basis of this 
evidence, the NVAC (1999, p. 29) concluded that ‘it is possible that regulation has 
worked to reduce clearing — at least in some parts of New South Wales’. Over the 
period 1997–2000, clearing of woody native vegetation is estimated to have 
declined further to around 14 000 hectares per year (DLWC 2001). 
However, questions over the accuracy of this type of satellite technology, and the 
fact that this measure focuses only on woody vegetation (and does not, for example, 
include estimates of the amount of clearing of native grasslands and some 
shrublands), mean that these figures provide only a partial indicator of rates of total 
native vegetation clearance (box C.6). Again, definitions of ‘remnant vegetation’ 
and ‘clearance’ are critical, along with the ability of satellite imagery to differentiate 
what falls within and outside the legislated definitions.  
The DIPNR also maintains a register of clearing approvals in accordance with the 
provisions of the NVC Act. The annual area of land approved for clearing in the 
period 1996–2002 is shown in figure C.1 (the area applied to be cleared, and the 
area approved to be cleared, by DLWC region are shown in figure C.2 in 
section C.7).     
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These figures may understate the area cleared as they do not include land cleared 
without a permit: that is, land cleared illegally or legal clearing under an exemption. 
On the other hand, where clearing involved only partial clearing of the area 
approved (for example, the clearing of isolated trees, clumps of trees and sparse 
woodlands), or where clearing was postponed or not undertaken, the figures may 
overstate the amount of clearing.  
 
Box C.6  Satellite monitoring of native vegetation clearance  
The DIPNR contracts the Environmental Research and Information Consortium (ERIC) 
to monitor land clearing using Landsat satellite technology. The ERIC approach uses 
satellite images to compare and interpret changes in woody vegetation (trees and large 
shrubs) with at least 20 per cent canopy cover, followed by detailed visual inspection 
and measurement of clearing. The technology underpinning the approach is restricted 
to measuring woody vegetation and cannot reliably detect clearing in open woodlands, 
shrublands, grassland and other herbaceous communities. 
In 2001, the National Parks and Wildlife Service conducted a study of clearing in the 
NSW wheatbelt. It used targeted aerial photography to add a higher degree of 
accuracy to satellite imagery. The study showed that the rate of clearing in the 
wheatbelt areas was 10 times that revealed by satellite measurement alone. DIPNR is 
currently working with the Native Vegetation Advisory Council to improve vegetation 
monitoring techniques. The NSW Government has allocated $17  million to develop 
comprehensive mapping coverage of New South Wales over the period 1999–2006. 
Sources: AONSW (2002); DLWC (2001). 
 
 
In 2002, the Audit Office of New South Wales (AONSW 2002, p. 22) found that 
‘there is currently no program in place to systematically monitor changes in native 
vegetation’. While the DIPNR has instigated a program to improve its mapping 
capability, the program will not be able to provide complete coverage of New South 
Wales for many years (AONSW 2002).  
As noted in section C.3, the NSW Government has indicated that satellite mapping 
is likely to play a more prominent role in the monitoring of native vegetation 
clearance. 
Moreover, rates of vegetation clearance are affected by a number of factors, in 
addition to regulation. Economic factors, such as commodity prices and exchange 
rates, and environmental conditions (drought etc.) also influence a landholder’s 
decision whether to clear native vegetation. As such, even if accurate figures of 
changes in vegetation clearing were available, they would only provide a partial 
indication of the effectiveness of the regime in reducing native vegetation clearance.     




Figure C.1  Native vegetation clearance in New South Wales based on 



































a 1998 and 1999 figures subject to validation. b Approvals prior to 1998 were issued under SEPP 46. 
Data sources: AONSW (2002); DLWC (2003). 
Appropriate rates of native vegetation clearance? 
There has been considerable debate about the effectiveness of the regime in 
achieving its environmental objectives. A major criticism is that it has 
‘demonstrably failed to control broadscale clearing’ (Australian Conservation 
Foundation, sub. 146, p. 12). The DLWC (2002a, p. 25) commented that vegetation 
is being cleared at ‘unsustainable rates’. Since the introduction of the NVC Act, it 
has been argued that New South Wales has continued to lose large amounts of 
native vegetation — both through legal and illegal clearing. Bartel (2003, p. 139) 
argued that with large areas of permitted clearance, and many areas of clearance 
exempt, even if the existing legislation was being complied with, ‘its aims may not 
be achieved’.  
The NSW Government has stated that an objective of the 2003 reforms to natural 
resource management (section C.3) is to ‘end broadscale clearing of remnant 
vegetation’ (DIPNR 2003a, p. 2).     
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Clearing allowed under exemptions 
In 2000, the NSW Government established a Community Reference Panel (CRP) 
comprising peak stakeholder groups and key government agencies to advise on 
measures to improve the implementation of the NVC Act, including reviewing the 
system of clearing exemptions. The CRP reported that: 
… reliance on the exemptions was intended as an interim measure until either a new 
suite of exemptions was drafted or until [RVMPs] were in place. The considerable time 
that would be required to prepare [RVMPs] was not originally anticipated, nor was the 
fact that substantial areas of New South Wales would not have [RVCs] appointed in the 
short term … Therefore the significance of the current system of exemptions has 
increased. (2001, p. 3) 
Some participants considered that the system of exemptions reduced the 
effectiveness of the NSW regime. The Wentworth Group (2003, p. 5) argues that 
‘the [NVC Act] is being undermined by too many exemptions that have created 
legal loopholes and have made compliance complicated’. The Nature Conservation 
Council of New South Wales argued that: 
There are major concerns about the unchecked cumulative impacts of the exemptions 
under the Act, as there is no requirement for landholders to inform the Department of 
clearing perceived to be exempt. Therefore land clearing is being carried out without 
assessment, and without consideration for the broader and cumulative impacts on a 
regional basis. Alleged breach reports indicate the use of exemptions over large areas, 
an increasing use of a combination of exemptions so more land can be cleared, clearing 
of areas adjacent to land that falls under the exemption, and ‘creative’ interpretations of 
the exemptions which are not consistent with the objects of the Act. (sub. 109, p. 2)  
As discussed in section C.3 and below, the natural resource management reforms 
introduced in December 2003 provide for a new system for determining exemptions 
from the need to obtain development consent. The impact of exemptions under the 
NVC Act on farming practices is discussed in detail in section C.7 below.  
Perverse environmental outcomes 
Many participants argued that in a number of cases native vegetation and 
biodiversity conservation regulations were proving to be detrimental to landholders’ 
ability and willingness to provide environmental services. 
Landholders undertake a number of activities to manage and improve the quality of 
native vegetation on their properties — through activities such as weed and feral 
animal control, planting of native vegetation and bushfire reduction measures.      




The NSWFA noted: 
… the direct impacts on conservation resulting from the regulatory approach to land 
management can be seen in terms of reduced ability to sustainably manage the land. 
That land benefits from management in many parts of the State is well recorded yet this 
is a point that few seem to understand. The tendency is to think that of a well-preserved 
environment as inconsistent with economic productivity. But there is a plethora of 
evidence that native vegetation benefits from careful management. (2001, p. 10) 
Some participants argued that while regulation may prevent the clearing of native 
vegetation, it does not necessarily ensure that the remaining native vegetation will 
be managed effectively to provide positive environmental outcomes. Several 
participants considered that ‘minimal interventionist’ approaches to native 
vegetation management often resulted in detrimental environmental outcomes 
(subs 27, 57, 58, 172).  
Some evidence was provided that the current legislative regime impedes action to 
manage native vegetation. A common example concerned the management of 
‘invasive’ native vegetation which, if left unchecked, could result in land 
degradation and biodiversity loss. The NSWFA observed: 
In many of the lower rainfall areas of the State, woody regrowth of Cyprus Pines, 
Bimble Box and other invasive natives leads to the choking out of understorey species 
that are crucial to the survival of many indigenous species of fauna. The resulting 
monocultures do nothing to promote biodiversity and may in fact result in severe 
erosion and environmental degradation. (2001, p. 10) 
Restrictions on the removal of native vegetation were also claimed to have 
implications for the management of ‘invasive’ weeds such as Lippia (box C.7). 
P.A. and E.G. Gallagher (sub. 70, p. 2) noted that ‘the lack of native vegetation 
clearing imposes difficulties in the eradication of feral animals and is disastrous to 
bushfire management’. F.S. Hespe expressed similar views (sub. 62). 
The NSWFA argued that the regulations create incentives for landholders to avoid 
the impacts of the legislation: 
The current regulatory approach encourages what is termed in the United States as a 
‘shoot, shovel and shut-up’ approach to threatened species conservation. Certainly 
when talking to farmers many will acknowledge areas of great ecological value on their 
properties and the presence of endangered and valued species. Farmers value these 
habitats and always have but the regulatory framework currently in place means that 
they will never inform authorities of their existence, undermining any attempts at 
recovery planning or improved information. The reason for this reluctance to inform is 
fear of management restrictions. (2001, p. 11)      
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Box C.7  Lippia and the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 2003 
Lippia (Phyla Canescens) is an introduced plant that is ‘highly competitive’ with native 
pastures. The species is unpalatable to stock, and infestations have the potential to 
reduce the carrying capacity of native pastures significantly. Lippia has a system of 
deep roots, which can dry out soil and lead to erosion.  
The Murray Darling Basin Lippia Working Group argued that, given current knowledge, 
effective management and eradication of Lippia often involves selective clearing of 
native pastures and woodlands followed by a program of spraying or cultivation (to 
ensure the root system is eliminated). The Group considered that the regime 
established under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act (NVC Act) restricted 
landholders’ ability to undertake these management activities.  
… to maintain productivity in Lippia affected country [landholders] must have exemptions in 
the [NVC Act] to allow selective clearing to rehabilitate the land from this imported weed … 
(sub. 170, p. 2) 
Sources: Murray Darling Basin Lippia Working Group (sub. 170, trans., pp. 967–76). 
 
 
Rod Young observed that potential restrictions under the NVC Act and the TSC Act 
had created a situation where landholders are forced to question the viability of 
allowing certain species of flora to continue to grow on their land. He noted in 
relation to threatened species, such as Giant Red Grass, and the endangered 
ecological communities of White Box and Yellow Box, that these: 
… species grow naturally on our better red and black soil types. The implications of 
certain terms such as ‘High Conservation Value’ will almost certainly lead to serious 
ramifications for those landowners with these species growing on their properties … 
The legislation is crying out to be amended so that it is financially and environmentally 
attractive to enhance the growth of such species. (sub. 27, p. 2) 
The 10-year exemption on the clearing of regrowth has been cited as creating a 
‘perverse incentive to re-clear regrowth to maintain its unprotected status’ (WWF 
Australia, sub. 108, p. 6). The incentive created for landholders under the exemption 
is to clear to avoid regrowth becoming classified as remnant vegetation under the 
legislation, thus requiring consent (with all the attendant costs). 
Under reforms announced in 2003, clearing of regrowth will not require regulatory 
approval. ‘Regrowth’ is defined in the Native Vegetation Act as all native 
vegetation that has grown since 1990, or since 1983 in the Western Division. 
However, native vegetation may also be considered regrowth in instances when it 
has grown after a date specified in a PVP. The Minister noted that this later 
provision is: 
… intended to cover those situations where regrowth has arisen as part of a planned and 
legitimate cropping or grazing rotation that commenced before the standard cut-off date     




for defining regrowth … there will be cases where one size does not fit all. (NSW 
Legislative Assembly 2003, 12 November, p. 4896). 
The criteria for defining native vegetation as regrowth through PVPs is to be 
contained in the supporting regulations for the Native Vegetation Act. 
Voluntary conservation efforts  
An objective of the NVC Act is to encourage landholder and community 
involvement in native vegetation management (DLWC 1998b). Instead of 
encouraging landholders to undertake measures to improve the quality and quantity 
of native vegetation on their properties, many participants have argued that it has 
had the opposite effect. General frustration with the regulatory regime has been 
cited as a reason that landholders are now less inclined to get involved in voluntary 
conservation measures, both on their own properties and in the local community.  
The NSWFA argued that one of the most damaging results of the regulatory 
approach: 
… is the loss of goodwill [among farmers] to carry out much needed conservation 
works on a voluntary basis. Although there are those who continue to commit their time 
and money to voluntary conservation efforts, an increasing number of landholders are 
questioning why they should put themselves out when in return they are not trusted to 
make the most basic land management decisions. Moreover, the compulsory 
contributions many are making to conservation through income forgone and reduced 
property values, is a real disincentive to offering still more on a voluntary 
basis. (2001, p. 12) 
The Timber Communities of Australia (Grafton Branch) argued that: 
The approach taken by the State Government of over regulation and the threat of 
prosecution has led to landholders who were amenable to some sort of environmental 
work taking place on their properties now refusing to come to the party. (sub. 100, p. 2) 
Doug Menzies considered the current regulations had created a disincentive to 
manage areas of his family’s property, Iona, for conservation purposes: 
Our plans for Iona, had we been left alone, would have resulted in 465 hectares, or 
about 29  per cent of that holding, preserved as healthy, managed native woodland, 
including approximately 145 hectares of heavily wooded creek country we intended to 
fence off from farming and livestock. We would have been very pleased to maintain it 
as our own private little national park, having properly managed noxious plants and 
feral animals. 
Under the present environmental and land management rules, there is no way known 
our family is going to agree to remove any area of our holding totally from production. 
Rather than leave us to do our work, the government elected … to force us into its idea     
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of environmental enhancement, which not only lacks knowledge but is completely 
devoid of incentives or compensation of any consequence. (trans., p. 1290–1)  
Another reason cited was that landholders were, in some cases, less inclined to 
undertake revegetation activities because of the risk that the native vegetation would 
later become subject to regulatory restrictions. Eva and Arnfried Duden (sub. 57) 
noted that landholders were not planting native vegetation as they anticipated 
potential restrictions on management and harvesting activities. The Leverton 
Pastoral Company observed that: 
Since the [NVC Act] has been introduced there is less incentive to improve the 
environment as it is a burden to our livelihoods. That is, the [NVC Act] has had the 
opposite effect. (sub. 96, p. 1) 
The Institute of Public Affairs (sub. 135, p. 5) listed a range of potential ‘perverse’ 
outcomes that might eventuate when a landholder is deprived of the possibilities to 
‘combine economic and environmental activity’.  
Compliance levels 
Since the introduction of the NVC Act ‘the number of alleged breaches reported to 
the DLWC each year has increased steadily’, to the point that in 2001 there were 
more than 200 alleged breaches of the Act (AONSW 2002, p. 44). Once a breach is 
detected, there are several alternatives available to address violations of the Act, 
including warning letters and stop-work orders, through to prosecution of the 
offence in the Land and Environment Court. In the period since the introduction of 
the NVC Act in January 1988 until April 2002, there were 705 reported breaches. 
Of these, no further action was taken in approximately 70 per cent of cases, 21 per 
cent of breaches resulted in the issuance of a warning letter and in just under 1 per 
cent of cases, the DLWC commenced prosecution (AONSW 2002). 
The DLWC considered that the increase in the number of cases reported in 2001-02 
reflected: 
… increased vigilance and greater awareness of the [NVC Act] in the community. The 
compliance outcomes achieved during the year far exceed those in previous years, 
indicating a trend towards increased efficiency on the part of the [DLWC] in dealing 
with compliance matters. (2002a, p. 29) 
Effective monitoring appears to be hampered by the large area that needs to be 
monitored, combined with the fact that clearing on private property may often be 
difficult to observe. Current monitoring in New South Wales relies on property 
inspections conducted by the DLWC, document searches and, to a lesser extent, 
compliance monitoring from the air through the interpretation of satellite images     




and aerial photographs. Breaches of the Act are most likely to be detected through 
complaints from the public, or from reports from DLWC staff and other public 
servants (AONSW 2002; Bartel 2003). This has led to criticisms that monitoring is 
unsystematic and relies on chance to detect violations (Bartel 2003). 
The amount of illegal clearing will be determined by various factors, including the 
likelihood that breaches will be detected and successfully prosecuted, the penalties 
for non-compliance, and the benefits derived from not complying with the 
regulations. The AONSW considered that there was a high likelihood of breaches of 
the NVC Act, in part, because: 
•  an individual’s private financial interests will not generally coincide with the 
public’s conservation interests; 
•  the very large number of individual properties and the remoteness of much native 
vegetation mitigate against detection of breaches of the Act; 
•  the time required to obtain consent from DLWC may extend to over a year;  
•  [RVMPs] are introducing self-assessment to landholders with no established 
assessment skills and limited extension officer support; [and] 
•  industry associations, some of whom are lobbying for the Act to be repealed, 
provide little or no pressure to their members to comply with the Act. (2002, p. 42)  
It has been claimed that the number of broadly-worded exemptions under the NVC 
Act make enforcement difficult (Wentworth Group 2003; Nature Conservation 
Council of New South Wales, sub. 109; AONSW 2002). Bartel (2003) argued that 
inadequate mechanisms for enforcing the provisions of the NVC Act, combined 
with low penalties, were unlikely to discourage non-compliance. The Australian 
Conservation Foundation (sub. 146) cited lack of enforcement as one of the key 
problems with the legislation. 
As part of the reforms announced in October 2003, measures are to be introduced to 
encourage voluntary compliance, but also to strengthen the native vegetation 
compliance framework. The focus will be on the ‘systematic monitoring of changes 
in native vegetation cover rather than ad-hoc investigations’ (DIPNR 2003a, p. 3). 
Consideration of economic and social impacts 
Consideration of the economic and social impacts of regulation is required under 
the NVC Act when assessing applications for development consent and when 
developing RVMPs. Economic factors must also be considered in the development 
of environmental planning instruments under the EPA Act.      
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However, it has not always been clear how these trade-offs have been evaluated. 
This has led to criticism that social and economic aspects have not been 
incorporated in the decision-making process in any meaningful way. This appears to 
be particularly relevant with applications that have implications for the protection of 
threatened species. The AONSW observed: 
Reconciling multiple objectives can be difficult, and there is limited guidance to staff 
on how to address this tension. The [DLWC’s] staff guidelines do not generally 
distinguish environmental screening criteria that are likely to trigger a refusal, from 
tradeable benefits and costs. In particular, there is little guidance on ‘trading-off’ 
environmental impact for socio-economic gain. (2002, p. 36) 
The Moree Plains Shire Council (trans., p. 913) and the Narrandera Shire Council 
(sub. 72) both said that social and economic aspects were not considered ‘properly’ 
in the development of RVMPs. 
The Local Government Association and Shires Association of New South Wales 
expressed similar concern: 
… in relation to socio-economic implications of listings of threatened species through 
the [TSC Act] … Greater consultation with the regional and local community is 
required to ensure that recovery plans for these species can be implemented with 
success, and [to] fully consider the implications to local communities. (sub. 178, p. 2) 
The legislative reforms introduced in December 2003 aim to achieve environmental 
objectives while maintaining ‘productive landscapes’. As such, the objects of the 
Native Vegetation Act are to be pursued in accordance with principles of 
ecologically sustainable development (Native Vegetation Act, s. 3). There is also an 
explicit requirement to consider the economic and social implications of declaring 
regrowth as ‘protected’ through a PVP. However, economic and social factors do 
not appear to be required to be considered with respect to broadscale clearing (as it 
is defined under the Act). Broadscale clearing is only permitted if it is considered to 
‘improve or maintain environmental outcomes’ (Native Vegetation Act, s. 29).  
C.6  Administration and implementation 
The Commission is directed in the terms of reference to examine a number of issues 
with respect to the administration and implementation of State regulatory regimes 
(terms of reference, para. 3).      




Administrative costs of the regimes 
The costs of developing and administering native vegetation and biodiversity 
conservation are borne primarily by the NSW Government. Administration of the 
NVC Act has been undertaken mainly by the DIPNR, although some costs are also 
borne by local government and representatives of local communities through their 
participation in RVCs.  
Under the proposed reforms, the DIPNR is to provide some staff and corporate 
support services (such as financial management, human resources, accommodation, 
information technology) for CMAs. DIPNR (2003a, p. 5) noted that the Australian 
Government ‘will also play an important role as a major investor in CMA activities 
through joint Commonwealth/State programs such as the NAPSWQ and the NHT’.  
The NPWS is responsible for maintaining schedules of threatened species, 
populations and ecological communities, and for developing threat abatement plans 
and recovery plans under the TSC Act.  
The role of assessing whether particular developments have implications for species 
and communities listed under the TSC Act, tends to reside with various consent 
authorities. For example, the DIPNR is required to consider the potential impacts of 
a development proposal on threatened species when assessing an application under 
the NVC Act. Local councils are required to consider the TSC Act when processing 
applications made under various planning schemes. Shoalhaven City Council 
provided an example of local government involvement in the administration of the 
TSC Act, and noted that there: 
… are costs to both Council and landowners in the Shoalhaven that arise from 
legislation that deals with biodiversity conservation and native vegetation protection. 
Because Council is a consent authority, they are required to invest resources into 
assessment relating to biodiversity conservation and native vegetation protection that 
relate to requirements under the [EPA Act] and [TSC Act]. Because of the nature of 
Shoalhaven, Council has many applications that need to have issues of threatened 
species assessed and has therefore employed a Threatened Species Officer to deal with 
the large amount of environmental assessment work that is required in development 
applications. (sub. 98, p. 1) 
Implementation of the regime 
The implementation of the regulatory regime originally envisaged under the 
NVC  Act was delayed by the protracted development of RVMPs. When recent 
reforms were announced in October 2003, only 2 of a potential 22 RVMPs had been 
gazetted — the Mid-Lachlan RVMP and the Riverina Highlands RVMP.      
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Factors that appear to have contributed to the slow development of RVMPs include: 
difficulties in reaching consensus (Thompson 2001, National Association of Forest 
Industries, sub. 90); a lack of quality data on which to base decisions, including 
appropriate mapping (AONSW 2002, Wentworth Group 2003); that members of 
RVCs may have lacked the appropriate skills — such as meeting, facilitation and 
negotiation skills — or lacked access to appropriate technical knowledge to develop 
the plans (DLWC 2002a). 
Murrumbidgee Irrigation summarised what it considered to be the shortcomings of 
the RVMP process: 
… the department support was patchy, data was limited, advice was inconsistent and 
the focus squarely on legislative means. Ideas developed at the committee level to deal 
with a regional issue were often overridden by the government desire to have a single 
approach across the state. This just compounds the regional community feeling that 
they are not consulted and remote/political decisions are being made with no reference 
to the local considerations. Other points that have affected any meaningful plan 
development were: 
•  limited or no assessment of the likely costs versus benefits; 
•  limited understanding of local ecosystem dynamics to assist in decision making; 
•  limited access to alternative options such as incentives, education, stewardship 
arrangements … (sub. DR262, p. 1) 
The RVMP process was terminated in late 2003. Regional planning under 
legislation introduced by the NSW Parliament in December 2003 is to be based on 
Catchment Action Plans developed by CMAs (section C.3). The NSW Government 
has stated that there will be consultation with RVCs to integrate existing RVMPs 
into Catchment Action Plans (DIPNR 2004b), but many landholder representatives 
on RVCs felt the process would have to start anew, and that they would not 
participate again. 
Complexity 
The information required to determine whether a proposed clearing activity requires 
consent and, if so, what course of action needs to be followed can, in some 
circumstances, be quite onerous. A landholder planning to clear native vegetation 
must first ascertain if government permission is required to undertake the activity. 
Landholders need to be aware whether the proposed activity is exempt, and if it is 
not, which agency or agencies are responsible for assessing an application to clear. 
The NSW National Party (sub. 115, p. 2) argued that it ‘is becoming increasingly 
difficult for landholders to keep up with the legal requirements for managing their 
own land’. The South Grafton Residents Progress Association observed that:     




The statutes are very complex and will require considerable expenditure on the part of 
landholders to ensure that they do not become penalised for breaching various sections 
of one or more of the requirements. (sub. 104, p. 3) 
The Munmurra Landholder Action Group commented that:  
Anecdotal evidence would suggest that the current bureaucratic application process is 
lengthy and difficult to navigate. The time and assistance required in making 
applications to clear or develop land are at a substantial cost to the applicant … 
(sub. 69, p. 4) 
Understanding how regimes operate can be onerous not only for landholders but 
also for authorities which have responsibility for administering planning 
instruments. Moree Plains Shire Council noted that:  
… unless you’ve been working in government a while, it’s pretty hard to understand 
some of these things and how it works … the challenge … in a lot of this is to actually 
start to align … our planning instruments with what’s happening with some of the 
higher legislation as well. Sometimes, if you don’t know the exact provisions in some 
of these things, then it can actually create confusion in the field because people say, 
‘We’re getting conflicting advice’. (trans., pp. 914–5) 
Shoalhaven City Council noted: 
One of the main problems with the implementation of the [TSC Act] is the lack of 
information provided to consent authorities when new listings for species are made. In 
order to have a species listed on either the Commonwealth or State legislation 
information on the distribution, threats, biology of the species or community are 
provided to a scientific committee however this information is not made public … 
Dissemination of this information to consent authorities and proponents would reduce 
the resource and financial costs in undertaking further assessments. (sub. 98, p. 2) 
The NVRIG (2003, p. 7) argued in its report that: 
Fundamental to the success of a new model for landscape management is simplifying 
the overwhelmingly complex structures that exist at present, to empower the farming 
community to take control of the problem …  
As such, an overarching stated objective of the 2003 reforms is to reduce the 
complexity of the regulation of native vegetation management. 
Assessing clearing applications 
In the absence of finalised RVMPs, the DIPNR’s role in assessing development 
consent applications under the NVC Act has been more significant, and of longer 
duration, than was originally anticipated. The assessment process under DIPNR has 
been subject to some criticism, especially over the length of time taken to process 
applications and the lack of transparency in the decision-making process. The     
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AONSW (2002) noted that the average length of time taken to assess clearance 
applications considerably exceeded the maximum amount of time recommended in 
the DLWC’s customer service guarantees. 
In addition, the AONSW considered that there were a number of factors that 
contributed to a lack of transparency in decision-making, including that: 
•  internal staff guidelines for assessment are not made available to the public; 
•  although determination notices and assessment summaries are provided to 
landholders, the detailed assessment reports are not made available; 
•  there are no public hearings (such as by panels) for major proposals … 
•  there are limited mechanisms for appeal that are expensive and come at the end of 
the process … (2002, p. 38) 
A lack of transparency, combined with a lack of well-understood targets and 
guidelines detailing native vegetation objectives, may have encouraged perceptions 
of unfairness and inconsistency in the application approval process. Peter Weston 
considered that: 
The [DIPNR’s] inconsistency and consent process and the time lag is quite 
unacceptable. We’ve got an example … [where] they’ve allowed a family to take out 
individual trees across the landscape, and I encourage it because it’s leading to better 
farm practice; yet another chap up the road, who’s got 8000 acres of encroached 
timber, made an application to clear 600 acres to try and get some degree of drought 
control … He could not disturb a tree. (trans., p. 1284) 
Murray Irrigation Ltd noted that it is:  
… apparent there is a lack of consistency in the treatment of different applications for 
vegetation  removal/clearing … Whilst  flexibility is an important component in 
assessment, inconsistent interpretations and administration is not desirable, and leads to 
further frustration within the community. (sub. 79, p. 1)  
Compliance costs borne by landholders 
The Commission received considerable comment that the costs incurred by 
landholders in complying with the NVC Act, and with other related legislation, 
were often significant and excessive. Although there is no direct charge imposed by 
the DIPNR to assess a development consent application, there are, depending on the 
size of the application, a number of other direct costs associated with the application 
process (an example of these costs is described in box C.8). The Institute of Public 
Affairs observed that: 
Under the [NVC Act], any ‘clearing’ is subject to the development consent procedures. 
The clearing application process involves 30 or more steps, numerous consultations, 
opportunities for almost anyone to object and a mountain of paper. This puts such     




processes beyond the reach of most landowners. They all have a day job and are 
already grappling with many other regulations. (sub. 135, p. 4) 
In some cases, as a condition of consent being granted, there may be requirements 
for the landholder to undertake certain activities to improve the extent and quality of 
native vegetation on the property. For example, native vegetation ‘offsets’ may be 
required, whereby an area of cleared property is set aside and replanted with native 
vegetation. Alternatively, improvements may be required to areas of existing native 
vegetation, such as fencing-off riparian areas.  
 
Box C.8  Compliance costs — a case study 
Euroka Station Partnership (ESP) manages a property of approximately 
11 000 hectares of unrestricted freehold land near Jerilderie, upon which merino sheep 
and beef cattle have been run for over fifty years.  
In 1996-97, after a period of declining margins from wool and livestock sales, ESP 
considered it ‘essential’ to expand the existing small irrigation and dry farming 
operations on the property by converting up to 1200 hectares of freehold land from 
livestock grazing pasture to irrigation. After applying for approval in 1997-98, ESP 
encountered considerable delays that resulted from ‘application and implementation of 
the Threatened Species Conservation Act and the Native Vegetation Conservation 
Act’.  
Approval was granted for the development, although the area approved was less than 
that sought in the original application. ESP anticipates that the first irrigation crop will 
be sown during spring 2003, some five years after the decision was taken to pursue 
this development. ESP estimates that forgone income over the past four financial years 
is around $1.6 million, or approximately $435 000 in lost operating surplus.  
In addition to lost production opportunities, ESP noted:  
… Financial Records for the past five financial years reveal that a total of $110,000.00 have 
been spent on surveying and drafting services, preparation and presentation of clearing 
applications which comply with the [NVC Act], technical and legal advice, preparation for and 
attendance at the meetings referred to above and additional project management time, 
communications and fees. (sub. 167, p. 3) 
Source: Euroka Station Partnership (sub. 167). 
 
 
Landholders also may incur costs from the time taken to assess an application. 
Under the NVC Act, a site visit is required before an application to clear native 
vegetation can be submitted. Clearing guidelines state that generally 2–3 weeks 
notice is required to organise a visit. Once an application is submitted, the DLWC 
has a statutory requirement to respond within 40 days (DLWC 1999), although, as 
mentioned above, the amount of time taken by the DLWC has often been 
considerably longer.     
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Elizabeth Tomlinson argued that complying with native vegetation regulations 
resulted in a loss of flexibility for landholders in terms of adopting new technology 
and responding to changes in market conditions: 
The loss of the right to introduce, rapidly, new technology can not see our farmers 
continue to be amongst the most efficient in the world. If it is necessary to pass by a 
government department any wish to change, the time lag could see the advantage lost. 
(sub. DR246, p. 1) 
The issue of compliance costs also was raised in relation to forestry operations. The 
NSW Forest Products Association highlighted the significant compliance costs 
resulting from the operation of the TSC Act in conjunction with the on-going 
Brigalow Belt South Bioregion Regional Forest Assessment. The Association 
argued that before temporary licences for forestry operations can be granted under 
the TSC Act, State Forests is required: 
… to undertake costly and technically difficult surveys before allowing entry by 
harvesting businesses into areas planned for logging. The costs and additional work 
associated with these surveys is causing neglect of normal management operations 
within the forest. (sub. DR243, p. 2)  
Moreover, the NSW Forests Products Association (sub.  DR243, trans., 
pp. 1207–25) argued that the often restrictive nature of temporary licences granted 
has resulted in significant costs for forest operators. 
Costs resulting from inconsistency  
Some participants argued that inconsistencies in State legislation, and between State 
and Commonwealth legislation, were resulting in uncertainty for landholders and 
increased compliance costs. 
At the State level, clearing authorised by a development consent or consistent with 
an approved RVMP, generally is exempt from the provisions of other 
environmental planning instruments and regulations, such as local environmental 
plans issued by local councils. However, in the absence of a RVMP, clearing that is 
exempt under the NVC Act may be subject to other regulation such as a local 
environmental plan made under the EPA Act or a recovery plan under the TSC Act. 
In these cases, activities that are allowed under the NVC Act may be prohibited 
under another piece of legislation. The National Farmers’ Federation argued that: 
Farmers are required to comply with the [NVC Act] and must seek approval to clear 
land … unless it falls within a statutory exception … Yet where a proposed 
development activity falls within this exception it may still trigger the [TSC Act] which 
may result in severe restrictions in property use. Under the [TSC Act] where a species 
is identified as ‘threatened’ it is an offence to ‘harm, pick or damage’ the species and     




potential development is likely to involve an expensive and time-consuming Species 
Impact Statement. The [TSC Act] provides that clearing done in the interests of 
‘routine agriculture’ may be exempt from the operation of the Act yet fails to provide 
any definition of what this exemption entails. (sub. 128, p. 15) 
Shoalhaven City Council raised the issue of inconsistencies between State and 
Commonwealth legislation potentially leading to increased compliance costs. 
Because no bilateral agreement has been reached between the NSW State Government 
and the Commonwealth, in situations where threatened species are affected that are 
listed on both NSW and Commonwealth legislation, potentially two assessments will 
need to be undertaken by the proponent. (sub. 98, p. 2) 
Dispute-resolution procedures 
The Land and Environment Court hears appeals against decisions made under 
Environmental Planning Instruments established under the EPA Act and, therefore, 
appeals against decisions under the NVC Act. Appeals must be made within 
12 months of being advised of a determination. Since the introduction of the NVC 
Act, the appeals process has been used very rarely. The AONSW (2002) noted that 
opportunities to appeal decisions were limited and expensive. 
The Land and Environment Court will hear appeals made against decisions under 
the Native Vegetation Act. There are no provisions for third parties to challenge the 
merits of a decision to grant a consent. However, third parties may challenge the 
legality of a consent decision on procedural grounds (NSW Legislative 
Assembly 2003, 12 November, p. 4897). 
C.7  Impacts on landholders  
A large number of submissions addressed the implications that restrictions on 
broadscale clearing had for farming practices and farm viability. Participants also 
noted that regulations often had significant implications for landholders intending to 
change land use or to adopt new technology (for instance new irrigation systems), 
as well as their ability to undertake normal farming practices (fencing and paddock 
rotations). The Commission also received information concerning the impact of 
regulations on forestry activities. 
For the most part, these submissions concerned the negative impact of the 
regulations on farming and agricultural practices. Participants noted that the impacts 
of the regulations on landholders and farm activities can differ substantially across 
regions, and even across particular properties within regions, depending on the type     
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and amount of vegetation on particular properties. The Institute of Public Affairs 
noted that the impact of regulations: 
… will be uneven across landowners and profoundly inequitable. It will generally be 
costliest to those who have historically been the most responsible. Some landowners 
have extensive private forest, some have none, some have many protected species some 
have few. The costs of this essentially social legislation will be disproportionate across 
the community and within the rural community. (sub. 135, p. 7) 
Impacts on farming practices 
The NSWFA observed that many of the restrictions on farming practices resulted 
from the perceived impact of the proposed activity on threatened species: 
Australian farmers are acutely aware of the need to improve productivity and respond 
to market signals. However, their ability to implement more productive and efficient 
technologies (such as the use of centre-pivot or underground drip irrigation systems) is 
often constrained directly or indirectly by threatened species legislation. Even 
ecologically positive management technologies such as long-rotation cropping and 
grazing systems and cell-grazing are unable to be utilised in some situations, because of 
the restrictions imposed by this legislation. (2002, p. 2) 
The impacts of the regulation are likely to be greatest in the regions where the 
demand for clearing is significantly higher than that permitted under the regulations. 
In 1999, the NVAC reported that clearing in New South Wales is ‘mainly occurring 
in the Coolabah-Black Box woodland of the Darling Riverine Plains Bioregion 
(Moree-Walgett-Nyngan regions) for wheat and cotton, and the Riverina Bioregion 
for rice’ (NVAC 1999, p.  29). In 2002, applications were received to clear 
30 655 hectares in the Murray region, 20 058 hectares in the Far West and 12 453 
hectares in the Central West. The data in figure C.2 suggest that the Murray region 
was potentially the most affected by restrictions under the NVC Act in 2002, as 
only 50 per cent of the area applied to be cleared in that region was approved. It 
should also be noted that applications to clear land are unlikely to represent the total 
demand for clearing in these regions. Landholders are unlikely to submit an 
application to clear in cases where they considered (or had already been advised) 
that the application would not be approved. 
In a majority of cases, development consent was sought for ‘permanent land use 
change clearing’ such as for ‘cropping’ or ‘grazing and cropping’ purposes. Areas 
approved to be cleared by land use are shown in table C.1. Clearing of isolated trees 
accounted for approximately one-third of all approved clearing in 2002, although 
the amount of clearing actually undertaken would have been much smaller, given 
the partial nature of vegetation coverage.      
























Area applied to clear Area approved to clear
Data source: DLWC (2003). 
Table C.1  Approved clearing by proposed land use and type of clearing in 
the Murray, Central West and Far West regions, 2002a 
  Murray  Central West  Far West 
  Hectares  % Hectares  % Hectares  %
Proposed land use       
Cropping  2 036  12  7 007  69  10 645  65
Cropping and grazing  9 132  56  1 435  14  217  1
Irrigation development  3 660  22  228  2  90  1
Woody weed burning  0  0  0  0  4 151  25
Other  1 606  10  1 427  14  1337  8
Total  16 434  100  10 097  100  16 440  100
Type of clearing       
Isolated trees  5 207  32  8142  81  843  5
Open woodland  5 016  31  744  7  12 120  74
Shrubland 2  919  18  0  0  700  4
Grassland  219 1 0 0  1230  8
Other  3  073  19 1211  12 1547  9
Total  16 434  100  10 097  100  16440  100
a DLWC regions.  
Source: DLWC (2003).     
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Expanding agricultural production  
Some participants noted that the difficulty of obtaining a development consent had 
significant implications for long-term development plans. Increasing the amount of 
land for cultivation was often seen as crucial for there long-term viability. Some 
participants observed that restrictions on land clearing not only denied landholders 
the returns from bringing new land into production, but also the attainment of the 
scale economies associated with larger operations — such as the productivity 
improvements achieved through more efficient crop rotations and spelling.  
Kevin and Sue Campbell (sub. 11, p. 1), for example, described how they purchased 
a property in 1993, prior to the introduction of SEPP 46. The farm of 11 000 acres 
was only ‘18 per cent developed at the time’ and the property was purchased with 
the intention to develop. A costly application process under SEPP 46 (both in terms 
of the costs associated with the application process and lost production 
opportunities), resulted in approval of a further 7  per cent of the property for 
clearing. The landholders would like to develop more of the property, but consider 
that they cannot under the NVC Act.  
Managing regrowth and changing land use 
Participants also argued that the requirements of the regime were affecting their 
ability to manage their existing operations effectively. For many agricultural 
businesses, broadscale clearing was not a once-off activity, but an important 
component of the production cycle and an essential tool in managing regrowth.  
It was argued that regrowth, if left unchecked, reduces the amount of native pasture 
available for grazing and makes stock management more difficult. Over an 
extended period of time, the invasive native vegetation (often referred to as ‘woody 
weeds’) can become so dense as to make the land unsuitable for grazing, and can 
result in land degradation (NSWFA 2003b, subs 7, 12, 16).7  
Tania Hall noted: 
Land management required on our properties should not be referred to as clearing or 
developing, as the land was originally open productive woodland with ample pasture 
cover, any clearing should be regarded as land maintenance … each year this 
                                              
7  Landholders argue that certain dense growth of woody weeds prevents the establishment of 
native grasses. Woody weeds ‘out compete’ the native grasses for space, light and available soil 
moisture. The resultant lack of effective ground cover reduces topsoil stability, leading in many 
instances to soil erosion (NSWFA 2003).     




property’s carrying capacity is reduced, due to invasive native vegetation. (sub. TS10, 
p. 1).8 
Under the NVC Act, development consent is required to remove native vegetation 
regrowth if the land has not been cleared in the past 10 years. Participants argued 
that not obtaining a consent can have significant implications for their operations. 
The Leverton Pastoral Company observed: 
Paddocks that would have been cleared on a 20 to 30 year cycle now cannot be cleared. 
Our land has enormous regenerative ability, regrowth timber, (belah, box and myall) 
which has not been taken into consideration in the [NVC Act] …  
In uncleared areas the regrowth timber has got so thick it has choked the native grasses 
out and the paddocks now have limited stock carrying capacity. Erosion has started to 
develop under the heavy timber. (sub. 96, p. 1) 
Faye McPherson also noted that: 
Legislation works in many cases out here to reduce the productivity of the properties by 
preventing the clearing, cultivation, [and] pasture improvements needed to improve 
both the [carrying] capacity and the income of the property. (sub. 173, p. 4) 
While selective ‘thinning’ of native vegetation may be permitted under the 
regulations, this can be a high-cost form of native vegetation management 
(NSWFA, pers. comm., 10 July 2003). Participants noted that the removal of 
‘invasive’ native vegetation may be more cost effective when clearing is combined 
with cropping activities. Raymond Perkins observed that the requirement to obtain 
development consent often meant that: 
… the practice of cropping and grazing, often with long periods between cultivation, 
adopted by most good farmers is prevented. The common practice of incorporating 
weed eradication with cropping to cover this expensive exercise is also prevented, so 
the chance to eradicate perennial weeds such as Box Thorn and Galvanised Burr is lost. 
Failure to destroy weeds in this way leads to a downward spiral in productivity and 
value. (sub. 86, p. 2) 
Declining carrying capacity on properties because of regrowth places pressure on 
other more productive areas of the property, which in turn has implications for the 
long-term sustainability of agricultural activities. Tania Hall observed: 
Normally the property is productive where it is open, but extreme pressure is put on 
these open areas by domestic livestock, uncontrolled numbers of feral and native 
animals and cropping, because of the inability to use the rest of the property 
productively. (sub. TS10, p. 1) 
                                              
8  The NSWFA provided members with a questionnaire on some of the issues they considered 
relevant to this inquiry. A number of completed questionnaires were forwarded to the 
Commission as submissions. Submissions of this nature are referred to as template submissions. 
For example template submission 1, when referenced, is referred to as sub. TS1.      
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In certain situations, development consent is required for the removal of paddock 
trees. In the Draft Western Riverina Regional Vegetation Management Plan, the 
clearing of certain paddock trees in areas of ‘high conservation value’ will, in 
instances where approval is granted, require the landholder to provide an offset ratio 
of 400 new trees for every paddock tree removed (WRRVC 2002).  
An example illustrating the potential impacts on farming practices associated with 
an application to remove paddock trees is shown in box  C.9. The example 
highlights the potentially high costs involved with the application process when the 
proposal may have ramifications for threatened species and their habitat. 
Some participants argued that the NVC Act prevented some landholders from 
managing certain types of ‘invasive weeds’ effectively. Doug Arnott (trans., 
pp.  1241–60) stated that treatment of exotic weeds such as St John’s Wort and 
Patterson’s Curse by introducing improved pastures (which, in his case, involves 
aerial spraying and sowing of hill country) is prohibited under the NVC Act: 
… in hilly country we’re being restricted in spraying and also, with native vegetation 
issues, we can’t spray out these weed dominated pastures and put in an improved 
pasture. As a management tool if we do put in an improved pasture, we can then 
compete with the restricted weeds and cut down paddocks, use stock better to manage 
the weeds and basically, in essence, cut down the time spent using chemicals, 
manpower, everything — chasing around hills, chasing around weeds — and use 
livestock and pasture to combat these problems we have. (trans., p. 1241) 
 
Box C.9  Restrictions on the removal of paddock trees 
Restrictions on the removal of individual trees may be applied in several regions, 
usually when the trees are assessed to provide habitat for threatened species.  
An example that highlights some of the impacts associated with the removal of 
paddock trees occurred when a landholder near Wagga Wagga applied to remove 
19  paddock trees to install a centre-pivot irrigation system over an area of 
approximately 56 hectares. Initially, the landholder was advised that an offset of 400 
trees for every tree removed was required — 7600 trees in total. After an extensive 
period of negotiation, approval was granted for the removal of the paddock trees with 
an offset provision of 2000 trees at an approximate cost of $10 000. (As part of the 
application process, the landholder was required to finance a targeted fauna survey at 
the cost of $3315, which found that threatened species would in no way be impacted 
by the proposed clearance). The length of the application process resulted in a year of 
lost production on an irrigated paddock in a drought year.  
Source: NSWFA (pers. comm., 10 July 2003). 
 
     




The 10-year exemption on the clearing of regrowth native vegetation 
The 10-year exemption on the clearing of regrowth creates a strong incentive to 
clear regrowth within the 10-year period to avoid the requirement to obtain a 
development consent. Participants noted that the implication of this ‘rule-of-thumb’ 
was that it forced landholders to clear land sooner than they otherwise would have 
— sometimes with negative impacts on farm productivity (box C.10).  
Despite the inconvenience and additional costs of clearing, landholders felt that it 
was necessary to avoid the risk of subjecting the land to the development consent 
process. If, for example, threatened species were associated with the land, a 
landholder could lose the ability to clear at a later date. According to Rod Young: 
You would get to a stage where you would have threatened species in there and, 
technically, once you get over the 10 years … you should legally go to consent. The 
problem could be, say, if Giant Redgrass shows up — Giant Redgrass is growing along 
virtually all our shire roads on any of the red soil country, so if you got somebody in 
from say [DIPNR] to inspect it, they probably would find say Giant Redgrass or maybe 
Queensland Bluegrass, maybe some of the wallaby grasses, and this could cause you 
problems. So despite the fact that we don’t mind the native grasses, particularly for 
cattle production, we’ve got to be careful that we don’t tie ourselves up.  
I feel that if that law could be made more flexible, there would be a lot of people that 
would be prepared to leave that grass there for a longer period of time … I know in 
years gone by we often used to leave a grass paddock out for much longer and that 
returned a certain amount of humus and structure to the soil, and therefore we were less 
prone to erosion when we went back into a farming phase. (trans., pp. 948–9)  
 
Box C.10  Participants’ comments on the impacts of the 10-year rule 
[When I purchased the property] the majority of the regrowth was eight to nine years of age. 
I realised that under the current regulations I was able to clear this regrowth and had no 
other option than to borrow the money to do so. The alternative would have been 
catastrophe. I would have been left with a property of scrub which would be of no use to 
anyone except feral animals. The clearing of the regrowth has improved this property. The 
soils and pastures are healthier as a result … Stock are easier to locate and we have less 
deaths as a result of better wild animal control. (Clyde Cook, sub. 12, p. 1) 
The ten year rule on native grassland has shortened the period I leave arable land under 
pasture in my overall crop-pasture rotation program, I wonder sometimes for how long can I 
keep this rotation going … The native grasses help overall with bloat control in cattle, and 
provide some dry feed in drier seasons. I appreciate a mix of pasture and in some cases 
would like to leave these paddocks under grass for a longer period. However this would 
mean I would legally lose the option of returning those paddocks back to cropping sometime 
in the future. (Rod Young, sub. 27, p. 1) 
The under ten year regrowth is a real problem. We need flexibility. It is not always practical 
to remove the regrowth every 10 years, often, it is better … to leave it for longer periods and 
remove when time, money and weather permit. (Jim and Evelyn O'Neill, sub. 172, p. 2) 
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The legislation introduced in December 2003 will result in a change to the 
definitions of regrowth and broadscale clearing. These changes seem intended to 
reduce the impact of existing native vegetation regulations on farming practices 
described above. The changes move away from prescriptive regulations, to allow 
for more flexibility in the management of regrowth. 
Positive impacts 
Little evidence was presented to the Commission on positive impacts on farming of 
the regulatory regime in New South Wales. However, some positive comment was 
received on the benefits available under the regulatory regime to mitigate the costs 
of certain activities. Anthony O’Halloran observed that the TSC Act: 
… has been useful for me to get funding to fence off my creek lines. These Box Gum 
riparian areas were in a sad state, and now after obtaining grants and revegetating the 
area, these areas are bio-diverse, erosion is under control, weeds are on the decline and 
we now have a couple of koalas! If this riparian corridor had not come under the [TSC 
Act], I do not believe we could have done the remedial work necessary. (sub. 80, p. 1) 
Nita Lennon considered that the negative impacts of the legislation may not be that 
great:  
… [the NVC Act] does not impact upon us detrimentally and I would suggest that most 
farmers in the Central West would not be adversely affected by this legislation as most 
suitable farmland was cleared some time ago. Many of our farming colleagues are now 
engaged in, or interested in, revegetating parts of the landscape. (sub. 82, p. 1) 
Others suggested that there have been some benefits arising from increased 
awareness of environmental problems, derived from the information provided under 
the regimes. The South Grafton Residents Progress Association noted in relation to 
the development of the Clarence RVMP:  
We believe that one benefit in this area has been a greater awareness of the extent of 
acid sulphate soils and the need to manage this problem particularly in the lower river 
areas where cane is grown. There has been a marked increase in activities and co-
operation from the sugar industry in research and experiments resulting in better 
management of this problem. 
There is no doubt that the clearing of vegetation from along creek and riverbanks has 
added to erosion. This problem has effected downstream properties and associated 
waterways together with the property that is the source of the erosion. Any 
encouragement to protect these locations under the Vegetation Plan will help to 
alleviate this problem. (sub. 104, p. 3)     




Impact on property values and returns 
Many participants observed that the adverse impact of the regulations on the 
earning capacity of the land was being reflected in property values (sales and land 
valuations) and returns (box C.11).9  
 
Box C.11  Participants’ comments on the impact of native vegetation and 
biodiversity regulations on property values 
The equity of our scrub country has fallen dramatically due to not being able to sustainably 
develop it. Our overall property value has drastically reduced because we do not have 
enough developed land. Wool production and yields are down due to increased vegetable 
matter and dust. It’s very hard to fatten stock due to overgrazing by kangaroos and crop 
yields are also affected by wildlife. Lambing percentages are down. (Kevin and Sally 
Campbell, sub. TS12, p. 1) 
The Valuer General’s Department has always valued land at an unimproved capital value 
arrived at by looking at land sales and assuming that similar land could have the same 
potential value. When we wrote to the Valuer General objecting to his latest valuation of our 
land, stating the amount of native vegetation that we are not allowed to clear and therefore 
cannot farm, the value of this land was reduced by $200 000. The return to a landholder of a 
patch of scrub can be negative if it is just a habitat for feral animals … (Jane Manchee, 
sub. 83, p. 1) 
As similar quality rural properties vary widely in historic use there will be wide variations in 
value under this Act. Properties that have been conserved by minimum cultivation should 
have a higher value due to higher fertility, but these are now restricted use properties with a 
much lower value and a lower productive capacity. (Raymond Perkins, sub. 86, p. 2)  
 
 
Since the introduction of the regulatory regime, participants observed that the 
difference in value between ‘developed’ and ‘undeveloped’ land — land with native 
vegetation that requires a development consent to clear — had, in many cases, 
widened considerably. The differential no longer reflected just the costs of clearing 
and bringing land into production, as well as its relative productive capacity (soil 
quality, topography etc), but also reflected the impact of increasing legislative 
restrictions on landholders’ ability to use and develop the land. The Leverton 
Pastoral Company argued that: 
Land that has not been cleared has depreciated in value to the extent where it is very 
difficult to sell in our area especially as our area has a predominance of farming. The 
value difference is no longer what it would cost to clear the land but rather like 
comparing gold to rock. No one wants rock and everyone wants gold. The laws have 
                                              
9  A number of participants (such as Narranda Shire Council (sub. 72), Jane Manchee (sub. 83) 
and the Leverton Pastoral Company (sub. 96)) referred the Commission to a study by Professor 
Jack Sinden (sub. 15) into the impacts of native vegetation regulation on land values in northern 
New South Wales. This study is discussed briefly in appendix K.     
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punished the landowners who preserved native vegetation and have significantly 
benefited those that have developed. (sub. 96, p. 2) 
Russell Gillard (sub. 36) observed how he purchased a 1600 acre property in 1995 
with the intention of developing approximately half of the property for a mix of 
agricultural purposes. Difficulties in obtaining development consent have meant 
that he has been only able to develop 100 acres of the property: 
… our plan was to develop the farm to partially or fully sustain us in retirement and/or 
[en]able us to retire early. Without the ability to develop further, our plans will not be a 
reality, our future is unsure. 
The value of the property is not known, we have not tried to sell it, however we own 
1600 acres in total, we have the use of 100 acres, that is 1/16
th, or 6.25 per cent. Would 
you buy a 16 story office block, where you could only lease out one floor? I doubt it. 
Yes, the value of the property has been drastically affected. (sub. 36, pp. 1–2) 
Property values have also been affected by the uncertainty as to how the regulations 
might evolve over time. In relation to the Wilderness Act 1987, Rod Young 
observed: 
… the problem with the Wilderness Act as it stands is that an area is nominated. It is 
then assessed. If an area is identified as the potential for wilderness it is only then that 
the owner of the land has the right to say no and it will not go through to declaration. 
However, the blot of nomination remains on that land and as a result this process has 
lowered the value of those properties. (trans., p. 946) 
Impact on investment patterns 
The decision by landholders to undertake investment is determined by a number of 
factors, including the real rate of interest, expectations about commodity prices and 
developments in technology. Native vegetation and biodiversity regulations can 
have a significant impact on the decision to undertake investments by affecting the 
costs and risks associated with a particular investment. For example, costs 
associated with the application process may include compliance costs, the need to 
provide offsets, and lost production opportunities associated with the time taken to 
obtain approval. As discussed above, these costs can be considerable.  
Regulation may also affect investment decisions by adding to the level of 
uncertainty associated with a proposed development. Changes in the interpretation 
of regulations, the discovery of threatened species in a particular area, and the 
listing of new species and habitats on the schedules of the TSC Act might possibly 
lead to new restrictions being imposed on land-use options.      




The uncertainty associated with native vegetation and biodiversity regulations in 
New South Wales was cited by a number of participants as having negative 
implications for investment decisions (box C.12).  
 
Box C.12  Participants’ comments on the impact of native vegetation and 
biodiversity regulations on investment 
The [NVC Act] has detrimental effects on farm businesses, farm management, landholders’ 
investments and rural communities … Over regulation of land clearing means uncertainty to 
land accessibility. For any farm business this jeopardises its productivity and in turn, reduces 
farm profitability. (P.A. and E.G. Gallagher, sub. 70, p. 1) 
The laws discourage investment in agriculture because you never know when the 
government is about to further restrict your rights to manage your land in the way that you 
see fit. I would not purchase land that had not been developed for farming. The laws 
certainly encourage further off-farm investment which only enhances the decline in regional 
NSW. (Leverton Pastoral Company, sub. 96, p. 2) 
The legislation and related regulations … make profitable new investment slow, tedious, 
more risky and expensive. (Euroka Station Partnership, sub. 167, p. 3) 
 
 
Impact on the attitudes of finance providers 
Although evidence was provided to the Commission about the ramifications of 
native vegetation and biodiversity regulations for investment, little evidence was 
provided on the impacts of the regulatory regime on finance providers’ attitudes. 
Jane Manchee commented: 
Finance providers should speak for themselves but seem reluctant. They certainly let us 
know the obvious, which is that land not farmed, in this district, is worth much less 
than that which is farmed. This has a big impact on the landholders ability to obtain 
finance. (sub. 83, p. 2) 
Similarly, the Euroka Station Partnership stated that the: 
Application and implementation of the legislation and regulations under review have 
negative impacts on collateral values through the placement of encumbrances on 
freehold title. Bank representatives are concerned about these aspects of the legislation 
particularly where their borrower customers are concerned. (sub. 167, p. 3) 
In some instances, the impacts of the regulations on farm profitability and property 
values, combined with the uncertainty associated with the regime, could be 
expected to result in lending institutions reducing their valuations of properties, 
therefore increasing landholders’ risk status.     
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Government measures to mitigate negative impacts 
While some funding is provided to encourage voluntary conservation activities by 
landholders (for example, funding provided through the Native Vegetation 
Management Fund and property agreements — section C.2), there do not appear to 
be any measures to offset the negative impacts of the regime, particularly in the 
form of monetary assistance. This was cited as a serious flaw of the regulatory 
regime by landholders and associations that represent them. Landholders argued 
that they were unfairly bearing the costs associated with the retention and 
management of native vegetation. 
The DLWC noted that information and education initiatives are available to 
landholders, which are aimed at lessening the impacts of the legislation where 
possible. For example, in the context of regional vegetation planning, the DLWC 
noted that: 
Regional vegetation management planning is not just about clearing controls and 
exemptions. [RVCs] are also examining alternative mechanisms to promote sustainable 
resource management through the development of incentive schemes, providing more 
accurate and relevant information, and property planning. This will provide landholders 
with the additional skills and resources to plan and manage their properties for the best 
economic and ecological outcomes. (DLWC 2002b, p. 4) 
Generally, however, the comments received indicated that the measures introduced 
to mitigate the negative impacts of the legislation were considered to be inadequate. 
Increased assistance to landholders to encourage the retention and management of 
native vegetation is a feature of the reforms announced in October 2003. 
To encourage land managers to actively manage and restore vegetation, current 
financial incentives will be targeted to on-ground action and the dollars distributed at a 
regional level. (DIPNR 2003a, p. 2) 
In addition to funding for on-ground activities, funding will likely be provided for a 
revolving fund to purchase properties of high conservation value. The details of 
incentive programs are yet to be announced. 
C.8  Impacts on regional communities and other 
economic activities 
Participants noted that the impacts of regulations on farm productivity and property 
values also have implications for regional communities. To the extent that 
production and incomes of landholders decline, this can be expected to be reflected     




in the demand for services (labour and other) in the regional communities. P.A. and 
E.G. Gallagher observed: 
The impact of native vegetation clearing regulation has many adverse effects beyond 
the farm gate. If growth and productivity of a farm are diminished, the flow-on effect to 
the larger rural community means businesses, contractors, labourers and financial 
services will suffer. (sub. 70, p. 2) 
Moreover, restrictions imposed on land use that affect government valuations of 
property will affect the rate base of local governments. It was also noted that 
properties of high conservation value purchased by organisations such as the NPWS 
or non-government organisations (such as the Australian Bush Heritage Fund) are 
excluded from the rate base. A landholder entering a voluntary conservation 
agreement is entitled to a rebate, which further diminishes the rate base. The use of 
rebates as an incentive for landholders to enter into voluntary conservation 
agreements concerned the Local Government Association and Shires Association of 
New South Wales:  
The Associations oppose the rate rebates as a conservation mechanism due to concerns 
about the inequities in the distribution of the rate burden across the local community. 
Conservation benefits extend beyond local boundaries, so it would be more equitable 
for the costs associated with the provision of rate rebates to be shared across the State. 
(sub. 178, p. 4) 
The Commission received no information regarding the impact of the NSW 
vegetation regimes on other economic activities, such as infrastructure 
development. 
C.9 Summary 
Native vegetation and biodiversity regulations in New South Wales appear to have 
resulted in significant impacts on some landholders and farming practices. Evidence 
suggests that the distribution of impacts is uneven across regions, and often across 
properties within regions — with the impacts determined by the extent and type of 
native vegetation on properties. This led a number of participants to question the 
equity of the regimes, arguing that certain landholders were unfairly bearing the 
costs of pursuing environmental objectives. 
Regulation has affected farming practices in a number of ways. As well as 
restricting broadscale clearing, participants noted that regulations often had 
significant implications for landholders intending to change land use or to adopt 
new technology (for instance, new irrigation systems), as well as their ability to 
undertake normal farming practices (fencing and paddock rotations).      
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Concerns were also raised about implementation and administration of the regime.  
•  The slow development of RVMPs has meant that the implementation of a 
regional framework for vegetation management, an objective of the NVC Act, 
has not eventuated. 
•  A lack of consideration given to the economic and social aspects of applications 
to clear native vegetation. The issue of how to consider trade-offs between 
development applications and the potential impacts for threatened species 
appeared particularly problematic.  
•  There was a lack of transparency in the decision-making process under the 
NVC Act. This, for example, may have encouraged perceptions that economic 
aspects of proposals were not given appropriate consideration and/or that the 
provisions of the Act were inconsistently interpreted across regions and 
properties. 
•  There was considerable uncertainty associated with the implementation of the 
regimes. This was a result of the complexity of the legislation and uncertainty as 
to how the provisions of the regime were being interpreted and implemented. 
•  Compliance with the legislation was also seen as a problem with the suggestion 
that illegal clearing may be undermining the objectives of the NVC Act and the 
TSC Act. 
In terms of environmental objectives, it appears the NVC Act has resulted in a 
reduction in the rate of native vegetation clearance, although the extent of the 
reduction is not clear. Generally, there was criticism that the reduction in clearing 
has been inadequate. However, any assessment is complicated by a lack of clearly- 
specified native vegetation or, more importantly, broader environmental targets. It is 
misleading to count just the number of hectares cleared, or not cleared, disregarding 
their location, conservation value, and the value of agricultural production.  
Participants also provided evidence that, in some cases, native vegetation and 
biodiversity regulations were contributing to poor environmental outcomes. 
Restrictions on the removal of native vegetation may affect landholders’ ability to 
undertake certain activities that are beneficial to the environment, such as managing 
invasive weeds and controlling feral animals. Dissatisfaction with the regime may 
also be contributing to an unwillingness among landholders to undertake voluntary 
conservation efforts. 
The legislation introduced by the NSW Parliament in December 2003 appears to 
address many of the issues raised by participants to this inquiry. Importantly, the 
reforms aim to improve the regional approach to native vegetation management and 
have the potential to reduce the complexity of the regulatory process. There will be     




greater flexibility to manage regrowth and to change land use. That said, broadscale 
clearing will not be allowed unless it is considered to improve or maintain 
environmental outcomes.  
Although there has been a move to strengthen the compliance and enforcement 
framework, the importance of encouraging voluntary compliance is acknowledged 
in the reform package. To this end, funding has been increased significantly.      




Over the last 170 years there has been significant clearing of woody native 
vegetation in Victoria to provide land for housing, agriculture and mining activities. 
It is estimated that in that time around two-thirds of pre-1800 forest and woodlands 
— which covered close to 90 per cent of the State — has been cleared (Woodgate 
and Black 1988). This represents an average rate of clearing in the vicinity of 
80 000 hectares per year.  
Of the remaining native vegetation, only about 13 per cent (1.1 million hectares) is 
on private land — which makes up over two-thirds of the State. Over 90 per cent of 
the original tree cover on private land has been cleared. An estimated 7.4 million 
hectares of vegetation is on public land. Relatively, this is the largest level of 
clearing of all States and Territories, reflecting the suitability for agriculture of 
much of Victoria’s land and climate.  
Woodgate and Black (1988) estimated an average gross clearing rate (excluding 
reforestation) of around 15 400 hectares per year between 1972 and 1987. Annually 
this clearing represented less than 0.1 per  cent of the State’s land area, close to 
0.2 per cent of remaining woody vegetation and about 1.4 per cent of the remaining 
native vegetation on private land.1 Around 13 000 hectares of this clearing was on 
private land, much of it around Mildura, Horsham and Portland during the early and 
mid 1980s. Woodgate and Black (1988) note that the rate of clearing slowed in the 
late 1980s due to a greater awareness of land degradation and the removal of 
government incentives to clear land.  
Following the introduction of controls on clearing native vegetation into the 
Planning and Environment Act 1987 (PE Act) in 1989, permanent loss of woody 
native vegetation in Victoria in recent years has been estimated (using satellite 
imagery) at around 2500 hectares per year (DNRE 2002).  
The Victorian Government (sub. 185) indicated that 19 of the 90 known species of 
non-marine mammals, which existed in Victoria at the time of European settlement, 
                                              
1  The net clearing rate, after allowing for revegetation, was about 10 400 hectares per year.     





are now extinct in the State, with many others having reduced populations and 
distributions. Over 900 species of Victorian plants are considered to be rare or 
threatened. 
D.2  Description of the regulatory regime 
In Victoria there are two major pieces of State legislation that regulate native 
vegetation clearance (PE Act) and the conservation of biodiversity (Flora and 
Fauna Guarantee Act  1988  (FFG Act).2 This legislation operates as part of a 
broader framework of sustainable land management and environmental protection 
policies (such as catchment management) which is outlined further below. 
Vegetation clearance 
Regulation of native vegetation clearance in Victoria does not involve separate 
native vegetation legislation. Rather, it is achieved via planning schemes and related 
permit requirements established under the PE  Act. Native vegetation retention 
controls were introduced under the PE Act in 1989.  
The purpose of the PE Act is to: 
… establish a framework for planning the use, development and protection of land in 
Victoria in the present and long-term interests of all Victorians (s. 1). 
The objectives of the PE Act are: 
(a) to provide for the fair, orderly, economic and sustainable use and development of 
land; 
(b) to provide for the protection of natural and man-made resources and the 
maintenance of ecological processes and genetic diversity; 
(c) to secure a pleasant, efficient and safe working, living and recreational environment 
for all Victorians and visitors to Victoria; 
(d) to conserve and enhance those buildings, areas or other places which are of 
scientific, aesthetic, architectural or historical interest or otherwise of special 
cultural value; 
(e) to protect public utilities and other assets and enable the orderly provision and 
coordination of public utilities and other facilities for the benefit of the community; 
                                              
2  In Victorian planning schemes native vegetation is defined as plants that are indigenous to 
Victoria including trees, shrubs, herbs and grasses. Plants indigenous to Victoria are those 
species that occurred naturally within the State before European settlement.     
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(f)  to facilitate development in accordance with the objectives set out in paragraphs (a), 
(b), (c), (d) and (e); 
(g) to balance the present and future interests of all Victorians (s. 4). 
Part 1A (s. 4A) of the PE Act allows the Minister to prepare or approve standard 
planning provisions (the Victorian Planning Provisions (VPP)) to ‘provide a 
consistent and coordinated framework for planning schemes in Victoria’. Within 
this state-wide framework, responsible authorities (usually municipal councils) have 
scope to develop their own tailored provisions considered appropriate for their 
municipality. These local provisions cannot obviate the need for a planning permit 
where this is required by the PE Act. The Minister can also prepare a planning 
scheme for any municipality. 
The VPP require that in planning schemes established under the PE Act, a planning 
permit needs to be obtained to remove, destroy or lop native vegetation. The VPP 
provide a range of exemptions from these permit requirements, many of these to 
facilitate normal rural management practices. These exemptions include: 
•  clearing on properties that are less than 0.4 hectares in size; 
•  clearing regrowth that is less than 10 years old where the land is being re-
established or maintained for cultivation or pasture; 
•  cutting of reasonable amounts of wood for personal use; 
•  clearing of vegetation presenting an immediate risk of personal injury or 
property damage; 
•  clearing to make fire breaks (up to 6 metres wide) or for periodic fuel reduction 
burning; 
•  clearing as a result of grazing by domestic stock or moving stock along a road; 
•  clearing to the minimum extent necessary, and not more than 10 hectares, to 
remove burrows for vermin control (after obtaining permission from the 
Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE)); 
•  clearing of dead vegetation and certain types of native vegetation (for example, 
bracken); 
•  clearing under the Catchment and Land Protection Act 1994 (CaLP Act); 
•  clearing of native vegetation planted for timber production, agroforestry, shelter 
belts, woodlots, street trees, gardens and horticultural purposes; and 
•  clearing necessary for carrying on an extractive industry.     





Local planning schemes can override some of these exemptions. For example, in the 
West Wimmera Shire, a permit is required to remove, destroy or lop dead native 
trees, because they may provide habitat for the Red-tailed Black Cockatoo. 
Although the administration and enforcement of planning controls over clearing 
generally rests with municipal councils as the ‘responsible authority’, for 
applications involving an area of clearing greater than 10 hectares, councils must 
seek the view of the DSE as the ‘referral authority’. Its advice (including refusal of 
a permit or placing conditions on a permit) must be followed, hence providing DSE 
with effective overriding power in such cases. For areas under 10 hectares, councils 
may seek advice from DSE regarding a clearing application but in general are not 
bound to accept it.  
The responsible authority may grant permits subject to conditions.  
Protection of biodiversity 
Along with the native vegetation controls in the PE Act, the main Victorian 
legislation for protecting biodiversity is the FFG Act which also covers sustainable 
use of native flora and fauna. 
The FFG Act was the first State biodiversity legislation in Australia. Rather than the 
broad habitat protection provided by the PE  Act, the FFG  Act is specifically 
targeted at identifying and preserving particular threatened species and communities 
and identifying and controlling processes that may threaten biodiversity. 
Department of Natural Resources and Environment noted: 
The Act seeks to put in place preventative management mechanisms to ensure no biota 
or ecological communities become extinct and that the processes that threaten 
biodiversity are identified and addressed. The Act is far broader than ‘endangered 
species’ legislation, covering ecological communities; potentially threatening 
processes; community involvement in conservation; a strategic approach to biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable use. (DNRE 2003) 
The purpose of the FFG Act is: 
… to establish a legal and administrative structure to enable and promote the 
conservation of Victoria’s native flora and fauna and to provide for a choice of 
procedures which can be used for the conservation, management or control of flora and 
fauna and the management of potentially threatening processes (s. 1). 
The Act defines fauna as any animal life (excluding humans) indigenous to 
Victoria, in any stage of biological development. Flora is defined as any plant life 
indigenous to Victoria, in any stage of biological development.     
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Under the FFG Act (s. 10), threatened species or ecological communities of flora 
and fauna, and potentially threatening processes can be listed by the Minister after 
recommendation from the Scientific Advisory Committee established under the Act. 
To be listed, flora or fauna must be in a demonstrable state of decline likely to result 
in extinction or significantly prone to future threats likely to result in extinction. 
Potentially threatening processes need to pose, or have the potential to pose, a 
significant threat to the survival or evolutionary development of a range of flora or 
fauna. Anyone can make nominations (supported by prescribed information) for 
listing (or repealing of listing) of flora, fauna or threatening processes.  
When a listing occurs under the Act, an Action Statement must be prepared by DSE 
identifying actions that have been, or will be, taken to conserve the species or 
community or to manage the potentially threatening process.3 As well as relevant 
nature conservation matters, the statements must also consider relevant social and 
economic issues. To date, over 120 Action Statements have been produced.  
Both living and non-living flora listed under the Act have legal protection. A permit 
must be obtained from DSE (s. 47) to collect or trade in protected native plants or to 
undertake works (including clearing native vegetation) or other activities which 
might kill, injure or disturb listed native plants or other declared flora. However, an 
exemption is provided to private landholders if the flora are not sold. 
The Act (s. 20) allows DSE to determine that part or whole of the habitat of any 
taxon or community of flora or fauna that is critical to its survival.4 DSE is also able 
to make Management Plans for any taxon or community of flora or fauna or 
potentially threatening process. It must consult with any landholder or water 
manager who may be materially affected by the plan and prepare a draft plan for 
public comment. The plan must indicate how flora and fauna conservation and 
management objectives are to be implemented and how progress is to be assessed. It 
must also state the nature conservation and the social and economic consequences 
of the plan and indicate when it should be reviewed (s. 23). 
Section 26 of the FFG Act allows the Minister to make interim conservation orders 
to conserve the critical habitat (on land or in water) of a taxon of flora or fauna that 
has been listed, or nominated for listing, as threatened or potentially threatened. The 
                                              
3  For example, the predation of native wildlife by the Cat Felis catus, was listed as a potentially 
threatening process and an Action Statement was produced in March 1997, outlining the actions 
to be taken to ameliorate the adverse effects of this process. These proposals included 
continuing education programs, control programs and regulation of the keeping of cats in 
sensitive areas. 
4  The FFG Act defines taxon as a taxonomic group of any rank into which organisms are 
categorised.     





Minister must consider nature conservation matters and the social and economic 
consequences of making the order.  
The order may provide for the conservation protection or management of flora, 
fauna, land or water within the critical habitat, the prohibition or regulation of any 
activity or process taking place on that habitat, and the prohibition, regulation or 
management of activities outside the habitat which are likely to adversely affect it. 
The order can also specify work or activities that are to be undertaken. Any person 
can make a submission about the interim conservation order and those owning 
critical habitats must be consulted before it receives Ministerial approval. An order 
operates for two years and can be amended by the Minister during that period. 
Where there is any conflict between them, the conservation order prevails over any 
planning scheme. 
Section 43 requires compensation to be paid to landholders for financial loss 
suffered as a direct and reasonable consequence of the making of an interim 
conservation order and of having to comply with that order. Section 7(3) allows the 
provision of grants and other incentives to encourage the achievement of the flora 
and fauna conservation management objectives of the Act. 
Catchment management legislation 
In common with a number of other jurisdictions, regulation of a range of land and 
water conservation issues in Victoria has been rationalised into a regional 
framework. The CaLP Act replaced and integrated various Acts dealing with soil 
conservation and control of vermin and noxious weeds. While the sole focus of the 
CaLP Act is not preservation of native vegetation and biodiversity per se, the Act’s 
operations will have a significant impact on them (for example by reducing land and 
water degradation). Targeted native vegetation retention and regeneration will also 
be an important part of catchment management strategy. 
The Victorian Catchment Management Council stated that the CaLP Act system, 
known as the Catchment Management Framework, was: 
… derived from regional community land management activity — predominantly the 
Landcare movement. The framework is based on a recognition that over 64 per cent of 
Victoria’s landscape remains privately owned and community participation is required 
to address natural resource management and sustainability issues. (VCMC 2003) 
The Victorian Government indicated that the purpose of the CaLP Act is to: 
… set up a framework for the integrated management and protection of catchments; 
encourage community participation in the management of land and water resources and 
set up a system of controls on noxious weeds and pest animals. It provides for the     
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declaration of special areas and the development of management plans to address 
specific land management issues in those areas. (sub. 185, p. 13) 
Nine (non-metropolitan) Catchment Management Authorities (CMAs) were 
established under the CaLP Act. They brought together the roles of a number of 
groups previously providing advice on single issues. In introducing the legislation 
the then Minister indicated that CMAs would: 
… encourage a coordinated approach to the management of natural resources within 
their region in close cooperation with the regional community, particularly land-holder 
groups, local government organisations and water authorities and promote community 
awareness and involvement. (Victorian Legislative Assembly 1994, 5 May, p. 1621) 
CMAs develop and implement Regional Catchment Strategies (s. 24) which assess 
the extent and causes of land degradation. These strategies set out objectives for the 
quality of land and water resources, and set out a program of measures to improve 
and monitor land and water use and to treat land degradation. These measures have 
included promoting sustainable agricultural and land management practices, such as 
the introduction and management of perennial pasture species, regeneration of 
remnant vegetation and tree planting.  
While not limiting the programs a strategy may contain, section 24(3) focuses on 
cooperative mechanisms such as research, educational programs, land management 
advisory services, land use planning and incentives for better land management. A 
CMA can recommend to a planning authority established under the PE Act that 
amendments be made to a planning scheme to give effect to the catchment strategy. 
CMAs have also been used as the vehicle for developing Regional Native 
Vegetation Management Plans as part of their regional catchment strategies. These 
plans will be used to inform the decision making of planning authorities when 
assessing vegetation clearance applications and other environmental issues in an 
integrated way.  
The CaLP Act establishes general duties of land owners (s.  20) to take all 
reasonable steps to: avoid causing land degradation which may cause damage to 
another property; conserve soil; protect water resources; eradicate regionally 
prohibited weeds; prevent the growth and spread of regionally controlled weeds; 
and control established pest animals.  
Land owners must also take all reasonable steps to prevent the spread of regionally 
controlled weeds and established pest animals on roadsides adjoining their land. 
DSE can direct a land owner to eradicate or control noxious weeds or pest animals. 
The costs of these actions are to be borne by the land owner. DSE can issue land     





management notices (s.  37) to land owners who do not meet these obligations, 
(including their general duties under s. 20).5 
A CMA can also recommend to the Minister that land in its region be declared a 
special area (s. 27) and it can prepare a plan to deal with specific land management 
issues in that area. These plans must state a program of action to be taken to deal 
with the relevant land management issues, state the targets, costs and benefits of 
that action and allocate responsibility for taking and bearing the costs of the action 
(s.30). 
Land owners may be required to observe land-use conditions recommended in a 
special area plan (s. 33). The plan must include an estimate of the total cost of 
complying with these conditions, including any decrease in the value of land or 
financial loss likely to result, and provide a method of apportioning this cost 
between land owners and others who will benefit from the plan, and between the 
properties to which the conditions will apply (s. 30(3)). 
Other legislation and activities 
There are a number of other pieces of State legislation which, while not having 
vegetation or biodiversity protection as their main objectives, do contain provisions 
that can impact on these matters. For example, the Wildlife Act 1975 and Fisheries 
Act 1995 provide for protection of endangered fauna. Other Acts, such as the 
Mineral  Resources  Development Act 1990 and the Forests Act  1958, refer to 
protection of biodiversity.  
The Victorian Government (sub. 185) observed that its approach to the conservation 
of native vegetation and biodiversity goes beyond regulatory mechanisms. It noted a 
range of initiatives including: government assistance to private land conservation 
programs, such as Land for Wildlife and Trust for Nature; programs such as the 
Natural Heritage Trust and Landcare, which assist landholders to achieve 
improvements in native vegetation and biodiversity; and the direct purchase by 
Government of properties considered of particular environmental value. 
It also noted the BushTender scheme, which aims to achieve improved biodiversity 
outcomes, beyond those required by the regulatory regime, in a cost-effective way. 
BushTender provides the opportunity for landholders to bid to provide management 
                                              
5 Among other things, land management notices may prohibit or regulate land use or 
land-management practices and require action to improve land-management practices, prevent 
or minimise land degradation or rehabilitate degraded land. They can only be issued after 
attempts to reach agreement on appropriate remedial actions have failed and only with the 
consent of the relevant CMA (s. 39).     
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services to improve the quality or extent of native vegetation on their land. In this 
way, it provides an indication of the cost of producing the environmental services 
the community receives from management of native vegetation.6 Unlike the 
clearing restrictions in the PE Act, BushTender also requires the Government to 
prioritise its environmental objectives because public funds are being expended. A 
number of trials of the BushTender scheme have been carried out in the north east 
and north central regions and in Gippsland, involving nearly 5000 hectares of 
significant native vegetation and the expenditure of $1.2 million over the period of 
the management agreements.  
The Victorian Farmers’ Federation (VFF) considered that the Government’s 
reliance on the PE Act to conserve vegetation, detracted from the potential of 
BushTender: 
The VFF believes that BushTender has great potential to be expanded and to provide 
the framework for cost sharing of Victoria’s environmental responsibilities as an 
ongoing, market driven cost-sharing arrangement. Yet, this program, which had so 
much potential, appears to be floundering. Payment for environmental management 
outcomes is not very attractive to government when the alternative is draconian 
legislation which requires the landowner to protect all indigenous flora and fauna at his 
or her own cost anyway. (sub. 149, p. 14) 
D.3  Development of the regulatory regime 
The permit requirements for clearing native vegetation were introduced into 
planning schemes in 1989 with little, if any, consultation. This lack of consultation 
may have reflected concerns about panic clearing if advance notice were given.  
Because native vegetation clearing restrictions are implemented under planning 
schemes (and government policy statements and other documents guiding these 
schemes), important changes can be made to their provisions and operation without 
the same degree of scrutiny as legislative amendments. Changes in approach, such 
as the ‘no net loss’ of vegetation and now the ‘Net Gain’ objective, are implemented 
by introducing new guidelines underlying the planning scheme which provide broad 
direction to responsible authorities and referral authorities. 
Several participants were concerned that the regulations implementing the planning 
scheme requirements were developed and amended without consultation with 
landholders.  
                                              
6  To the extent that landholders also receive some private benefit from management of the 
vegetation concerned, bids should be somewhat below the total cost of these management 
activities.     





Paul McGowan of Barnawartha commented: 
It is the bureaucrats that make the regulations and the community which I represent 
here today is completely excluded from those situations. It should be the community 
making the regulations, and in the community we have got enough wise, experienced, 
committed people to know what is the right thing to do with the land. (trans., p. 1335) 
Timber Towns Victoria argued that greater consultation with landholders could be 
achieved without compromising environmental objectives: 
In the future, governments could place a temporary suspension on the issuing of 
permits for land clearing while they consult with landholders and the community, prior 
to the development and implementation of any biodiversity/native vegetation 
legislation. This would allow for local knowledge and experience to be properly 
incorporated in the legislation. (sub. DR263, p. 5) 
DNRE (2002) noted that there had been no comprehensive review of the native 
vegetation regulations since their introduction in 1989. Moreover, the VFF was 
critical of the time taken to produce operational guidelines for the new Net Gain 
assessment approach outlined by DNRE (2002): 
The Framework was released in August 2002, but it is only now that Operational 
Guidelines for the interpretation of the Framework are being produced. It is ironic that 
guidelines are needed to interpret a framework that was designed to provide direction 
for the interpretation of the VPPs. All of this will be available 14 years after the 
original VPPs were introduced. (sub. 149, p. 6) 
The Victorian Government (sub. DR323) stated that guidelines for native vegetation 
control have been in place since 1990. 
Regional Native Vegetation Plans are being developed involving consultation with 
native vegetation committees in each CMA. These committees have developed draft 
plans that are awaiting ministerial approval. These will be part of the framework 
supporting the native vegetation provisions of the VPPs. Because the CMA process 
is regionally based there is greater potential for consultation with landholders, local 
environmental groups and other regional interest groups. However, the Victorian 
Government  (sub. 185, p. 10)  indicated  that these plans were to ‘set regional 
priorities to achieving Net Gain’. The impact of local input is hence somewhat 
constrained. 
The VFF (sub. 149) expressed concern that draft regional vegetation management 
plans being prepared by CMAs may be altered without consultation at the 
departmental level to fit in with the Net Gain objective.     
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D.4  Promotion of environmental goals 
Victoria’s native vegetation and biodiversity legislation has a number of often 
inter-related goals. This section presents these and discusses the extent to which 
they have been achieved. 
Objectives of the regime 
Native vegetation clearance controls for private land are constituted under 
provisions of the PE Act, the overarching objective of which is ‘to establish a 
framework for planning the use, development and protection of land in Victoria in 
the present and long term interests of all Victorians’ (s. 1).  
The specific objectives of the vegetation clearance provisions are to: 
•  protect areas of significant vegetation; 
•  ensure that development minimises loss of vegetation; 
•  preserve existing trees and other vegetation; 
•  recognise vegetation protection areas as locations of special significance, natural 
beauty, interest and importance; 
•  maintain and enhance habitat and habitat corridors for indigenous fauna; and 
•  encourage the regeneration of native vegetation. 
Retention and management of native vegetation is also considered important for 
agricultural productivity by improving land and water quality. 
In implementing native vegetation clearance controls the Net Gain principle is now 
the primary objective of the regime (that is, gains greater than losses on a 
quality/quantity adjusted basis). Goals are also established for sub-regions with 
specific priorities attached. Hence, regional Native Vegetation Plans are being 
developed. DNRE 2002 (p. 4) indicated: 
A priority for implementing Net Gain is to avoid clearing. Where flexibility is required 
to support landholders as they move towards more sustainable land use and limited 
clearing is permitted, a rigorous process of ensuring achievement of the Net Gain 
principles must be pursued through strict application of the offset requirements. 
Net Gain is measured on a combined quality and quantity basis. The conservation 
significance of an existing area of vegetation is determined by the conservation 
status of the vegetation types, the quality of the vegetation, the conservation status 
of any species present and other site-based criteria.     





The Victorian Government is investigating ways in which offsets required in return 
for permission to clear native vegetation could be achieved through third-party 
agreements, thereby providing landholders with some flexibility in how they meet 
the offset requirements. 
Section 4 of the FFG Act sets out the flora and fauna conservation objectives as: 
(a) to guarantee that all taxa of Victoria’s flora and fauna other than the taxa listed in 
the Excluded List can survive, flourish and retain their potential for evolutionary 
development in the wild; and  
(b) to conserve Victoria’s communities of flora and fauna; and  
(c) to manage potentially threatening processes; and  
(d) to ensure that any use of flora or fauna by humans is sustainable; and  
(e) to ensure that the genetic diversity of flora and fauna is maintained; and  
(f) to provide programs — 
  (i)  of community education in the conservation of flora and fauna; and  
  (ii) to encourage co-operative management of flora and fauna through, amongst  
other things, the entering into of land management co-operative agreements  
under the Conservation, Forests and Lands Act 1987; and  
  (iii) of assisting and giving incentives to people, including landholders, to enable  
flora and fauna to be conserved; and 
(g) to encourage the conserving of flora and fauna through co-operative community 
endeavours. 
The key objectives of the CaLP Act (s. 4) are to establish a framework for the 
integrated and coordinated management of catchments which will: 
(i) maintain and enhance long-term land productivity while also conserving the 
environment; and 
(ii)  aim to ensure that the quality of the State’s land and water resources and their 
associated plant and animal life are maintained and enhanced. 
In addition, the Act aims to provide for the control of noxious weeds and pest 
animals and encourage participation by landholders, resource managers and the 
community in catchment management and land protection. 
Landholder understanding of objectives 
The Victorian legislation protecting native vegetation and biodiversity was among 
the earliest in Australia and there seems to be a broad understanding among 
landholders of the objectives of the regulation.      
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Nevertheless, the precise objectives and implementation of the regulations have 
changed over time and there remains a degree of uncertainty among landholders 
affected by the regulations. Submissions to this inquiry suggest that a major source 
of uncertainty comes from inconsistencies in application of the regulations across 
the State. Ron Hawkins (a West Wimmera Shire councillor) cited a lack of 
consistency in referral authority advice and requirements (sub.  111). The VFF 
argued: 
The regulations appear to vary significantly from Shire to Shire, and region to region, 
depending upon the way in which Department personnel or Shire planners are willing 
to interpret them. (sub. 149, p. 11) 
In addition, as noted below, some landholders have observed cases where 
apparently small environmental benefits have led to large administrative costs (to 
government and landholders) and other costs to landholders. This has tended to 
cause disquiet among landholders about the underlying objectives of the regime and 
those implementing it.  
Nillumbik Shire Council observed that for its region near Melbourne, landholders 
were not well informed about the regimes: 
Many landholders are still unaware as to their obligations as land managers as stated in 
the regulatory regimes. It is often as a result of approaching Council in relation to other 
matters that landholders are informed of their obligations. (sub. 174, p. 2) 
This may reflect a high proportion of retirees and hobby farmers in that area. 
The Victorian Government (sub. 185, p. 13) noted that the FFG Act ‘drives various 
programs that foster community education’. 
Have objectives been achieved? 
As in all jurisdictions, there is a variety of often inter-related environmental and 
land-use productivity objectives underlying Victoria’s native vegetation and 
biodiversity regulatory regime. These include retention of native vegetation for its 
own sake and as a habitat for fauna, special protection of particularly threatened 
flora or fauna, prevention and remediation of salinity and land erosion, eradication 
of weeds and feral animals and protection of water quality. 
The achievement of these objectives is usually difficult to observe directly. 
However, for many of them the extent of native vegetation cover provides some 
(although highly imperfect) indication of their achievement. Hence, the extent of 
vegetation clearance and replanting is a commonly-used indicator of the 
performance of the regulatory regimes.      





Native vegetation clearance 
The extent of vegetation clearing that had occurred before 1989 limits the impact 
that the PE Act — which only operates on restricting future clearing — can have on 
the extent of native vegetation cover. The VFF noted: 
When the regulations were introduced in 1989, almost all of the large-scale land 
development in Victoria was finished anyway. Other than in East Gippsland, some of 
the Mallee and in the south-west corner of the state, where large tracts of native 
vegetation still remain on private land, there is no desire or need to engage in 
large-scale vegetation removal. In fact, farmers in Victoria have undertaken voluntary 
vegetation planting and protection on quite a large scale where it is needed by our 
active involvement in the Landcare movement. (trans., pp. 662–3) 
Nonetheless, annual woody vegetation clearance appears to have fallen by around 
10 000 hectares in the years after the introduction of vegetation clearance controls. 
It is now estimated to be around 2500 hectares per year. Since the clearing controls 
were introduced, government policy under the PE Act has moved to an objective of 
‘no net loss’, and now to a ‘Net Gain’, in vegetation cover.  
Although there may still be a small annual woody vegetation loss in Victoria, 
broader application of the Net Gain objective is likely to turn this around. West 
Wimmera Shire Council (sub.  110) indicated that over the last three years 
vegetation planting offsets in its region had led to increases in the number of trees 
(around ten times the number removed on permit) and the establishment of several 
permanent reserves and wetlands on private land.7 
Some participants questioned the accuracy of this figure particularly as it relates to 
agricultural land where they contend native vegetation cover has been increasing. 
The VFF questioned the official estimate of 2500 hectare annual net loss in native 
vegetation in Victoria, particularly in relation to agricultural land: 
This estimate … must be considered questionable at best, as it is determined using 
satellite imagery and it does not differentiate between native vegetation removal for 
agriculture and native vegetation removal for urban development. The VFF suspects 
that clearing on rural land is more than offset by revegetation and planting works on 
rural land. (sub. DR284, p. 3) 
Jack Vallance (sub. DR222) of Tempy noted significant voluntary planting of trees 
by landholders over the last decade to provide shade and shelter for stock. Paul 
                                              
7  There will be other causes of woody vegetation changes not picked up by the permit system. For 
example, reductions can occur because of legal clearing under permit exemptions, illegal 
clearing and fire, while increases can reflect voluntary plantings and revegetation under other 
regulations like the CaLP Act.      
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McGowan  (trans., p. 1137)  of  Barnawartha considered that vegetation regrowth 
meant that the area of cleared land was decreasing in the north east of Victoria. 
The variation in offsets required in return for clearing approval under the Net Gain 
principle depends on the environmental quality of the vegetation to be cleared. This 
is an attempt to recognise the loss in environmental value as a result of clearing. 
The revegetation costs imposed on landholders are then modified commensurately 
to reflect this and will be incorporated into the landholder’s decision on whether to 
proceed. However, the policy does create incentives for landholders to fail to 
manage, or even actively to degrade, any areas of vegetation that they consider they 
may wish to clear in the future, in order to minimise required offsets. Gippsland 
Private Forestry Inc. (previously Gippsland Farm Plantations) noted: 
The quality of management of existing (and future) native vegetation is surely as 
important as reducing losses in area or extending the area of native vegetation in our 
rural landscapes. There appears to be little ‘reward’ to native vegetation owners for 
good past or future management. In fact one can argue there is in fact the opposite. 
Degraded native vegetation is generally given wider management options than quality 
native vegetation. The scope to undermine the intent of policy aiming to achieve 
sustainable native vegetation communities in the future by inadvertent or deliberate 
negative management actions will not be lost on landowners who do not support 
adoption of regimes they regard as unfair or unreasonable. (sub. 92, p. 2) 
Where application of the regulations causes landholder disenchantment they can 
lead to the loss of landholder input in achieving environmental goals. Janet and 
Kevin Blake (sub. 188) of Barunah Park noted that they had been heavily involved 
in Landcare. However, concerns about excessive restriction on their ability to 
efficiently manage their property under the Victorian regime had led them to focus 
solely on farming. The National Farmers’ Federation (NFF) noted the case of Sally 
and Gordon Moon of the Wulgulmerang area:  
The Moons have been involved in Landcare for a number of years and prior to the 
application to clear had received Landcare funding to enable the planting of 700 native 
trees on another area of their farm as part of a re-vegetation program. Since the refusal 
of the clearing permit and as a result of the way in which they were treated by the 
department, Sally and Gordon have not only cancelled their plans to be involved in the 
voluntary tree planting program but they have also left the Landcare program. 
(sub. 128, appendix H, p. iv) 
The ecological processes being managed are often complex and overall outcomes 
can be difficult to predict. Mitchell Environment Group (from the Seymour area) 
noted that the requirement to remove pest plants can have unforeseen perverse 
consequences: 
… some programmes such as the Rabbit Buster programme saw the removal of all the 
bracken in places where it was the last vestige of habitat for small birds. Also the weeds 
programmes had unforseen impact on biodiversity in that blackberries and gorse in     





some areas were in fact protecting small native animals from introduced predators. 
Removal of these weeds without prior restoration of suitable native habitat meant local 
extinctions. (sub. 65, p. 1) 
In other cases some types of native vegetation may occur in abundance in an area 
and requiring its retention would appear to provide little in the way of 
environmental services. Geoff Sebire of the Strathbogie Shire noted that Silver 
Wattle was widespread in his region: 
It is an indigenous species which seeds and more importantly suckers prodigiously. It is 
fast growing, short-lived and sometimes a curse in high rainfall hill country, and I 
experienced that. It is not threatened … There should be no restriction on its removal 
by authorities or by private individuals, particularly for fencing maintenance and 
construction. (trans., p. 1609) 
Timber Towns Victoria expressed similar views about Coast Wattle and Sallow 
Wattle growing outside their natural range: 
Timber Towns Victoria believes landholders should have the ability to remove invasive 
vegetation that is not indigenous to the area without having to undertake an onerous 
permit application process. If this does not occur the environmental quality of their 
properties will not be enhanced and the legislation will not have achieved its desired 
goal. (sub. DR263, p. 5) 
The native vegetation framework is implemented, at least initially, by local 
government. The Moyne Shire considered that lack of resources may compromise 
achieving the legislative objectives: 
Councils are neither resourced nor adequately skilled in native vegetation ecological 
assessments to effectively and efficiently implement the framework. (sub. DR229 p. 1) 
Similarly, Corangamite Shire Council argued: 
Local Government is required to implement these regulations with very little or no 
training and resources. This has therefore reduced the effectiveness of the 
implementation and the ability of the community to clearly understand the restrictions 
placed on the general community. (sub. DR236, p. 2) 
At times government objectives for land use may conflict with attempts to achieve 
biodiversity outcomes. Harry Haralambous of Melton, whose attempts to develop 
an orchard of viable size are being frustrated by requirements to protect native grass 
found on his property, commented: 
I’m in a green wedge area which is being preserved for agriculture or farming 
activities, but I can’t … plant a tree. (trans., p. 682) 
Frances Overmars of Mt Cotterell, where native grass is the predominant form of 
native vegetation, considered that the regulations had failed to protect the local 
environment adequately:     
  VICTORIA  363
 
Overall the regulations have been rarely applied even though the native grasses are 
reduced to less than 1% of their original cover. It is one of the most threatened 
ecosystems in Victoria and plants and animals within this system are extinct in this area 
or are bordering on extinction. It would appear that the regulations are not effective in 
controlling this spiral of destruction.  
We have salinity, soil erosion, weed infestation and water quality problems, which are 
directly linked to loss of native grasses, and the function that they perform in mitigating 
land degradation. (sub. 18, p. 1) 
The Trust for Nature (Victoria) (sub.  129) also was concerned that agricultural 
activities were damaging or destroying native grasslands and considered that greater 
resources were required for compliance and enforcement of legislative 
requirements. 
Initially, the major focus of regulation may have been on the more easily detectable 
clearance of woody vegetation. Submissions to this inquiry suggest that now native 
grass preservation is being more actively pursued either under Victorian legislation 
or the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) 
(for example, VFF, sub. 149). However, any such developments are also likely to 
add to the costs the regime imposes on landholders. 
Preservation of threatened species  
To date, 231 plant species, 214 animal species and 35 ecological communities are 
on the list of threatened taxa and communities and 30 processes are on the list of 
potentially threatening processes under the FFG Act (DSE 2004).  
The Victorian Government (sub. 185) argued that the success of various Victorian 
legislation and processes (including the FFG Act) in achieving Australian 
Government objectives in biodiversity conservation should be recognised and 
accredited under the EPBC Act. 
Conversely, the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) (sub. 146) considered 
that the FFG Act has had very little impact in achieving biodiversity goals. It noted 
that no Interim Conservation Order (ICO) — the principal mechanism under the Act 
for regulating activities or uses which may harm a listed value — had ever been 
issued and that only one Critical Habitat Declaration (CHD) had been made and this 
was almost immediately revoked.  
The ACF commented with regard to this CHD: 
The site where the species (the Small Golden Moths Orchid) has most recently been 
recorded, which had comprised the core of the critical habitat area, was promptly 
developed as a storage area for shipping containers. (sub. 146, p. 7)     





The ACF argued that compensation provisions in the FFG Act played a significant 
role in restricting the use made of it: 
Ill-conceived ‘compensation’ is provided for, for any landholder who suffers financial 
loss as a result of the making of or having to comply with an ICO. The compensation 
provisions, forced through the Upper House of the Victorian Parliament, are very 
broad, and to a large degree are responsible for the fact that no ICO has yet been made 
(political obstacles around the making of CHDs are another factor here). 
(sub. 146, p. 8) 
To the extent that the requirement to pay compensation to landholders under 
section  43 of the FFG Act discourages the issuing of ICOs in cases where the 
Government assesses the value of environmental benefits to the community as less 
than the costs they impose on landholder (and effectively the community), the 
outcome is an efficient one. Presumably if environmental benefits outweighed costs 
to landholders, governments should be willing to pay the necessary compensation.  
However, it appears that many biodiversity objectives are being achieved without 
the need to pay compensation by preserving and expanding habitat under the 
PE Act. The VFF (sub. 149) considered that the FFG Act had been largely usurped 
by the requirements in the VPP. These provisions require that responsible 
authorities, in deciding on permits to clear native vegetation, must consider the role 
of native vegetation in conserving flora and fauna and the need to retain native or 
other vegetation if it is rare, supports rare species of flora or fauna, or forms part of 
a wildlife corridor. 
Other objectives 
Under the VPP, authorities responsible for deciding on applications for clearance of 
native vegetation must consider the role of native vegetation in preventing various 
forms of land degradation and the adverse effects on groundwater recharge 
(clause 52.17). These decision guidelines, if successfully implemented, should help 
prevent deterioration in land and water quality. The catchment management process 
also aims to deal with land degradation but generally in a less prescriptive way than 
the PE Act and focuses more on degradation issues rather than broader 
environmental goals.  
Land degradation and water quality are long-term problems that can affect 
vegetation and biodiversity outcomes and agricultural productivity. It will be some 
time before the success of today’s actions in addressing these problems can be 
assessed. Identifying what would have happened to land and water quality in the 
absence of current restrictions on vegetation clearance is particularly problematic. 
Hence the focus on assessing the success of native vegetation regulation in     
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rectifying these issues initially tends to be on input measures such as the extent and 
location of vegetation clearance and revegetation.  
Level of landholder compliance 
The Commission has received little direct evidence of non-compliance with the 
provisions of the various Victorian regulations. However, even in a small, relatively 
densely-populated State like Victoria, policing of the regulations is difficult and 
hence assessing the extent of non-compliance is problematic. It is unlikely that 
broadscale clearing would go unnoticed, but some smaller breaches of permit 
requirements might not be detected. The VFF (sub. 149) considered that councils 
rely significantly on landholders ‘dobbing in’ their neighbours as a means of finding 
breaches of the regulations.  
Also, a number of participants indicated that compliance with the strict letter of the 
law could still see a failure to achieve the underlying environmental objectives — 
the attitude of landholders can make a significant difference to the environmental 
quality of native vegetation required to be retained on their land.  
Drew Gailey from Echuca considered that landholders had options to circumvent 
the regulations without breaking the law: 
In the case of a grassland there is also nothing to stop someone overstocking, 
fertilizing, broadcast seeding or pugging up a paddock with livestock. Any of these acts 
can destroy the diversity of species, lessen its value or eliminate certain listed 
endangered species. (sub. 97, p. 1) 
Similarly, confining excessive numbers of stock to graze in areas of native 
vegetation can significantly downgrade its quality. 
The level of non-compliance is also likely to vary with the way the regulations are 
implemented. A number of landholders indicated that they are happy to assist 
achieve environmental goals, but need flexible administration to elicit this 
cooperation. Gerald McArdle from Geelong indicated:  
I had spent time and money in conjunction with Landcare to plant up to 16,000 trees in 
lots of 4,000 each along a creek area. When I queried the local government on possible 
removal of any of those trees should they present any problems, I was told that 
presently any or all removals would have to be matched with a replanting of four trees 
for every one removed provided a permit was issued. This meant if at some future time 
I required to remove these trees, I would have to replant and guarantee for life 64,000 
trees, this was a stupid possibility, so I decided not to shoot myself in the foot, and 
refrained from planting any trees at all. (sub. 53, p. 6)     





The difficulty in determining the level of achievement of underlying environmental 
goals means that any such sub-optimal outcomes resulting from landholder 
concerns are very difficult for policy makers to identify. 
VFF considered that many landholders would often ignore newly-introduced 
requirements to obtain permission to clear native vegetation for vermin control: 
The fact is, few farmers will bother going to visit DSE to get a letter of permission to 
clean up a rabbit burrow. A farmer sees a burrow and gets rid of it while they are there. 
They don’t go home, change, head off to the nearest regional DSE office, ask for a 
letter of permission and wait a number of days until it’s approved and then go out and 
do the job. It’s just another level of bureaucratic nonsense. Unfortunately, the change 
was gazetted without consultation with the VFF. (trans., p. 16) 
Incentives provided by the regulatory framework 
As with most jurisdictions, the main incentive for landholders to comply with the 
regulations in Victoria is fear of detection and punishment. Gippsland Private 
Forestry Inc.(formerly Gippsland Farm Plantations) considered that the Victorian 
regulatory framework did not provide sufficient motivation for landholder 
cooperation: 
… there is little attention given to the need for such landowners to have a convincing 
motivation to value native vegetation and regard it as an asset rather than a liability. 
There is insufficient focus on the fundamental drivers that will influence the behaviour 
of private landowners in order to achieve sustainable improved outcomes with respect 
to native vegetation management. (sub. 92, p. 2) 
Particularly over the last 20 years many landholders have recognised the benefits to 
them of some revegetation of their properties. Timber Towns Victoria felt that 
regulatory restrictions on managing native vegetation meant that landholders were 
often not planting native vegetation when revegetating: 
Numerous landholders are confused and uncertain about the implications of native 
vegetation and biodiversity regulations on their farming activities. As a result some 
landholders are choosing to replant using introduced species because management of 
these species is not affected by onerous government legislation. This is unfortunate, as 
indigenous vegetation would provide many benefits to the landholder, environment and 
wider community. (sub. DR263, p. 2) 
Jack Jones (trans., p. 1362) from the Ovens Valley commented that his Landcare 
group had difficulty convincing landholders to plant native trees because of 
concerns about their ability to clear this vegetation, if necessary, in the future. 
Landholders will have an incentive to ‘comply’ with the regulations for their own 
benefit by not clearing existing native vegetation that provides some production or     
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amenity benefits to them. However, such behaviour would have occurred even 
without the regulation. 
The FFG Act has an entitlement to compensation for landholders for the impact of 
an ICO. If landholders consider that compensation were likely to be adequate, they 
would be indifferent between the situation before and after an ICO was introduced. 
Indeed, to the extent that landholders receive private amenity benefits from 
conservation of endangered species and habitats — and a number of landholder 
participants have expressed such sentiments — they would be willing to bring 
attention to the existence of such species on their land.  
However, the PE Act — which does not provide for compensation for restrictions 
on vegetation clearance — has been the main vehicle used to protect endangered 
habitats in Victoria. This means that, in the absence of private amenity benefits to 
landholders, there is a significant disincentive for them to report the presence of any 
threatened flora or fauna on their properties. Indeed, the regulation provides 
incentives for landholders to allow such species to deteriorate or to eradicate them.  
Many landholders also complained of the detrimental impact on productivity and 
incentives of the poor management of adjoining publicly-owned land, and 
considered that this imposed costs on their farms and reduced the incentives of 
complying with environmental regulations on their own property. 
Consideration of economic and social impacts 
The Victorian Government’s aim for the planning system is to ‘establish a system 
that achieves a sensible balance between economic development, social growth and 
cohesion and the sustainability of Victoria’s environment’ (Thwaites 1999, p. 1). 
The range of exemptions to permit requirements partly reflect economic and social 
matters by allowing established rural practices, such as clearing of regrowth under 
10 years old and personal use of wood from native vegetation, and by effectively 
exempting most urban properties via the exclusion of properties of below 
0.4 hectares.  
However, decisions on individual applications for permits for native vegetation 
clearance (and in particular any offsets required to achieve the Government’s Net 
Gain objective) are based on environmental grounds. They generally do not take 
economic issues (such as the impacts on the landholder) or social issues into 
account.  
Mr Fern Pty Ltd suggested: 
The requirement for compensation would improve the level of consideration of social 
and economic impacts on individual landholders. (sub. 46, p. 8)     





The Victorian Government (sub. 185) argued that the possibility for permission to 
clear if suitable vegetation offsets are provided by the landholder lowered the total 
economic cost of the vegetation controls. 
A number of the processes under the FFG, such as Action Statements, Management 
Plans and ICOs, must consider social and economic consequences, as well as nature 
conservation impacts. In addition, landholders are entitled to compensation for 
financial loss suffered as a direct consequence of an ICO. Landholders have not 
expressed major concerns to this Inquiry about the operation of the FFG Act to date.  
D.5  Administration and implementation 
Administrative costs 
The Commission received a number of submissions arguing that the costs of 
complying with the Victorian regime are significant. The VFF (sub. 149) observed 
that farmers seeking permits can incur significant expense particularly where flora 
and fauna studies are required. It detailed the extensive and potentially very 
expensive administrative costs facing a proposed orchard development at Melton 
(trans., pp. 678–81). Ron and Margery Beach of Porepunkah had not applied for a 
permit to clear vegetation partly because of the anticipated expense and delay in the 
process (VFF, sub.  149, p.  17). Ian and Sue Jack (sub.  141) of Barnawartha 
expressed frustration at costly delays and inaccuracies in the planning process for 
establishing their proposed vineyard. 
Local government is generally the responsible authority for administering and 
enforcing vegetation clearing controls. This can be costly to local government in 
regions with significant native vegetation and, if no additional State Government 
funds are provided, resources are likely to be limited. Nillumbik Shire Council 
indicated that: 
Monitoring and enforcement of the regulatory regimes is limited due to inadequate 
resources in the region. The State Government offers limited ‘on ground’ support to 
matters of this nature. (sub. 174, p. 3) 
Because of the extent of past clearing, the average size of clearance applications in 
Victoria will be quite small, which in general would make the environmental 
benefits of refusing individual requests commensurately small. However, many of 
the administrative costs of dealing with applications are likely to be relatively fixed. 
In this situation, the case-by-case approval approach is likely to be an 
administratively expensive mechanism for achieving often relatively modest     
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environmental outcomes. The requirement to seek approval to remove a branch 
from a tree can create costs for administrators and landholders for very little benefit. 
Janet and Kevin Blake (trans.,  p.  628) considered that the administration of the 
clearing controls was hampered by inexperienced staff who did not understand 
farming practices and the requirements of running a viable farming enterprise. The 
St James-Devenish Branch of the VFF (sub. 99) expressed similar views.  
A number of participants, including Paul McGowan (trans.,  pp.  1333–5) of 
Barnawartha and Timber Towns Victoria (trans.,  p.  1733) considered that those 
implementing the regulations did not take sufficient account of the views and 
knowledge of landholders regarding the impact of land clearing applications on both 
landholders’ operations and the environment. 
Dispute-resolution procedures 
The PE  Act allows appeals (application for review) to the Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) by landholders against decisions to reject or 
modify applications for native vegetation clearance. The referral authority 
(currently DSE) can also appeal against council decisions or the conditions attached 
to them. Cases of alleged illegal clearing are also heard initially by VCAT. 
The VFF (sub. 149) expressed concern that the Government had made changes to 
the planning regime during the appeals process in the Tripod Farmers case which 
had fundamentally altered the outcome. VFF also noted (trans.,  p.  670) that the 
administrative process can be expensive for landholders, with Tripod Farmers 
incurring legal costs of $52 000. 
The VFF also commented on State Government changes to regulations — without 
consultation — which had previously exempted from permit requirements, removal 
of native vegetation to the minimum extent needed to destroy burrows for vermin 
control. These changes followed a landholder’s successful appeal to VCAT: 
The tribunal found the farmer had undertaken the works in accordance with a legitimate 
exemption. The Department did not graciously accept the umpire’s decision but rather 
amended section 52.17 of the VPP to require all farmers to seek permission from DSE 
if native vegetation is to be removed in the process of destroying rabbit warrens or fox 
holes. Given the extremely wide definition of native vegetation this in effect means 
farmers across the state must obtain written approval from the Department before they 
undertake any works to remove burrows for vermin control. (sub. DR284, p. 4)     





Trust for Nature noted VCAT’s preference for voluntary agreements when ruling on 
landholder appeals: 
The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) sometimes refers applicants 
who are refused vegetation clearing permits to Trust for Nature, ‘obliging’ them to 
negotiate Trust for Nature conservation covenants or at least expressing a preference 
for these landowners to negotiate a Trust for Nature covenant over a Section 173 
agreement as applied through local planning provisions. (sub. 129, p. 3) 
D.6  Impacts on landholders 
This section considers the impacts on landholders (both negative and positive) of 
the key Victorian regulations protecting native vegetation and biodiversity.  
Negative impacts 
Much of the land in Victoria worth using for agricultural purposes has already been 
cleared. Barson et al. (2000) estimate that over 90 per cent of the original tree cover 
on private land in Victoria has been cleared. For the majority of landholders who 
have cleared their properties (including of native grasses) to the extent they wished, 
and have maintained it in that cleared state, the vegetation clearance and 
biodiversity regulations will have little if any impact. Some landholders are 
voluntarily planting additional vegetation to improve their property’s productivity, 
or for aesthetic reasons, or to improve environmental outcomes for the community.  
Nonetheless, the pre-1989 clearing rates of between 10 000 and 20 000 hectares per 
year suggest an ongoing landholder preference to clear more land for agricultural 
production. The rate of native vegetation clearance slowed markedly — probably by 
over 10  000 hectares per year — following the commencement of clearance 
controls under the PE Act and has continued to decrease as policies for 
implementing the regime have become more restrictive. This suggests important 
negative impacts for some landholders, which will accumulate over time in line 
with unachieved preferences to clear vegetation. Submissions to this inquiry from 
landholders in most jurisdictions have indicated that clearing of a property in stages 
over time is a common practice for both financial and sustainability reasons. The 
VFF commented on the introduction of vegetation clearance controls: 
The government failed to recognise the severe impact this had on individual farmers, 
many who had bought uncleared land with the view to developing it for agriculture 
slowly and carefully over a number of years. (sub. 149, p. 6) 
In addition, the introduction of new technology and scope for changing land use 
often requires removal of vegetation. West Wimmera Shire Council (sub.  112)     
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noted that in parts of its region, both switching land use from grazing to cropping 
and introducing larger machinery was being hindered by restrictions on clearing 
trees. 
The implementation of the Net Gain principle to vegetation clearing applications 
has meant that, in many cases involving vegetation or habitat which is not of critical 
importance, landholders are not presented with an outright rejection of clearing. 
Rather they have an option to plant additional trees elsewhere and/or permanently 
set aside part of their property for conservation purposes. The cost of the regulation 
to landholders in these cases will be the lesser of the lost net income stream from 
not clearing and the cost of offsets required to obtain permission to clear. 
For those landholders prevented from undertaking desired clearing, the costs can be 
significant. In some cases, viability of a property can be threatened if changes in 
costs or market conditions require a greater scale of operation, or, adoption of new 
technology, which involves clearing of native vegetation. For example, Shaun and 
Tonya Ellis from Tallandoon have a 1100 acre dairy property with 600 acres of 
native vegetation, of which they wished to clear 300 acres which had been cleared 
in the past. They indicated that the refusal of permission to clear had reduced the 
returns from their property for 15 years and was now threatening the viability of 
their enterprise. In addition, they considered that the environmental value of the 
land in its current state is minimal: 
The significant financial impact has resulted due to off-farm agistment costs and the 
need to purchase significant amounts of fodder to feed our stock. These costs would not 
be incurred if we were able to use this land in a productive manner ... 
We respect the preservation of the natural environment and have only ever wanted to 
clear the area of land, which had previously been milled. The native vegetation in this 
area is already limited due to the previous milling, with the land being overtaken with 
blackberries and vermin. These problems are spreading to our productive land, 
increasing the costs associated with controlling and maintaining our land. (sub. 14, p. 1) 
Sally and Gordon Moon of the Wulgulmerang area (NFF, sub. 128, appendix H) 
were not granted a permit to clear 120 hectares of their property, which had been 
cleared 50 years earlier. Clearing for pasture would have increased carrying 
capacity of that land 30-fold from 0.5 dry sheep equivalents to 15 dry sheep 
equivalents.8 The clearing was part of an expansion and development program to 
make the property a viable sheep and grazing property. 
                                              
8  The conditions that would have been attached to the permission to clear (conserving up to two 
to four  hectares of currently uncleared land for every hectare cleared) were considered too 
onerous by the Moons.     





The VFF (sub. 149) provided a number of case studies outlining significant negative 
impacts that restrictions on native vegetation clearance can have on individual 
landholders. Several of these are presented in box D.1.  
Gippsland Private Forestry Inc (formerly Gippsland Farm Plantations, sub.  92) 
considered that uncertainty regarding future directions in native vegetation 
regulations was discouraging the planting of native vegetation plantations. It argued 
that private forestry could provide economic and environmental benefits: 
It can represent a means to retain areas under forest (planted or native) on a property as 
a productive land use whilst also contributing the various property and catchment wide 
environmental benefits that forested areas so ably generate. (sub. DR250, p. 1) 
Similar views were expressed by Timber Towns Victoria, which submitted: 
There is anxiety among landholders, investors and operators that current regulations in 
Victoria may prevent a landholder from harvesting his/her timber because, under the 
Native Vegetation Framework (2003), native vegetation in excess of 10 years old is 
considered to be remnant vegetation. Without clear guidelines for Victoria’s Native 
Vegetation Framework this concern will persist. (sub. DR263, p. 6) 
The introduction over time of the no net loss and now Net Gain objectives in 
implementing the PE Act controls, is likely to have further increased these impacts 
by reducing the extent of clearing allowed or by imposing other costs (in the form 
of revegetation requirements) on landholders given permission to clear. 
A number of participants commented on inefficiencies and unnecessary costs in the 
implementation of the regime. West Wimmera Shire Council claimed that some 
responsible authorities had applied the regime incorrectly:  
In recent publicised cases landowners are being told they cannot clear the trees along 
fence lines or if they do they have to plant back large numbers of trees to compensate, 
when in fact this is not a requirement. (sub. 110, p. 4) 
Reg Holt (trans.,  p.  686) was initially required to provide significant offsets for 
removing branches overhanging fencelines, but these requirements were later 
withdrawn. He also indicated other significant costs of not being able to clear small 
amounts of vegetation: 
Agricultural machinery has had to become wider to enable farms to remain viable. 
Sparse native vegetation may be close enough to prevent the passage of these machines 
through the paddocks and need to be removed. (sub. 87, p. 2) 
Reg Holt’s example indicates that some potentially substantial negative impacts on 
landholders delivered little in the way of environmental benefits.     
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Box D.1  Negative impacts on landholders 
John and Lorraine Croft have a 2640 hectare property in north west Victoria 
(purchased in 1974). They were part-way through long-term clearing plans when 
clearing controls were brought in. Of the 900 hectares which remain covered in largely 
regrowth vegetation, they wish to clear about half and in return are willing to maintain 
and protect 150 hectares of existing mallee species. In addition to lost income 
(currently in the vicinity of $30  000 per year), the large area of retained native 
vegetation provides a means for pests and native animals from the adjoining national 
park to access crops grown on the farm. Council and water rates have to be paid on 
the uncleared and unused land. 
Murray Davis from Dergholm had long-term plans to clear native vegetation on his 
property in order to raise productivity, but these were prevented by the introduction of 
vegetation clearing controls in 1989. Current council valuations of the uncleared 
portion of his land are around $100 per hectare compared to $1000 per hectare for his 
productive grazing land. Costs of clearing would explain some of this differential, but a 
large part will reflect the capitalised value of lost potential earnings. 
Harry Haralambous purchased a 40 hectare weed-infested property for $1.2 million at 
Melton on Melbourne’s north west fringe in 2000. He planned to develop it as an 
orchard. However, there are native grasses on the property and these cannot be 
removed or destroyed without a permit. He was required to provide a large amount of 
additional information such as a botanist’s report in support of his clearing application. 
He argued that the native grass (which is not the predominant species on his land) will 
still grow if he develops the land. He has been offered a permit to develop the majority 
of his property if he enters into a covenant agreement to not develop 10 hectares. 
Ron and Margery Beach have owned a 160 hectare beef cattle property in Porepunkah 
shire since 1966. Around 120 hectares is thick bushland. They wish to clear 
48 hectares to improve productivity and offset cost increases. However, they have not 
applied for a clearing permit because of expectations about the time and expense of 
the process, and the likely permit requirements to permanently set aside the rest of the 
farm for conservation purposes. Animals from adjoining public land constantly damage 
the property fences while the weeds spread from that land are expensive to control. 
Rates are paid on the unused land. 
Tripod Farmers purchased 28 hectares of land to grow lettuce. The property contained 
11 scattered mature Red Gums which Tripod wished to remove as they reduced the 
quality of the lettuce crop. As a compromise to obtain a permit they proposed to 
remove only three trees and revegetate a 1.2 hectare area. A permit was granted, but 
on appeal to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal by the Department of 
Natural Resources and Environment (and after a government amendment to the local 
planning scheme) permission was granted to remove one tree in return for assorted 
offset conservation work. Tripod did not take up this option. The cost of the planning 
process to Tripod was over $50  000 while delays led to lost gross income of over 
$2 million.  
Source: VFF (sub. 149, trans., pp. 662–717). 
 
     





The Tripod Farmers’ case (VFF, sub.  149) also imposed large costs on the 
landholder for what appear, on the face of it, to be relatively small environmental 
benefits (the saving of three trees). J. and M. Boardman (sub. 39) from She Oaks 
argued that preventing clearance of small areas of vegetation often has a negative 
effect on farming procedures and can stop development. 
The above losses in income and additional costs imposed on landholders by 
restrictions on clearing vegetation will generally lead to lower property values for 
affected landholders. Neil Kerr from Drik Drik has 200 acres of his property 
(purchased before 1989) which, if cleared, could sell for around $2000 per acre: 
So I lose an asset of $400 000 ... This land is difficult to control, vermin and kangaroos 
proliferate, and cattle have to be handled using horses. Even then, because logs trip 
horses up, it’s not a safe workplace. Meanwhile my neighbours with clear land continue 
to farm unfettered. (sub. 154, p. 2) 
The FFG Act is aimed at particular problems of particular endangered species and 
their habitats and seems to have had very little impact on most landholders. This 
may partly reflect the compensation requirements to landholders contained in the 
Act. It may also indicate that many issues of biodiversity are now mainly handled 
by planning regulations controlling vegetation clearance, under which no 
compensation is payable. 
Mr Fern Pty Ltd from Wyelangta was concerned about lack of resource security 
under the FFG Act: 
While we operate our business to a twenty-year plan, the permit to harvest tree ferns 
from private land issued under the Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act is issued annually 
and we must re-apply each year. We do not understand why we are not permitted the 
security of a longer-term permit. The lack of security is stressful. (sub. 46, p. 5) 
Similar views were expressed by Steven Lawson (sub. 157) of Lavers Hill. 
The VFF considered that the FFG Act had the potential to work well for landholders 
but had largely been overtaken by restrictions on clearing vegetation: 
The Flora & Fauna Guarantee Act is far less adversarial than much of Victoria’s other 
conservation legislation and regulation, and appears designed around consultation and 
agreement, rather than command and control. There are also provisions within this Act 
for payment of compensation to landowners who are required to protect a critical 
habitat. It is felt that this legislation has been largely usurped by the VPPs, which has 
no provision for compensation and requires protection of all native species at the cost 
of the landowner. (sub. 149, p. 7) 
Landholders who purchased or expanded their properties since the introduction of 
the biodiversity regulations and native vegetation clearance controls are likely to 
have paid a somewhat lower price for land containing native vegetation than they     
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otherwise would. In this case, at least some of the impact will have been borne by 
the original owner rather than the current owner. However, the strengthening of the 
regulations and the implementation of them over time makes it likely that in some 
cases only part of the impact will have been factored into sale prices.  
Positive impacts 
Selective retention or expansion of vegetation on a property can often improve 
productivity and provide aesthetic benefits to landholders.9 A number of Victorian 
landholders outlined these benefits. The Mitchell Environment Group from 
Seymour noted: 
… native vegetation provides so many benefits, that is ecosystem services, eg salinity 
control, lowered wind velocities, shelter, habitat for pest eating birds and animals and 
so on. (sub. DR282, p. 4) 
However, it could be expected that well-informed landholders would, of their own 
volition, undertake those actions affecting native vegetation and biodiversity that 
furthered their own interests. Hence, for these landholders, achievement of such 
benefits cannot be considered as a benefit of the regulations. Anthony Wait from 
Western Victoria argued: 
There seems to be an attitude that has developed that we as farmers are not capable of 
running our farms, and that what is imposed on us is simply done to save us from 
ourselves. I would argue that those of us who have large amounts of capital invested 
are in a better position to look after it. After all it is our livelihood, so why would we 
want to destroy it. Any farms that have been run down in this district have eventually 
been sold. The next owners have picked up the pieces and started again and have these 
properties back to their former productive capabilities. This is the free enterprise 
system. (sub. 43, p. 1) 
To the extent that landholders are not well informed about the benefits to them of 
native vegetation and/or biodiversity, the regulatory process may have benefited 
them by improving their knowledge. Nillumbik Shire Council (sub. 174), situated in 
Melbourne’s ‘green wedge’, considered the regimes had created greater public 
awareness of the benefits of retaining native vegetation. However, it noted that little 
practical on-ground advice was available to landholders from the State Government 
and that most assistance came from local government and Landcare. Several local 
councils (for example, Moyne Shire, sub. DR229 and Corangamite Shire Council, 
sub. DR236) submitted that they do not have the trained staff to fulfil such a role. 
                                              
9  This need not be the vegetation type or location currently existing on the property and, indeed, 
may not need to be native vegetation.     





There is little evidence of an educative role in applying the regulations: limited 
council and departmental resources appear to have been focussed on administration 
and enforcement of the clearing permit provisions. The negative landholder 
sentiment expressed to this inquiry about the native vegetation clearing regulations 
and their enforcement does not suggest a good environment for knowledge transfer. 
In any case, such benefits do not require regulations restricting clearing or 
protecting biodiversity. They could be delivered more directly and effectively by 
programs specifically designed to provide information to landholders. 
Benefits of selective native vegetation retention can also accrue to the wider 
regional landholder community as well — for example, via the prevention of 
various forms of land and water degradation. Hence, targeted restrictions on 
vegetation clearing could potentially provide positive impacts for landholders in 
such circumstances (chapters 2 and 6). However, vegetation retained predominantly 
for its contribution to wider community conservation objectives is unlikely to 
provide net benefits to Victorian landholders. The East Gippsland and District 
Council (VFF) commented: 
We have no objection to the aim of minimising off-site effects — our only concern is to 
ensure transparency of the decision-making process. We are mindful of the possibility 
that the government and others might attempt to piggyback other outcomes in the name 
of minimising significant off-site effects. (sub. 187, p. 1) 
The CaLP Act is directed at addressing issues of benefits of vegetation retention and 
replanting on a regional basis and contains mechanisms for allocating costs among 
landholders and others who will benefit. 
D.7  Impacts on regional communities and other 
economic activities 
Regional impacts 
Even in the absence of regulations, annual vegetation clearance rates in Victoria are 
likely to have been relatively low because of the extent of previous clearing. For a 
number of regions where extensive clearing has already occurred, the impact of the 
controls, although sometimes very significant for the individual landholders 
affected, will be relatively minor for the region as a whole.  
However, there are some areas of Victoria where the potential for clearing on 
private land is more concentrated. The VFF (trans.,  pp.  663–4) noted that East 
Gippsland, some of the Mallee, and the south west corner of the State were the only 
areas where there was likely to be a demand for any large-scale vegetation removal.     
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West Wimmera Shire Council observed that its shire contained significant areas of 
native vegetation and extensive wetlands and is also a major cropping and grazing 
area. As such, there is significant potential for agricultural activities to conflict with 
conservation objectives (sub. 110). The Council submitted that native vegetation 
controls were affecting small communities: 
Given the difficulties faced any prospective landowner may be discouraged from 
investing and existing landowners not undertaking development, which could yield 
significant economic benefits for the local and regional community as well as assisting 
to arrest the slide in rural populations. This is a significant social impact upon small 
communities. (sub. 110, p. 3) 
The East Gippsland and District Council (VFF) (sub.  187) noted that East 
Gippsland had a very high rate of tree cover (83 per cent), much of it in State forests 
or parks. In view of this, it questioned the rationale for vegetation clearing 
restrictions which were inhibiting agriculture in an already depressed region. 
The requirement for landholders to achieve a net gain in vegetation implies a 
decline in the area available for agricultural production. For its region, West 
Wimmera Shire Council (sub. 110) noted that on average, in its region, clearing 
permits required plantings of new trees close to ten times the number to be removed 
by landholders. 
In examining observed outcomes in rural communities, it is usually very difficult to 
disentangle the impacts of environmental regulation from that of a range of other 
influences. In particular, a long-term decline has been occurring in many (but not 
all) smaller regional communities. 
Impacts on other economic activities 
The Prospectors and Miners Association of Victoria argued that the high fixed costs 
for small mining operations of the range of environmental regulations with which 
they had to comply had led to a serious decline in that sector. It stated: 
For an industry with such an incredibly small footprint we are over-regulated to a 
degree where any possibility for growth is strangled. The potential productivity of the 
mining industry is being destroyed by unnecessary red tape.  
It is time some reality returned to land use policy decisions particularly those made in 
relation to the mining industry. The financial return per hectare of land disturbed for 
mining is extremely high, the mining industry is a very efficient provider of jobs and 
wealth. (sub. 117, p. 3) 
     





The Bush Users Group also considered that small miners had been significantly 
affected: 
These regulations range from excessive rehabilitation bonds, compensation for the use 
of crown land (despite the area being rehabilitated upon completion of work — often to 
a standard higher than before being worked), flora and fauna surveys, the ‘net gain’ 
requirement of the Government in relation to vegetation clearance, etc. (sub. 155, p. 9) 
While large mining companies are more able to spread the costs of complying with 
regulation over greater output and a range of sites, small miners are likely to find 
the burden more onerous. In some cases, the cost to land users of regulations may 
be the failure to proceed with an otherwise viable project. The Prospectors and 
Miners Association of Victoria (sub.  117) considered that native vegetation 
regulation was one of the major contributors to the large decline since the early 
1990s in applications for mining licences for areas of 5 hectares or less.  
There are instances of costs to the mining industry associated with the 
implementation of the FFG Act. For example, in order to protect the habitat of 
several rare species of butterflies, permits for mineral exploration at Mt Piper have 
been refused.  
DSE is the referral authority when Councils wish to obtain a planning permit to 
clear native vegetation on roadside reserves. These permits usually involve offset 
plantings. The Northern Grampians Shire Council indicated that its shire had 2913 
kilometres of local roads, half of which had significant amounts of native trees. It 
pointed out that the majority of trauma on the roadside resulted from accidents 
involving single vehicles hitting trees. It argued: 
A road’s purpose is primarily for public traffic and for another level of government to 
put restrictions on public safety through environmental controls is not acceptable. 
Alternatively the roads budget is funding net gain at the detriment to road safety. 
(sub. 150, p. 1) 
Where road maintenance or widening involves clearing of native vegetation, 
VicRoads or local authorities may be required to make offsets for any permitted 
vegetation clearance. This additional cost may lead to the project being delayed, 
altered or cancelled if the benefits no longer justify the costs. If the project goes 
ahead and the construction authority’s budget is fixed, other projects will be 
deferred. Alternatively taxes or rates would need to be increased to make up the 
shortfall. VFF (sub. 149) noted that the route of the Craigieburn bypass was altered, 
at considerable expense, to protect rare species of flora and fauna. Robin 
Weatherald of Strathbogie Shire (sub.  DR271) noted that in the shire’s road 
resealing budget, roadside vegetation management imposed a greater cost than the 
bitumen used for resurfacing.     
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Retention of trees close to the side of roads also can create a significant safety risk 
for occupants of vehicles which leave the road. In some cases, speed limits are 
being reduced to reflect the increased danger to road users where trees close to 
roadsides have not been cleared or trimmed. 
For some regions in Victoria, native vegetation represents a tourist attraction. The 
Nillumbik Shire Council (sub. 174) noted that the extensive vegetation cover in its 
shire assisted in attracting visitors to the region. Conversely, the Bush Users Group 
(sub. 155) considered that eco-tourism from expanding national parks and reserves 
created few jobs in central Victoria. 
There can be spin-off benefits from the regulatory regime for tourism in some 
Victorian regions, although generally not all vegetation retention is necessary to 
provide such benefits.  
D.8 Summary 
In general, application of Victoria’s native vegetation clearance regulations involves 
relatively small areas of vegetation. In the years immediately before planning 
controls were introduced, annual woody vegetation clearance rates were about 
15  000 hectares. Nonetheless, aggregating even relatively small desired annual 
clearance rates over a number of years will imply a more substantial impact of 
regulatory controls, particularly as the costs of regulation usually must be absorbed 
by landholders. Much of Victoria’s agricultural land is highly productive and hence 
constraints on the area available for production, and on the introduction of new 
innovations, will tend to generate relatively higher costs for landholders. 
There appear to be opportunities for reductions in negative impacts on individual 
landholders for little or no direct reduction in environmental benefits if 
higher cost/low gain outcomes were treated more flexibly. The clearing of trees and 
lopping of branches to maintain fencelines — a routine agricultural practice with 
apparent exemptions under the regulations — is a case at point. Removal of isolated 
paddock trees is another. 
However, some developments in native vegetation regulation in Victoria appear to 
be towards greater regulatory control with, for example, new requirements to obtain 
approval for removal of vermin burrows when native vegetation may be disturbed 
— imposing high costs on both landholders and regulators. 
Because landholders’ preferred vegetation clearance mostly relates to small 
amounts of vegetation, the administrative costs for government and landholders 
tend to be commensurately higher relative to environmental benefits.     





The extent of previous vegetation clearance in Victoria means that vegetation cover 
varies between regions. Also problems of soil and land degradation vary within and 
between regions. Hence application at a property level of the Net Gain in vegetation 
requirement for approval of clearing permits is not likely to result in the most 
valued revegetation being achieved. The development and implementation of 
regional vegetation plans may result in better environmental outcomes from 
clearance and revegetation activities. Government plans currently under 
consideration to allow required offsets to be made through third parties should also 
assist in this regard. 
The BushTender scheme provides incentives to landholders to manage retained 
native vegetation and hence offers opportunities for attaining environmental 
outcomes more efficiently. Because it involves expenditure by government and 
competitive bidding by landholders, BushTender is likely to better prioritise the 
achievement of environmental services compared to the vegetation clearing controls 
in the PE Act, which achieve broad environmental objectives at relatively little cost 
to government. However, BushTender will only be applied to conservation 
measures above those required under the PE Act. 
The negative effect that the regulations and their administration and the absence of 
compensation for landholder losses, have had on the attitudes of affected 
landholders has reduced their effort in providing public benefit conservation 
services.  
Small mining operations in Victoria also appear to have suffered because of a range 
of regulatory requirements. The costs of this lost economic activity would need to 
be compared with the environmental and other benefits of the regulations 
concerned.     




For a large part of Queensland, particularly in the north, the relative extent of 
clearance of native vegetation since European settlement has been much lower than 
in other States. Of Queensland’s total area of over 170  million hectares, an 
estimated 81  million hectares consists of woodland and forest ecosystems 
(NR&M 2003a).1 Over 30  per  cent of Australia’s remaining woody native 
vegetation cover is in Queensland and significant areas of the State have extensive 
native vegetation cover.  
Partly reflecting the extent of uncleared land, there has been far greater woody 
vegetation clearing in Queensland over the last decade than in any other State. From 
1991 to 1995, the average annual rate of clearing was estimated to be 289  000 
hectares, increasing to 340 000 hectares for 1995 to 1997 and 425 000 hectares for 
1997 to 1999.2 For the latter period, this represented over 80 per cent of the national 
area of woody vegetation clearance (ACF 2001). Most woody vegetation clearing in 
recent years has been of land with an over-storey and shrub foliage projective cover 
of between 20–30 per cent.  
During 1999-00 — the year before the proclamation of the Vegetation Management 
Act 1999 (VM Act) — estimated vegetation clearance increased by 78 per cent to 
758 000 hectares per year. In the years leading up to the VM Act, clearing rates 
were much higher on freehold land, where clearing was largely unregulated. Around 
60  per  cent of land clearing was on freehold land (which makes up around 
30 per cent of private land tenure). 
                                              
1  Data on vegetation coverage in Queensland come from the Statewide Landcover and Trees 
Study (SLATS), conducted by the Department of Natural Resources and Mines. The SLATS 
statistics refer to all woody vegetation including: remaining areas of native vegetation; disturbed 
areas of native vegetation; regrowth; and plantations of native and exotic species and domestic 
woody vegetation (NR&M 2003a). 
2  NR&M (2003a) notes that vegetation change for 1988–91 has been analysed for the entire State, 
but that further checking is needed before results are reported.     





Following the proclamation of the VM  Act in September 2000, clearing fell to 
378  000 hectares in 2000-01, the bulk of this reduction being on freehold land 
(NR&M 2003a). This represented around 0.5 per cent of Queensland’s remaining 
woodland and forest ecosystems. However, much of this clearing was concentrated 
in particular areas (for example, the Brigalow Belt) and for those areas the 
percentage cleared would be much higher. In 1999-00, around 68  per  cent of 
clearing occurred in areas mapped as remnant. This fell to 58 per cent in 2000-01. 
The remainder was clearing of non-remnant woody vegetation. The 500 000 hectare 
cap on the granting of clearing applications after March 2003, and the eventual 
cessation of broadscale clearing of remnant native vegetation after December 2006, 
will reduce these clearing rates substantially. 
Apart from an initial meeting between departmental staff and the Commission, the 
Queensland Government indicated that it would not participate in this inquiry. 
Hence, information regarding the Queensland regulatory regime and the 
Queensland Government’s views on particular issues have been based on published 
sources such as Hansard, press releases and government publications and websites. 
E.2  Description of the regulatory regime 
This section outlines the native vegetation and biodiversity regulatory regime that 
has operated in Queensland in recent years. Submissions to this inquiry have been 
based on experience under this regime. In March 2004, the Queensland Government 
introduced the Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 
(VM Amendment Bill), which will make significant changes to the regulation of 
native-vegetation clearing. Some of these changes are noted below. 
Queensland has separate regimes specifically targeted at managing native 
vegetation clearance on freehold land and on State-owned land (including leasehold 
land), together with legislation to protect native wildlife and preserve biodiversity. 
In addition, other State government legislation and local government laws and 
planning schemes also place some restrictions on vegetation clearance.  
Prior to 2000, there were no general restrictions on clearing native vegetation on 
freehold land in Queensland, although a number of Acts imposed piecemeal 
limitations on land clearing. In addition, local governments were allowed to make 
vegetation protection orders under local laws in order to protect significant 
vegetation on freehold land. Since September 2000, clearance of native vegetation 
on freehold land has been covered by the VM Act in conjunction with the 
Integrated Planning Act 1997 (IP Act).      
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Vegetation clearance on leasehold and other State-owned land is regulated under the 
tree management provisions (Part 6) of the Land Act 1994, which were not 
proclaimed until 1997.  
The Nature Conservation Act 1992 (NC Act) deals with conserving and managing 
native animals and plants and declaring and managing protected areas, such as 
national parks. 
The Department of Natural Resources and Mines (NR&M 2001a) stated that the 
aims of Queensland’s native vegetation framework are to achieve: 
•  the ecologically sustainable use of land; 
•  the protection of biodiversity and other environmental and social values; 
•  planning certainty for landholders, industry and the community; 
•  prevention of land degradation such as salinity and soil erosion; and 
•  protection of water quality within catchments. 
Vegetation clearance on freehold land 
In common with a number of other jurisdictions, native vegetation clearing on 
freehold land in Queensland is primarily regulated under the planning system. The 
IP Act is used to administer and enforce clearing permit requirements while the 
VM  Act (and Vegetation Management Regulation 2000) provides the policy 
framework to guide the permit regime.  
The purpose of the IP Act is to seek to achieve ecological sustainability.3 This is to 
be achieved by: 
(a) coordinating and integrating planning at the local, regional and State levels; and 
(b) managing the process by which development occurs; and 
(c) managing the effects of development on the environment (including managing the 
use of premises) … (s. 1.2.1) 
The IP Act (Schedule 8, part 1, item 3A) makes the clearing of native vegetation on 
freehold land assessable development. Hence, generally a permit is required before 
clearing native vegetation. Most of the IP Act is administered by local government, 
                                              
3  Section 1.3.3 defines ecological sustainability as a balance that integrates: protection of 
ecological processes and natural systems at local, regional, State and wider levels; economic 
development; and maintenance of the cultural, economic, physical and social wellbeing of 
people and communities. Section 1.3.6 further explains terms used in the definition of 
ecological sustainability.     





but in the case of vegetation clearance, unless it is part of another sort of 
development requiring approval, applications are dealt with by NR&M. 
Native vegetation is defined as a native tree or a native plant, other than a grass or 
mangrove. In Schedule 10 ‘clear’: 
(a) means remove or cut down, ringbark, push over, poison or destroy the vegetation in 
any way; but  
(b) does not include 
  (i)  destroying standing vegetation by stock, or lopping a tree; and 
  (ii)  removing or cutting down, ringbarking pushing over, poisoning or destroying 
  the vegetation in any way as a forest practice. 
Schedule 8 provides a number of exemptions where clearing native vegetation on 
freehold land is not assessable development and hence a clearing permit is not 
required.4 These include: 
•  clearing associated with building a single residence and associated buildings; 
•  clearing for ‘essential management’, including establishing or maintaining 
certain fire breaks, clearing vegetation that is likely to endanger people or 
property and clearing to maintain an existing fence, stockyard, shed, road or 
other built infrastructure; and 
•  clearing for ‘routine management’ in an area not deemed to be a remnant 
endangered ecosystem or not declared to be of high nature conservation value, or 
vulnerable to land degradation or not an area of unlawfully cleared vegetation. 
Routine management covers such matters as establishing a necessary fence, road 
or other built infrastructure that is on less than five hectares, clearing vegetation 
that is not declared remnant and supplying fodder for stock in drought 
conditions. 
Clearing regrowth native vegetation on freehold land, being considered 
‘routine management’, is generally not assessable development and hence is exempt 
from permit requirements. However, once regrowth which forms the predominant 
canopy, covers more than 50 per cent of the undisturbed predominant canopy and 
averages more than 70 per cent of the vegetation’s undisturbed height it will be 
defined as remnant vegetation (VM Act schedule). As such, it becomes subject to 
permit requirements. Also, if regrowth is in an area declared as being of high nature 
conservation value, or vulnerable to land degradation, a permit is required before it 
can be lawfully cleared. 
                                              
4  Urban areas are generally exempt unless they are part of an endangered regional ecosystem or 
are declared as areas of high nature conservation value or vulnerable to land degradation.     
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Local planning schemes can impose additional requirements on tree clearing 
applications but cannot remove the need to obtain a clearing permit. 
The VM Act provides the policy framework for assessment of applications for 
permits to clear native vegetation under the IP Act and details the investigation and 
enforcement provisions for vegetation clearance matters. The Act’s purposes are 
achieved mainly by providing for: 
(a) codes for the [IP Act] relating to the clearing of vegetation that are applicable codes 
for the assessment of development applications under IDAS5; and 
(b) the enforcement of vegetation clearing provisions. (s. 3(2)) 
Sections 10 and 11 allow for the development of State-wide and regional guidelines 
for vegetation management (see below). 
After consultation with relevant regional vegetation management committees and 
local governments, section 17 allows the declaration of areas as being of high nature 
conservation value or vulnerable to land degradation. Declarations must include a 
code for the clearing of vegetation in the declared area and are taken to be an 
amendment to any Regional Vegetation Management Plan (RVMP) covering that 
area. 
For an area to be declared an area of high nature conservation value, the Minister 
must consider that it is one or more of: 
(a) a wildlife refugium; 
(b) a centre of endemism; 
(c) an area containing a vegetation clump or corridor that contributes to the 
maintenance of biodiversity; 
(d) an area of regrowth vegetation that, if retained, will enhance an endangered 
regional ecosystem stated in the notice; 
(e) an area that makes a significant contribution to the conservation of biodiversity; 
(f) an area that contributes to the conservation of a wetland, lake or spring, stated in the 
notice. (VM Act, s. 19(11)) 
For an area to be declared an area vulnerable to land degradation, the Minister must 
consider it is subject to one or more of: 
(a) soil erosion; 
(b) rising water tables; 
(c) the expression of salinity, whether inside or outside the area; 
                                              
5  The Integrated Development Assessment Scheme is the system detailed in the Act (chapter 3), 
for integrating State and local government assessment and approval processes for development.     





(d) mass movement by gravity of soil or rock; 
(e) stream bank instability; 
(f) a process that results in declining water quality. (VM Act, s. 19(2)) 
The Act also defines the status of regional ecosystems prescribed under regulations 
by the extent of their pre-clearing vegetation that remains.6 An ‘endangered’ 
regional ecosystem is one with less than 10 per cent of its pre-clearing extent or 
which contains between 10 and 30 per cent of its pre-clearing vegetation, but the 
remnant vegetation remaining is less than 10 000 hectares. An ‘of concern’ regional 
ecosystem contains 10 to 30 per cent of its pre-clearing vegetation, or contains more 
than 30 per cent, but the remaining remnant vegetation is less than 10 000 hectares. 
‘Not of concern’ regional ecosystems have more than 30  per  cent of their 
pre-clearing vegetation, and the remnant vegetation remaining is more than 
10 000 hectares. At August 2002, of 1130 regional ecosystems in Queensland, 369 
(33 per cent) were classified as ‘of concern’ and 96 (9 per cent) as endangered for 
VM Act purposes. Over half of all ecosystems were ‘not of concern’. 
Section 21 requires that an application for permission to clear native vegetation on 
freehold land must be accompanied by a Property Vegetation Management Plan 
(PVMP) if it is being assessed by NR&M.7 The Vegetation Management 
Regulation 2000 requires that as a minimum, a PVMP must contain: the location 
and extent of proposed clearing; a description of the vegetation involved; the 
location, extent and description of any existing land degradation on the property and 
action to be taken to prevent the proposed clearing contributing to land degradation; 
any remaining remnant vegetation on the property; and any proposed rehabilitation 
or restoration of vegetation on the property.  
Any other information considered useful in assisting the assessment of the 
application may also be included in a PVMP. NR&M (2002) indicates that further 
supporting information such as the proposed use of the cleared land, proposed 
method of clearing, and details of soil types, watercourses and wetlands on the 
property is likely to be required by the assessing officer.  
                                              
6  The VM Act defines a regional ecosystem as a vegetation community in a bioregion that is 
consistently associated with a particular combination of geology, landform and soil. 
7  A PVMP is a plan of the area to which a development application relates showing the matters 
prescribed under a regulation.     
  QUEENSLAND  387
 
The VM Act was passed in October 1999 but not proclaimed until September 2000 
after it was amended to remove proposed tight controls on clearing freehold land in 
‘of concern’ regional ecosystems.8 
Vegetation clearance on Crown leasehold and State land 
Vegetation clearance on Crown leasehold land is covered by the Land Act (and 
Land Regulation 1995), which also governs vegetation management on other State 
land.9 A permit is required to clear trees (s. 255) unless the clearing is covered by 
exemptions under the Act. Trees include bushes and shrubs and need not be native 
to Australia. 
The key exemptions to permit requirements vary depending on the type of lease. If 
the clearing is for routine management purposes (non-agricultural or grazing lease), 
or for routine rural management purposes (agricultural or grazing lease not 
involving a State forest or timber reserve, or a protected area, or forest reserve 
under the NC Act), a clearing permit is not required (ss 257, 268–70).  
The exemptions for routine rural management purposes include to: obtain posts or 
rails for fences or yards needing immediate repair; establish reasonable access for 
fence maintenance; remove trees that may fall and cause significant damage to a 
fence; establish firebreaks around fences, buildings and stockyards; establish a new 
fence, building, yard or watering facility; protect natural or established pasture; and 
clear regrowth resulting from initial clearing under a permit issued after 
31 December 1989 (Land Regulation 1995, 24J).  
Trees must not be cleared under an exemption in an environmentally-sensitive 
area.10 Certain tree species prescribed under the Land Regulations can only be 
cleared under an exemption if NR&M does not object. 
Tree-clearing permits must not be for longer than five years, must state the purpose 
of the clearing, must include any approved PVMP and may state the way the trees 
must be cleared (s. 264(1)). Section 260 allows for an applicant for a tree-clearing 
                                              
8  The original Act stopped clearing in ‘of concern’ regional ecosystems in most circumstances. 
These controls were significantly loosened following a failure in negotiations between the 
Queensland and Australian Governments to provide some compensation for landholders 
affected by restrictions on clearing native vegetation. Tight controls remain on clearing in 
endangered regional ecosystems. 
9  Queensland has 215 national parks covering about 6.5 million hectares or about 4 per cent of 
Queensland. Additional lands have been bought for nature conservation. 
10  These are areas declared under a regulation to be of high nature conservation value or 
vulnerable to land degradation.     





permit to be asked for a PVMP and this is generally required. Section 265 allows 
conditions to be imposed on the permit and requires compliance with a PVMP 
included in the permit. 
When an approved RVMP exists, the guidelines in that plan will be used to assess 
clearing applications in the region concerned. Where such a plan does not exist, 
assessment of clearance applications is carried out under the broadscale tree-
clearing policy for State lands (NR&M 2002).  
The Land Act also imposes on leaseholders a duty of care to the land:  
All leases, licences and permits are subject to the condition that the lessee, licensee or 
permittee has the responsibility for a duty of care for the land. (s. 199) 
Section 214 allows the Minister to give a lessee or licensee a notice to take remedial 
action to protect a lease or licence in certain circumstances. In addition, 
section 133(a) limits eligibility for ‘without competition’ granting of an additional 
lease, to those who have demonstrated a duty of care in the management of their 
land. 
The VM Amendment Bill repeals the tree management provisions (chapter  5, 
part 6) of the Land Act. Clearing on leasehold land will be covered by the VM Act 
in the same way as freehold land. 
State-wide policies for vegetation management 
As part of the overall framework for vegetation management on leasehold and 
freehold land and, in particular, to guide the consideration of applications for 
clearance permits, State-wide policies for vegetation management have been 
prepared under both the VM Act and the Land Act.  
The VM Act requires the preparation of a State policy for vegetation management 
on freehold land which must: 
(a) state outcomes for vegetation management and actions proposed to achieve the 
outcomes; and 
(b) include a code for the clearing of vegetation. (s. 10) 
The Land Act provides for the development of State guidelines for vegetation 
clearance that must include the issues to be covered in local guidelines, including: 
(a) zones for tree clearing guidelines; 
(b) native vegetation communities; 
(c) maximum slope limitations;     
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(d) watercourse buffers; 
(e) size and configuration of clumps or strips of trees to be maintained; 
(f) the proportion of vegetation type that should be kept. (s. 271) 
The Broadscale Tree Clearing Policy covering leasehold lands was released in 1997 
following several preliminary versions, and has since been further revised to make it 
consistent with the guidelines for freehold land.  
In many respects the State-wide policies for freehold and leasehold land are 
identical. Clearing of remnant ‘endangered’ regional ecosystems, areas of high 
nature conservation value, areas declared as vulnerable to land degradation or where 
clearing will change the conservation status of a regional ecosystem, is generally 
not allowed under either policy.  
However, several important differences exist. On leasehold land, the guidelines 
generally protect ‘of concern’ regional ecosystems, whereas on freehold land these 
have generally been available for clearance under permit. There are also additional 
restrictions on clearing on leasehold land in ‘core commercial timber areas’ and 
cultural, heritage, scenic, visual and landscape values need to be maintained. 
Regional guidelines for vegetation management 
Section 11 of the VM Act requires the preparation of RVMPs for vegetation 
management on freehold land in regions of the State. Section 272 of the Land Act 
requires the Minister to approve guidelines for broadscale tree clearing applying to 
areas of the State. Both Acts require public input into the development of these 
plans. 
Regional codes for assessing vegetation clearing applications have been developed 
progressively by Regional Vegetation Management Committees (RVMCs) 
established under the VM Act. RVMPs are based on specific objectives for 
particular regions but reflect State policy on vegetation management. For draft 
RVMPs to be endorsed by the Minister, they must at least achieve the outcomes set 
out in the State-wide guidelines. When approved by the Minister, they replace the 
State-wide policies for assessing such applications.11  
RVMPs include information on the location, type and status of vegetation (regional 
ecosystems) within a region, including areas that are of high nature conservation 
value or those that are vulnerable to land degradation and also identify areas that 
                                              
11 To limit duplication, these committees have also considered issues related to leasehold land in 
their regions.      





should be retained and/or managed in a particular way. RVMPs were to facilitate a 
more targeted assessment of individual applications for permission to clear by 
placing them in the context of the vegetation and biodiversity situation of the local 
region. 
This process was able to draw on the expertise of existing community-based natural 
resource management groups. AgForce Queensland (AgForce trans., p. 68) argued 
that regional variations in soil, vegetation and climate meant that different rules and 
outcomes were appropriate for different regions, but that this approach needed to be 
based on accurate information and consistent implementation. 
Queensland is partitioned into 24 regions for the development of RVMPs. The bulk 
of the draft RVMPs have been released for public comment. They integrate the 
regional planning for both Acts and include an assessment code for freehold land 
and local tree-clearing guidelines for leasehold land. 
NR&M considers the RVMP process was a strength of the Queensland regime. It 
described the VM Act as: 
The most strategic and sophisticated legislation of its kind in Australia, it takes a 
landscape approach and provides a safety net for native vegetation on freehold land … 
the department is committed to involving regional communities in the development of 
locally relevant, scientifically sound regional vegetation management plans. 
(NR&M 2003b) 
However, the VM Amendment Bill will significantly alter any role for the regional 
plans as there will be no broadscale clearing of remnant vegetation allowed after 
December 2006. Hence, the State-wide constraints are now very different from 
those under which the RVMPs were developed. The draft RVMPs will now be 
assessed and, after further consultation with stakeholders, will be put before a panel 
of scientists as part of the process for developing regionally-based codes for land 
management (Queensland Legislative Assembly 2004, 18 March, pp. 64-7). 
New vegetation management arrangements 
In May 2003, in response to concerns about the rate of vegetation clearance in 
recent years, the Queensland Government introduced a moratorium on accepting 
new applications to clear any remnant vegetation on either freehold or leasehold 
land. The moratorium was part of an agreement between the Queensland and 
Australian Governments and was formalised in the Vegetation (Applications for 
Clearing) Act 2003.12 Clearing applications which had already been lodged were 
                                              
12 This Act is repealed by the VM Amendment Bill.     
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still processed under the existing guidelines. Clearing under permits that had 
already been granted, or where a permit was not required under the VM Act or Land 
Act, was able to continue. The Australian Government Minister for the 
Environment and Heritage indicated that key objectives of the moratorium were the 
immediate protection of ‘of concern’ vegetation and the phasing down of broadscale 
clearing of remnant vegetation to zero by 2006 under a transitional cap of 500 000 
hectares (Kemp 2003b). 
In March 2004, the Queensland Government introduced the VM Amendment Bill to 
end permanently broadscale clearing of remnant native vegetation and to make a 
number of other changes to the regulation of native vegetation clearance. Key 
features of the new arrangements include: 
•  broadscale clearing of remnant native vegetation will be phased out under a cap 
of 500 000 hectares by December 2006. Existing applications (not processed 
before the moratorium was announced in March 2003) will be assessed under 
current guidelines. The balance of the 500 000 hectares will then be allocated 
under a regionally-based ballot and assessed against regional vegetation 
management codes that are to be developed under the amendments; 
•  the tree-clearing provisions of the Land Act will be repealed and vegetation 
clearing on leasehold land will be assessed under the VM Act; 
•  there will be no more clearing of remnant and ‘of concern’ vegetation on Cape 
York peninsula; 
•  regionally-based codes will be developed ‘for landholders to manage their land 
in a locally relevant and sustainable manner’ (Queensland Legislative 
Assembly  2004, 18  March, p.  64). The codes will provide guidance for 
vegetation management activities such as thinning, fodder harvesting and weed 
control and contain provisions for forestry practices and extractive industries. 
When finalised, they will be used to assess future applications for clearing; 
•  landholders will be able to develop Property Maps of Assessable Vegetation 
(PMAV) for their property that identify regrowth vegetation and that, when 
certified, will replace the regional ecosystem map for that property;  
•  a tribunal will be set up to deal with native vegetation clearing issues under the 
IP Act; and 
•  a structural adjustment package of $130 million over five years will be provided 
to assist landholders who are significantly disadvantaged by the new vegetation 
management framework. A further $20  million will be made available for 
incentives for landholders willing to manage and maintain remnant and high 
value non-remnant vegetation and to assist rural industry groups in promoting 
sustainable agriculture.     





The new arrangements contain some provisions that are aimed at addressing some 
of landholders’ concerns regarding the negative impacts of the present regulations. 
However, the complete ban on broadscale clearing will impose a significant new 
negative impact, albeit partly offset for some landholders by the structural 
adjustment package. 
Local government regulations 
The VM Act (s. 7) specifically states that the Act does not prevent local laws or 
local planning instruments from imposing requirements on native vegetation 
clearance in local government areas. These local requirements can impose 
additional restrictions on vegetation clearance but outcomes must be at least equal 
to, or better than, those required by the VM Act. The State-wide ban on broadscale 
clearing of remnant native vegetation is likely to make some of these local 
restrictions redundant. 
In many areas, local government land-clearing controls do not appear to have 
imposed significant costs on landholders. However, particularly in shires with 
vegetation of high conservation value and significant urban populations, local 
clearing and biodiversity regulations are often more constraining for rural 
landholders. Bruce Page (sub. 186) from Peachester on the Sunshine Coast noted 
that, in his area, local authority environmental laws dealing with matters such as 
managing land close to a watercourse and harvesting timber, were more restrictive 
than State-wide requirements. He considered these restrictions affected agricultural 
landholders quite adversely, for example, by restricting the ability to subdivide land 
from an agricultural block (sub. DR305).  
Conversely, in some environmentally-sensitive areas, the absence of local controls 
has raised concerns among residents about a failure to prevent serious land and 
water degradation. Tamborine Mountain Landcare (sub. 5) indicated that control 
over vegetation clearance in the Beaudesert Shire planning scheme will be 
strengthened in 2004, but in the meantime clearing in erosion-prone areas was 
causing loss of habitat and silting of streams.  
Protection of biodiversity 
The NC Act replaced a variety of other legislation and commenced operation at the 
end of 1994.13 Key mechanisms of the Act include the dedication, declaration and 
                                              
13 The NC Act replaced the Fauna Conservation Act 1974, National Parks and Wildlife Act 1975, 
Native Plants Protection Act 1930 and parts of the Land Act relating to environmental parks.     
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management of protected areas, protection of native wildlife and its habitat 
(including by entering into conservation agreements with landholders) and 
cooperative involvement of landholders in the conservation of nature. Section  6 
stresses community participation and requires that the Act be administered, as far as 
practicable, in consultation with, and having regard to the views and interests of, 
landholders and interested groups and persons. 
The NC Act (s.  29) allows State land to be dedicated as a national park, 
conservation park or a resource reserve (all protected areas under the Act). Leases 
can be granted in these areas under the NC Act and the Land Act, but these must be 
consistent with management principles and plans under the Act. 
Section 44 allows the Minister to propose that any area be declared a nature refuge, 
coordinated conservation area or a wilderness area (all protected areas). Section 45 
allows for conservation agreements with landholders on a proposal to declare an 
area a protected area and on the management intent for the area. Section 46 then 
allows for the declaration of state land, or any area subject to a conservation 
agreement, as one of the above types of protected areas.  
Section 45 conservation agreements may require the State to provide financial or 
other assistance or technical advice and may place various conditions on the use of 
the land and activities of the landholder. 
If a section  45 agreement is not reached, section  49 allows for compulsory 
declaration of an area proposed as a nature refuge if it is considered an area of 
major interest or a critical habitat. The Minister can also declare World Heritage 
management areas and international agreement areas and prepare management plans 
for these areas. Section  67 requires reasonable compensation to be paid to the 
landholder for the effects of restrictions or prohibitions on existing use of the land 
under these various declarations. 
Section  102 allows the Minister to issue an interim conservation order for the 
conservation, protection or management of rare or threatened wildlife, a critical 
protected wildlife habitat, an area of major interest or a protected area under the 
Act. Among other things, the order may prohibit or control a threatening process. 
Interim conservation orders may be for a maximum of 60 days with an extension of 
up to 90  days allowed. Landholders are entitled to ‘reasonable compensation 
because of the making of the order’, the amount to be reached by agreement or 
determined by the Land Court (s. 108). 
The Acts protecting native vegetation are also important vehicles for protecting 
biodiversity, particularly on private land. Part of the rationale for native vegetation 
controls under the VM Act and Land Act is to protect habitat for native animals and     





to maintain biodiversity. A criterion used when ruling on a permit to clear native 
vegetation is the status of the bioregional ecosystem concerned. ‘Endangered’ 
ecosystems and areas of high conservation value or vulnerable to land degradation 
are protected under both the VM Act and Land Act. The Land Act also protects ‘of 
concern’ ecosystems, while the VM Act aims to achieve voluntary protection of 
such ecosystems on freehold land through the regional vegetation planning process.  
The VM and Land Acts both give special consideration to areas declared to be of 
high nature conservation value in assessing clearance applications and in 
determining exemptions to requirements to obtain a clearing permit. In general, 
permits will not be given to clear such areas. 
Catchment management processes 
There are no legislated local catchment management bodies in Queensland. In 1991 
the Queensland Government began the Integrated Catchment Management (ICM) 
program to assist voluntary groups and individuals to address land and water quality 
issues on a catchment basis. The ICM program aims to develop catchment strategies 
and policies that link the activities of individual groups and draw on the local 
knowledge of members. 
Under this program, over 30 Catchment Coordinating Committees (CCCs) have 
been established. Other community groups, such as Landcare and environment 
groups, also address environmental issues at a local level and, in a number of cases, 
they or their members also participate in CCCs. While the Queensland Government 
provides funds to some local projects and CCCs, its main aim is to give strategic 
direction to community-based groups. Natural Heritage Trust (NHT) funds have 
been directed to CCCs, although the sometimes disjointed nature of this funding has 
raised some concerns among CCCs (for example, the Mulgrave Landcare 
Catchment Group, trans., p. 162). 
Other legislation  
Several other Acts may have indirect implications for clearing of native vegetation 
and biodiversity conservation. The New England Tablelands Bioregion Draft 
RVMP (NR&M 2003c) notes that obtaining approval for tree clearing under the 
Land Act or NVM Act does not guarantee that such clearing is legal. Depending on 
the circumstances, separate approvals might also be required under other legislation 
including: 
•  Nature Conservation Act 1992 (discussed above);     
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•  Environmental Protection Act 1994 (EP Act); 
•  local laws under the Local Government Act 1993; 
•  Fisheries Act 1994; 
•  Queensland Heritage Act 1992; 
•  Cultural Record (Landscapes Queensland and Queensland Estate) Act 1987; 
•  Soil Conservation Act 1986; 
•  Water Act 2000;  
•  Beach Protection Act 1968;  
•  Coastal Protection and Management Act 1995; and  
•  the Australian Government’s Environmental Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999. 
E.3  Development of the regulatory regime 
The native vegetation clearing controls (both the legislation and its implementation) 
for both freehold and (particularly) leasehold land have been developed and refined 
over a number of years. The State-wide policies for assessing applications for 
vegetation clearing permits on leasehold land were revised several times between 
1995 and 1997. In 1995, draft State guidelines for broadscale clearing on leasehold 
land were produced and, following discussion with stakeholders, a new draft — the 
Preliminary Tree Clearing Policy — was approved in December 1995. This was 
further revised as the Broadscale Tree Clearing Policy in 1997 and again when the 
VM Act guidelines were introduced.  
Following the signing of the NHT Partnership Agreement with the Australian 
Government in 1997, the Queensland Government convened a Regulation 
Framework Task Force for Vegetation Management including stakeholder 
representatives to consider issues of native vegetation clearance on freehold land 
(Dixon 2003). This task force proposed using the IP  Act as the means for 
introducing regulation in this area. In March 1999, a Vegetation Management 
Advisory Committee was set up which involved stakeholder representatives. The 
VM Act was passed in December 1999. 
AgForce was critical of the failure to assess the likely impacts of the VM Act. 
It is an absolute travesty that in the lead up to the legislation being debated and 
subsequent to its passing through Parliament, there has been no assessment of the likely 
social and economic impact on individuals as well as rural and regional communities. 
(sub. 54, p. 40)     





Following the passing of the VM  Act, further consultation occurred with 
stakeholders and the Australian Government regarding a funding package for 
payment of some form of compensation to landholders affected by the controls. As 
a result of the failure to obtain agreement on this funding the vegetation clearing 
restrictions imposed by the Act were significantly diluted in September 2000, in line 
with earlier commitments given to landholders. 
The consultation process continued for both leasehold and freehold land with the 
development of RVMPs for 24 regions of the State. Once approved, these were to 
guide the assessment of applications to clear vegetation. While these plans were 
developed within the constraints of the State-wide policies, they potentially 
provided an opportunity for stakeholder participation in the development of the 
clearing regulation regimes. 
Only draft plans have been produced and landholders and their representatives have 
argued that, to date, in many cases the RVMP process has not generated meaningful 
participation in the implementation of the land-clearing regimes. Environmental 
groups have also often been critical of some of the draft reports that did not meet 
their environmental objectives. The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF, 
sub. 146) was concerned that the draft RVMPs would allow too much vegetation 
clearance and that many did not adequately address protection of 
environmentally-sensitive areas. 
However, the broadscale clearing ban introduced by the VM Amendment Bill 
makes much of this regional consultation redundant as the State-wide framework 
within which the RVMPs were developed has changed significantly. After further 
consultation with stakeholders, RVMPs will now be put to a panel of scientists as 
part of the development of regional codes for vegetation management. 
A Ministerial Advisory Committee on Vegetation Management advises the Minister 
and regional vegetation planning groups about vegetation management issues of 
State-wide significance. Its members include landholders and their representatives, 
local government, environmental groups and scientists. 
The NC Act replaced a variety of other legislation. It commenced operation at the 
end of 1994. In relation to private land, its procedures focus on negotiations with 
landholders and compensation for losses as a result of actions taken under the Act.      
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E.4  Promotion of environmental goals 
Objectives of the regime 
Vegetation clearing on freehold land 
The purposes underlying the VM Act are a combination of environmental and land 
degradation objectives. They are to regulate the clearing of vegetation on freehold 
land to: 
(a) preserve the following— 
(i)  remnant endangered regional ecosystems; 
(ii)  vegetation in areas of high nature conservation value and areas vulnerable to 
land degradation; and 
(b) ensure that the clearing does not cause land degradation; and 
(c) maintain or increase biodiversity; and 
(d) maintain ecological processes; and 
(e) allow for ecologically sustainable land use. (s. 3(1)) 
The VM Amendment Bill omits the reference to ecologically-sustainable land use 
but adds objectives for the preservation of remnant ‘of concern’ regional 
ecosystems and remnant ‘not of concern’ regional ecosystems as well as the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.14 The Bill also specifies that the 
decision-making framework for achieving these objectives must apply the 
precautionary principle.15 
Vegetation clearing on leasehold land 
The objectives of the tree management controls of the Land Act (contained in 
Chapter 5, Part 6) are: 
… to manage trees on unallocated State land and on reserves, deeds of grant in trust, 
roads, licences, permits and leases on which the State owns the trees, consistent with 
the following principles— 
(a) to maintain the productivity of the land; 
(b) to allow the development of the land; 
                                              
14 Other minor changes are also made to the Act’s objectives. 
15 In the VM Amendment Bill (clause 6), the precautionary principle states that ‘lack of scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing a measure to prevent degradation of the 
environment if there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage’.      





(c) to prevent land degradation; 
(d) to maintain biodiversity; 
(e) to maintain the environmental and amenity values of the landscape; 
(f)  to maintain the scientific, recreation and tourism values of the land; 
(g) to ensure public safety. (s. 252) 
Trees are defined to include bushes and shrubs but not other plants. Trees do not 
need to be native to Queensland or Australia. 
As the Land Act tree-clearing provisions are abolished by the VM Amendment Bill, 
these objectives will no longer apply to assessment of future clearing applications. 
Protecting biodiversity  
The overriding objective of the NC  Act (s.  4) is the conservation of nature. 
Conservation is defined as the protection and maintenance of nature while allowing 
for its ecologically-sustainable use. The Act focuses on conserving and managing 
native animals and plants and declaring and managing protected areas on public 
land (for example a national park) and private land (for example, nature refuges) as 
well as World Heritage and international agreement areas. 
Achieving objectives 
The environmental goals of much regulation of native vegetation clearance and 
conservation of biodiversity are usually quite broad and outcomes are often difficult 
to measure with any precision. Hence, the extent of vegetation clearance is often 
used as an (albeit imperfect) proxy for the achievement of these goals.  
In Queensland, estimated vegetation clearance of 378 000 hectares in 2000-01 was 
down 11 per cent on the average for 1997 to 1999. However, this decline may have 
partly reflected the 758 000 hectare clearance rate in 1999-00, in response to the 
introduction of the VM Act. This clearing would have included a significant amount 
of pre-emptive clearing, brought forward to avoid having to apply for a clearing 
permit.  
Hence, the extent of the initial impact of the VM Act and Land Act on woody 
vegetation clearance is difficult to determine. Submissions indicated that a 
significant number of landholders in Queensland have had their plans for vegetation 
clearance refused, substantially altered or delayed by the regulations. This suggests 
that the regulations have lowered significantly the extent of clearing compared to 
what it would be otherwise.     
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Since the proclamation of the VM Act, clearance rates (as assessed by using 
satellite images) have slowed noticeably from the pre-legislation induced peak of 
1999-00, but remain broadly similar to rates of the 1990s. However, there remain 
concerns that some clearing is occurring without a required permit. The Natural 
Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2003 was designed to address 
these concerns by amending the Land Act and VM Act to clarify existing 
provisions, improve the ability to enforce existing regulations and impose additional 
enforcement provisions. 
There should be a reduction in clearing in the 2004 to 2006 period as a result of the 
cap of 500 000 hectares on broadscale clearing permits granted after March 2003. 
After December 2006, vegetation clearance should largely comprise clearing of new 
or thickened vegetation classified as regrowth or the thinning of thickened remnant 
vegetation, implying little if any net reduction in the extent of woody vegetation 
cover. 
To maximise environmental benefits related to protecting threatened ecosystems, 
the focus of the native vegetation clearance controls has been on restricting clearing 
in endangered regional ecosystems and on those ecosystems on the verge of 
switching from ‘of concern’ to ‘endangered’. Hence, clearing in these areas will 
have been significantly reduced by the VM Act and Land Act and should have 
produced the highest available environmental benefits because of the relative 
scarcity of the retained vegetation. Nonetheless, Robertson (2003) noted that much 
of the 2000-01 clearing was concentrated in regions that were already highly 
cleared such as the Brigalow Belt.  
Several submissions noted shortcomings of the regulatory regime in achieving 
underlying environmental objectives. The Cardwell Shire Council considered that 
greater conservation had resulted but that environmental outcomes might be further 
improved: 
There is no doubt that the EPBC Act and Vegetation Management Act are contributing 
an additional planning control above the Planning Scheme that is resulting in a higher 
level of conservation. However, the effectiveness of this control particularly relating to 
the Vegetation Management Act is questionable as when viewing the maps it does not 
appear that the endangered regional eco-systems form habitat corridors but rather are 
isolated pockets of vegetation scattered throughout the Shire. (sub. 123, p. 3) 
However, it argued that for its shire, existing national parks provided sufficient 
vegetation cover: 
It is also questionable as to whether the Cardwell Shire requires additional controls to 
conserve vegetation, particularly when considering that approximately 70 per cent of 
the Shire is included within National Parks, Wet Tropic Areas, State Forests and World 
Heritage Areas. (sub. 123, p. 3)     





The Gold Coast & Hinterland Environment Council (Gecko) argued that the land 
clearing controls had not been sufficient to achieve desirable environmental 
outcomes in the south-east Queensland region and that some previous clearing 
needed to be rehabilitated: 
Unsustainable agricultural practices, past poor planning allowing rural residential 
subdivision and hobby farms, and decisions made without the benefits of today’s 
scientific knowledge and awareness of the impacts on our biodiversity and native 
vegetation, are being carried over into the future due to the Government’s 
unwillingness to reverse these decisions. (sub. 127, p. 2) 
In a similar vein, the Inland Burnett RVMC noted that existing (often regrowth) 
vegetation was sometimes not in the optimal location to improve environmental 
outcomes: 
The unfortunate legacy of these past practices, specifically in landscapes and land 
systems in the order of land classes 7 and 8 — highly sensitive and fragile soils 
susceptible to rapid degradation if unwisely disturbed — is that what is currently 
classified as remnant vegetation is not always in the preferred landscape location for 
long-term sustainability and protection of those landscapes and the environmental 
services they provide. (sub. 139, p. 2) 
The ACF (sub.  146) noted that regrowth vegetation can provide similar 
environmental benefits (for example, reducing salinity) to those from remnant 
vegetation but received much less protection under current regulations.  
There have also been some instances where the regulations may have worsened 
environmental outcomes, at least in the short term. The initial impact of the 
announcement and then the passing, but delayed proclamation of the VM Act, was a 
significant temporary increase in the rate of native vegetation clearance on freehold 
land. The prospect of having limitations placed on the ability to clear native 
vegetation provided incentives for landholders to bring forward actions to remove 
vegetation that they considered would be profitable to clear.  
AgForce argued: 
In essence, the introduction of Acts such as the VMA 1999 caused large amounts of 
land throughout Queensland to be ‘panic cleared.’ That is, before the introduction of 
the VMA 1999, producers thought that their ability to clear land in the future would be 
lost and hence many producers who had no short term plans of clearing decided they 
had no option but to clear. (sub. 54, p. 38) 
Noel Whitehead (trans., p. 1057) of Mackay submitted that there had been more 
clearing in the last two years in the surrounding area than he had seen in 40 years. 
He attributed this to concern that clearing controls would restrict landholders’ future 
options. Rod Reedman from Pindi Pindi observed that a portion of his land was the 
only sizable private holding classified as endangered in that region:     
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… in the area around my farm there was more clearing done in the 12 months prior to 
the legislation coming out than there would ever have been if the legislation hadn’t 
been in the wind. So I believe that the legislation has caused more clearing than its 
saved. (trans., p. 1033) 
The ACF (sub. 146), argued that such panic clearing causes short-term increases in 
clearing but longer-term clearing rates will be lower as a result of the regulation. 
This would be so if the regulations restricted future clearing to very low levels. 
However, the pre-moratorium regime still allowed significant amounts of clearing 
and hence panic clearing could continue in many areas. It is difficult to determine if 
such ongoing ‘panic’ clearing in anticipation of progressively stricter restrictions 
has offset the clearing prevented by the regulations. The proposed ending of 
broadscale clearing will unambiguously reduce clearing after 2006. 
To avoid further problems of panic clearing, the 2003 moratorium on new clearing 
permit applications was immediately followed by the announcement and then the 
passage of the Vegetation (Application for Clearing) Act.  
In introducing the legislation, the Minister for Natural Resources and Mines noted 
the balance between the need for consultation and the avoidance of unintended 
consequences: 
This bill will allow consultation with stakeholders on this very important issue to be 
carried out without the spectre of panic clearing hindering the proceedings. 
(Queensland Legislative Assembly 2003, 27 May, p. 2083) 
The maximum two-year time limit on the use of permits can provide similar 
incentives for inefficient clearing. AgForce quoted a submission from one of its 
members: 
We are currently waiting to see if we can obtain an extension on our existing permit as 
we believe that the drought has left the country in such poor condition it would be 
detrimental to clear country now. However, our permit runs out in September and if it 
isn’t extended we will pull regardless as it is obvious there will be no more permits 
issued. (sub. 54, p. 38) 
This time limit may be increased if clearing applications are assessed against local 
guidelines in a RVMP. In addition, existing permits close to their expiry date can be 
extended by the NR&M assessment manager. 
The VM Amendment Bill deadline of December 2006 for undertaking clearing of 
remnant vegetation would also encourage premature clearing by those landholders 
who obtain a permit for clearing that they would prefer to use after 2006. 
Some participants have argued that the Queensland regulatory regime can have a 
detrimental impact on the environment by providing poor incentives for landholders     





to retain and manage native vegetation. Canegrowers & CSR Sugar (Herbert River 
District) argued: 
Currently landholders are motivated to behave inappropriately in regard to management 
of vegetation cover that has not reached trigger levels for the regulations. This leads to 
unintended consequences with erosion and water quality whereas greater certainty of 
the owner’s property and usage rights would effectively counter such perverse and 
unintended effects. (sub. 164, p. 6) 
They indicated (trans.,  p.  613) that premature clearing of regrowth to avoid it 
becoming defined as critical habitat was an example of such behaviour.  
The Queensland Resources Council noted that the possibility of regrowth eventually 
being declared remnant could lead to mining companies clearing prematurely: 
In the resource industry’s case, clearing may not occur until some 20–30 years after the 
commencement of mining, so this difficult definitional issue could potentially have a 
major impact on final land use and successful rehabilitation criteria … Thus while 
companies may wish to retain vegetation while long term mine planning is undertaken, 
short term decisions may be made to clear areas to preserve future access. 
(sub. DR311, p. 2) 
The Coolum District Coast Care Group (sub. DR252) considered that significant 
damage to biodiversity was being caused by land clearing and further development 
in urban areas — often not covered by existing regulatory restrictions. It argued: 
It is clear that in the area of the Sunshine Coast in Queensland that both preemptive 
clearing and illegal clearing has taken place prior to the stopping of broad scale 
clearing so that future urban development can occur on both rural and non-rural land. 
(sub. DR252, p. 1) 
The VM Amendment Bill amends the definition of ‘urban’ for vegetation 
management purposes. The Minister for Natural Resources Mines and Energy 
noted: 
These provisions have the effect of removing rural residential zones from the current 
urban area definition and will prevent the high clearing rates associated with the 
conversion of land from rural to rural residential (Queensland Legislative 
Assembly 2004, 18 March, p. 66) 
Landholder representatives have also argued that poor implementation of the land-
clearing regulations has seriously harmed relations between Government and 
landholders, often with resultant reductions in the goodwill that might have 
encouraged greater landholder participation in achieving underlying environmental 
benefits. The Innisfail Canegrowers Association argued that because of the clearing 
restrictions landholders were not willing to set aside and manage unproductive land 
for environmental purposes:     
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But the unproductive land, or economically unviable land is not being considered for 
protection by landholders. … What you want to be able to do is develop the productive 
land, and that that’s not so productive or not quite economically viable you could 
probably be interested in doing something with it. But because you’re told, ‘Right 
that’s it’ even some good land you can’t develop, they back off, they’re not even 
interested. (trans., p. 144) 
The extent of tree cover is not always a barometer of desirable environmental 
outcomes. Bob Katter (trans., p. 118) considered that environmental outcomes such 
as the level of erosion would be worsened in North Queensland by excessive 
retention of trees which leads to insufficient grass cover. Wally Peart (sub. DR304) 
of Injune considered that similar outcomes would arise in his area.  
Andrew and Kathy Schmidt (trans., p. 1001) of Charleville felt that biodiversity had 
increased on their heavily-treed property after some clearing was undertaken. Wally 
Peart of Injune commented on the impact of clearing trees on his property: 
When I took up this block, ‘Sunnyholt’, 40 years ago, it had 600 trees per acre on it, no 
water for many miles and the dingoes had not been controlled for 100 years. Bird life 
was very scarce because of the distance to water and the dingoes had eaten themselves 
into starvation; they were so poorly they could hardly get out of your way. Now, birds 
abound on the property with over 200 species identified and the wildlife is abundant. 
(sub. DR304, p. 2) 
The Inland Burnett RVMC also considered that simple prohibition of tree clearing 
might not produce the best environmental outcomes: 
Early dominance by several tree species and other primary species could extend for 
sufficient time to exclude the recovery of some of the original and short-lived species 
by exhausting seed banks, thereby precluding their regeneration. Thinning these 
regenerating trees will therefore maintain higher levels of biodiversity and hasten 
system recovery whilst also maintaining productivity (sub. 139, p. 4) 
It further noted the potential of well-conceived regional plans to overcome 
potentially perverse environmental outcomes: 
The usual practice of tree clearing in for example Perry Shire, is to allow trees to 
mature to greater than the ‘regrowth stage’ and then thin, stimulating soil through deep 
root penetration, providing better quality timber and maintaining a consistent vegetative 
cover for native fauna. Under the VM Act 1999 (current guise) thinning is not allowed 
within remnant areas unless the landowner has historically conducted timber harvesting 
using forestry practices. This dis-incentive actually encourages landholders to clear 
non-remnant areas and perform no maintenance work in remnant regional ecosystems 
(REs). The thinning policy developed by planning committees in south-east 
Queensland has been designed to provide management options and is perhaps 
singularly the most important recommendation developed by the respective 
committees. (sub. 139, p. 6)     





Mrs V.D. Burnett (sub.  DR296) of Avocavale District considered that native 
grasslands were an integral component of native vegetation and hence should also 
be covered by clearing controls if environmental objectives were to be achieved. 
Some landholders suggested that factors other than tree clearing may pose greater 
threats to biodiversity in their areas. Joe Galeano from Cardwell Shire argued: 
Rampant feral pigs pose a far greater threat to that species [cassowary] than land 
clearing on private property. Pigs eat cassowary eggs and cassowary young. However, 
the government spends only token money on the pig problem. (sub. 35, p. 2) 
The East End Mine Action Group (sub. 16) considered that the activities of a nearby 
limestone mine had resulted in a long-term impact on the water table which had led 
to a significant deterioration of agricultural productivity and vegetation cover in the 
surrounding area. 
Although neither the VM Act nor the Land Act contain objectives related to 
greenhouse gas emissions, the Minister for Environment and Energy and Natural 
Resources and Mines, in his second reading speech for the VM Act, stated: 
This Government has a commitment to help meet Australia’s international obligations 
for controlling greenhouse gas emissions. This legislation will assist in meeting those 
obligations. (Queensland Legislative Assembly 1999, 8 December, p. 6082) 
As noted above, the VM Amendment Bill includes reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions as an objective of vegetation clearing regulation. 
The exact relationship between tree clearing and greenhouse gases is complex. 
Nonetheless, while the legislation will have reduced woody vegetation clearing to 
some degree below what would otherwise have occurred, the rate of clearance up to 
2001 indicates that this is likely to have had only a limited impact on reducing 
greenhouse emissions. The 2003 moratorium on new tree-clearing applications 
seemed to be largely based on concerns about achieving reductions in national 
emissions of greenhouse gases to approximate the Kyoto Protocol targets. The 
Australian Government Minister for Environment and Heritage, in announcing 
broad details of the proposal to reduce broadscale clearing of remnant vegetation in 
Queensland to zero by 2006, stated: 
It meets the Commonwealth Government’s objectives of a substantial reduction in the 
clearing of remnant vegetation, in greenhouse gas emissions and the additional 
protection of the biodiversity of ecosystems. (Kemp 2003b) 
The VM Amendment Bill has confirmed the post 2006 cessation of clearing of 
remnant vegetation.     
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Landholder understanding of the objectives 
Although Queensland’s pre-moratorium vegetation clearing restrictions have been 
in force for around six years on leasehold land and three years on freehold land, a 
number of participants considered that the regulations were not well understood by 
landholders. QFF (sub. 177) argued that this reflected the large number of natural 
resource management regulations being introduced by all levels of government. 
Mulgrave Landcare Catchment Group considered that: 
… the understanding by landowners of the regulations and the implications of those 
regulations are extremely low, mainly due to the complexity and plethora of various 
plans and strategies. (trans., p. 159) 
The NRM Board (Wet Tropics) (trans., pp. 106–9) also considered that the very 
large number of inquiries and plans (as opposed to actions) undertaken in recent 
years that had relevance to natural resource management issues in the wet tropics 
had left landholders confused. 
QFF considered that information provided by government on landholders’ 
obligations and requirements regarding vegetation clearing had been reasonable, but 
that the reasons for having the regulations had not been accepted by landholders. 
They argued that this was because of: 
… the emphasis on nature conservation at the expense of production, rather than an 
emphasis on balancing nature conservation and production. (sub. 177, p. 17)  
A common cause of uncertainty about the objectives among Queensland 
landholders has been the inaccuracy of the vegetation mapping for their areas. 
A.R. and A.L. Read (QFF, sub. 177, attachment 3) noted that areas identified on 
regional maps as having no vegetation, in fact had the same remnant vegetation 
ecosystems as on their land, which had been initially mapped as ‘endangered’ and 
had now been revised to ‘of concern’. Such errors in mapping can either result in 
environmental objectives being compromised or in unnecessary costs being 
imposed on landholders. Russell Turkington of Greenmount commented: 
The level of understanding by many land owners of the Act and proposed biodiversity 
areas is not good. Inaccuracies in mapping adds to the confusion as to does the 
classification on existing vegetation (as per herbarium map Queensland Government) 
versus historical local knowledge including photographic evidence. (sub. 50, p. 1) 
He also argued (trans., p. 1104) that in some cases inaccurate mapping inhibited 
best-practice solutions and resulted in landholders being threatened with 
prosecution. AgForce (sub.  54) also commented on inaccuracies in vegetation 
mapping: 
Without mapping and data accuracy, incorrect decisions will be made. Mapping needs 
to be ‘ground-truthed’ and other data tested with appropriate bodies before being used     





as guidance on any environmental issues. AgForce has examples of incorrect mapping 
that has led to unfounded warrants being issued on landholders. (sub. 54, pp. 43–4) 
In some areas, the native woody vegetation existing before European settlement 
appears to have spread significantly due to agricultural activities and the absence of 
traditional fire control of vegetation practised by Indigenous communities. In these 
cases, comparisons of current vegetation cover against that of the relatively recent 
past would give a misleading picture of the extent of clearing over the last 150 
years. This appears to have made it difficult for some landholders to understand and 
accept the objectives of clearing restrictions. 
Compliance levels 
While uncertainty regarding the accuracy of estimates based on satellite images 
makes precise estimates problematic, there appears to have been a significant 
amount of vegetation clearing without a permit in Queensland in recent years. The 
Minister for Natural Resources and Mines indicated that SLATS analysis had 
identified 61  000 hectares of land that had been potentially illegally cleared, of 
which 25 000 hectares was on freehold land and 36 000 hectares was on leasehold 
land (Queensland Legislative Assembly 2003, 25 February, pp. 53–4).  
This illegal land clearing activity has led to the introduction of a system of 
infringement notices for illegal clearing of small amounts of land. If not contested 
by landholders, these notices impose small fines (between $375 and $1500) for 
clearing undertaken without the required prior approval from NR&M or that fails to 
meet permit approval. An order for restitution of the cleared area can also be made.  
The Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Act clarifies some 
existing legislative provisions16 and introduces additional offences and enforcement 
provisions. The explanatory notes for that Act state: 
… for successful enforcement of the vegetation management legislation, a balance 
between the rights of the individual and the need for the community to be able to 
provide an effective deterrent is necessary. (Explanatory Notes for the Natural 
Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, 2003, p. 10) 
                                              
16 For example, remediation notices for areas cleared illegally on leasehold land.     
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The explanatory notes also outline several clauses which raise possible breaches of 
fundamental legislative principles.17  
AgForce (trans.,  pp.  71–2) expressed concern that the approach of harsher 
enforcement conflicted with attempts to obtain greater landholder involvement 
through the RVMP process and hence may worsen environmental outcomes. 
Similarly, Wally Peart (sub. DR304) of Injune considered that the goodwill nurtured 
by the Landcare movement had been lost because of increased regulation of 
vegetation clearance and the enforcement of those regulations. 
Consideration of economic and social impacts 
Decisions on native vegetation clearance are based on the environmental 
classification of the vegetation concerned and generally do not consider the costs of 
such decisions on landholders and others. Some of the examples of negative impacts 
on landholders indicate cases of significant economic impacts for apparently limited 
environmental benefit. Where land and water degradation are the environmental 
benefits being achieved through clearing restrictions there will be collateral 
economic benefits to landholders, but these typically are not the determining factor 
in the decision to grant a clearing permit. 
Exemptions to permit requirements are provided in both the VM Act and Land Act 
for a range of standard rural management practices. These exemptions, particularly 
those allowing the clearing of regrowth, provide some allowance for the economic 
and social impacts of clearing restrictions. If, in general, original clearing was 
undertaken in the most productive parts of a region and/or a property, then 
restricting clearance of regrowth would tend to have the highest economic cost. 
The NC Act (s. 67) requires that regard be had to the interests of landholders, and in 
some cases, compensation is payable. This requirement brings some consideration 
of economic impacts on landholders into the decision-making process when making 
declarations under that Act. 
                                              
17 For example, for charges of unauthorised clearing, the Act removed the defence normally 
available under the Criminal Code (s. 24) if the person has a reasonable and honest but mistaken 
belief that led to the commission of the offence. This defence has been used in many 
prosecutions relating to tree clearing based on mistakes in map interpretation, status of 
vegetation and errors relating to location on a property. In its place the person is required due 
diligence before taking action in relation to tree clearing. Also the onus of proof for showing the 
accuracy of that evidence from instruments or equipment (such as remotely sensed images) is 
reversed — they are taken to be accurate unless the defendant proves to the contrary.     





Both AgForce (sub. 54) and QFF (sub. 177) considered there had been a failure to 
assess the economic and social impacts of the regulatory regime. QFF stated: 
The lack of accurate, in depth assessment of the social and economic impacts of the 
regulatory regimes, particularly the VMA has been profound. In the development of the 
VMA, the lead up to the impending introduction of the Act, and its operational 
workings, there has been no assessment of the likely economic and social impacts on 
individuals or regional and rural communities. (sub. 177, pp. 17–18) 
The proposed allocation of part of the 500 000 hectare remnant vegetation clearing 
cap by a regional ballot process will not identify the relative economic costs of 
refusing various clearance applications competing for this quota. 
E.5  Administration and implementation 
The effectiveness in achieving regulatory objectives and the impacts of the 
regulatory regimes on landholders and others will be influenced by the efficiency of 
their implementation. 
Inconsistency  
QFF (sub. 177) noted that a long list of Acts was routinely drawn to the attention of 
landholders who obtained clearing permits under the VM Act. It argued: 
In isolation the EPBC Act and VM Act may not disastrously impact on landholders, 
however, together and combined with the myriad of other environment natural resource 
management focused reforms it is the cumulative impacts that may be the cause of 
most concern at the grass-roots level. (sub. 177, p. 4) 
For landholders affected by the native vegetation management and biodiversity 
conservation aspects of these Acts, the impacts of inconsistencies between the 
various Acts can be significant and can cover a range of activities. 
Canegrowers (sub. 101) referred to a number of impacts on sugar producers from 
such legislation: 
… the Fisheries Act … potentially impacts on the on-farm management activities of the 
approximately 700 cane growers with farms adjacent to estuarine areas. Under the 
Fisheries Act all marine plants are protected and interestingly this includes all plants 
growing in, or adjacent to fish habitat. Human-constructed drains on cane farms are 
considered important fish habitat by the Queensland Department of Primary Industries’ 
Fisheries Group. As a consequence a grower mowing a headland that contains salt 
couch or repairing an on-farm drain that contains native hibiscus risks prosecution. 
(sub. 101, attachment A, p. 2)     
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In a number of instances, Canegrowers has been able to negotiate with the 
responsible government departments whereby area-wide agreements avoided the 
need for individual farm businesses to apply for permits. 
The QFF argued that the absence of coordination within and between departments 
responsible for regulation of native vegetation and biodiversity conservation 
exacerbated the difficulty of dealing with a range of legislation: 
The administrative burden in jumping through the many approval ‘hoops’ is 
compounded by the lack of coordination between the number of government agencies 
involved in governing environmental and natural resource management legislation. 
Liaising across a number of government agencies where landholders often only receive 
‘one side of the story’ and at times conflicting advice makes obtaining an approval an 
arduous task. Even within Departments, lack of coordination has resulted in much 
frustration and anxiety for landholders. (sub. 177, p. 12) 
William Fritz from Bundaberg (trans.,  pp.  30–8 and sub.  177, attachment  1) 
complained of one division (Water Resources) of the Department of Primary 
Industries advising that a weir should be built on his property while another division 
(Fisheries) subsequently ruled the weir to be in breach of the Fisheries Act. In a 
similar vein, Dalrymple Landcare Committee, submitted that the way in which 
native vegetation regulations had been implemented in its region had significantly 
hindered attempts to control Parkinsonia (as required under the Land Protection Act 
2002). It argued: 
Weed management and policy is one of Queensland’s Department of Natural Resources 
and Mines core business activities. Whilst it has provided in-kind support to research 
best practice management for Parkinsonia, other sections of the NR&M department 
have put major impediments in the way of controlling weeds. (sub. DR256, p. 2) 
Even if clearing is allowed under the native vegetation and biodiversity regulations, 
the EP Act imposes an overarching general environmental duty — in effect, a duty 
of care to the environment: 
A person must not carry out any activity that causes, or is likely to cause, 
environmental harm unless the person takes all reasonable and practicable measures to 
prevent or minimise the harm … (s. 319) 
Maroochy Shire Council used this provision (through the Planning and 
Environment Court of Queensland) in 2002 to obtain a restraining order on a private 
landholder preventing the clearing of vegetation that would cause ‘serious 
environmental harm’ and requiring remedial work on certain areas already cleared. 
Section 436 of the EP Act creates an offence of unlawful environmental harm, 
which is an act or omission that causes serious or material environmental harm or 
an environmental nuisance. Unlawful environmental harm does not occur if the     





general environmental duty is complied with. Such compliance is deemed to occur 
if an approved code of practice or a code of environmental compliance applies to 
the causing of the environmental damage and this code was followed. 
Several agricultural industries have developed codes of practice which have been 
approved by the Minister for the Environment. However, these codes have focussed 
on reducing pollution from production processes rather than any environmental 
damage from vegetation clearance or biodiversity loss.  
Administrative costs 
A number of participants have criticised the implementation and administration of 
Queensland’s legislative vegetation clearing regime. AgForce (sub. 54) noted costs 
(maps, permit fees and time to develop a PVMP) of $5000 to $10  000 for an 
application to clear around 2400 hectares on a 23  000 hectare property. QFF 
considered that the administrative burden was particularly high for landholders 
having to deal with a number of the government agencies involved in environmental 
and natural resource legislation: 
The multitude of government regulatory regimes are impacting on agribusiness by 
creating a legislatively-induced cost price squeeze which has the potential to have a 
major impact on the Queensland economy. Unfortunately, in many cases, the 
government is unaware of this progressive cumulative impact because of the lack of 
coordination and cooperation within government. (sub. 177, p. 14) 
It regarded dealing with conflicting advice from different departments as a 
particular problem in such cases. 
Native vegetation regulations can add to the costs of other government 
environmental programs. The Dalrymple Landcare Committee (trans., pp. 1048–9) 
commented that a program for eradicating noxious woody weeds (Parkinsonia) 
required approval under the VM Act because there was a risk that some native trees 
might be inadvertently poisoned or mechanically eradicated. Approval involved 
time and cost for the Committee and involved several departments and delays of 
over four months which further added to costs. The Committee argued that weed 
eradication posed a very limited threat to the plentiful native vegetation in the 
region, but failure to control Parkinsonia represented a major threat to the Cape 
River catchment’s productivity and environmental health.  
Both landholders and environmental groups were concerned that insufficient 
resources had been provided to administer land-clearing regulations efficiently. 
AgForce (trans., p. 69) considered that due to small numbers of staff and/or their     
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inexperience, responses to requests for advice had often not been timely. The NRM 
Board (Wet Tropics) stated: 
… the other thing which agencies need to face is that there are less and less people on 
the ground from an agency point of view to either implement these regulations or to be 
of assistance to land-holders in developing alternatives, and less and less of the 
extension-type people, less and less of those sorts of people on the ground. 
(trans., p. 111) 
Roz Burtenshaw (trans., p.  163) from Mount Garnett also noted the recent 
substantial decline in extension services, and argued for more research and 
development and professional advice to be provided to landholders. Harry Berger 
(sub.  DR251) of Cardwell submitted that those assessing clearing applications 
needed to have a good understanding of rural industries. Peter Voller 
(trans.,  p.  1021) felt that government agencies needed to give regional staff 
longer-term tenure in an area to develop their knowledge of local conditions. 
Property Rights Australia also considered that significantly more resources were 
needed to implement the regulations effectively: 
Current natural resource management decision-making processes in Queensland have 
been constrained by a lack of reliable scientific data and a chronic lack of financial and 
human resources allocated to support these processes. This should be addressed via a 
significant injection of resources into the state government’s research, mapping and 
extension services. (sub. 203, p. 3) 
NR&M has indicated that in the future SLATS satellite imagery for vegetation 
management purposes will be undertaken annually rather than every two years. In 
addition, the VM Amendment Bill allows for the development by landholders of 
property scale maps identifying regrowth vegetation on their properties. When 
certified, these maps will replace regional ecosystem maps for the property 
concerned. 
Dispute-resolution procedures 
Landholders with freehold properties can appeal to the Planning and Environment 
Court against NR&M decisions to refuse a clearing permit including the conditions 
attached to it.  
Several participants have considered that in some cases government departments 
may spend large amounts of money appealing lower court rulings to higher courts. 
Canegrowers, in discussing the case of William Fritz stated: 
… on the advice of their Barrister and faced with the financial clout of the Queensland 
Government they decided to cut their losses and plead guilty. 
(sub. 101, attachment C, p. 5)     





With regard to 460 hectares of his property that was added to a National Park, and 
for which he had previously received a private offer of $2500 per hectare, Roy 
Dickson (a licensed valuer) of Cardwell stated: 
I was originally offered $250 per hectare by the Government ... Settlement was finally 
made at $1000 per hectare because I simply could not contest it any longer … The law 
alternative is available, only providing one has the finance to proceed through the 
process. (sub. 163, p. 2) 
He noted that a recent case involving similar land that was taken to court was 
decided at a rate close to $2500 per hectare.  
While no formal negotiating process exists for making vegetation decisions under 
the IP Act and Land Act, a number of cases raised by participants indicate that, in 
some instances, options are discussed and negotiated between officials and 
landholders (for example, the case of Goshen Station outlined in AgForce, sub. 55).  
In cases where landholders have, in NR&M’s view, illegally cleared without a 
permit, infringement notices can be issued for small offences (two hectares for 
endangered ecosystems and five hectares for of concern ecosystems). Cases 
involving larger areas of clearing are dealt with in court. 
The VM Amendment Bill establishes a tribunal to hear appeals regarding vegetation 
clearing issues under the IPA. Appeals will only be able to proceed if a landholder 
has initially obtained an internal departmental review of the decision. The tribunal 
will include representatives of stakeholder groups and the scientific community. 
Further appeals of the Tribunal’s decisions to the Planning and Environment Court 
will be allowed. 
E.6  Impacts on landholders 
This section considers the impacts (positive and negative) on landholders of the 
major Queensland legislation regulating native vegetation clearance and the 
conservation of biodiversity. Nearly all submissions received by the Commission 
from landholders and their representatives have indicated that the impacts of the 
legislation are significantly negative (box E.1).18 The Queensland Government did 
not make a submission.     
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F South  Australia 
F.1 Introduction 
In South Australia, it has been estimated that 64 per cent of native vegetation that 
existed prior to European settlement still existed in the intensively-used zone in 
1997.1 Nearly 80  per  cent of vegetation within the agricultural regions (which 
comprise about 18 per cent of the State’s land area) was cleared by the late 1970s. 
This history of clearing is reflected today in the low application rates for clearing 
permits and the relatively (compared with the 1970s) small amount of vegetation 
approved for clearing — in 2000, 1600 hectares of land were approved for clearing. 
Legislative amendments introduced in 2002 are intended to reduce clearing further.  
F.2  Description of the regulatory regime 
The primary legislation for native vegetation management in South Australia is the 
Native Vegetation Act 1991 (NV Act), and more recently, the Native Vegetation 
(Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2002 (NV Amendment Act). However, several 
other pieces of legislation could potentially affect the management of native 
vegetation in South Australia: the Soil Conservation and Land Care Act 1991, the 
Development Act 1993, the Pastoral Land Management and Conservation Act 1989, 
and the Animal and Plant Control Act 1986.  
Native Vegetation Act 
The NV Act applies to all land except inner metropolitan Adelaide, and it applies to 
all landholders, both public and private. Native vegetation is defined as any 
naturally-occurring local native plant, and covers the full range of species from trees 
to groundcovers, native grasses, wetland plants and marine plants (Smith 2003).  
                                              
1  Intensively-used zone refers to the agricultural area of Australia where the predominant land 
uses are cropping and improved grazing, with introduced grasses and legumes (Hamblin 2001). 
A map of the intensively-used zone is presented in chapter 3.      





The Act establishes the Native Vegetation Council (NVC), which has responsibility 
for overseeing all issues concerned with vegetation. The NVC is an independent 
body appointed by the Government. It is responsible for making decisions on a wide 
range of matters, including making determinations on applications to clear land, and 
establishing conditions under which clearance may be carried out. The NVC is 
responsible to the Minister for Environment and Heritage. 
The NVC’s seven members represent a range of relevant interests. For example, the 
South Australian Farmers’ Federation (SAFF), the Soil Conservation Council, the 
Conservation Council of South Australia and the Local Government Association 
nominate one member each. One member is nominated by the Australian 
Government Minister for the Environment, while the other two are appointed by the 
South Australian Minister for Environment and Heritage.  
The NV Act requires all property owners, in matters not covered by an exemption, 
to submit a proposal to the NVC seeking approval to clear vegetation. All 
applications must be accompanied by a native vegetation management plan and any 
other information required by the NVC (s. 28).  
In making its decision, the NVC must consider advice from the District Soil Board 
and the local council, and assess the application according to the clearance 
principles outlined in box F.1. The NVC must not make any decision that is 
seriously at variance with these principles, unless: 
•  the vegetation involved is one or more isolated plants; 
•  the applicant is a primary producer; and 
•  it is the NVC’s opinion that the retention of such vegetation would cause the 
applicant unreasonable expense (s. 29). 
If the application to clear is for the primary purpose of managing other native 
vegetation, the NVC must have regard to the applicant’s desire to manage that other 
vegetation (s. 29). If the primary purpose of clearing is for agricultural production, 
the NVC must have regard to the applicant’s desire to run their farm as efficiently 
as possible (s. 29).  
Where the NVC gives consent to clear native vegetation, there are usually 
conditions attached. These conditions typically include a requirement to establish 
native vegetation on land specified by the NVC, or fence-off remnant bush on the 
farm, such that the NVC is satisfied that after allowing for the loss of the vegetation 
to be cleared, there is a significant environmental benefit (s. 29).     
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Box F.1 Clearance  principles  under  the  Native Vegetation Act 1991 
Native vegetation should not be cleared if, in the opinion of the Council:  
(a)  it comprises a high level of diversity of plant species;  
(b)  it has significance as a habitat for wildlife;  
(c)  it includes plants of a rare, vulnerable or endangered species;  
(d)  the vegetation comprises the whole, or a part, of a plant community that is rare, 
vulnerable or endangered;  
(e) it is significant as a remnant of vegetation in an area which has been 
extensively cleared;  
(f)  it is growing in, or in association with, a wetland environment;  
(g)  it contributes significantly to the amenity of the area in which it is growing or is 
situated;  
(h)  the clearance of the vegetation is likely to contribute to soil erosion or salinity in 
an area in which appreciable erosion or salinisation has already occurred or, 
where such erosion or salinisation has not yet occurred, the clearance of the 
vegetation is likely to cause appreciable soil erosion or salinity;  
(i)  the clearance of the vegetation is likely to cause deterioration in the quality of 
surface or underground water;  
(j)  the clearance of the vegetation is likely to cause, or exacerbate, the incidence 
or intensity of flooding; or  
(k)  (i) after clearance the land will be used for a particular purpose; and 
  (ii) the land is the subject of assessment under section 35 of the Soil 
Conservation and Land Care Act 1989; and 
  (iii) according to that assessment the use of the land for that purpose cannot be 
sustained. 
Source: NV Act, Schedule 1. 
 
 
Recent amendments by way of the NV  Amendment  Act contain major new 
provisions to ensure that: 
•  a person who receives a permit to clear land must contribute to a Native 
Vegetation Fund (NV Fund), which will be used to offset the environmental 
impact of their actions by funding native revegetation within the same region 
(environmental offsets); and 
•  all applications to clear land are placed on a public register to allow members of 
the public to comment. 
The amendments also have strengthened enforcement and compliance provisions. 
Penalties for illegally clearing native vegetation, or contravening or failing to 
comply with a condition attached to a clearing consent, are calculated at a     





prescribed rate per hectare of land, or $100  000, whichever is greater (s.  26). 
Landholders may also be required to restore the property.  
Illegal clearing has been changed from a criminal offence under the NV Act to a 
civil offence under the NV Amendment Act. Under the NV Amendment Act, the 
Environment, Resources and Development Court (ERD Court) is able to serve an 
order on a landholder found to have illegally cleared, or breached a heritage 
agreement (s. 31), that requires them to:  
•  remove buildings, works or vegetation that may have been erected, undertaken 
or planted on the land since the clearing occurred;  
•  establish vegetation, specified by species and number of plants, on certain parts 
of the cleared land; and  
•  nurture, maintain and protect the plants until they are fully established, or for the 
period specified in the order (Smith 2003). 
Proceedings may be brought before the ERD Court for an order to remedy or 
restrain a breach of the Act by NVC, any person who owns or has an interest in land 
that will be affected by a breach of the Act, or by a party to a heritage agreement 
(s. 31A). 
Exemptions 
Under certain circumstances, clearing of native vegetation does not require the 
approval of the NVC. Exemptions laid out in the Native Vegetation 
Regulations 1991 (r. 3) apply where: 
•  vegetation is to be removed to comply with another act or regulation; 
•  clearing is incidental to enable construction, maintenance or repair of a building 
or access track, or to allow maintenance or construction of a fence; 
•  clearing is for the purpose of building a dam to be used in primary production 
and the remainder of the surrounding land has already been cleared of native 
vegetation and has been maintained for the previous 5 years for cultivation or 
pasture; 
•  vegetation is within 20 metres of a house;  
•  the sole purpose of clearing the vegetation is to provide a fire break; 
•  the sole purpose of the clearing is to provide material for fencing or firewood for 
the owner of the property, and the nature and extent of the clearance is 
reasonable (however, river red gums cannot be cleared under this exemption); 
•  clearance involves taking seeds or a specimen or cutting for propagation;     
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•  clearance is incidental to authorised exploratory or mining operations; or 
•  clearance is required to maintain land so that it can be used for cultivation, 
pasture or forestry, and the land on which the vegetation is situated was used for 
cultivation, pasture or forestry within five years immediately before the 
proposed clearance occurs. 
State Revegetation Committee 
The State Revegetation Committee (SRC) is South Australia’s peak advisory body 
on revegetation issues. It was established in 1995 as a joint committee comprising 
members from the SAFF, the Conservation Council of SA, Local Government 
Association, the NVC, the Soil Conservation Council, Greening Australia, Trees for 
Life, the Department of Primary Industries and Resources SA (PIRSA) and the 
Department for Environment and Heritage (DEH). 
Key functions of the SRC include: 
•  revegetation of previously cleared areas for multiple outcomes and balance 
between revegetation for biodiversity, resource management and economic 
purposes;  
•  development of revegetation policies, plans and strategies;  
•  identifying opportunities for coordination of effort within the revegetation 
sector;  
•  providing a mechanism for advancing revegetation in South Australia through 
grant funding, forums, and publications; and 
•  seeking funds to deliver revegetation programs and research priorities 
(PIRSA 2003).  
In contrast to the NVC, which has responsibility for revegetation only in relation to 
specific properties where clearing applications are being considered, the SRC has 
responsibility for district and regional revegetation plans (PIRSA 2003). 
The functions of the NVC and the SRC are therefore complementary, and there are 
mechanisms in place to ensure close collaboration between the two, and to 
coordinate monitoring and evaluation to allow for assessment of progress over time. 
Other legislation 
There is a range of other legislation that may affect landholders’ ability to manage 
native vegetation on their properties.      





Soil Conservation and Land Care Act  
This Act has four main aims: to ensure that land is used within its capacity; to 
ensure that land conservation becomes an integral part of land management; to 
provide for monitoring of the condition of the land; and to encourage 
implementation of procedures designed to reduce land degradation (s. 6).  
The Act imposes a duty on landholders ‘to take all reasonable steps to prevent 
degradation of the land’ (s. 8). On the recommendation of the Soil Conservation 
Council, and with public consultation, the Minister for Primary Industries can 
establish soil conservation districts and soil conservation boards (s. 22), with the 
task of increasing awareness of land conservation and of providing advice and 
assistance to landholders (s. 29).  
A soil conservation board must develop and implement a district plan, which 
assigns land to various classes, outlines the capability and preferred uses of that 
land, identifies the nature and extent of degradation, and describes land 
management processes and measures for preventing further degradation (s. 36). The 
board must form a district plan within five years, in consultation with the 
community, the Council and various other organisations. The plan must be reviewed 
every three years (s. 36). The board must also encourage landholders to enter into 
voluntary property plans outlining their proposed land management procedures over 
a three year period (s. 37).  
If the Council believes that land degradation is occurring, or is likely to occur 
within its district due to certain land management practices, or failure to implement 
a property plan, the board may issue a soil conservation order to prevent further 
activities that could cause land degradation (s. 38). Such an order may require that 
vegetation be replanted or cleared, or require that some other specific action be 
taken or not taken. 
Contravention of, or failure to comply with, a soil conservation order constitutes an 
offence (s. 38). If non-compliance with a soil conservation order results in damage 
to the land of another person, that person may recover damages (s. 44). 
Development Act  
The Development Act requires the preparation of a planning strategy for South 
Australia, or parts of the State. The strategy can include planning or development 
objectives relating to ecologically sustainable development and the management, 
conservation or use of natural resources (s.  22). Development may only be 
permitted in a particular area if it is approved under the development plan. A     
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development can be classified as complying or non-complying, and conditions can 
be imposed.  
The Government or a local council can enter into a land management agreement 
with a landholder for the preservation of land, and has power to carry out work on 
that land, as required by the agreement (s. 57). 
Under this Act, native vegetation may only be ‘damaged’ without appropriate 
authorisation in the event of an emergency, as a means to protect a person or 
building (s. 54A). The Development Act requires that approval be obtained before 
damaging any ‘significant tree’, even if approval has already been granted under the 
NV Act (s. 54B).  
Under the Act, a ‘tree-damaging activity’ includes: killing, removal or destruction 
of a tree; severing of branches, limbs, stems or the trunk; ringbarking, topping or 
lopping; or any other substantial damage to a tree. It also includes any other activity 
that causes any of the above to occur, but excludes maintenance pruning that will 
not adversely affect the general health and appearance of a tree (s. 4). 
Animal and Plant Control Act  
This Act deals mainly with the removal of non-native vegetation. However, it 
contains a provision that anyone clearing non-native vegetation take all reasonable 
steps to make sure that they do not unnecessarily destroy or damage native 
vegetation (s. 64). Fines of up to $2000 may be imposed on anyone not complying 
with this provision (s. 64). 
Pastoral Land Management and Conservation Act 
This Act imposes a general duty on pastoral lessees to carry out their agricultural 
practices in accordance with good land management, to prevent degradation of the 
land, and to endeavour, within financial constraints, to improve the condition of the 
land (s. 7). Misuse of pastoral land extends to cutting down, lopping branches or 
otherwise damaging any vegetation on pastoral land. The maximum penalty for 
such an offence is $10 000 (s. 57). 
If the Pastoral Board holds the opinion that pastoral land has been degraded, or is 
likely to deteriorate, it may require the lessee to submit a property management plan 
(s. 41). The property plan must outline how the lessee intends to manage the land 
over a specified period so as to minimise, arrest or prevent degradation, or to 
rehabilitate the land to protect it from further damage (s. 41).     





National Parks and Wildlife Act 
There is no legislation that explicitly pursues biodiversity objectives in South 
Australia. Biodiversity is indirectly protected by the National Parks and Wildlife 
Act 1972, which provides protection for habitat and wildlife through the 
establishment of parks and reserves. It also provides for the use of wildlife through 
a system of permits allowing certain actions, such as keeping, selling, trading, 
harvesting, farming, hunting and destruction of native species (s.  60). It also 
contains clauses for the conservation of native plants, including endangered, 
vulnerable and rare species (s. 49). 
In 1997, the Government of South Australia established a program for the 
preparation of biodiversity plans for each region of the State. These plans guide 
on-ground activities to conserve biodiversity and identify conservation priorities for 
the region. These conservation priorities include threatened species, plant 
communities/habitats and species of significance, and key biodiversity areas and 
threats. The plans also provide guidance on conservation actions that can be 
undertaken and may be used to allocate funding to projects. Regional Biodiversity 
Plans are prepared in consultation with landholders and community groups and 
include input from experts (Inns, Opperman and Croft 2003). Plans have been 
published for the South East, South Australian Murray-Darling Basin, Kangaroo 
Island and Northern Agricultural Districts. 
F.3  Development of the regulatory regime 
The Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories (DEST 1995) concluded 
that South Australia’s native vegetation has been extensively modified since 
European settlement. Most clearing occurred in the agricultural area which 
comprises 18 per cent of the State. In 1975, around 75 per cent of the agricultural 
area, or about 3 800 000 hectares, had been cleared.  
A voluntary scheme was introduced in 1980 to encourage landholders to enter into 
heritage agreements. The aim of this scheme was to persuade landholders to retain 
and manage areas of native vegetation on their land by providing financial 
incentives. The SA Government (2001)  reports however that the scheme was 
ineffective in achieving its objectives, as landholders were unwilling to amend their 
land clearance practices for the financial assistance on offer. In 1983, only 0.75 per 
cent of remnant native vegetation in the agricultural zone had been placed under 
heritage agreement. By 1988, the area of the agricultural region that had been 
cleared had risen to almost 80 per cent (DEST 1995).     
  SOUTH AUSTRALIA  429
 
With the introduction of clearing controls under the Planning Act 1983, (brought in 
without public consultation to prevent panic clearing), vegetation clearance was 
defined as a land-use change requiring planning approval. There was significant 
backlash in response to these new regulations, particularly from landholders whose 
clearance applications were refused.  
After extensive consultation, the Native Vegetation Management Act 1985 
(NVM  Act) was introduced, with clearance controls managed by the Native 
Vegetation Authority. This Act allowed for compensation, subject to areas being 
placed under a heritage agreement (s.  27). Farmers were entitled to receive as 
compensation an amount equivalent to the diminution in the value of the land as a 
result of a clearing permit being denied (s. 28). 
With the introduction of the current NV Act, these explicit compensation provisions 
were removed. Some financial assistance still remains for heritage agreement areas, 
as noted under the section on the Heritage Agreement Scheme (SAFF 2000).  
Under the NVM Act, the maximum fine for landholders found in breach of the Act 
was $40 000 — an amount small enough for some landholders to integrate into the 
cost of clearing for agricultural production. In contrast, the new Act requires 
landholders who have cleared vegetation without permission to revegetate the area, 
and to face fines of up to $100 000 (SA Government 2002). 
F.4  Promoting environmental goals 
Objectives of the regime 
The objectives of the NV Act are described in box F.2. In summary, the Act is 
designed to protect, enhance and restore native vegetation for biodiversity, habitat 
and land degradation reasons. 
Aims of the Development Act include enhancing conservation, use, development 
and management of land; and facilitating and encouraging sustainable development 
and environmental protection. These aims contribute to the broader goal of 
achieving orderly and efficient planning and development in South Australia (s. 3). 
The Pastoral Land Management and Conservation Act aims to ensure the good 
management and use of all pastoral lands; to manage renewable resources to 
improve their yield; and to prevent the degradation of the land and its indigenous 
flora and fauna (s. 4).     






Box F.2  Objects of the Native Vegetation Act 1991  
The objectives of the Native Vegetation Act include: 
(a)  conservation, protection and enhancement of the native vegetation of the State 
and, in particular, remnant native vegetation, in order to prevent further – 
i)  reduction of biological diversity and degradation of the land and its soil; 
ii)  loss of quantity and quality of native vegetation in the State; and 
iii)  loss of critical habitat;  
(b) provision of incentives and assistance to landowners to encourage the 
commonly held desire of landowners to preserve, enhance and properly 
manage the native vegetation on their land;  
(c) limitation of the clearance of native vegetation to clearance in particular 
circumstances, including circumstances in which the clearance will facilitate the 
management of other native vegetation or will facilitate the sustainable use of 
land for primary production;  
(d)  encouragement of research into the preservation, enhancement and 
management of native vegetation; and 
(e)  encouragement of the re-establishment of native vegetation in those parts of the 
State where native vegetation has been cleared or degraded. 
Sources: NV Act, s. 6; NV Amendment Act, s. 6. 
 
 
The Soil Conservation and Land Care Act has four main aims: to ensure that land is 
used within its capacity; to ensure that land conservation becomes an integral part of 
land management; to provide for monitoring of the condition of the land; and to 
encourage implementation of procedures designed to reduce land degradation (s. 6). 
Consistency 
The NV Act makes provision for avoiding the duplication of procedures and 
compliance requirements where the clearance of native vegetation requires consent 
under this Act and approval under the Australian Government’s Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (s. 29A).  
There is very little overlap in the South Australian legislation that influences native 
vegetation management, and no obvious inconsistencies that would compromise 
achievement of the objectives. 
However, under section 54B of the Development Act  approval is required to 
damage a significant tree, even if the activity is permitted under the NV Act. The 
regulatory regime involving multiple acts, may therefore make permit approvals 
more difficult to obtain than under a system where only one act regulates clearance.     
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Although the NVC delegates some clearance decisions to DEH, as provided for 
under section 15 of the NV Act, the NVC has a Review and Audit Sub-Committee 
to review all decisions made under delegated authority. This review process ensures 
that decisions made by DEH are consistent with NVC policies (NVC 2002). 
The NV Act provides that the NVC must have regard for the clearance principles 
outlined in box F.1, which may promote consistency between decisions regarding 
permit approval. Another clause states that, where native vegetation is in a soil 
conservation district, the NVC must, before giving its consent to clear, consult the 
soil conservation board in that district, and have regard to any recommendations it 
might make in relation to the application (s. 29). Where native vegetation is on 
pastoral land, the NVC must consult the Pastoral Board before granting permission 
to clear (s. 29). 
Where a soil conservation board or the Pastoral Board has been consulted by the 
NVC, the NVC may request that the owner of the land submit a property plan as 
required under the Soil Conservation and Land Care Act  or the Pastoral Land 
Management and Conservation Act. The relevant board may recommend to the 
NVC that it refuse consent to clear on the basis that a property management plan 
has not been submitted (s. 29). 
Inconsistencies between various government documents regarding definitions of 
remnant native vegetation may be causing unwarranted additional administration 
costs. This problem may stem from the inaccurate nature of the State’s mapping 
resources. Sally McKay (trans., pp.  465–6) asserted that the maps held by the 
Department of Planning SA are incorrect, in that they depict a watercourse running 
through her property when in fact there is none. Inaccuracies such as this could 
potentially have implications for the assessment of any clearing permit submitted, 
creating unnecessary costs for the landholder and also the administrative authorities.  
Support for objectives 
In 1999, the Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council 
(Griffin 1999) reported that the SA Government displays a strong commitment 
towards community engagement in the conservation of native vegetation, evidenced 
by: 
•  strong public debate over the clearing of native vegetation in the 1980s; 
•  community involvement in preparation and implementation of Regional 
Biodiversity Plans; 
•  a Property Management Planning Program inclusive of conservation modules; 
and     





•  extension services promoting conservation of native vegetation by landholders. 
However, Jim McDowall disputed the assertion that there was strong public debate 
over native vegetation clearing in the 1980s. He argued that: 
I don’t think there really was any strong public debate. They had no chance. The debate 
was settled before the question was asked. The legislation was brought in under cover 
of darkness, so after that all you had was basically more of what we’ve heard today, 
where people are complaining about something that they haven’t got. (trans., p. 1688) 
Griffin (1999, p. 73) also reported, however, that there are still significant issues in 
communication and capacity building to be achieved in South Australia. It noted 
that particularly in Adelaide, community engagement processes are ‘ad hoc and lack 
a strategic focus’. Communication with landholders, currently undertaken through 
separate extension services run by the Department of Environment, Heritage and 
Aboriginal Affairs (DEHAA) and PIRSA, requires more integration and 
coordination to ensure consistent objectives and approaches. 
The broad nature of many of the objectives may result in uncertainty and confusion 
and this may hinder the achievement of environmental objectives. Scott Donner 
(SAFF) argued that: 
… you need clearly defined goals and outcomes of what you want. This is always what 
has been lacking. Nobody quite knew what they wanted … Well you actually have to 
be very clear and quite scientific so that things are achievable, otherwise it doesn’t help 
biodiversity and it certainly antagonises farming communities. (trans., p. 1708)  
According to Griffin (1999), South Australia needs to: 
•  develop and target community education programs about the role of native 
vegetation in achieving sustainable natural resource management;  
•  support Natural Heritage Trust (NHT) coordinators in their role of promoting the 
objectives of regional strategies and programs; and 
•  train extension officers in both sustainable agricultural management and on-farm 
nature conservation. 
The Pastoral Program was established under the Pastoral Land Management and 
Conservation Act to provide protection for South Australia’s rangeland resources 
whilst facilitating ecologically sustainable use. Key program activities include: 
•  monitoring of rangeland condition on pastoral leasehold lands;  
•  systematic assessment of land condition;  
•  enforcement of lease conditions, particularly in relation to land condition;  
•  providing information and support to the Pastoral Board;      
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•  tenure administration;  
•  lease rental administration; and 
•  providing a network of public access through pastoral lands.  
Effectiveness of the regulatory regime 
Ongoing monitoring 
Under the NV Act, the Minister appoints authorised officers to inspect land for the 
purpose of administering and enforcing the Act, and for determining whether 
landholders are in compliance with heritage agreements (s. 33). However, the Act 
seems to allow for random and intermittent monitoring, rather than comprehensive 
or extensive monitoring and enforcement. 
South Australia does, however, have several programs that monitor the general state 
of the natural resource base, and some of these include components that specifically 
track changes in native vegetation cover. 
State of the Environment Report 
In South Australia, the Environment Protection Act 1993 (EP Act) requires the 
Environment Protection Authority to produce a State of the Environment (SoE) 
report, tabled in Parliament, at least once every five years.  
The SoE report provides a framework for recording progress towards sustainable 
development. The reports include environmental indicators and performance 
measures for land-use and soil condition, as well as loss of biodiversity. The 
indicators are expressed in terms of changes in land-use, the area of land affected by 
acidic and saline soils, the area of land with potential for wind and water erosion, 
and the extent and condition of remnant terrestrial vegetation.  
It is chiefly the Soil Conservation and Land Care Act that is monitored for 
performance against its objectives (DEHAA 1999).  
Biological Survey 
The Biological Survey of South Australia is a program of systematic surveys, 
developed and implemented in 1971 to provide a baseline inventory of the State’s 
flora and fauna. The program is overseen by the Biological Survey Coordinating 
Committee, which is an interdepartmental State government body.      





It is estimated that surveying and mapping will be complete in about a decade. Once 
complete, the biological survey could be used to monitor the status of native 
vegetation cover in the State, and to determine where illegal clearing may be 
occurring. 
In conjunction with the biological survey and vegetation mapping program, a 
complementary program exists to map pre-European vegetation in the intensive 
zone. The south-eastern region (from the South East to Murray Mallee and Mid 
North) will be completed within the next three years, while the northern Mid North, 
Eyre and Yorke Peninsula do not yet have completion dates. Once complete, the 
information from this program may be used to provide options for revegetating 
farms with indigenous flora. The use of pre-European vegetation mapping is also 
used for determining whether revegetated areas qualify for heritage agreement 
status under s. 23 of the NV Act. 
Transparency 
Elliott argued that greater accountability and openness were required in the 
implementation of the NV Act and in the operations of the NVC (Legislative 
Council 4 August 1999). The NV Amendment Act, accordingly, contains clauses to 
ensure that the process of permit approvals for native vegetation clearance is more 
transparent. The NVC must now advertise its meetings to allow public comment in 
relation to the granting or refusal of consent to an application to clear (s. 29). 
It was also suggested that the composition of the NVC should be revised to increase 
the level of scientific expertise. Elliott proposed that the NVC be reconfigured to 
provide for the membership of a trained ecologist or botanist (Legislative Council 4 
August 1999). However, the NV Amendment Act does not provide for alterations to 
the composition of the NVC.  
A lack of transparency in the assumptions used by the authorities when mapping 
vegetation has also created problems for some landholders. Sally McKay and Jim 
McDowell claimed that there is a widespread problem associated with definition of 
remnant vegetation in South Australia, and with some of the assumptions made 
regarding the state of forest resources prior to the use of aerial photography: 
I think that my discussions with farmers across the breadth of South Australia and 
[with] other landholders who have significant historical knowledge going back two, 
three generations or more — and a lot of it is backed with photographic evidence — 
[indicate] the database is flawed and probably seriously so. To some extent, that’s 
proved by the misstatements in various documents, or variations in statements. Quite 
often you will read that Mount Lofty has only 4 per cent remnant vegetation. You will     
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pick up another government document and it will have 12 per cent remnant vegetation. 
That’s a lot of area, so there’s a problem of definition. (trans., pp. 466–7) 
In Sally McKay’s (sub. 78) case, problems with mapping, and a lack of 
transparency have contributed to the landholder being unable to clear vegetation 
planted as a tree crop a generation ago.  
Perverse outcomes 
Until recently, provisions existed under the NV Act for the NVC to allow clearance 
in contravention of the clearance principles if the vegetation in question comprised 
one or more isolated plants (s.  29). This section has resulted in some perverse 
outcomes involving significant numbers of ‘isolated plants’ as the Act was open to 
individual interpretation, and was one of the reasons cited by Elliott for the 
necessity for the NV Amendment Act (Legislative Council 4 August 1999).   
In another instance of broad interpretation of the NV Act, a landholder cleared a 
number of mature trees by erecting a fence that weaved its way around the trees, 
and then by cutting down all the vegetation either side of the fence, citing 
exemptions under the Native Vegetation Regulations 1991, which allow clearance 
without a permit for purposes of fence construction (Legislative Council 4 August 
1999). A related exemption, which allows the clearing of trees for fence posts, has 
also been used inappropriately, and has resulted in a significant level of tree 
clearing (Legislative Council 4 August 1999).   
Under the Animal and Plant Control Act, landholders are obliged to control or 
destroy pest plants on their land (s. 57). If the landholder fails to ensure that pest 
plants are controlled or destroyed, the Animal and Plant Commission, or a control 
board, has the authority to serve a notice on the landholder requiring them to 
remove the plants. If the landholder fails to comply with the notice, the Commission 
or the control board has the authority to undertake the work and to bill the 
landholder for the cost of removal (s. 58).  
However, Sally McKay (sub. 78) claimed that local council requirements insist that 
some pest plants, such as Bridal Creeper, be removed by hand, rather than sprayed, 
since spraying may result in poisoning of native vegetation. Sally McKay claimed, 
however, that hand weeding is ineffective, as it results in the plant spreading. 
It was suggested that the requirements under the Animal and Plant Control Act to 
destroy pest plants have been used as an excuse for destroying native vegetation that 
has become infested with pest plant species (South Australian Legislative Council, 
4 August 1999).       





SAFF (sub. 140) claimed that the current regulatory regime is causing confusion in 
relation to the clearance of regrowth. The legislation prevents clearance after 
10  years for grazing and after 5 years for any other clearance activity, such as 
cropping and maintaining pasture. However, poor communication has resulted in 
confusion in the community.  
This approach to managing regrowth has a significant impact on landholders, 
particularly because the timeframes enforced are arbitrary and do not reflect the 
financial realities of farming enterprises: 
To manage a property within the required time frame would require a landholder to 
thoroughly clear any regrowth on a property on a strict schedule or risk prosecution if 
the time guidelines are broken … Few landholders would normally pursue clearance in 
such a rigorous manner — pasture improvement plans for large (and commercially 
viable) properties would typically run over decades, not a five (or even a ten) year 
cycle. (SAFF, sub. 140, p. 8) 
The upshot of these restrictions is that landholders clear regrowth far more 
rigorously than they otherwise would, for fear of losing their capacity to develop 
their farms. This outcome is perverse in that it fails to encourage landholders to 
maintain native vegetation on their properties for long-term benefit.  
Water use inefficiency is another perverse outcome potentially stemming from 
inflexibility in vegetation regulations. Bryan Paech (trans., p. 444) from the Tatiara 
District Council suggested that centre pivot irrigators are far more water-efficient 
than flood-irrigation. Yet in some cases, landholders have been prevented from 
implementing this technology because it would have involved the removal of ‘one 
or two trees’. This has been enforced even when landholders were prepared to plant 
many trees in offsets, or to fence-off other areas for placement under heritage 
agreement. 
It would seem from evidence given by Bryan Paech (trans.,  p.  443) that often 
approval to clear these trees is refused not on the basis of the clearance principles 
under the native vegetation regulations, but on the basis that they contribute to the 
amenity values of the area. This type of assessment relates to section 23 of the 
Development Act, which provides for a tree to be classified as ‘significant’ if it 
contributes to the character or amenity of an area. 
The considerable amount of time — in some cases as long as two years — often 
taken to obtain an assessment on clearance applications imposes significant costs on 
landholders (Bryan Paech, trans., p. 445).      
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In extreme circumstances, Tatiara District Council believes that landholders may 
take matters into their own hands and clear illegally: 
Our refusal to [allow clearance of] the native vegetation, which is often the case, may 
have an impact on the future viability of the farm. Unfortunately it seems that no 
consideration is given to the future viability of the farm in any decision made by the 
authority, and I think probably that’s another thing that landholders are frustrated with 
… when landholders become frustrated … these trees will disappear — I don’t think 
that’s the way they really want to do it but they will do it by illegal means to clear it, 
and that becomes a fight between the native vegetation people and the landholders and 
the council. (trans., p. 445)  
Applications for clearance 
In the period 1995-96 to 1999-00, 22 applications for broadacre land clearance were 
assessed by the NVC. Approval was granted for about 2000 hectares of clearance, 
while applications for about 1100 hectares were refused. Conditions on clearance 
applied to approximately 1000 hectares (SA Parks and Wildlife 2002). 
Over this period, most permits were for vineyard construction or extension. A 
significant proportion of permits were also requested for clearing associated with 
irrigation, farm management and miscellaneous developments. 
In 2000-01, 94 applications for clearing were assessed by the NVC. However, only 
two of these applications fell into the broadacre category; both of which were 
regrowth only. Four applications, covering about 40 hectares, were made for 
brushcutting, woodcutting and clearance for research. These are considered to have 
high prospects of recovery, and consent was granted by the NVC for all 
applications. Ninety applications were made for clearing which would result in no 
prospect of vegetation recovery. The applications involved about 1000 hectares of 
land, and approval was granted for clearing about 300 hectares (NVC 2001).  
Conditions on approval included that: 
•  108 hectares of remnant vegetation be placed under heritage agreements; 
•  355 hectares of land be permanently set aside for natural regeneration to 
complement naturally occurring vegetation; 
•  150 hectares of land be permanently set aside and planted with about 17 000 
trees and shrubs to enhance existing vegetation; and 
•  104 hectares of land be permanently set aside and planted by direct seeding in 
areas containing little or no existing vegetation (NVC 2001).     





In 2001-02, nine applications for clearing associated with high prospects of 
recovery were determined over 41 hectares. Consent was granted for all 
applications. Eighty-seven applications were processed for clearance with no 
prospect of recovery over 559 hectares of land. The NVC refused clearance for 
about 1000 trees with a canopy area of 56 hectares (NVC 2002).  
Conditions on approval included that: 
•  82 hectares of remnant vegetation be placed under heritage agreements; 
•  1042 hectares of land be permanently set aside for natural regeneration to 
complement naturally occurring vegetation; and 
•  45 hectares of land be permanently set aside and planted with 5700 trees and 
shrubs to enhance existing vegetation (NVC 2002). 
Level of compliance 
The Resource Protection Section of SA National Parks and Wildlife is responsible 
for undertaking investigations of suspected breaches of the NV Act. Over the period 
1998 to 2002, reports of alleged illegal clearing, which have been investigated, 
fluctuated between 120 and 152 per year. The majority of illegal clearing was 
reported to have occurred in the Adelaide, Yorke Mid North and Kangaroo Island 
regions, with fewer reports from the South-East, Murraylands, Western and 
Outback regions (NVC 2001 and 2002) (table F.1).  
Table F.1  Number of reports of illegal clearing by region 
Region 1998-99  1999-00  2000-01  2001-02
Outback and the ranges  2  2  8  13
West 6  10  3  13
Murraylands 35  19  16  10
South-East 9  32  17  23
Adelaide, Yorke Mid North, 
Kangaroo Island regions 
69 78 76  93
Total 121  141  120  152
Sources: NVC (2001; 2002). 
The NVC (2001) reported that in 2000-01, the number of incidents of alleged illegal 
clearing in the South-East region halved from the previous year, and that the 
number of reports from the Western region had been reduced. However, statistics 
reported in 2001-02 suggest that these reductions were only temporary, and may 
represent annual fluctuations in clearing. In 2001-02, 117 cases were submitted to 
the Legal Officer within the Investigations and Compliance Unit. This represented a     
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significant increase on the 26 breach reports lodged in 2000-01 and the 42 breach 
reports lodged in 1999-00. 
Adjudication outcomes relating to matters referred to the Investigations and 
Compliance Unit are provided in table F.2. 
Table F.2  Adjudication outcomes on breach reports 
Legal action taken  Number of cases 2000-01  Number of cases 2001-02
Prosecution 7  20
No further action  2  6
Warning letters  16  21
Outstanding na  17
Settled out-of-court  1  13
Total 26  85
Sources: NVC (2001; 2002). 
Most prosecutions resulted in fines (ranging from $100–$3500) and/or good 
behaviour bonds.  
The Investigations and Compliance Unit recently launched a satellite imagery pilot 
called ‘Operation Crusoe’, which involves the use of satellite imagery to detect 
instances of illegal clearing on Kangaroo Island (NVC 2002). Using this trial 
method, 21 anomalies were detected and investigated. The program has since been 
refined and another 144 anomalies in vegetation cover have been detected and are in 
the process of being investigated. 
However, Tatiara District Council (sub.  60) indicated that enforcement and 
monitoring are an ongoing concern due to lack of resources. Rather than directing 
additional resources to making more legislation, the Council suggested that 
resources should be directed to providing on-ground staff and education to build 
better relationships with landholders to achieve the desired outcomes.  
Economic and social impacts 
The District Council of Elliston (sub. 120, p. 5) claimed that under the approval 
process for clearance, the main criteria for consideration are the potential impacts 
on flora and fauna, rather than economic or social impacts. 
The SA Government observed that under the NV Act, the NVC ‘now considers the 
circumstances under which the applicant operates their property and the extent to 
which their decision may affect its viability’ (sub. DR324, p. 37) The social and 
economic interests of the community are considered under the Development Act.     





The EP Act states that both short and long-term social, economic, environmental 
and equity considerations should be taken into account to uphold the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development. 
F.5  Administration and implementation 
Administrative costs 
Some of the costs of administering the NV Act may be obtained from the financial 
statements of the NV Fund. For example, in the year ended 30 June 2001, the NV 
Fund spent almost $1 million on assistance payments, research and other expenses. 
This figure does not take into account the cost of salaries or expenditure by 
government departments in administering the various acts that relate to native 
vegetation and biodiversity. This figure also neglects the costs associated with 
monitoring and enforcing the NV Act. 
Dispute resolution procedures 
The main avenue for dispute resolution under the NV Act was provided by 
section 30, where an applicant who was dissatisfied with the NVC’s ruling on their 
application to clear, could request that the NVC refer the application to a conciliator 
for assessment. The conciliator would submit a report to the NVC with a 
recommendation to either uphold, vary or revoke the original determination. The 
reasons for the conciliator’s decision were laid out in a report. Where the conciliator 
recommended that the determination be varied or revoked, the NVC had to 
reconsider the application, taking into account the conciliator’s recommendation. 
The conciliator had no powers to overturn a decision of the NVC. 
In 2001-02, seven conciliator reports were prepared in relation to determinations 
questioned by dissatisfied applicants. Upon reviewing the reports, the NVC 
resolved to uphold its original decision in every case, reputedly because the 
applications involved intact blocks of vegetation or scattered trees with high habitat 
value (NVC 2002). 
Under the NV Amendment Act, the provision for conciliators has been repealed. 
However, section 33F provides for persons who have applied to clear native 
vegetation to appeal to the ERD Court against a refusal by NVC to grant permission 
to clear.      
  SOUTH AUSTRALIA  441
 
The ERD Court may either affirm, or rescind the decision and refer the matter to the 
NVC for further consideration. However, the ERD Court may not overturn the 
ultimate discretion of the NVC to refuse to grant a consent to clear, or to impose 
conditions associated with a consent to clear.  
F.6  Impacts on landholders 
Impacts on farming practices 
Tatiara District Council (sub.  60) stated that many of the impacts on farming 
practices occur because the current regulations fail to take into account, or fail to 
achieve a balance between, the economic, social and environmental impacts of 
native vegetation regulations. The Council believes that when assessing applications 
for vegetation clearance, there is no consideration given to best farming practices 
and the impact on the capacity for farms to be sustainable. The impacts on farming 
practices may be an inability to control for weeds, vermin or soil erosion, or simply 
a matter of time and convenience — in one case, a landholder was required to drive 
17 kilometres between his two properties instead of the 900 metres necessary if the 
clearing permit for his access track had been approved (Tatiara District Council, 
sub. 60). 
As raised earlier, SAFF (sub. 140, p. 8) noted that due to the provisions under the 
NV Act that implement five and ten-yearly exemptions for clearance of regrowth, 
landholders are clearing their regrowth far more rigorously than they otherwise 
would in order to ensure that they do not lose their rights to use their farm land as 
previously. 
Sally McKay (trans., p. 468) also referred to the incentives for landholders to ensure 
that their native pasture is never left for more than five years without being 
cultivated. This may not be the best environmental outcome, for example, because it 
means paddocks cannot be minimum tilled or pastured using broadcast seed. It is 
also likely to mean that landholders are less willing to maintain native pasture on 
their land, since exotic species do not attract the same scrutiny. 
According to Sally McKay (trans.,  p.  470), the current regulations also act as a 
disincentive to planting trees, because there is no guarantee that landholders will be 
able to remove them later, either for profit or convenience reasons. This 
disincentive has been strengthened by the NV Amendment Act, since it has 
reclassified illegal clearing as a civil offence, meaning it is now up to the landholder 
to prove that they planted the trees, rather than the onus of proof being on the 
authorities to prove that trees are remnant native vegetation.     





Regulations that do not allow sufficient clearing on road verges pose potential 
hazards to people. This has a direct economic impact through landholders 
employing less farm labour: 
I can barely drive without scratching my tractors. I used to have three people working 
for me on the farm. Now, my son and I do the lot, because … if I did have anyone 
helping me … you’ve only got to have a person, a labourer, drive somewhere and 
collect one of those trees through the windscreen and my occupational health and safety 
would just go through the roof. So unfortunately, certainly where we are, it’s just a 
long, sad litany of problems. Not me personally, but in this whole area. (Sally McKay, 
trans., p. 463)  
Sally McKay (trans.,  p.  463) also referred to some of the possible hazards to 
livestock associated with having trees too close to fence lines. In particular, there is 
an issue with liability if stock from the farm were to escape and cause damage if 
council trees fell on the shared boundary fence. Sally McKay has previously 
encountered problems with livestock injuring themselves on low-hanging branches 
that cannot be removed due to vegetation regulations. 
Impacts on property values and returns 
Sally McKay (sub. 78, p. 2) indicated that an inability to obtain permission to clear 
trees that her family planted on her farm 40 years ago has cost thousands of dollars 
in legal advice, $250  000 in lost income potential from harvesting the trees for 
firewood, the opportunity cost of lost land productivity, and potential future losses 
from not being able to re-employ the land in new enterprises. 
Kevin Parker noted: 
In our case we’ve got a property which, if it was allowed to be cleared to the conditions 
of the deeds, today’s value would be around $3 million, and at the moment I think if we 
put it on the market it might bring $600 000 … (trans., p. 433)  
He further noted that based on his observation of land sales in his area:  
… a property with a heritage agreement on it brought around about $60 an acre for 
cleared arable land. The one with no heritage agreement on, all cleared, brought three 
hundred and something dollars an acre — similar condition. (trans., p. 433)  
Gary Anderson (sub. 194) argued that as a direct result of the NV Act, his family 
was unable to clear regrowth on 75 per cent of their farm. This resulted in a decline 
in the value of the property amounting to one-tenth of the value of cultivated land, 
and one-quarter of the value of the land as it was in its partly-cleared state. Gary 
Anderson also claimed that the potential annual income generation of this property 
had been significantly affected — the Anderson farm grosses $15 000 to $30 000 
per year, while nearby cleared farms of similar size gross $300 000 to $380 000 per     
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year. In addition, the scrubland on the property ‘provides negligible income, and 
would create no profit at all if we were to carry out the desired level of weed and 
feral animal control’ (Gary Anderson, sub. 194, p. 13). 
The SA Government (sub.  DR324) referred to research that demonstrated that 
application of Heritage Agreements either reduced or had no effect on property 
prices, depending on the location of the property and its agricultural use.  
Impacts on attitudes of finance providers 
The Commission has received very little evidence from South Australia in relation 
to the impacts of the regulatory regime on the attitude of finance providers and any 
associated impacts on landholders’ investment decisions. 
One instance involves the refusal of banks to mortgage a property with a registered 
heritage agreement. Kevin Parker stated: 
This heritage agreement we have on our property stopped us having a mortgage on it … 
We have not been able to find a financial institution to mortgage it. If it didn’t have a 
heritage agreement … it would be valued at about $3 million. (trans., p. 432)  
Gary Anderson (sub. 194, p. 7) also indicated that once clearing was denied on his 
property, the banks and stock firms refused finance because the property was 
deemed ‘not potentially viable’. He claimed that nearby properties of similar size 
and topography, that have arable areas fully cleared are able to access overdraft 
facilities of $80 000. 
Government measures to mitigate negative impacts 
South Australia spent around $85  million in financial assistance after the 
introduction of clearing controls under its NVM Act. 
The NV  Act, introduced in 1991, provides for the establishment of heritage 
agreements over areas of native vegetation in order to preserve or enhance them 
(s.  23). A heritage agreement is a contract between a landholder and the State 
Government for the protection in perpetuity of a particular area of native vegetation. 
These agreements attach to the land, and are binding on the current owner of the 
land, whether or not that owner was the person who entered the agreement (s. 23). 
A heritage agreement may restrict the use of the land, require specific work to be 
carried out, or require management plans to be agreed periodically (s. 23A).  
Heritage agreements are designed to encourage and assist landholders to conserve 
native vegetation on their properties, and the NVC provides financial assistance for     





this. For example, a landholder who has signed an agreement may become eligible 
for financial assistance to manage the land, a rate rebate on the heritage agreement 
land, an amount of money equal to the devaluation of the land and/or fencing 
assistance if required (s. 23).  
As of 2002, the South Australian Heritage Agreement Scheme had 1266 heritage 
agreement landholders protecting 560 000 hectares of native vegetation (SA Parks 
and Wildlife 2003). Over $80  million has been allocated since the Scheme 
commenced (SA Parks and Wildlife 2003). NVC (2002) report that, during 
2001-02, it provided $84  000 from the NV Fund for supporting heritage 
agreements. This was supplemented by an additional $95 000 from the NHT. 
There is evidence to suggest that heritage agreements have not always been entered 
into voluntarily, but have on occasion, been entered into under pressure. Helen 
Mahar (sub.  40 and DR238) claimed that the NVC initially offered clearance 
consent over regrowth, subject to signing a large heritage agreement. Helen Mahar 
objected and consent was refused. Subsequent negotiations for such a trade-off 
failed to reach an agreement. Helen Mahar exercised an exemption to maintain 
grazing, which was eventually recognised by the NVC. The NVC recommended 
that a ‘hardship payment’ be made in recognition of income losses caused by delays 
in acknowledging the exemption. The NVC then linked the receipt of the payment 
to Helen Mahar signing a heritage agreement. Helen Mahar claimed that this 
heritage agreement was signed under pressure and without the clearing consent 
being issued. This process took five years. Helen Mahar claimed that the NVC was 
acting unlawfully from the start requesting that a heritage agreement be signed for 
land that was not in the application to clear. Helen Mahar also claimed that the 
NVC was acting unlawfully in linking reimbursement of income losses to signing a 
heritage agreement.  
Kevin Parker (trans., p. 431) also stated that the heritage agreement that he and his 
family signed on their property was ‘forced’: 
We were forced to sign a heritage agreement because it had taken five years and the 
only way we could get compensation was to sign a heritage agreement. (trans., p. 431) 
In addition, the Coorong Local Action Plan (LAP) offers incentives to landholders 
for revegetation projects and actions that protect existing native vegetation and 
wetlands. A bonus is given for projects that generate an added biodiversity benefit. 
The LAP is jointly funded (both cash and in-kind) by the NHT and the Coorong 
District Council (Bateson 2000).  
Incentives provided for fencing remnant vegetation are determined by several 
factors, including the health, size, location and intactness of the vegetation, as well 
as whether it protects endangered species (Bateson 2000).      
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F.7  Impacts on regional communities and other 
economic activities 
Gary Anderson (sub. 194, p. 15) stated that the restrictions placed on the use of his 
farm by the regulations have reduced farm spending within the local community by 
$80 000 per year, as he is no longer able to employ shearers, shed hands, farm 
labourers or tradespeople.  
The District Council of Elliston (sub. 120) reported that the regulation of native 
vegetation, particularly through heritage agreements, has negative consequences for 
local government and consequently, the local community more generally. The 
Council pointed out that land that carries heritage agreements is valued at zero for 
the purpose of rates assessments, which results in a significant loss in the total 
revenue recouped by local government. In order to fund this ‘shortfall’, Council 
must raise the rate at which it assesses the remaining valued properties in the 
District. Thus, the costs associated with heritage agreements are manifested in the 
additional burden that the landholders of cleared properties in the District have to 
pay in rates (District Council of Elliston, sub. 120). 
Where potentially productive agricultural land is prevented from being cleared by 
regulations, this has impacts for local economic activity and population drift, as 
marginal farms are sold to neighbours and the local population shrinks. In turn, 
declines in regional populations affect schools and other regional facilities (District 
Council of Elliston, sub. 120). SAFF noted:  
Whilst regional economic decline cannot be wholly blamed upon one set of prescriptive 
regulations, the rapid decrease in farm numbers in South Australia in recent years 
(9 per cent 1993 to 1999) is the clearest indicator possible of the pain felt in rural 
communities as ever increasing numbers of farms become unviable. It is impossible to 
argue that the inability to fully develop farm businesses as a result of the South 
Australian native vegetation legislation has not had a part to play in this drawn out 
drama. It is simply exceedingly difficult to quantify its contribution to agricultural and 
regional decline. (sub. 140, pp. 5–6) 
Gary Anderson (sub.  194) referred to the social costs that may be (indirectly) 
associated with the impacts of native vegetation regulations. In particular, he 
referred to the decline in health suffered by his family as a result of stress, anxiety 
and poverty brought on by lower income and by battling with bureaucracies. He 
also stated that his children no longer participate in local sports or social activities 
because the family cannot afford transportation costs to and from such activities. 
Such impacts undoubtedly affect the individuals concerned, and extrapolated to a 
broader scale, could potentially have significant impacts on the social fabric of 
regional communities.     





Benefits to the community associated with intact areas of native vegetation include 
tourism, lower risk of salinity, higher biodiversity, ecosystem services such as water 
filtration and pollination.  
F.8 Summary 
Clearing regulations are not as widespread an issue in South Australia as in some 
other States, probably because only a small portion of the state is suitable for 
clearing and much of this was cleared prior to 1980. The major issue in South 
Australia is one of equity. 
The main problems with the legislation focus around lack of flexibility in its 
implementation. In addition, a failure to take into account the economic and social 
costs when assessing clearance applications, may mean that high costs are imposed 
on some landholders.     
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G Western  Australia 
G.1 Introduction 
The legislative framework regulating the clearing of native vegetation in Western 
Australia is about to change significantly. The Environment Protection Amendment 
Act 2003 (EP Amendment Act), which sets out a new process for assessing clearing 
proposals and enforcing compliance, was passed by Parliament on 20 October 2003 
and part of the Act came into operation on 19 November 2003. However, the 
sections of the Act which relate to clearing controls and prosecutions for 
environmental harm have not yet been proclaimed.1 Throughout this appendix the 
new legislation is referred to as the ‘proposed’ arrangements; the current legislation 
is referred to as the ‘current’ regulatory arrangements.  
The new legislation will change the current system of land clearing notifications, 
where notifications are submitted to the Commissioner for Soil and Land 
Conservation, to a system of clearing permits processed through the Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA).  
G.2  Description of the regulatory regime  
Under the current regulatory arrangements in Western Australia, several pieces of 
legislation directly affect native vegetation management: the Soil and Land 
Conservation Act 1945 (SLC Act), the Conservation and Land Management 
Act 1984 (CALM Act), the Environmental Protection Act 1986 (EP Act), the Land 
Administration Act 1997 (LA Act) and the Country Areas Water Supply Act 1947 
(CAWS Act). The ways in which these regulations currently relate to land clearing 
are described in box G.1. The Wildlife Conservation Act 1950 (WC Act) also affects 
native vegetation management in WA.  
                                              
1  These are sections 37, 54(2), 55, 72(2) and (4), 75(3) and (4) and Part 9. These provisions are 
expected to come into operation during 2004. The WA Government (sub. DR290) indicated that 
clearing regulations that will underpin the new regime are currently being developed.      





A landholder wishing to clear native vegetation is required to lodge a notice of 
intent (NOI) with the Commissioner for Soil and Land Conservation. The 
Commissioner has 90 days in which to object to a notification of clearing.  
 
Box G.1  Regulation of land clearing in Western Australia 
Soil and Land Conservation Act 1945 
Section 28 relates to activities that injuriously interfere with the land in any soil 
conservation reserve. 
Section 35 requires compliance with a Soil Conservation Notice. 
Soil and Land Conservation Regulations 1992 
Regulation 4 — a landholder who wishes to undertake clearing (more than 1 hectare) 
that will result in a change in land use, must notify the Commissioner for Soil and Land 
Conservation at least 90 days before commencing clearing.  
Regulation 5 — an owner or occupier of land who proposes to drain or pump water 
from under the land surface because of salinity and to discharge that water onto other 
land, or into other water or a watercourse, must give 90 days notice to the 
Commissioner for Soil and Land Conservation. 
Land Administration Act 1997 
Section 109 — a pastoral lessee must not remove trees or clear land under the lease 
except if it is permitted under the lease, it is necessary for construction of 
improvements as permitted under the lease, or if a permit has been issued. 
Section 110 — pastoral land must not be sown with non-indigenous pastures without a 
permit. 
Section 111 — a pastoral lessee must control declared animals and declared plants in 
compliance with the Agriculture and Related Resources Protection Act 1976 and to the 
satisfaction of the Board.  
Section 267(2) — a person who clears, cultivates, causes or allows stock to graze on 
Crown land without the permission of the Minister or reasonable excuse, or removes 
from Crown land any plant (whether alive or dead), commits an offence. 
Country Areas Water Supply Act 1947 
Section 12B — clearing without a licence in a controlled catchment area is an offence. 
Environmental Protection Act 1986 
Section 41A — if the EPA has set a level of assessment for a proposal and this has 
been set out in the public record, a person who implements a proposal before a final 
decision is published by the EPA commits an offence. 
Source: DEP (2002a). 
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The Commissioner is limited to considering land degradation issues that may result 
from clearing (Bennett 2002). Following assessment by the Commissioner, 
proposals that may have a significant impact on the environment usually are 
referred to the EPA for assessment. EPA involvement may be necessary to ensure 
that the impacts of clearing on biodiversity are taken into account. If the 
environmental impact assessment process is invoked, the Environment Minister 
consults with interested Ministers and decision-making authorities and considers 
economic and social factors raised by these parties before making a decision (WA 
Government, sub. 151, p. 6). 
The assessment of economic and social impacts differs depending on the nature of 
the decision. The Western Australian Government (sub.  151, p.  6) noted that in 
respect of rural clearing proposals, environmental considerations generally are not 
balanced against economic and social considerations. The WA Government 
(sub. DR290) further noted that the Commissioner for Soil and Land Conservation 
does not have the authority to consider the social and economic benefits of a 
clearing proposal.  
Soil and Land Conservation Act 
The Department of Agriculture (AgWA) has primary responsibility for the 
administration of the SLC Act, but is supported by a number of State and regional 
structures in this responsibility, including the Soil and Land Conservation Council 
(SLCC)2 (box G.2), the Rural Adjustment and Finance Corporation of Western 
Australia Board, and over 140 Land Conservation District Committees. 
Under the Act, the Minster for Agriculture can recommend to the Governor that 
certain tracts of land be designated as soil conservation districts (LCDs) (s. 22) or 
soil conservation reserves (s.  26). The Minster may regulate to restrict land use 
within LCDs, but this power has not been generally used (WA Government, 
sub. DR290).  
Where private land is taken for a soil conservation reserve, it is acquired as per 
acquisitions for public works under the LA Act (s. 26). The Minister is required to 
manage soil conservation reserves so as to minimise potential degradation and 
prevent impacts on other land. Land within designated soil conservation reserves 
may be leased by the Minister for any use she/he deems fit (s. 30). Classification of 
land as a soil conservation reserve may be revoked at any time by the Governor on 
                                              
2 The Soil and Land Conservation Council is an inter-agency group, which includes 
representation from local government, the Conservation Council, WA Farmers’ Federation and 
the Pastoralists and Graziers Association.      





the recommendation of the Minister. Anyone disturbing soil or vegetation within a 
soil conservation reserve may incur a penalty of up to $2000 (s. 28). 
 
Box G.2  Functions of the Soil and Land Conservation Council 
The Soil and Land Conservation Act 1945 establishes the Soil and Land Conservation 
Council. Functions of the Council under the Act include: 
•  to advise the Minister as to the condition of soil and land resources;  
•  to make recommendations to the Minister as to land use, soil and land conservation 
policy, and programs for the implementation of that policy;  
•  to coordinate, monitor, and review soil and land conservation programs and 
activities; 
•  to coordinate and advise on the implementation in the State of soil and land 
conservation programs funded by the Australian Government;  
•  to supervise soil and land conservation programs undertaken by the Government of 
the State; 
•  to promote awareness of land degradation and conservation; and 
•  to coordinate the establishment of, and activities within, land conservation districts. 
Source: Soil and Land Conservation Act 1945, s. 16. 
 
 
A Soil Conservation Notice may be placed on private property, where it is the 
Commissioner’s belief that land degradation has occurred, or may foreseeably 
occur, due to the failure of any person to take adequate precautions to prevent or 
control soil erosion, salinity or flooding (s. 31).  
A Soil Conservation Notice may be placed on land in order to: 
•  prevent further degradation on that property or elsewhere;  
•  aid regeneration of vegetation; and  
•  require the landholder to undertake any activities that may be required to address 
land degradation concerns (Native Vegetation Working Group 2000).  
Where a landholder contravenes or fails to comply with a soil conservation notice, a 
penalty of $3000 applies (s. 35). If a landholder causes damage to the property of 
any other person, and that damage would not have occurred had the landholder 
complied with a soil conservation notice, then the owner of the damaged land has a 
right of action against the landholder. If a landholder fails to comply with actions 
required by a conservation notice, then persons authorised by the Commissioner 
may enter the land and undertake the required actions, and the costs incurred will be 
debts due to the Crown (s. 35).     
  WESTERN AUSTRALIA 451
 
The Commissioner has power under the Act to prevent the removal of individual 
paddock trees, where this is deemed detrimental to the future use of the land 
(although this power has never been exercised in Western Australia). However, 
unless more than one hectare is to be cleared, the removal of such trees is not 
notifiable under the Act, provided their removal would not alter the existing land 
use (Native Vegetation Working Group 2000). 
The SLC Act does not provide compensation for landholders adversely affected by 
land clearing regulations. However, there are six controlled catchments in the south-
west of Western Australia where special arrangements are in place under the 
CAWS Act to prevent clearing in ‘declared’ catchments. In these catchments, where 
an application to clear is refused, claims may be lodged with the Water and Rivers 
Commission3 for compensation. As at January 2000, more than $36 million had 
been paid to settle such claims (Native Vegetation Working Group 2000). 
There are additional clauses in the SLC Act that establish the potential for the 
Commissioner to enter into conservation covenants with private landholders (s. 30). 
Another clause in the Act creates the Landcare Trust (s. 40). 
In 1991, an amendment to earlier regulations incorporated a clause that introduced a 
timeframe on ‘no objection’ notices from the Commissioner for Soil and Land 
Conservation. This means that landholders must commence clearing within two 
years of receiving such a notice, or else be required to lodge a new NOI if they 
propose land clearing in the future (Native Vegetation Working Group 2000). 
Environmental Protection Act 
The EP Act is administered by the Department of Environment Protection (DEP) 
and EPA. These agencies are responsible for environmental impact assessment 
processes within the State, including proposals that may impact on vegetation and 
biodiversity.  
There are very few guidelines in the Act itself to describe the role and position of 
the EPA in relation to land clearing. However the EPA’s position statement on 
clearing of native vegetation (EPA 2000) reflects several National and State 
policies, including: the National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s 
Biological Diversity 1996; the Natural Heritage Trust Partnership Agreement 1997; 
the  ANZECC National Framework for the Management and Monitoring of 
Australia’s Native Vegetation 1999; the Memorandum of Understanding for the 
                                              
3  The Water and Rivers Commission and the Department of Environmental Protection are to be 
merged to form the Department of Environment.      





Protection of Remnant Vegetation on Private Land in the Agricultural Region of 
WA 1997; and the Native Vegetation Working Group Final Report 2000. 
If a proposal appears likely to have a significant environmental effect, the local 
decision-making authority should refer the proposal to the EPA for assessment as 
soon as the proposal comes to the attention of that authority (s. 38). However, where 
the proposal does not fall into the category of an assessed scheme, the proposal may 
be referred to the EPA by either the proponent or any other interested person (s. 38). 
The Minister may also refer any proposal to the EPA if it appears that there is 
public concern about the likely environmental impacts of a given proposal (s. 38). 
The Act provides for statutory environmental protection policies (EPPs) to protect a 
particular region by regulation (s. 71). For example, EPPs are in place to protect 
nominated wetlands and their fringing vegetation in the south-west agricultural area 
and the Swan Coastal Plain (Griffin 1999). 
Conservation and Land Management Act  
The Department of Conservation and Land Management (CALM) is created by the 
CALM Act. CALM’s role is to administer the CALM Act and the WC Act. CALM 
is responsible for the management of Western Australia’s terrestrial conservation 
reserves, state forests, marine parks and marine nature reserves, and for the 
protection of biodiversity. CALM operates through a structure of nine regions. It 
works with the Conservation Commission of Western Australia (in which terrestrial 
conservation reserves, State forest and timber reserves are vested) and the Marine 
Parks and Reserves Authority (in which marine parks and marine nature reserves 
are vested).   
The CALM Act provides for conservation agreements over private and pastoral 
leasehold lands (s. 16). CALM may also purchase, in whole or in part, pastoral 
leases, freehold remnant vegetation and wetlands that are required for conservation 
purposes (s. 15) for future addition to the conservation reserve system.  
Land Administration Act 
On pastoral leasehold lands, stocking rates are regulated by the LA  Act, and 
administered by the Pastoral Lands Board. The Act explicitly requires land to be 
managed on an ecologically-sustainable basis (s. 95).  
A pastoral lessee is required to maintain all indigenous pasture and vegetation on 
the land (s. 108) and cannot clear or disturb vegetation unless it has already been 
approved under the terms of the lease (s. 109). The penalty for illegal clearing of     
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pastoral land is $10 000 (s. 109). It is an offence under the Act to sow pastoral land 
with non-indigenous pastures without a permit (s.  110). The Native Vegetation 
Working Group (2000) found that the main threat to native vegetation in pastoral 
regions is grazing, despite the provisions of this Act. 
Country Areas Water Supply Act  
The Board of the Water and Rivers Commission has responsibility for managing the 
water resources of Western Australia. Its charter requires community consultation in 
planning and implementation, supported through local Catchment Coordinating 
Groups and Waterways Management Authorities. Under this Act, any person who 
clears vegetation without a licence in a controlled catchment commits an offence 
(s. 12B). A person committing such an offence may be liable to pay a fine of up to 
$2000 and may be required to restore the vegetation (s. 12B).  
Wildlife Conservation Act  
The principal Western Australian legislation relating to biodiversity conservation is 
the WC Act, which is administered by CALM. All native flora are protected under 
the WC Act.  
It is the Minister who declares flora to be rare. Declared rare (threatened) flora may 
not be removed by any person without the consent of the Minister, even on private 
land. There are no guidelines in the legislation as to conditions the Minister might 
set in regard to such takings. The maximum penalty for removing protected flora 
without consent is $10 000 (s. 23F). 
If a private landholder has been refused consent, and can satisfy the Minister that 
they will suffer loss of use or enjoyment of the land by reason of that refusal, the 
landholder will be paid compensation for up to five years, so long as the loss 
continues. If compensation has been paid for a period of five years, the Minister 
must not refuse an application to take rare flora from that part of the land for which 
compensation has been paid (s. 23F).  
Regardless of whether compensation has been paid for the loss of use or enjoyment 
of land or not, any land in the State that is private land may be acquired by the 
Minister for Planning and Infrastructure under the LA Act (s. 9) for any purpose 
listed under the LA  Act. The Minster for the Environment has no compulsory 
acquisition powers.      





Programs of assistance 
In addition to schemes which provide technical advice and training to landholders, 
the WA Government has a number of assistance schemes to promote and achieve 
environmental objectives (box G.3). Several of these schemes are discussed in more 
detail below.  
 
Box G.3 Financial  assistance  schemes 
•  Community Conservation Grants 
•  Nature Conservation Covenant Program 
•  Wetlands Conservation Program 
•  Regional Parks Community Grants 
•  Native Vegetation Trust Fund 
•  Swan Alcoa Landcare Program 
•  Priority Projects and Devolved Grants Schemes 
•  Envirofunds Grants 
•  Landcare Australia 
•  Fishcare WA 
•  Denmark Conservation Appeal 
•  Auction for Landscape Recovery Pilot Project  
•  Busselton Biodiversity Incentive Strategy 
•  Conservation Zone Rates Rebate 
•  Biodiversity Conservation Grants 
Source: WA Government (sub. DR290).  
 
 
Natural Resource Adjustment Scheme  
The Natural Resource Adjustment Scheme (NRAS) was developed primarily to 
assist landholders disadvantaged by land-clearing restrictions. The program is 
funded by the State Rural Assistance Fund. Under the Scheme, landholders who 
register conservation covenants on their land may be eligible for several types of 
assistance such as: 
•  payments to retain bushland based on the current market value at the time of 
commencing negotiations with the applicant; 
•  payments to meet subdivision costs where this is needed to place the bushland 
on a separate title; and     
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•  assistance in the coordination and negotiation of the sale of the land, should the 
landholder wish to sell the land. 
The Scheme is only available to rural landholders who have had a NOI to clear 
rejected in full by the Government after 17 May 1995 and prior to 31 
December 1999. In addition, the land must be more than 20 per cent bush at the 
time of submitting the NOI. 
Remnant Vegetation Protection Scheme 
This scheme ceased operation in the 1999-00 financial year. It had operated 
since 1989, providing grants to landholders for the fencing ($1200 per km) and 
protection of remnant native vegetation that had been protected by 30-year 
conservation covenants. Similar funding is now available under the Natural 
Heritage Trust (Bushcare). 
AGWEST Farm Planning Programs 
AGWEST manages a number of assistance and training programs including State 
Landcare Program and schemes overseen by the Rural Adjustment and Finance 
Corporation (RAFCOR). 
Schemes overseen by RAFCOR include the South Coast Productivity Grants, 
Progress Rural WA and FarmBis. The South Coast Productivity Grants scheme was 
the final regional initiative under the Rural Adjustment Scheme. It provided grants 
of up to $10 000 to landholders or businesses for property development, enterprise 
diversification, property build-up and amalgamation, and professional advice for the 
development of appropriate enterprises relevant to the South Coast region. The 
scheme ceased in February 2002 after outlaying around $3.3 million. 
Bush Brokers 
Bush Brokers is a collaborative program developed by the World Wildlife Fund, the 
Real Estate Institute of Western Australia and the SLCC, with support from the 
AgWA. The program has been developed as a means to promote private investment 
in bushland for conservation.  
Bush Brokers aims to increase the market value of bushland and improve land-
planning processes to facilitate a new market in bushland blocks. By creating a 
commercial market for bushland, Bush Brokers aims to preserve biodiversity, 
improve land and soil quality, and reduce the gap between private and public 
conservation values to help promote sustainability.     





The WA Farmers’ Federation (WAFF) argued that the Bush Brokers scheme has 
value in urban and near urban areas but noted that: 
… in the broadacre agricultural areas of the state this scheme will be of little value to 
landholders prevented from clearing because the demand for native bush is very low 
and as a consequence so is the price commanded. (sub. DR287, p. 2) 
G.3  Proposed regulatory arrangements 
Under the proposed regulatory arrangements, native vegetation management in 
Western Australia will be dealt with directly through the EP Amendment Act. The 
new legislation seeks to integrate assessment of land degradation and biodiversity 
conservation concerns within the same approval process, bringing Western 
Australia in line with other jurisdictions. 
The new Act repeals the legislation under which a NOI to clear is required and 
replaces it with a system of clearing permits issued under the EP Act. The system 
therefore will change from one under which it is permissible to clear unless the 
Commissioner for Soil and Land Conservation objects, to one in which it is an 
offence to clear without a permit. Permits will be issued by the Chief Executive 
Officer of DEP (WA Legislative Assembly 2002, p. 12301). 
Environmental Protection Amendment Act 2003  
Among other things, the stated purpose of the EP Amendment Act is to ensure more 
effective protection of native vegetation by incorporating sustainability principles, 
providing for more effective post-approval monitoring of major projects, and 
improving the impact assessment process to address cumulative and regional 
impacts (WA Legislative Assembly 2002). DEP (2002b) suggests that the 
advantages of the new system include: 
•  broader assessment — the EP Amendment Act will allow for the assessment of 
clearing applications for all forms of environmental degradation; 
•  stronger penalties — new penalties include large fines and the power to direct 
landholders who have illegally cleared to revegetate; 
•  equality between city and country — both urban and rural clearing proposals 
will be assessed on the same basis; and 
•  equality between Government and private applications — the legislation will be 
binding on both Government and private landholders.      
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The new legislation will enable strategic environmental impact assessment to be 
undertaken by the EPA, as well as retaining the existing provisions for referral of 
significant proposals. This will enable the EPA to become involved in proposals 
from an early conceptual stage, with the aim of generating more environmentally-
friendly project designs. However, only the proponent can refer a strategic proposal 
for assessment by the EPA, and this referral is voluntary (WA Government 2002).  
Under the new legislation, the WA Government is pursuing a ‘no net loss’ policy, in 
an attempt to maintain and increase the quality and quantity of native vegetation in 
Western Australia. All proposals to clear native vegetation will require an 
assessment and permit from DEP. However, exemption may be granted, for 
example, where vegetation was intentionally planted for harvest, where clearing is 
required for firebreaks not more than five metres wide, or to construct a lawful 
building or road. 
In assessing applications for permits, the DEP must consider a range of clearing 
principles (to be listed in proposed Schedule 5 of the Act), which may only be 
departed from with good reasons that are made public. The clearing principles are 
based on principles that have been used by South Australia for the past 10 years and 
are designed to ensure that consideration is given to the value of remnant vegetation 
(WA Legislative Assembly 2002). 
Inter-agency consultation will be retained in assessing permit applications. Site 
evaluations will be carried out by government officers to assess the environmental 
impacts of a proposal, using criteria based on biodiversity, water and soil, salinity 
and other impacts. In addition, all applications must be advertised to allow public 
comment on the impact of the proposed clearing. Only the most complicated 
clearing applications, involving potential impacts that cannot be considered under 
the permitting process, will be referred to the EPA for impact assessment. 
Under the EP  Act, unauthorised clearing of vegetation is not considered to be 
‘pollution’. The new Act introduces the concept of ‘environmental harm’, to allow 
for prosecution of deliberate or negligent activities that result in environmental 
degradation outside the approval process.  
There are two levels of environmental harm offence. Environmental harm is defined 
under the Act as any activity that kills or damages native vegetation, including 
flooding or draining the land, burning vegetation, or grazing stock (DEP 2002c). 
The lower level environmental harm offence is ‘material environmental harm’, 
where the harm must be ‘more than trivial or negligible or result in loss, damage, or 
costs (of prevention or making good) of more than $20  000’ (WA Legislative 
Assembly 2002, p. 12304). ‘Serious environmental harm’ applies when the harm is 
‘high impact, irreversible, broad-scale, significant, in an area of high conservation     





value or special significance, or when damage costs exceed five times the threshold 
amount, or $100  000 as currently provided’ (WA Legislative Assembly 2002, 
p. 12304).  
The maximum penalty for serious environmental harm, where the harm was 
deliberate or negligent is $500 000 plus five years imprisonment for individuals, 
and $1 million for corporations (DEP 2002b). Where intent cannot be proven, the 
maximum penalty for serious harm is $250 000 and three years imprisonment. This 
penalty also applies to criminally negligent material environmental harm. Material 
environmental harm without intent carries a penalty of $125 000 for an individual. 
Clearing in breach of a permit, or before the completion of the EPA’s assessment 
process, incurs a maximum penalty of $62 500 (WA Legislative Assembly 2002, 
p. 12304). 
The Act also includes a retrospective clause that requires landholders who clear 
land without authorisation after 26 June 2002, to restore the vegetation at their own 
expense.  
Incentive and assistance measures for protecting native vegetation will increase 
under the proposed legislation. The Government has established a new incentive 
package to assist landholders in protecting and managing native vegetation, 
including: 
•  an initial $1 million for a Native Vegetation Trust Fund to facilitate a range of 
measures including fencing, revegetation, weed and feral control for bushland 
under voluntary protection; 
•  $350 000 for the Land for Wildlife program; and 
•  a further $1  million to support industry adjustment through land purchase 
(DEP 2002b). 
Biodiversity legislation 
The WA Government is in the process of developing a Biodiversity Conservation 
Bill to replace the WC Act. The primary objectives of the proposed Act will be to 
provide for the protection and restoration of biodiversity, and the sustainable use of 
native plants, animals and other organisms. Another goal is to meet criteria for 
accreditation to allow State implementation of relevant parts of the Australian 
Government’s  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(EPBC Act) (CALM 2002).  
It is envisaged that the proposed Act will be wider in its application than the 
WC  Act, more open to community input and processes, contain more effective     
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decision-making and enforcement mechanisms, incorporate mechanisms to 
facilitate community conservation efforts, and attempt to address the processes 
threatening the conservation of biodiversity.  
In particular, it is proposed that new provisions under the Bill will:  
•  strengthen special protection for identified threatened species, and extend this 
protection to threatened ecological communities; 
•  ensure that decisions to protect species and ecological communities are made in 
accordance with clear statutory criteria and on the basis of advice from the 
independent, expert Threatened Species and Communities Scientific Committee; 
•  place special restrictions on the circumstances in which licences to harm 
threatened species or ecological communities can be granted; 
•  include enhanced and more effective enforcement mechanisms, including 
increased penalties and the power for the Minister for the Environment to issue 
conservation orders to ensure site-specific protection of threatened species or 
ecological communities; 
•  include controls on environmental pests and weeds and more effective controls 
on the importation of species that may become pests or weeds; 
•  provide the Minister with the power, on the recommendation of the Threatened 
Species and Communities Scientific Committee, to list key threatening processes 
and regulate threatening processes where they impact on biodiversity 
conservation; and 
•  provide statutory backing for nature conservation covenants, under which 
landholders can voluntarily protect the biodiversity on their land in perpetuity. 
Covenanting provisions might include obligations to manage land in accordance 
with a management plan (CALM 2002).  
All decisions involving significant conservation risks must be authorised by the 
Minister, but more general cases of authorisation will continue to be administered 
by CALM. Any actions that could result in extinction or destruction of a species or 
ecological community must first gain the approval of the Governor (effectively 
Cabinet) and be tabled in Parliament to ensure that the government of the day is 
held accountable (CALM 2002).  
Under the proposed Act, protection of the three tiers of biodiversity (genetic, 
species and ecosystem diversity) will be strengthened by: 
•  applying protection to all of Western Australia’s native biota, to assist species 
diversity;     





•  giving strong protection to distinct populations and specified sub-species where 
the Minister believes they are eligible for listing, to assist genetic diversity 
within species; and  
•  giving the Minister the power to list and protect threatened ecological 
communities, to assist ecosystem diversity. 
The proposed Act will prohibit the killing, harming or detrimental disturbance 
(without authorisation) of species protected by the Act. Enforcement provisions 
under the new Act are likely to increase significantly the fines associated with 
offences. The Minister may also be empowered to serve conservation orders, 
requiring landholders to protect, conserve or manage threatened species or 
ecological communities. A person convicted of an offence may be required to repair 
the damage they have caused at their own expense (CALM 2002). 
Conservation offset conditions may be introduced, for example, where takings do 
not seriously endanger the species.  
The Minister may approve bioregional plans, which would need to be recognised 
under the Act in any decisions made in relation to biodiversity management. 
Recovery plans for a native species, ecological community or critical habitat may 
form part of the bioregional plan, while wildlife management plans would be used 
to guide licensing decisions to ensure the ecologically sustainable use of resources. 
All such plans would need to be factored into the operations of public authorities. 
G.4  Development of the regulatory regime 
Given that most of the existing legislation regulating native vegetation clearance 
and biodiversity conservation in Western Australia is relatively old, the legislation 
pre-dates any requirements to undertake regulation impact statements.  
The Commission, in the time available, could not gain access to information on the 
community consultation processes that were undertaken prior to implementation of 
all land-clearing regulations in Western Australia. The WA Government (sub. 151, 
p. 8) indicated that due to the number of different policies that make up the current 
regime, it would take considerable time to outline the community consultation 
processes that were carried out in developing all of those policies.  
The level of public consultation has varied depending on whether changes to 
clearing legislation have been incremental or major (WA Government, sub. 151, 
p.  8). For example, the introduction of tougher criteria for considering clearing 
applications in 1995 was cited as a shift in approach that does not require broad 
public consultation. In contrast, the current Biodiversity Conservation Bill heralds a     
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clear change in regime and is therefore undergoing a detailed public consultation 
process involving a consultation paper and a draft Bill. 
In addition, as part of the consultation process, CALM is undertaking several 
consultative sessions with interested groups such as Indigenous, conservation and 
industry bodies, and Government agencies, on how the objective of biodiversity 
conservation can best be achieved. The consultation paper expressly requests 
suggestions that would help promote biodiversity conservation and sustainable 
resource use, and on the possible roles that the Conservation Commission and 
Marine Parks and Reserves Authority could be given.  
The closing date for public submissions on the consultation paper was 
5 March 2003. A total of 157 submissions were received and were reviewed by 
CALM for possible inclusion in the drafting of the Biodiversity Conservation Act 
(WA Government, sub. DR290).  
The WA Government has established a Natural Resource Management Council to 
provide advice to Government on natural resource management issues and to ‘foster 
a consultative approach that ensures broad community involvement in NRM policy 
development’ (WA Government, sub. 151, p. 9). 
However, the WA Government has not always used a consultative approach in 
developing new legislation. The clearing provisions to be inserted into the EP Act 
were not published for public comment prior to their reading in Parliament because 
the ‘Government wanted to move quickly to solve obvious problems with existing 
land clearing laws’ (WA Government, sub. 151, p. 8). The WA Government does, 
however, intend to consult with the peak farming bodies in regard to the details of 
exemptions from the new clearing permit provisions. 
There is also some evidence that consultation with landholders may be lacking at 
the regional level. Peter Wren submitted that: 
The West Australian State Planning Strategy, and in particular the Leeuwin-Naturaliste 
Statement of Planning Policy … arbitrarily reclassified our land use categories from 
rural and farming to reflect nature conservation and landscape values. Consultation 
with private landowners was available only after the maps were drawn and new land 
use categories set. No consideration whatsoever was granted as to the financial 
implications of losing the choice to determine the future use of our private freehold 
land. It seems that the West Australian Planning Commission engaged in ‘a 
comprehensive process of community consultation’ that somehow excluded the party 
most affected – the private landowner. (sub. 119, p. 1)  
The WA Government, however, disputed Mr Wren’s claim that private landholders 
were excluded from consultations over the Leeuwin-Naturaliste Statement of     





Planning Policy. The WA Government stated that community consultation in 
relation to the statement involved: 
… arguably the most comprehensive public involvement achieved to date in Western 
Australia over a regional land use policy. Consultation included workshops for the 
general public, interest group meetings, publication and responses on issues papers, a 
social assessment survey, public meeting, information days, panel hearing and 
individual meetings with landowners affected by recommendations  … 
(sub. DR290, p. 26) 
The Shire of Gingin also expressed some frustration over a perceived lack of 
consultation, explanation and transparency with which the Government applied 
native vegetation and biodiversity legislation: 
It is considered incumbent upon Government, if it wishes to ensure native vegetation 
and biodiversity protection into the future, that it do so in a more consultative manner 
with the community so that there is an understanding at a broader community level of 
the necessity for such legislation. The current environmental management ethos is very 
much ‘top-down’, which is perceived by the majority as a draconian bureaucratic 
process introduced without reason or justification. It is the reasoning and justification 
which needs to be more clearly enunciated if the community is to embrace the concept 
of, and need for, sustainable management of native vegetation and biodiversity. 
(sub. 37, p. 6)  
The Shire of Dandaragan (sub.  191) claimed that a lack of transparency and 
community consultation also characterised the introduction of the 
1997 Memorandum of Understanding, which was a key document that guided the 
actions of the six agencies involved in assessing land-clearing applications.  
G.5  Promotion of environmental goals 
Objectives of the regime 
None of the existing Acts that make up the native vegetation and biodiversity 
regulatory regime in Western Australia contain objectives. However, the WA 
Government (sub. 151, p. 1) indicated that, in general, there has been a trend for 
native vegetation and biodiversity regulations to be tightened over time, in response 
to greater recognition of the benefits of protecting native vegetation and 
biodiversity. 
The WA Government agreed that the legislation contained no explicit objectives, 
but noted that: 
… the need for the legislation was widely debated by industry and community groups 
for several years prior to the legislation being proclaimed … Therefore, it could be     
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argued that since the introduction of clearing controls in Western Australia, for both the 
gazetted water supply catchments and the general agricultural areas in the 1970s and 
1980s, the avoidance of additional secondary salinity impacts on public water supplies 
and agricultural land has always been clearly articulated as the prime focus. 
(sub. DR290, p. 6) 
Nonetheless, monitoring of the effectiveness of the regime is difficult because there 
are no stated objectives against which to judge outcomes. There are also very few 
monitoring programs in place, and where they do exist, they tend to monitor 
improvement or decline in native vegetation relative to the status quo. This is 
despite the fact that the SLC Act lists monitoring as one of the key functions of the 
SLCC. 
Western Australia produces its own State of the Environment Report, which 
provides information on the key environmental problems facing the State. Although 
it is indicated in the report that clearing of native vegetation can cause 
environmental problems such as salinity, erosion, waterlogging, eutrophication and 
biodiversity loss, no monitoring or comment is made directly on the level of land 
clearing. 
The Western Australian Rangelands Monitoring System is a program designed to 
monitor trends in rangeland conditions in the shrublands of Western Australia. It 
monitors sites at five-yearly intervals, and uses a Normalised Difference Vegetation 
Index to put the collected data into the correct seasonal context, so as to allow a 
better interpretation of the nature of any rangeland changes.  
The monitoring system has shown that there has been an improvement in perennial 
vegetation and range condition over the last few years in the Southern Rangelands. 
While a sequence of good seasons has contributed to these results, it is also thought 
that the outcome reflects good management over most areas (Department of 
Agriculture 2002). 
Applications for clearing 
Table G.1 indicates the trend in clearing applications processed without objection 
over the period 1986-87 to 2000-01. There is a significant downward trend in the 
percentage of clearing applications that were approved without objection, 
particularly from around 1995-96 onwards. While an explanation for this trend is 
unclear, it may be the result of the Government’s shifting philosophy on land 
clearing and the coinciding introduction of the NRAS.     





Table G.1  Clearing applications under the Soil and Land Conservation Act 
(1986–2002) 
Year  Area notified (ha)  Area without objection (ha)  % without objection
1986-87  34 632  30 467  88
1987-88  43 259  35 624  82
1988-89  78 030  61 541  79
1989-90  48 041  39 356  82
1990-91  36 137  22 953  63
1991-92  12 640  7 342  58
1992-93  5 967  5 110  86
1993-94  13 078  9 443  72
1994-95  10 587  6 916  65
1995-96  21 504  5 624  26
1996-97  17 132  2 258  13
1997-98 9  214  965  10
1998-99  9 572  1 377  14
1999-00 3  039  378  12
2000-01  2 722  1 034  38
Source: WA Government (sub. 151). 
Agreements to protect vegetation 
Table G.2 outlines the area of vegetation protected under the SLC Act between 
1999-00 and 2001-02, through both conservation covenants and soil conservation 
notices. The Commissioner for Soil and Land Conservation reported that during 
2001-02, six agreements involving 73 hectares of native vegetation were registered 
as reserve on certificate of title. One agreement to reserve nine hectares was 
discharged, and eleven conservation covenants on certificate of title were registered, 
involving the protection of 374 hectares of native vegetation (Commissioner for 
Soil and Land Conservation 2002). 







Soil conservation notices  1 394  2 900  3 323
Agreement to reserve lodged  2 125  2 362  64
Conservation covenants (Remnant 
Vegetation Protection Scheme) lodged 
1 382  10 223  0
Conservation covenants (Non-Remnant 
Vegetation Protection Scheme) lodged 
736 868  374
Total area protected   5 637  16 353  3 761
Source: Commissioner for Soil and Land Conservation (2002).      
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All nine soil conservation notices issued during 2001-02 were issued to prevent 
notified land clearing or in response to land clearing complaints, but two were later 
discharged. Five soil conservation notices that had been issued in previous years 
were also discharged, and a further three were varied (Commissioner for Soil and 
Land Conservation 2002). 
Level of compliance 
During 2001-02, the Commissioner for Soil and Land Conservation reported that 
four summonses were issued for failure to notify clearing, and one summons was 
issued in relation to breach of a soil conservation notice. The Commissioner also 
reported that around 3000 hectares of land had been illegally cleared in Western 
Australia since July 2001, and that these complaints are currently being investigated 
(Commissioner for Soil and Land Conservation 2002). 
The Wildflower Society of WA (sub. 33, p. 4) stated that illegal land clearing has 
historically been a problem in rural Western Australia. The Society suggested that 
the backlog of illegal clearing complaints has increased in recent years as the 
Government has moved towards a more stringent legislative stance and permits 
have become harder to obtain. Many cases are yet to be investigated, and so 
offenders remain unprosecuted due to a lack of resources and legislation that makes 
prosecution difficult. At the same time, the Society claimed that penalties are 
inadequate for discouraging illegal clearing of native vegetation. 
Under the SLC Act, the maximum penalty for illegal clearing is $2000. However, 
the penalty may be multiplied by up to five times for corporations (Department of 
Agriculture 2002). 
To date, the largest fine that has been imposed for illegal clearing in Western 
Australia is $6000, which was imposed on a corporation for unnotified clearing of 
native vegetation at Badgingarra in 2001. The Commissioner for Soil and Land 
Conservation indicated that this penalty reflects increasing community concern 
about uncontrolled clearing and its possible effects on land degradation 
(Department of Agriculture 2002). 
The WA Government noted that the introduction of harsher penalties was intended 
to address the problem of illegal clearing: 
It is acknowledged that the penalties for illegal rural clearing (a maximum $2000 fine 
for individuals failing to notify proposed clearing) have been inadequate, and that 
illegal clearing in the order of 1000 ha per year has reduced the effectiveness of 
clearing controls in rural areas. This problem will be addressed by proposed 
amendments to the Environmental Protection Act 1986, which will substantially 
increase the penalties for illegal clearing. It should be noted that the amendments to the     





Act include retrospective provisions announced by the State Government on 25 June 
2002, under which a person undertaking illegal clearing between the date of that 
announcement and the date on which the amendments come into effect can be required 
to revegetate the land. This is intended to reduce the risk of illegal clearing increasing 
in the period leading up to the enactment of the new laws. (sub. 151, p. 5)  
Perverse environmental outcomes 
The Commission has received evidence from several parties to suggest that 
significant pre-emptive clearing in both urban and rural settings has been an 
unintended consequence of announcing proposed clearing regulations. The 
Wildflower Society of WA noted that: 
In metropolitan Perth, pre-emptive clearing occurred when Bush Forever (2000) 
(formerly  Perth’s Bushplan 1998) was released and documented proposed ‘Bush 
Forever’ sites earmarked for bushland conservation on the Swan Coastal Plain. 
(sub. 33, p. 4) 
Anthony Witham also made reference to pre-emptive clearing in anticipation of the 
EP Amendment Act, which was before the State Parliament: 
… farmers by and large perceive the new legislation as creating the legal power to stop 
clearing, so as has occurred in the past, the scale and rate of paddock tree clearing has 
been greatly increased. This response has occurred even before it is clear whether or 
not permits or some other exemption will be able to be obtained for such activity. 
(sub. 34, p. 1) 
T. Price (sub. 38) indicated that the scale and rate of paddock tree clearance has 
greatly increased in anticipation of the passing of the EP Amendment Act.  
G.6  Administration and implementation 
Administrative costs 
The costs of administering Western Australia’s native vegetation and biodiversity 
regulations currently fall predominantly on AgWA, which has primary 
responsibility for the administration of the SLC Act. AgWA is supported in this 
function by the SLCC. It has not been possible to establish the portion of AgWA’s 
budget that relates to regulation of native vegetation. 
Other agencies that bear administrative costs in relation to native vegetation and 
biodiversity regulations include:     
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•  the EPA, through its role in undertaking environmental impact assessments for 
applications referred by the SLCC; 
•  the Water and Rivers Commission, which oversees the CAWS Act; 
•  CALM, which is responsible for the CALM Act (and any associated 
conservation agreements entered into under this Act) and the WC Act; and 
•  the Pastoral Lands Board, which is responsible for administering the LA Act, 
and monitoring and enforcing regulations on pastoral leasehold lands. 
The Serpentine–Jarrahdale Land Conservation District Committee (SJLCDC) 
(sub. 66) stated that administrative costs borne by landholders are high in terms of 
the time commitment required for developing suitable management plans, surveying 
and monitoring. These costs are particularly high if landholders are attempting to 
obtain or maintain a conservation covenant. The other significant administrative 
cost for landholders is associated with undertaking development applications. 
Consistency 
The WA Government did not consider that there are any problems with overlap 
between the Australian Government’s EPBC Act and the State’s native vegetation 
and biodiversity conservation legislation. The usual practice is for the 
Commonwealth to accredit the State’s assessment process on a case-by-case basis to 
avoid any dual assessment (sub. 151).  
A bilateral agreement between the Australian Government and WA Government 
will formalise this process once the EP Amendment Act is proclaimed. Under this 
agreement, environmental impact assessment (for activities in Western Australia) 
will be carried out by the State for matters requiring approval under Part 9 of the 
EPBC Act. 
Dispute-resolution procedures 
In the past, there does not appear to have been a standing dispute-resolution process 
in place. Each appeal against a decision of the Commissioner for Soil and Land 
Conservation is dealt with by a separate Appeals Committee established by the 
Minister for Agriculture. The Committee advises the Minister and the Minister’s 
decision is final (WA Government, sub. DR290).  
The Commissioner for Soil and Land Conservation (2002) reported that during the 
2001-02 period, one landholder lodged an objection to a soil conservation notice     





with the Minister. During the same period, the Minister quashed one notice and 
varied one notice, and had one decision pending on appeal at 30 June 2002.  
Proposed dispute-resolution procedures 
An appeals process is provided for in the EP Amendment Act. Under the proposed 
permit system, a landholder may appeal to the Minister in writing within 21 days of 
receiving notification of a decision. The Minister refers the appeal to the Office of 
the Appeals Convenor.  
The Office is independent of the DEP, and is responsible for administering the 
appeals inquiry process and recommending an ‘appropriate action’ to the Minister. 
The rationale for the Convenor’s recommendation is to be made public, as are the 
reasons for the Minister’s final decision. 
G.7  Impacts on landholders 
Native vegetation and biodiversity regulations appear to have had a negative impact 
on a minority of landholders in Western Australia. The WA Government 
acknowledged that: 
… the progressive tightening of clearing controls during the 1990s has affected land 
values, albeit not in a uniform way. The Valuer-General’s office advises that in the 
more remote wheat and cropping areas the value of uncleared land has been 
significantly discounted, but in the higher rainfall and more populated areas land values 
are being sustained by non-agricultural buyers.  
The rural real estate market has been adjusting to the tighter clearing controls 
introduced in the past decade. The landowner who has held bushland for more than a 
decade with the expectation of future development prospects is most affected. The 
proportion of landowners in this category is small. (sub. 151, p. 3) 
However, the impacts on individual landholders have, in some cases, been 
significant. Impacts on landholders have been mitigated to some degree by limited 
compensation, but the eligibility criteria for assistance schemes historically have 
been quite narrow.  
The SJLCDC (sub. 66) outlined several potentially negative impacts on landholders 
resulting from native vegetation and biodiversity regulations, including: 
•  a reduction in the potential carrying capacity of the land; 
•  limits on the subdivision potential of land;     
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•  loss of faith in government/leadership to deliver outcomes, since much of the 
remnant vegetation is there due to the foresight of the landholders; and 
•  inequality between the requirements of private landholders and government 
agencies — government agencies are often perceived to be operating outside of 
the legislation with poor environmental performance. 
The Western Australian Conservation Council (WACC) argued that the positive 
impacts of these regulations are difficult to detail and are unlikely to be presented 
by landholders in the context of this inquiry: 
One can predict that the Commission will be pointed in the direction of specific 
examples of supposedly harsh penalties for unlawful clearing, or significant delays for 
the processing of clearing applications. Unfortunately, the Commission is very unlikely 
to hear from landholders where the retention of native vegetation further up their 
catchment has reduced salinity on their farm, but there is no question that these (less 
obvious) positive impacts are being felt. We know this because the corollary is true – 
clearing or modification of native vegetation can often have adverse impacts on 
neighbouring properties and/or the local region. (sub. 189, p. 3) 
Of course the Commission has not argued or implied that there are no downstream 
beneficiaries of clearing controls. The question is the extent to which costs are 
imposed on the few, for the benefit of the majority, and whether beneficiaries 
should pay.  
The SJLCDC (sub.  66) noted that potentially positive impacts resulting from 
existing native vegetation and biodiversity regulations include: 
•  a reduction in the negative impacts associated with vegetation clearance, such as 
lower nutrient loads in waterways, less salinity, erosion and habitat destruction; 
•  an increased focus on conservation and landcare, which has led to and is likely 
to continue to lead to the development of healthier, sustainable farming systems;  
•  funding opportunities to help manage natural areas, which also helps community 
empowerment and involvement; and 
•  positive environmental benefits from the maintenance of natural habitat. 
Impacts on farming practices, property values and returns 
The Commission received submissions from a number of landholders claiming 
financial losses and other detrimental impacts associated with the Western 
Australian regulatory regime (subs 9; 19; 38; 44; 77; 119; 137; 143; 182; and 202).  
The section below outlines some of the landholders concerns in more detail. A 
response to some of the cases from the WA Government is presented in box G.4. In     





addition, several participants, including the Pastoralists and Graziers Association of 
Western Australian (sub.  DR313) and David Western (sub.  DR318) made 
submissions critical of the WA Government’s submission (sub. DR290).  
 
Box G.4  WA Government’s response to evidence by ‘affected 
landholders’  
The WA Government argued that there were a number of discrepancies and 
inaccuracies in some of the evidence presented to the Commission by some Western 
Australian landholders.  
Collins’ case 
The WA Government indicated that Ron Collins purchased his property in 1989 after 
clearing regulations were in place. Further, they argued that Mr Collins has never 
notified the Commissioner for Soil and Land Conservation of his intention to clear the 
land. As no notification has been made, no soil conservation notice has been issued 
which would have restricted clearing on the land.  
The WA Government therefore disputes Mr Collins’ claim that clearing restrictions led 
to the unplanned and premature sale of his land.  
Harris’ case 
The WA Government noted that Mr Harris had not submitted formal notification of 
intent to clear. Mr Harris had advertised in the local newspapers that he intended to 
clear but no formal application was submitted to the Commissioner for Soil and Land 
Conservation. Mr Harris therefore cleared his land without notification, and without an 
assessment of the proposed clearing being undertaken by the Commissioner for Soil 
and Land Conservation.  
The Commissioner subsequently investigated the ‘un-notified’ clearing and decided the 
area was at risk of salinity. A soil conservation notice was subsequently placed over 
the land to prevent further clearing and to permit the regeneration of the cleared areas.  
Beckingham’s case 
Mr Beckingham claimed that changing regulations prevented him from clearing parts of 
his farm. However, the WA Government noted that there had been no change in 
regulations over the period in question and all clearing notifications were assessed 
under the same guidelines.  
Wren’s case 
Mr Wren claimed that his property, although having significant biodiversity values, was 
not considered worthy of purchase under the Natural Resource Adjustment Scheme. 
However, the WA Government stated that to be eligible for purchase under the scheme 
the land must have had a notice of intent to clear rejected. Mr Wren has never 
submitted a notice of intent.  
Source: WA Government (sub. DR290).  
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In extreme cases, landholders may have been forced to sell their land at a loss 
(Ron Collins, sub. 182). In other cases, landholders have expressed concerns over 
their ability to sell their property as a result of the regulatory arrangements. Augusta 
Saunders’ situation was not atypical:  
My husband would like to retire from hard broadacre farming after a fifty-year working 
life, but we cannot sell the farm with the bush as part of it. No one is going to buy a 
farm with 910 ha of bush in the middle of it and emus and kangaroos in plague 
proportions. No one will buy a farm where they pay 30% extra rates on land they can’t 
use. (sub. 19, p. 3) 
Len Beckingham (trans., p. 277) indicated that the large proportion of land covered 
in bush has made his property almost unsaleable. At the same time, however, the 
Valuer General’s valuation of the farm has increased 30 per cent, and it is this 
valuation that is used to determine the rates that are paid on cleared and uncleared 
land alike. 
Landholders who purchased land prior to changes in native vegetation and 
biodiversity legislation are affected particularly. Ron Collins (sub.  182) gave 
evidence that clearing restrictions imposed on 1700 acres of their 3700 acre farm, 
resulted in an unplanned and premature sale of part of their farm. Mr Collins stated 
that he and his wife have been significantly affected both financially and 
emotionally: 
Everything my wife and I earned over the years has gone into this property, with many 
years of very hard work on and off the property … This has now been taken from us 
unjustly, as we are now told we no longer have a say as to what happens to the land we 
worked so hard to purchase and develop, and we get the impression the government 
wants to take this away from us to do with what they like, even though it belongs to us. 
This land has a freehold title! (sub. 182, p. 4)  
Mr Collins noted that prior to purchasing the property he had sought advice on 
whether clearing would be permitted. He stated that: 
Before we went ahead and purchased the property with such a large portion of bush on 
it, we wanted an assurance that we would indeed be able to clear it, and this is why we 
approached the Ag Dept. with our enquiry, and it was on this proviso that we purchased 
the property, only after written assurance that we would be able to clear in the future. 
And this was the reason we went ahead with the property purchase … 
(sub. DR321, pp. 1–2) 
The WAFF (sub. 94) argued that native vegetation and biodiversity regulations have 
had major economic impacts in relation to farming practices. The WAFF 
highlighted the fact that bush areas on properties are typically rated as having no 
commercial value, which affects landholders’ equity and their capacity to borrow. 
However, these areas are often associated with considerable maintenance cost, 
especially in regard to feral pest, weed and fire controls.     





There could also be potential impacts arising from provisions in the regulatory 
regime relating to clearance of paddock trees. Such regulation could affect the 
ability of some landholders to engage in efficient large-scale cropping enterprises, 
due to the presence of paddock trees that have historically been maintained in the 
landscape for alternative grazing operations (Anthony Witham, sub. 34).  
Evidence suggests that a number of properties that have become subject to clearing 
restrictions in Western Australia have become uneconomic to maintain in 
agricultural production. As a result, landholders have sought alternative options to 
generate income, and several have approached CALM to acquire their bushland for 
conservation purposes. Such applications require subdivision of the vegetated land 
from the cleared land under Development Control Policy 3.44, to create stand-alone 
conservation lots under the care, control and management of State agencies (Gingin 
Shire, sub. 37). Gingin Shire stated that: 
Council, whilst sympathetic to the excision of conservation areas from traditional 
broad-acre agricultural lots if such conservation areas are to be amalgamated into 
existing conservation reserves or national parks, is reluctant to support ad-hoc 
subdivision of rural land for conservation purposes merely on the basis that current 
clearing restrictions limit agricultural land use opportunities. (sub. 37, p. 3)  
Peter Wren (sub. 119) indicated that his pursuit of transferable subdivision rights, to 
cede 35 hectares of native vegetation from adjoining cleared land, cost over four 
years in time and more than $20 000. In order to recoup some of the value of the 
uncleared land, he attempted to sell the bushland to CALM, which manages the 
adjoining nature reserves. However, CALM considered that the conservation values 
of the land were not high enough to warrant purchase and that the land should be 
ceded to the Crown at no cost: 
Our Department [CALM] would prefer that the bushland (ie lot 24) be ceded to the 
Crown without cost for addition to the adjoining nature reserve. This option is highly 
favoured over covenants which have a high, often complex, and on-going requirement 
for Departmental input. If there is an opportunity for some transferable development 
right that would allow additional subdivision/development of lot 23 equivalent to the 
present value of lot 24, our Department considers the exploration of possible acceptable 
options to facilitate ceding of the land would be worth while. (sub. 119, attachment 1)  
Several landholders have provided evidence of the negative impacts associated with 
soil conservation notices. They claim that not only do such notices lock-up land that 
would otherwise have been agriculturally productive, but that such orders often 
have environmentally-detrimental consequences as well.  
                                              
4  Development Control Policy 3.4 allows landholders to excise a portion of vegetated land, of not 
less than 40 hectares, from their commercial agricultural enterprise in order to obtain rate relief 
and working capital.     
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Ken Harris (trans., p.  275) submitted that a soil conservation notice has had 
significant impacts on returns to the family farm. Five hundred acres of land owned 
and cleared by his son (12 months after advertising his intent to clear) was placed 
under soil conservation notice. An agronomist estimated the loss in income at 
$80 000 over two years, in addition to the sale of livestock to stay out of financial 
trouble.  
Len Beckingham (trans., pp. 276–7) also submitted that the changing nature of the 
clearing regulations has prevented him from clearing a significant proportion of his 
farm. He stated that 3000 acres of bush on his property is not only uneconomic, but 
harbours large numbers of kangaroos, eagles and emus; which last year were 
responsible for a 50 per cent loss of crops from the cleared land on his property. 
The Wildflower Society of WA (sub. 33) suggested that while Land Conservation 
District Committees (LCDCs) have had a positive impact on sustainable farming 
practices, they have had a limited effect on biodiversity and native vegetation 
conservation. The SJLCDC (sub. 66) indicated that potentially positive impacts on 
property values arise from the developing market for bush blocks and lifestyle 
properties in certain areas. 
Impacts investment patterns 
Evidence received on the impacts on investment patterns resulting from native 
vegetation and biodiversity regulations in Western Australia relates to the 
intensification of agriculture and the exacerbation of debt spirals. 
Gingin Shire (sub.  37) indicated that as a result of land-clearing restrictions 
inhibiting large-scale developments, agricultural intensification is occurring within 
the Shire. In particular, developments such as broiler farms, piggeries, egg-laying 
facilities and market gardens are becoming more common. The Council suggested 
that while some of these types of development require substantial on-site buffers, 
they can be located on existing heavily-vegetated properties with a minimal 
requirement for clearing. However, it was claimed (Gingin Shire,  sub.  37) that 
proponents of intensive agricultural developments are facing increasing difficulty in 
obtaining the support of State agencies, in particular, the DEP. 
Impacts on the attitudes of finance providers 
Len Beckingham (trans., p. 277) indicated that limits on clearing his property have 
led to financial hardship, culminating in a necessity to request an overdraft from the 
bank to cover running costs. However, the banks will only lend on the value of the     





cleared land, since they deem the uncleared land to have no value. Since the total 
area of cleared land on his property is ‘small’, the value of the overdraft is 
significantly less than it would otherwise have been, and his equity in the property 
is greatly reduced.  
Government measures to mitigate negative impacts 
The WA Government stated that it supports the application of polluter or impacter 
pays in native vegetation and biodiversity conservation. The Shire of Dandaragan 
submitted that: 
The Western Australian Government supports the application of the ‘impacter pays’ 
principle in the area of native vegetation and biodiversity conservation and is satisfied 
that the current distribution of costs for managing land clearing is acceptable. This is so 
because the Western Australian Government is not paying for it and it is left to a select 
few landowners to meet the burden of costs. (sub. 191, p. 3) 
However, the WA Government recognises that in some instances, there may be a 
need for short-term financial adjustment assistance where landholders have been 
required to increase their obligations significantly, and these new responsibilities 
could not have been reasonably anticipated (WA Government, sub. 151, p. 5). 
Assistance may be available under the Biodiversity Adjustment Scheme for 
landholders who have been significantly affected by land-clearing restrictions, that 
is, landholders who are required to maintain more than 20 per cent of their property 
under native vegetation, and who purchased their land before they could have 
reasonably expected strict restrictions to be introduced (prior to 17 May 1995) 
(WA Government  sub. 151).  Under  this Scheme, the State Government will 
purchase rural land for conservation at the pre-clearing control price, where 
applicants meet a significant set of conservation and hardship criteria. 
Incentives 
The WA Government perceives that there is widespread public appreciation of 
native vegetation and its role in maintaining stable and productive landscapes. The 
Government believes that this appreciation is also strongly held by most 
landholders, who understand the importance of, and gain enjoyment from, 
maintaining significant areas of bush on their farms (WA Government 2000). 
Disincentives to landholders maintaining native vegetation on their properties 
include present arrangements for calculating local government rates and land tax. 
Rates and taxes are seen to apply inequitably to landholders that manage their land 
largely for conservation purposes because they are based on the unimproved value     
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of the land, yet landholders with uncleared land are unable to generate any income 
from it in most instances.  
Although the WA Government runs covenanting programs that supply some local 
government rate relief, the SJLCDC (sub. 66) stated that these programs do not 
mitigate the full costs of the negative impacts from native vegetation regulations. 
Moreover, to be eligible, landholders must enter into a conservation covenant that is 
binding in perpetuity on their bushland. 
Incentives for conservation are generally insufficient to meet the costs of 
maintaining conservation values for the public good. This evidence is backed by the 
SJLCDC (sub.  66), which indicated that costs are only partially met by many 
funding bodies such as Envirofund and Natural Heritage Trust. For example, these 
bodies fund around $1000–$1500 per km for fencing costs, yet the actual costs are 
around $3500 per km. 
The NRAS was available from 1997 to 2000 to eligible rural landholders who 
applied to clear remnant vegetation on their land and had their applications rejected 
by the Government. In order to be eligible, the property had to be zoned rural, and it 
had to be able to be subdivided so the remnant vegetation could be made into a 
separate bush block. The Government coordinated and met the costs of subdivision 
and placed a conservation covenant on the block. The block was either sold, or a 
payment of compensation was made to the landholder (WA Government, sub. 151). 
Payments to landholders were determined based on the decline in the value of the 
land resulting from the landholder being unable to clear, with a cap of $100 000 per 
property. Over the life of this scheme, however, fewer than 100 landholders were 
deemed eligible for such payments — around 25 per cent registered interest and 
fewer than 15 per cent received offers of grants (WA Government, sub. 151). 
Graham Davies (sub. 9) indicated that the assistance he received under the NRAS to 
place 1000 hectares of native vegetation under two separate conservation covenants 
amounted to only a fraction of the decline in the value of his land. Moreover, 
although he accepted the offer of NRAS assistance in early 2002, he reported that: 
… the process of surveying the 800 ha and 200 ha blocks of bush onto separate titles 
has progressed at a snail’s pace. Currently we are almost at the point of getting the 
separate titles for the bush blocks and the balance of the farm. When this occurs we will 
get the ‘assistance’ offered under the scheme, which falls well short of compensation 
for what we have lost. (sub. 9, p. 2)  
Peter Wren (sub. 119), in reference to the Shire of Augusta’s Remnant Vegetation 
Strategy, noted a lack of funding to support incentive programs for conservation on 
private land. Mr Wren claimed that although the SLCC found that clearing was     





unacceptable on parts of his land that had high biodiversity values, it did not 
warrant purchase under the NRAS: 
Whilst the conservation values of Lot 24 are deemed to be of a high enough nature to 
thwart any sustainable development aspirations, the values apparently are not ranked 
high enough on a state wide priority basis to warrant purchase. (sub. 119, p. 3)  
G.8  Impacts on regional communities and other 
economic activities 
Although there is little hard information available on the direct impacts of native 
vegetation and biodiversity regulations on regional communities in Western 
Australia, the following effects have been reported: 
•  native vegetation regulations have had impacts at the farm-level, and some 
landholders have had to leave their properties because they became 
economically unviable (Ron Collins, sub.  182), while others have suffered 
depression (Augusta Saunders, sub.  19). Both of these impacts have flow-on 
effects for the wider regional community; and 
•  local Councils are concerned that provisions in the EP  Amendment Act  will 
impact on their capacity to carry out normal activities, such as road maintenance, 
where native vegetation is involved. Local councils are also concerned that their 
rate bases will be impacted by rate reductions or rate exemptions on privately-
held land that cannot be cleared (Shire of Dandaragan, sub. 191).  
Native vegetation loss is a major cause of salinisation of inland waterways and 
dryland salinity, and currently, 10 per cent (or 2  million hectares) of Western 
Australia’s agricultural land is affected. By 2030, 25–35 per cent (6.1 million 
hectares) could become salt-affected (Wildflower Society of WA, sub.  33). The 
Wildflower Society of WA reported: 
The economic costs from the impacts of land clearing are significant. An estimated 
$2  billion is required over the next 30 years to implement a salinity management 
strategy in the agricultural wheatbelt of WA. Lost agricultural production in WA 
attributable to salinity now exceeds $130 million annually and potentially could rise to 
nearly $1 billion/annum. In some areas, salinity is reducing the life of roads by 75 per 
cent and affecting rail lines and buildings from rising damp in at least thirty WA towns. 
Infrastructure costs such as these are estimated to cost the community around $100 
million per year. The State Government faces either heavily subsidising a town or the 
ramifications of closing it down. (sub. 33, p. 3)  
The Shire of Gingin noted that while intensification of land-use as a result of 
clearing restrictions has so far been beneficial for the local economy, further     
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restriction by way of land purchases for the conservation estate may prove to be 
detrimental to the Shire’s future prosperity: 
In 1997, it was estimated that 36% of the Shire of Gingin was either National Park, 
State Forest or Crown Reserve, with that figure now estimated at 38%. If this trend 
continues, economic and social investment opportunities within the Shire will be 
stymied, and opportunities for accommodating the projected State population growth 
will be curtailed. (sub. 37, p. 4)  
The WAFF alluded to the fact that there needs to be a broader consideration of 
criteria for sustainability and stated that:  
… the State Sustainability Strategy is already beginning to be unravelled through a lack 
of commitment by bureaucrats intent on maintaining their environmental focus at the 
expense of the economic and social wellbeing of rural communities. It is generally 
accepted that rural communities benefit from a multiplier effect of between 6 and 8 on 
income generated by farming activities. This is rarely afforded consideration by the 
current generation of environmentalists. (sub. 94, p. 4)  
G.9 Summary 
There is some degree of consensus that while the impacts of the native vegetation 
and biodiversity regulatory regime are not widespread in Western Australia, where 
there have been impacts on landholders, the effects have been significant and 
generally have not been compensated, although special compensation arrangements 
exist in some catchments.  
As with most jurisdictions, Western Australia progressively has introduced a more 
stringent land-clearing regime. Recently-introduced legislation imposes a ‘no net 
loss’ objective, and harsher penalties for non-compliance. 
Consultation has been an issue in the past and more recently with the introduction 
of the EP Amendment Act. Failure to consult may reflect a deliberate decision to 
minimise pre-emptive clearing.     




In Tasmania, the focus of native vegetation regulation is on the management and 
conservation of forest communities. The Regional Forest Agreement (RFA), signed 
by the Tasmanian and Australian Governments in 1997, provides the overall policy 
framework for forest vegetation management in the State. Clearing of native forest 
is regulated under the Forest Practices Act 1985 (FP Act).  
There is no legislation dealing directly with the conservation of non-forest native 
vegetation. However, there are provisions for the regulation of both non-forest and 
forest native vegetation through the State’s planning scheme, the Resource 
Management and Planning System (RMPS). In 2001, the Tasmanian Government 
endorsed: 
… a broad strategy for the management of native vegetation that placed a strong 
emphasis on facilitating conservation on private land through incentives, conservation 
plans, education and awareness whilst strengthening some of the policy and statutory 
levers. (sub. 201, p. 8)  
More recently, in June 2003, the Government agreed, via a bilateral Natural 
Heritage Trust (NHT) agreement, to a range of initiatives to strengthen the 
regulation of non-forest native vegetation clearing.  
Tasmania has been assessed to have around 80  per cent of its pre-1800 native 
vegetation remaining (NLWRA 2002a).1 Around half of Tasmania’s total land area 
is covered by native forest and about 30 per cent of forested areas are available for 
wood production. Between 1997 and 2001, around 15 000 hectares of native forest 
vegetation were cleared each year; the majority of clearing was for forestry 
purposes, with most cleared areas replaced by plantations.2 
Approximately 27 per cent of land in Tasmania is under agricultural management. 
Agricultural production accounts for a relatively small proportion of clearing of 
                                              
1  Native vegetation in the intensively-used zone (IUZ) — see figure 3.1. 
2  These areas are based on gross areas approved for clearing by the Forest Practices Board and 
will overestimate the actual amount of clearance (RPDC 2002).     




native vegetation. In 2001-02, around 1500 hectares of native forest a year was 
cleared for agricultural and infrastructure purposes, or approximately 12 per cent of 
the total area cleared. Due to a lack of comprehensive mapping of non-forest 
vegetation communities, the extent of the impact of agricultural practices on non-
forest native vegetation is not clear.  
H.2  Description of the regime 
In 2001, the Tasmanian Government released the Natural Resource Management 
Framework as a mechanism for integrating the various natural resource 
management systems across the State (Tasmanian Government 2001). The objective 
of the Framework is to provide an administrative system through which the 
Tasmanian Government can coordinate and integrate the wide range of entities that 
are involved in natural resource management, with the aim of ensuring consistency 
and efficiency in natural resource outcomes. 
The Framework is intended to encompass all legislation pertaining to natural 
resource management, several pieces of which are directed to, or have implications 
for, the management of native vegetation and biodiversity conservation, including 
the FP Act.3  
A sub-group of natural resource planning instruments and functions together 
comprise the State’s planning system, the RMPS. Within the RMPS, the most 
important legislation in terms of native vegetation and biodiversity regulation is the 
Threatened Species Protection Act 1995 (TSP Act) and the Land Use Planning and 
Approvals Act 1993 (LUPA Act).  
Forest Practices Act  
The harvesting of timber and the clearing of trees (clearing, cutting, pushing or 
otherwise removing, or destroying in any way) is regulated under the FP Act.4 The 
FP Act was introduced to achieve ‘sustainable management of public and private 
forests with due care for the environment’. To do this, the FP Act establishes the 
Forest Practices System. The Forest Practices System applies to ‘trees’, defined as: 
… any woody plants with a height or potential height of 5 metres or more, whether or 
not living, dead, standing or fallen, that are: (i) native to Tasmania; or (ii) introduced 
into Tasmania and used for the processing or harvesting of timber … (FP Act, s. 3) 
                                              
3  A full list of major State policy instruments relevant to natural resource management in 
Tasmania is contained in Tasmanian Government (2001). 
4  The FP Act also applies to tree ferns.     
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Under the FP Act, landholders require permits — Forest Practices Plans (FPPs) — 
to undertake certain forest practices, including the harvesting and removal of 
timber. The system relies on self-regulation to an extent, with the industry given 
some responsibility for the development and certification of FPPs. The FP Act was 
amended in 2001 to: 
… clarify that non-commercial clearing of forests for the purposes of agriculture or 
other land use is subject to the same environmental regulation that currently applies to 
the commercial harvesting and clearing of forests. (Tasmanian Legislative Assembly, 
1 November 2001, p. 41) 
This amendment was intended to remove a perceived ‘loophole’ whereby some 
landholders had considered that they could clear a forest without a FPP, if the 
operation did not involve ‘commercial’ harvesting. Wilkinson (2001) considered 
that very little clearing was conducted in a ‘non-commercial’ manner, because of 
the strong market for Tasmanian forest products — although, in a small number of 
cases, landholders have used the provision to clear stream-side reserves and other 
areas of retained forests for ‘non-commercial’ reasons. 
Forest Practices Code 
The Forest Practices Code (the Code) ‘prescribes the manner in which forest 
practices are to be conducted so as to provide reasonable protection to the 
environment’ (FP Act, s. 31). The Code is issued by the Forest Practices Board 
(FPB), after a process of community consultation (box H.1). 
The Code applies to the following practices: 
•  the establishment and maintenance of forests including standards to be complied 
with in the restocking of land with trees; 
•  the harvesting of timber or the clearing of trees;  
•  the construction of roads and other works connected with the establishment of 
forests, the clearing of trees or the growing or harvesting of timber. (FP Act, s. 31). 
The Code is intended to provide a practical set of guidelines and standards for the 
protection of environmental values in forest operations, including soils, water 
quality, flora, fauna, visual landscape and cultural heritage (FPB 2000). Certified 
FPPs are to be consistent with the guidelines established under the Code. In most 
cases, the Code sets the minimum standards that are to be achieved. In cases where 
further protection of environmental values is required, these measures may be 
specified in an individual FPP.     





Box H.1  Forest Practices Board 
The Forest Practices Board (FPB), established under the Forest Practices Act 1985, is 
required to: best advance the objective of the State’s Forest Practices System; and 
foster a co-operative approach towards policy development and management in forest 
practices matters. 
The FPB consists of: the Secretary of the Department responsible for administering the 
Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994; the director of Private 
Forests Tasmania; a representative of local government in an area where forestry is a 
major land use; and a person having expertise in the timber industry. 
One of the FPB’s functions is to issue and maintain the Forest Practices Code. The Act 
requires the FPB to consult with Private Forests Tasmania in developing a draft Code. 
The draft Code is open to submissions from the public over a period of 60 days. After 
consulting again with Private Forests Tasmania, and considering any public 
submissions received, the FPB issues the Code.  
Source: FP Act. 
 
 
The Tasmanian Government (sub. 201) considered that an important aspect of the 
Code is that it defines a duty of care with regard to forest activities. Specifically, the 
Code provides that sustainable management of natural and cultural values within 
production forests under the Forest Practices System will be determined in 
accordance with a range of State legislative and policy instruments. Landholders’ 
duty of care includes: 
•  all measures that are necessary to protect soil and water values as detailed in the 
Code;  
•  the reservation of other significant natural and cultural values. This will be at a 
level of up to 5 per cent of the existing and proposed forest on the property for areas 
totally excluded from operations. In circumstances where the partial harvesting of a 
reserve area is compatible with the protection of the values, the level will be up to 
10 per cent. The conservation of values beyond the duty of care is deemed to be for 
the community benefit and should be achieved on a voluntary basis or through 
compensation mechanisms where available. (FPB 2000, p. 52) 
Applications to clear native vegetation 
Generally, landholders planning to remove forest vegetation are required to obtain a 
certified FPP. There are a number of exemptions from this requirement (box H.2), 
which are intended to allow for small-scale operations to proceed on land where the 
potential for environmental harm is low (Wilkinson 2001).      
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Box H.2  Exemptions from the need to obtain a Forest Practices Plan 
Exemptions from the need to obtain a Forest Practices Plan include: 
•  the harvesting of timber or the clearing of trees on land that is not ‘vulnerable’ if 
(whichever of the following is lesser) — 
–  the volume of timber harvested is less than 100 tonnes each year; or 
–  the total area of land on which the harvesting occurs is less than one hectare 
each year; 
•  the harvesting of timber or the clearing of trees on vulnerable land, if necessary to 
protect public safety or to maintain existing infrastructure (if the volume of timber 
harvested or trees cleared is less than 5 tonnes for each ‘area of applicable land’, or 
where clearing is less than one hectare for each year); and 
•  the harvesting of timber or clearing of trees for easement of powerlines, gas 
pipelines, and public roads.  
Source: Forest Practices Regulations 1997. 
 
 
The information required to be provided as part of a FPP depends on the nature of 
the site. Factors that need to be considered when drawing up a FPP include: 
•  location and land ownership, with legal covenants noted; 
•  period of planned operations; 
•  basic features of the area, including information on topography, geology, soil 
type, erodability and landslide potential, rainfall and drainage characteristics, 
type of forest and existing access; 
•  management requirements to ensure adequate protection of values such as soils, 
water, flora, fauna, apiary resources, cultural heritage and visual landscape; 
•  management objectives, including harvesting prescriptions, and reforestation 
prescriptions where the landholder wishes to restock with trees; 
•  measures to ensure efficient timber harvesting and to sustain site productivity; 
•  local government planning schemes, where applicable; and  
•  potential off-site impacts of plantation development on adjoining land and 
potential measures to address these impacts (FPB 2000). 
FPPs are required to meet certain community consultation requirements: 
•  consultation with local government is required prior to certification of some 
FPPs, for example, those operations that potentially affect water quality in a 
specified catchment area; or where the development may have significant 
implications for the use of local government roads;     




•  local government and landholders within 100 metres of the boundary of the 
planned practices must be notified; and 
•  information relevant to the FPP should be made available to interested parties in 
an effective and efficient manner. 
FPPs are required to be certified by an authorised Forest Practices Officer prior to 
the commencement of operations and at the completion of operations.  
Private timber reserve 
A landholder may apply to the FPB to have land declared as a private timber reserve 
(FP Act, s.  5). Reserves are to be used only for ‘establishing, or growing or 
harvesting of timber’ in accordance with the Code. Forestry operations conducted in 
a private timber reserve are exempt from the provisions of the RMPS.  
The [FP Act] provides that forestry activities on [private timber reserves] are subject to 
a single, consistent, State-wide system of planning and regulation … rather than to 
variable systems that may be applied under different planning schemes through the 
[LUPA Act]. (FPB 2002a, p. 13)  
The FP Act (s. 16) provides for the payment of compensation in some instances 
when an application to have land declared as a private timber reserve is rejected. 
Resource Management and Planning System 
The RMPS was established in 1994 with the aim of promoting sustainable 
development in Tasmania by integrating resource management with the State’s 
planning system. The RMPS has a wide scope and can influence development 
through planning schemes, create legally enforceable policies, and provide 
incentives and enforcement provisions.  
Land Use and Planning Approvals Act 
The principal legislation underpinning the RMPS is the LUPA Act. Broadly, the 
LUPA Act provides for: the making and amendment of planning schemes; the 
assessment of planning directives; agreements between planning authorities and 
landholders and appeals into specific development control matters (Tasmanian 
Government, sub. 201).  
Under the LUPA Act, local governments are designated as planning authorities. 
They have responsibility for, among other things, the preparation and administration 
of planning schemes; the assessment and approval of applications for planning     
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permits for the use and development of land; and the enforcement of planning 
scheme provisions.  
Through planning schemes, restrictions can be imposed on the clearing of both 
forest and non-forest native vegetation. The planning schemes come into effect 
when an application is sought for certain development activities — including in 
some cases, proposals for changes to land use in the case of the agricultural 
industry. Other planning instruments implemented under the LUPA Act include 
planning directives and special planning orders.  
The Huon Valley Council (sub.  DR230) considered that the role of local 
government in implementing native vegetation and biodiversity regulations in the 
State was significant, with councils required to assess all development applications 
for land not contained within State Forests or private timber reserves. The Council 
stated that: 
In considering … land clearing development applications, the local Council must … 
work within the State legislative and policy framework that protects priority vegetation 
communities … 
How the Councils are implementing these regulations is critical to the long-term 
protection of the actual priority vegetation communities themselves. This relates to 
both land clearance proposals that require [FPPs] … and other development activity 
such as land subdivisions, residential or building development and new agricultural 
ventures that do not attract the need for such [FPPs] — but will require varying degrees 
of vegetation removal. (Huon Valley Council, sub. DR230, p. 2)  
Although planning schemes are developed by local governments, before taking 
effect, they need to be assessed and approved by the Resource Planning 
Development Commission (RPDC), a statutory body established to, among other 
things, ensure consistency in the development of planning instruments.  
Other statutes covered by the RMPS of relevance to native vegetation and 
biodiversity conservation include the TSP Act, the Environmental Management and 
Pollution Control Act 1994 (EMPC Act) and Resource Management and Planning 
Appeal Tribunal Act 1993 (RMPAT Act). However, some development activities 
are excluded from the RMPS, including forestry activities, marine aquaculture and 
mineral exploration, which are governed by their own legislation. 
Threatened Species Protection Act  
The TSP Act establishes a Threatened Species Protection System, with the primary 
objective to ‘ensure that all native flora and fauna in Tasmania can survive, flourish 
and retain their potential for evolutionary development in the wild’ (TSP Act, 
Schedule 1, Part 2, s. 3).      




The Act provides for listing and de-listing of flora and fauna on various schedules 
(endangered (Schedule 3), vulnerable (Schedule 4) and rare (Schedule 5)). A 
Scientific Committee is established, which is responsible for advising the Minister 
on which species should be included on the schedules. The Scientific Committee is 
also responsible for identifying ‘threatening processes’5 and criteria for the 
determination of ‘critical habitats’. 
The Act provides for a number of mechanisms to meet the objectives of the 
Threatened Species Protection System. These include: 
•  species recovery plans, which specify the objectives for the conservation and 
management of the species listed on the plan, and the ways in which those 
objectives are to be achieved;  
•  threat abatement plans, which specify the process that threatens a listed species 
and details procedures to be implemented to manage the process;  
•  land management plans, which are voluntary agreements between the 
Government and landholders allowing certain conservation measures to be 
implemented on land identified as significant to the particular threatened species 
or groups of threatened species; and 
•  interim protection orders, which may be implemented by the Minister in order to 
conserve the habitat, or part of the habitat, of a listed species on private land or 
Crown land not subject to a public authority agreement.  
The TSP  Act contains provisions for compensation to be paid to landholders in 
certain circumstances. For example, a landholder is entitled to compensation for 
financial loss resulting directly from an interim protection order or a land 
management agreement (TSP Act, s.  45). The Minister is responsible for 
determining whether compensation is warranted and, in cases where it is, the 
amount to be paid. The Minister is required to consider the impact on property 
values and on the loss (or profits) associated with compliance with the Act 
(TSP Act, s. 45).  
The TSP Act has a number of implications for native vegetation management. For 
example, provisions of the TSP Act need to be taken into account in the 
development of planning instruments under the RMPS. Provisions of the TSP Act 
are also taken into consideration in forestry policy in areas such as the development 
and certification of FPPs and in the development of the Comprehensive, Adequate 
and Representative (CAR) reserve system (see below). 
                                              
5  Threatening processes are defined as any action that poses a threat to the natural survival of any 
native taxon of flora or fauna (TSP Act, s. 3).     
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Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act  
The objective of the EMPC Act is to provide for the management of the 
environment and the control of pollution in the State. The Act provides for the 
control of all activities that may lead to environmental harm. The objectives of the 
EMPC Act are required to be taken into consideration by planning authorities when 
carrying out environmental assessment of new planning schemes, amendments to 
existing planning schemes and when assessing and approving applications for 
planning permits (RPDC 2003). 
Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act  
The RMPAT Act establishes the Resource Management and Planning Appeal 
Tribunal (RMPAT) as an independent statutory body to hear appeals against a wide 
range of administrative acts and decisions, including decisions under the LUPA Act, 
the TSP Act and the EMPC Act. The Tribunal can also make orders protecting 
environmental or planning rights and values.  
Tasmanian Regional Forest Agreement 
The RFA, signed by the Tasmanian and Australian Governments in 1997, 
established a framework for the management and conservation of forest native 
vegetation over a 20-year period. A key element of the RFA was the establishment 
of a CAR reserve system for native forest vegetation. The CAR reserve system 
provides mechanisms for the identification of native forest vegetation to be included 
in reserves, as well as legislative instruments that allow the establishment of 
reserves. Under the RFA, the Permanent Forest Estate Policy was also established 
(discussed below). 
The CAR reserve system comprises a formal reserve system of native forest on 
public land and a voluntary reserve system for private land. The design and 
magnitude of the reserve system is ‘informed by the comprehensive regional 
assessment of environmental heritage values and the national forest reserve criteria, 
sometimes referred to as the JANIS criteria’ (RPDC 2002, p. 14).  
On public land, the CAR reserve system comprises formal reserves (those dedicated 
by the Tasmanian Parliament), informal reserves managed to protect CAR values 
and any other areas protected by management prescription under the Code or Forest 
Management Plans (Tasmanian Government, sub.  201). The system has been 
implemented through legislative changes (such as the Regional Forest Agreement     




(Land Classification) Act 1998) to create new categories of reserves and through 
parliamentary and administrative actions. 
In the RFA it was noted that many of the elements of the CAR reserve system could 
not be adequately reserved on public land because some elements are (substantially 
or exclusively) found on privately-owned land (RPDC 2002). To meet CAR reserve 
elements on private land, the Private Forest Reserve Program (PFRP) was 
established. Under the PFRP, funds are provided to secure CAR reserves on private 
land through the negotiation of voluntary agreements with landholders. The most 
common form of agreement is a perpetual covenant, which places restrictions on the 
use of reserved land (box H.3). 
 
Box H.3  Private Forest Reserve Program 
The Private Forest Reserve Program (PFRP) was established in 1998 as a mechanism 
to establish Comprehensive, Adequate and Representative (CAR) reserves on private 
land through the procurement of voluntary agreements with landholders. Thirty million 
dollars in funding was made available through the Natural Heritage Trust and a special 
Australian Government grant. Land is assessed for the program by the CAR Scientific 
Advisory Group. Priority is given to: 
… protecting rare, vulnerable and endangered vegetation communities; rare and depleted 
old growth forests; Regional Forest Agreement priority species (fauna and flora) and 
National Estate values on private land. (PFRP 2002, p. 13) 
The program aims to protect native vegetation on private land through the negotiation 
of covenants in perpetuity with landholders. However, there are provisions for other 
mechanisms to be used, including purchasing of properties and long-term 
management agreements (for fixed periods until 2017). Reserves can have multiple 
land-use options. Activities that may be permitted include firewood collection and 
grazing. The level of financial incentives is proportional to the level of security obtained. 
The PFRP makes available a range of incentives to encourage landholders to place a 
perpetual conservation covenant on their forested land. These include: 
•  payment of an up-front ‘consideration’ to secure CAR values in perpetuity; 
•  payment of recurring stewardship fees for cooperative management; 
•  assistance with the cost of fencing and other management actions; 
•  exemption from State land tax; and 
•  annual local government rate rebates. 
The initial target for the PFRP was to secure long-term conservation of around 100 000 
hectares of targeted ecosystems on private land. As of March 2004, 167 properties 
had been secured (146 covenanted, 19 purchased and two through management 
agreements) representing a total of 27 641 hectares.  
Source: PFRP (2002). 
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The CAR reserve system on public and private land in Tasmania currently exceeds 
2.7  million hectares. Within the reserve system, about 1.3  million hectares of 
forested land, or approximately 40  per cent of Tasmania’s native forests, are 
protected in formal reserves. This represents an increase of 30 per cent on the area 
of forest reserved in 1996 (FPB 2002b). 
Permanent Forest Estate Policy 
As part of the RFA, the State Government agreed to adopt a broad policy 
framework to maintain an extensive and permanent native forest estate. This 
‘permanent forest estate’ comprises areas of native forest managed on a sustainable 
basis both within formal reserves and within multiple-use forests across public and 
private land. Among other things, the Policy is intended to provide the framework 
for sustainable forestry operations in the State, and its provisions underpin the 
operation of the Forest Practices System. The Tasmanian Government noted that:  
The [FPB] has, in accordance with the above provision of the Code, proactively 
implemented the Permanent Forest Estate Policy through its consideration and 
certification of Forest Practices Plans and Private Timber Reserve applications. This 
has included placing a moratorium on the further conversion of certain forest types 
within some bioregions. (sub. 201, p. 23) 
The Permanent Forest Estate Policy is currently under review. However, as part of 
negotiations with the Australian Government for the extension of the NHT in April 
2003, the Tasmanian Government agreed to implement a number of changes to the 
Permanent Forest Estate Policy, which are outlined below. 
Threatened species and communities 
Both the Tasmanian and Australian Governments also made a number of 
commitments to threatened species conservation under the RFA. Commitments 
were made to the development and implementation of the Threatened Species 
Protection Strategy, recovery plans and threat abatement plans for species and forest 
communities listed under either Australian Government or State legislation (RFA 
clauses 30–38 and 70).6 For example, signatories agreed to jointly fund and prepare 
any new or revised recovery plans for threatened species listed under both Acts. 
Commitments were also made to the protection of priority species (RFA 
clauses 68–71). 
                                              
6  At the time the RFA was signed, the relevant Australian Government legislation was the 
Endangered Species Protection Act 1992, which has since been replaced by the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act). The relevant Tasmanian 
legislation is the TSP Act.     




Natural Heritage Trust Bilateral Agreement   
Under the bilateral agreement with the Australian Government for the extension of 
the NHT in June 2003, the Tasmanian Government agreed to introduce a number of 
initiatives that have implications for the Permanent Forest Estate Policy and the 
regulation of non-forest native vegetation. Commitments to the management of 
forest communities include to: 
•  prevent the clearance and conversion of all rare, vulnerable and endangered forest 
communities on private and public land, subject to the exercise of discretion by the 
Forest Practices Board to approve conversion of these communities in exceptional 
circumstances where the conversion will not substantially detract from the 
conservation of a community or conservation values within the immediate area … 
•  maintain at least 95 per cent of the 1996 native forest estate that is currently on 
public land; and 
•  amend the [FPA] to require the [FPB] to implement the Permanent Forest Estate 
Policy in certifying [FPPs]. (Tasmanian Government, sub. 201, p. 24) 
Commitments for the management of non-forest communities include to: 
•  prevent the clearance and conversion of rare, vulnerable and endangered non-forest 
vegetation communities associated with forestry operations, except in exceptional 
circumstances where the conversion will not substantially detract from the 
conservation of a community or conservation values within the immediate area. 
(Tasmanian Government, sub. 201, p. 24); 
•  prevent the clearance and conversion of rare, vulnerable and endangered non-forest 
vegetation communities on public land, except in exceptional circumstances where 
the activity will not substantially detract from the conservation of the non-forest 
vegetation communities or conservation values within the immediate area; 
•  prevent the clearance and conversion of rare, vulnerable and endangered non-forest 
vegetation communities associated with forestry operations through amendments to 
the Permanent Forest Estate Policy; 
•  support Local Government in giving adequate consideration to the conservation of 
non-forest vegetation communities through the provision of information identifying 
the conservation status of non-forest vegetation communities, together with new 
information products and specific advice on rare, vulnerable and endangered non-
forest vegetation communities; 
•  work with Local Government to develop and implement suitable planning scheme 
provisions to conserve rare, vulnerable and endangered non-forest vegetation, 
including through capacity building within Local Government to deal with 
vegetation assessments and advising on such assessments; and 
•  pursue, within 30 months of the signing of the agreement, a Planning Directive 
under the [LUPA Act] to require any Council that has not made provision for its 
planning scheme to prevent the clearance and conversion of rare, vulnerable and     
  TASMANIA  491
 
endangered non-forest vegetation communities, to implement a standard set of 
planning provisions. (Tasmanian Government, sub. 201, pp. 9–10)  
The details of how the commitments made under the NHT bilateral agreement are to 
be implemented through the Tasmanian regulatory framework are yet to be made 
clear. The Tasmanian Government (sub.  201, p.  12) indicated that ‘regulation 
through the development approval process will be a vital component of this 
protection for non-forest vegetation’. As such, the commitments may be expected to 
result in a significant strengthening of regulation of native vegetation in the State. 
H.3  Development of the regulatory regime 
The overall policy framework for native forest vegetation in Tasmania has its basis 
in the RFA signed in 1997. The environmental guidelines and objectives, expressed 
in the Permanent Forest Estate Policy and the CAR reserve system were developed 
through an extensive consultation and assessment process, including a public 
inquiry and a ‘comprehensive regional assessment’ process (AFFA 2003).  
Legislative changes resulting from the RFA process included changes to the FP Act. 
The FP Act was amended in 1999 to give the FPB responsibility for auditing and 
monitoring FPPs to ensure that clearance of native vegetation did not exceed the 
targets established under the Permanent Forest Estate Policy. Under the amendment, 
changes were made to the composition of the FPB with the aim of improving its 
transparency and independence (Tasmanian Legislative Assembly 1999, 25 March, 
p. 82).  
Threatened Species Protection Act  
Development of the Act initially involved consultation limited to those with a direct 
interest in the legislation, such as the Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association 
(TFGA). A regulatory impact assessment does not appear to have been undertaken. 
However, considerable public comment was sought in the development of the draft 
Threatened Species Conservation Strategy (DPIWE 1999). The development of a 
draft Strategy was a requirement under the Act (TSP Act, Part 3). In the Second 
Reading speech for the Act, the Minister highlighted the importance of public 
participation in the development and implementation of the Strategy: 
A key feature of the bill is public education which is seen as an essential prerequisite to 
effective community involvement in the protection of threatened species. Public 
participation is provided for in the preparation of the threatened species strategy 
through community education programs, the listing process and the preparation of     




recovery plans and threat abatement plans. (Tasmanian Legislative Assembly 1995, 
21 June, p. 71) 
In terms of the operation of the regulatory regime established under the TSP Act, 
the RPDC (2002) noted some concerns about the transparency and extent of 
community consultation in the development of some management prescriptions. 
The RPDC expressed the view that while: 
… consultation has occurred on what is essentially a technical scientific issue with a 
limited number of interested stakeholders, it appears that the process for community 
consultation on changes to prescriptions for management of Priority Species has not 
always been full and open to the public. (RPDC 2002, p. 51)  
A number of participants questioned the adequacy of the processes used to 
determine listing of species on the various schedules of the TSP Act. The Northern 
Midlands Council emphasised the need for a listing process that is: 
… robust, vigorous and clearly understood with community input sought into the 
methodology to be used in the preparation and definition of that list. Clearly, greater 
use should be made of the knowledge and willingness … of landowners and local 
communities in the compilation of this list; thus better ownership and outcomes will be 
achieved, if locals have input. (trans., p. 1432) 
Other participants who expressed similar concerns over assessments of threatened 
species included Don McShane (trans., p.  1406), Peter Inness-Smith (trans., 
p. 1447), the TFGA (trans., pp. 1429–30) and Denise Swan (trans., p. 1467).  
H.4  Promoting environmental goals  
As noted above, the overarching environmental goals for native forest vegetation 
are stipulated in the RFA. The FPB, for example, is required to pursue the 
objectives of the Permanent Forest Estate Policy in administering the Forest 
Practices System. Environmental objectives for non-forest native vegetation and 
biodiversity conservation tend not to be explicitly stated, but are expressed in the 
more general objectives of the RMPS and the TSP Act. 
Objectives of the regimes 
Broad environmental objectives are specified in the FP Act, the TSP Act, and the 
RMPS. In some instances, more specific environmental targets pertaining to native 
vegetation and biodiversity objectives are contained in the instruments established 
under the legislation.     
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Forest Practices Act 
The objects of the FP Act centre on the need to achieve sustainable management of 
Crown and private forests ‘with due care for the environment’ (FP Act, Schedule 7). 
While environmental objectives are prominent in the Act, they are not the primary 
focus of the legislation. Among other things, the FP Act is to: 
•  [have] an emphasis on self-regulation; 
•  [provide for] delegated and decentralised approvals for forest practices plans and 
other forest practices matters; [and] 
•  … through the declaration of private timber reserves — [provide] a means by which 
private landholders are able to ensure the security of their forest properties. (FP Act, 
Schedule 7) 
However, specific targets for native vegetation retention are contained in the 
Permanent Forest Estate Policy. Native vegetation targets take the form of 
minimum threshold percentages of forests that must be retained. All forested land in 
Tasmania has been classified according to the type of forest community it contains, 
where it occurs in the State, and how much existed in 1996. The minimum 
thresholds are set for three levels: State, regional and forest community. Eighty per 
cent of the State’s native forest that existed in 1996 must be retained, and at least 
50 per cent of the native forest present in regions must be retained. The percentage 
of each forest community that is to be retained varies from 60–80 per cent, though 
in some small communities 100 per cent of the community must be retained (TSBC 
2002). 
Resource Management and Planning System 
As noted above, the RMPS provides the overarching legislative framework for 
natural resource management and development control in the State. As such, the 
RMPS contains broad objectives to be pursued across a range of functions and 
statutes. The objectives are: 
•  to promote the sustainable development of natural and physical resources and the 
maintenance of ecological processes and genetic diversity; 
•  to promote the fair, orderly and sustainable use and development of air, land and 
water; 
•  to encourage public involvement in resource management and planning;  
•  to facilitate economic development in accordance with the objectives set out above; 
and  
•  to promote the sharing of responsibility for resource management and planning 
between the different spheres of Government, the community and industry in the 
State. (Tasmanian Government 2001, p. 30)     




Threatened Species Protection Act 
The TSP Act contains a number of objectives focused on biodiversity conservation 
outcomes, including: 
•  to ensure that all native flora and fauna in Tasmania can survive, flourish and retain 
their potential for evolutionary development in the wild;  
•  to ensure that the genetic diversity of native flora and fauna is maintained; and 
•  … to assist landholders to enable native flora and fauna to be conserved … 
(TSP Act, Schedule 1(3)) 
As the TSP Act forms part of the RMPS, its implementation is required to be 
consistent with the objectives of the RMPS. Broadly interpreted, this requires that 
the TSP Act be implemented with the principles of sustainable development in 
mind. More specific environmental targets may be provided in instruments such as 
threat abatement plans, and species recovery plans.  
Comparing objectives 
The focus of the objectives of the FP Act and the RMPS is on achieving the 
sustainable development and use of natural resources — specifically, forestry 
resources under the FP Act, and resources more generally under the RMPS. While 
the TSP Act has specific conservation objectives, these are pursued in the context of 
the broader objectives of the State’s RMPS. 
The similarity of objectives across the regimes suggests a level of consistency. 
Where there is some potential for conflicting objectives across regimes, for 
example, between the explicit environmental objectives of the TSP Act and the 
‘development’ objectives of the RMPS, it is interesting to note that provisions are 
made in the objectives of both instruments for ‘cost-sharing’ measures between the 
community and government to be implemented to achieve sustainable outcomes.7 
Understanding of objectives 
Generally, it appears that the information and processes in place adequately inform 
landholders about the requirements of individual regimes. The Code, for example, 
contains information for landholders on the objectives of the Forest Practices 
System and guidelines for the development of FPPs. Processes used in the 
                                              
7  Although not contained in the objectives, the FP Act also has provision for the payment of 
compensation in some instances when a landholder’s application to have land declared as a 
private timber reserve has been rejected.     
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development and implementation of the Code can be expected to aid public 
understanding of the regime.  
Similarly, the objectives of the RMPS are well publicised through guidelines, such 
as those published by the RPDC (2003), which provide information about obtaining 
development approval under the LUPA Act.  
However, the amount of information required to effectively understand how the 
various regimes interact, and to determine when a particular activity is subject to 
regulation, was raised by some participants. For example, Reserve Design 
Management observed that the amount and complexity of legislation made it 
difficult for local governments to ensure that their planning instruments complied 
with the relevant State and Australian Government legislation. They stated: 
… that there was a very limited understanding and an enormous amount of confusion in 
the community about the responsibilities of individuals, the requirements that are 
placed on organisations by legislation, regulation and the opportunities that exist for 
them to achieve funding. (trans., p. 801) 
The issue was also raised by the Huon Valley Council: 
Local Councils must be fully informed and understand how this framework is 
administered in order that the Council’s role as a planning authority is able to be 
fulfilled. Councils must not only ensure that the regulations are being met in regard to 
new development applications but also must monitor compliance in regard to existing 
activities …  
This complexity is an issue in itself. A regulatory framework that is overly complex 
will not be effectively implemented and this has been an ongoing concern for local 
government within Tasmania. (sub. DR230, p. 2) 
In some cases, a lack of understanding may lead to issues regarding compliance. 
With respect to the introduction of a native vegetation policy by the local 
government on King Island, Reserve Design Management said: 
… no-one on the island knew anything about the [Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999] or the forest practices legislation which was in 
place or the recent changes to the forest practices legislation. There were people 
actively going about doing things on the island which they believed they had every 
right to do but which were clearly illegal. (trans., p. 801) 
The issue of compliance on King Island may have been aggravated by the fact that 
many operations may have only recently become subject to the provisions of the 
FP Act (due to the recent amendment that made removal of forest vegetation for 
non-commercial activities subject to the FP Act).      





The effectiveness of the regime established under the FP Act can be measured, to an 
extent, against the native vegetation targets outlined in the Permanent Estate Forest 
Policy. The FPB reported in 2003 that: 
… Tasmania’s native forest estate has been maintained at a level equivalent to 97.5 per 
cent of the native forest area that existed in 1996 … the current native forest area is 
well in excess of the minimum thresholds within all bioregions. The [FPB] notes that 
the level of conversion of some communities is approaching the thresholds. Action to 
maintain all communities in accordance with the Permanent Forest Estate Policy is 
being undertaken by the Board. This Action includes the imposition of an interim 
moratorium on the clearing of any further rare, endangered or vulnerable forest 
communities (FPB 2003, p. 7)  
In a recent inquiry into the implementation of the RFA, the RPDC noted that: 
During the last five years, maintenance of native forest across Tasmania has occurred 
in accord with the bioregional thresholds, based on the proportion of native forests in 
reserves, as specified in the policy on maintaining a Permanent Forest Estate. 
The data also indicate that all forest communities are well within the 50  per  cent 
threshold. While the level of conversion of some communities is approaching the 
threshold, the [RPDC] acknowledges that action being undertaken by the [FPB] should 
ensure that these communities are maintained in accord with the policy on maintaining 
a Permanent Forest Estate. (RPDC 2002, p. 62) 
There seems to be broad agreement that the objectives of the RFA (as currently 
specified) are being effectively achieved. However, there is some debate about 
whether the current native vegetation retention targets are appropriate and whether 
the system is providing adequate protection to certain classifications of forest 
communities.  
For example, the Tasmanian State Biodiversity Committee, expressed the view that: 
While the Permanent Forest Estate Policy provides protection for forest communities, 
there is increasing concern that the levels of protection are too low … increasing the 
minimum threshold levels for all three criteria … would mean that additional areas of 
significant native forest would be excluded from clearing. (TSBC 2002, p. 33) 
The RPDC observed that: 
Although no additional forest communities have become endangered, there has been a 
reduction in the areal extent of some endangered forest communities in the last five 
years … A number of vulnerable communities have also been depleted, to a greater 
extent, during this time. In its current form, the policy on maintaining a Permanent 
Forest Estate does not differentiate between the forest communities classified as non-
threatened and those classified as rare, endangered and vulnerable under the RFA. 
(RPDC 2002, p. 63)      
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The Permanent Forest Estate Policy is currently under review (FPB 2002a). A 
number of initiatives agreed to by the Tasmanian Government through the recent 
NHT bilateral agreement are intended to strengthen the operation of the Permanent 
Forest Estate Policy (section H.2).  
Some participants criticised the operational aspects of the Forest Practices System. 
The Tasmanian Conservation Trust (TCT) questioned whether rare and endangered 
forest types were being accurately identified and mapped in the development and 
certification of FPPs. The TCT suggested this inadequacy, in part, was attributable 
to relying on a self-regulating system for the approval and certification of FPPs 
(TCT 2002). 
More generally, the TCT (sub.  84) expressed concerns that the Forest Practices 
System was exempt from the more generic provisions that applied to resource 
planning in other industries in the State, namely the RMPS. As such, it was argued, 
the Forest Practices System was subject to less effective environmental controls 
than provided for under the RMPS, nor was it bound by the same standards of 
transparency and independence. 
The Huon Valley Council noted that there was a: 
… need to ensure that there was no (or minimal) exclusions from the RMPS and that it 
constituted an integrated, comprehensive and holistic regulatory framework for the 
State. It is an ongoing concern that some aspects of vegetation management fall outside 
of the RMPS. (sub. DR230, p. 2) 
In a recent inquiry into the implementation of the RFA, the RPDC considered that 
concerns that the forestry industry was exempt from the provisions of the TSP Act 
were unfounded: 
Threatened species habitat, on land subject to forestry operations, is managed through 
application of the relevant management prescriptions and procedures under the [Code]. 
Changes made to the [TSP Act] in 2001 amended the administrative arrangements 
under which forestry operations operate. These recognise that the [Code] requires that 
threatened species in forestry areas are managed in accord with the requirements of the 
Act, and management prescriptions endorsed by the Threatened Species Unit. (RPDC 
2002, pp. 51–2)  
Threatened Species Protection Act 
The TSP Act contains broad objectives that make assessment of the effectiveness of 
the Act in meeting environmental objectives difficult. Of the more than 600 
threatened species currently listed on the schedules of the TSP Act, only about 40 
are presently covered by recovery plans. Most funding for the implementation of     




these plans has come from the Australian Government with in-kind support from 
the State Government (RPDC 2003). The RPDC noted that: 
At current rates of preparation it would appear unlikely that Recovery Plans could be 
prepared for all those species for which it would be desirable for many years. 
(RPDC 2002, p. 46) 
While recovery plans have not been developed for the majority of listed species, 
DPIWE is currently preparing listing statements for all threatened species in 
Tasmania. Listing statements contain information about the species, its distribution, 
threats, management issues and recovery actions needed — in effect, simplified 
recovery plans (RPDC 2002).  
Since the RFA was signed, there has been an increase in the number of species 
listed on the schedules of the TSP Act, and some species have been moved to a 
higher risk category (RPDC 2002). The RPDC (2002) considered that, in the main, 
the increase in the number of listings can be attributed to increased knowledge 
about the listed species. However, a range of causal factors were also identified as 
contributing to the increase in the risk status of forest dwelling species. These 
factors included: 
•  the effects associated with mining; 
•  the effects associated with clearing for agriculture; 
•  introduced species … and 
•  fire and drought. (RPDC 2003, p. 50) 
The RPDC also noted that many species are also potentially threatened by forestry 
activities (RPDC 2002). 
Regulation of non-forest vegetation  
The lack of a specific native vegetation management regime has led to concerns that 
certain types of vegetation, particularly non-forest native vegetation, are not being 
adequately protected in Tasmania. As mentioned above, the FP Act initially only 
applied to forest practices undertaken for commercial purposes. This ‘anomaly’ was 
addressed when the FP Act was amended in 2001, so that the Act now clarifies that 
non-commercial clearing of forests for the ‘purposes of agriculture or other land 
use’ is now subject to the Act. 
In certain circumstances, the clearing of non-forest vegetation may be subject to 
regulation through planning schemes under the LUPA Act, and the TSP Act. The 
TSBC observed:     
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Native vegetation such as heath, grassland, saltmarsh and wetland have few protection 
mechanisms. In fact, there is no auditing or regular monitoring of the rates of clearing. 
This lack of regulatory mechanisms reflects a serious gap in protection as many of 
these non-forest vegetation communities are poorly reserved and are among the most 
heavily impacted and threatened in the State. (TSBC 2002, p. 33) 
The lack of a comprehensive mapping system for non-forest vegetation makes it 
difficult to assess the extent to which agricultural and forestry practices are 
affecting non-forest vegetation in the State. The State Government’s vegetation 
mapping system, TASVEG, is currently focusing on mapping non-forest vegetation 
communities to complement the forest mapping completed during the development 
of the RFA. 
Compliance levels 
The FPB reports annually on compliance and enforcement activity under the 
FP Act. There are a number of different enforcement provisions available under the 
FP Act, including written and verbal notification informing landholders that they 
must comply with the legislation, notices to stop work and prosecution in cases 
where operations have been undertaken without an approved FPP. In 2002-03, 
30 notices to stop work were issued, fines were imposed in seven instances, one 
breach resulted in prosecution. 
Under the FP Act, it is a requirement that a certificate of compliance be lodged by a 
landholder with the FPB within 30 days of the completion of operations prescribed. 
The FPB noted that: 
… a reasonable level of compliance is being reported through certificates lodged … by 
applicants upon expiry of Forest Practices Plans. The Board notes that there has been a 
substantial improvement in the rate of lodgement of certificates but that the lodgement 
of certificates, particularly by the non-industrial private sector is still not acceptable. 
(FPB 2002a, p. 7) 
The Commission received little evidence to suggest that non-compliance with the 
legislation was a significant issue. However, the TCT considered that application of 
the compliance and enforcement provisions of the FP Act was likely to be 
undermined by the self-regulatory nature of the monitoring and enforcement 
provisions (TCT, trans., p. 750). 
In its review of progress with the implementation of the RFA, the RPDC noted that: 
… though there is significant disquiet about the self-regulatory nature of the Forest 
Practices System, an independent review of compliance auditing procedures has found 
that it is appropriately structured and operated at an appropriate level. (2002, p. 37)     




The Tasmanian Government (sub. 201) has recently announced that it will introduce 
legislation to make the FPB more independent and skills-based. 
Consideration of economic and social impacts 
The requirement for the consideration of the economic and social impacts of 
decisions made under the regimes is either stated directly, or strongly inferred in the 
supporting legislation. 
One of the objects of the RMPS is to facilitate economic development in accordance 
with the other objectives of the Act. In developing a planning scheme under the 
LUPA Act, a planning authority must, among other things, seek to further the 
objectives of the RMPS, and must ‘have regard to the use and development of the 
region as an entity in environmental, economic and social terms’ (RPDC 2003, 
p. 10). 
However, the Southern Midlands Council considered that:  
… most decisions within the RMPS certainly and generally in Tasmania do not 
adequately take into account economic and social values as well as natural values. They 
certainly take into account natural values and in fact most of the decision-making in 
this sphere seems to be centred on assessing the natural values and the economic and 
social values are add-ons, if you like, if they’re considered at all, or are not considered. 
(trans., p. 774) 
Under the TSP Act (s. 9), a Community Review Committee is established, one of 
the functions of which is to ‘consider the social and economic impact of the 
implementation of land management agreements’. The objective of considering 
social and economic factors is to:  
… ensure that landholders do not carry an unreasonable burden for conserving 
threatened species on their land. (DPIWE 1999, p. 27)  
The requirement for the consideration of economic and social factors is not directly 
stated in the FP Act. However, certain provisions of the Act suggest that there is 
consideration of the trade-offs between economic and other factors in developing 
and certifying FPPs. For example, the Act’s overriding objective is to ‘achieve 
sustainable management of Crown and private forests’ (FP Act, Schedule 7). There 
is also a requirement that assessments of FPPs consider the impacts of the proposal 
on soils, water, flora, fauna, cultural heritage and visual landscape.      
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H.5  Administration and implementation  
Forest Practices Act  
Costs for implementing and administering the Forest Practices System are shared 
between the State Government, the forest industry and the FPB. It is an objective of 
the Act that sustainable forest management is delivered in a way that is as far as 
possible self-funding. The forest industry bears the cost for activities, such as 
preparation and certification of FPPs, supervision of forest practices and training 
and education of contractors, operators and Forest Practices Officers. In 2002-03, 
the FPB (2003) estimated these services to cost approximately $7 million.  
To cover the costs associated mainly with the provision of research and advisory 
programs, the FPB raises revenue from sources such as voluntary funding from 
Forestry Tasmania, voluntary contributions from privately-owned operations, and a 
levy on wood processors. Total revenue received under the self-funding activities of 
the FPB in 2002-03 amounted to $1.3 million (FPB 2003).  
In addition, in 2001-02, the State Government provided $430 000 for the provision 
of certain activities including: 
•  annual assessment of the Forest Practices System and FPPs; 
•  lodging complaints and prosecuting offences; 
•  payment of compensation for refusal of private timber reserves; and  
•  remuneration of the Chief Forest Practices Officer (FPB 2002a). 
Resource Management and Planning System 
Regulation of native vegetation and biodiversity conservation is only one of the 
functions covered by the RMPS and, as such, the cost of administering and 
complying with this regulation is difficult to identify precisely.  
Administrative costs are shared between local and State Government. Local 
Government, in some instances will be responsible for developing planning 
schemes under the LUPA Act, and assessing permits to carry out certain 
development activities against planning schemes.  The State Government funds 
organisations such as the RPDC (which, among other things, approves and assesses 
planning schemes) and the RMPAT tribunal. 
Some participants, such as Don McShane (trans., p.  1408) and the Southern 
Midlands Council (trans., p. 1457), expressed concern that local government might     




incur costs, without a commensurate increase in funding, as a result of incorporating 
native vegetation obligations contained in the recently signed bi-lateral agreement 
into local planning approval processes.  
Costs incurred by landholders include application fees for lodging a permit for some 
development activities, and costs associated with delays while waiting for a 
decision (for example, in the form of lost production). The Commission did not 
receive any comment on whether these costs were significant. 
Threatened Species Protection Act 
The TSP Act is primarily administered by the State Government. Funding for the 
development of some instruments under the TSP Act is provided by the Australian 
Government through bilateral agreements such as the RFA.8 
Costs of administering the TSP Act are also incurred by local government. For 
example, threatened species legislation needs to be considered in the development 
of planning schemes under the LUPA Act.  
Costs of inconsistency 
The Commission did not receive any evidence regarding costs associated with 
inconsistency between the regimes. This may be because certain aspects of the 
operation of the Forest Practices System are separate from the operation of RMPS.  
Dispute resolution procedures 
There are separate appeals processes for decisions made under the RMPS and the 
FP Act.  
Resource Management and Planning System 
As discussed earlier, the RMPAT hears appeals against decisions made under the 
RMPS. 
Unless otherwise specified in the legislation relevant to the appeal, RMPAT must 
receive notification of the appeal, in writing, within 14 days of the decision. A 
$55.50 fee is charged for lodging an appeal. Once appeals have been received, a 
                                              
8  For example, Australian Government funding was provided for the development of recovery 
plans for species that were jointly listed on the TSP Act and the EPBC Act (RPDC 2002).      
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‘Directions Hearing’ is convened to determine whether the matter can be solved 
through mediation. 
If it is deemed that the appeal cannot be resolved through mediation, a full hearing 
of RMPAT is arranged. RMPAT decisions on appeals are legally binding on all 
parties. 
RMPAT decisions may be appealed to the Supreme Court, but only on matters of 
law. Appeals to the Supreme Court must be lodged within 28 days of RMPAT’s 
decision. 
 Forest Practices Act 
The Forest Practices Tribunal (FPT) is an independent body established under 
section 34 of the FP  Act, to hear appeals against decisions made by the FPB. 
Decisions of the FPB against which appeals may be lodged include: 
•  refusal of establishment of a private timber reserve;9 and 
•  refusal, amendment or variation of the plan.  
There does not appear to be a time limit by which appeals have to be lodged with 
the FPT. Procedures for appeal hearings are detailed in section 37 of the FP Act. 
Legal representation is not permitted, and subject to certain conditions, the hearing 
procedure is ‘within the discretion of the Tribunal’ (s. 37(9)). The decision of the 
FPT with respect to an appeal is final. In 2001-02, three appeals were heard by the 
FPT, all in relation to applications for private timber reserves. 
H.6  Impacts on landholders  
The Commission received some evidence of the impacts of native vegetation and 
biodiversity regulations on landholders and farming practices, although it was 
difficult to ascertain the magnitude and extent of these impacts. Evidence suggested 
that there is potential for significant variation in impacts across regions, and even 
across properties within particular regions. The TFGA considered it difficult to 
determine the proportion of landholders affected by the regulations, but noted that: 
… there’s a wide spread effect across Tasmania, and it would vary from district to 
district … in the restrictions of the use of non-forest native vegetation you go to the 
Midlands area, where graziers are fairly heavily reliant on those areas for grazing sheep 
for the production of fine wool; you go to the islands, where restrictions on land 
clearing, development of properties … have a major impact. In the more highly 
                                              
9  A prescribed person may appeal against a granting of a Private Timber Reserve.     




developed areas of the state, across the north-western area, the effect would not be so 
great … (trans., p. 731) 
As well as noting the impact of current restrictions, landholders also expressed 
concern about the potential impact of a range of possible changes to native 
vegetation and biodiversity conservation regulations. These included the possibility 
that the TSP Act may be amended to include a ‘threatened communities’ category 
(TFGA, sub. 160, John Oldaker, trans., p. 1393) and the introduction of regulations 
affecting the clearing of non-forest native vegetation (TFGA, trans., p. 8; Southern 
Midlands Council, trans., p. 771). 
It was claimed that native vegetation and biodiversity conservation regulations were 
affecting farming practices in a number of ways. Restrictions under the FP Act, for 
example, may impede the development of certain areas of land that requires the 
removal of native vegetation. The long history of established agriculture in the State 
means that there are not large areas of land with development potential outside the 
reserve system. However, the TFGA argued that, as most properties have some 
native vegetation, the potential returns from bringing this land into production 
imply that the impacts of the restrictions on some properties could be significant 
(TFGA, trans., p.  730; Forest and Forest Industry Council of Tasmania, 
trans., pp. 783–5).  
The Southern Midlands Council provided an example of the impacts associated with 
clearing restrictions under the FP Act on a property in the Midlands region: 
[the] property … has a total area of 1690 hectares. The land already developed for 
agriculture is 800 hectares and there’s 890 hectares of native forest and grasslands. The 
landowner would like to clear 45 hectares of forest located on potentially productive 
farmland and is willing to preserve the remaining 845 hectares of native forest and 
grassland, but this is subject to a moratorium under the [Code] … and he has been 
advised that it’s simply not worth his while putting in an application to do this … you 
can determine that there's approximate loss of capital value of $64 000 and approximate 
loss of yearly income of $29 000. (trans., pp. 774–5) 
The TFGA argued that application of the FP Act to clearing of all native forests, 
whether for commercial activities or not, had resulted in some significant impacts 
for some landholders who wished to remove native forest vegetation: 
A notable example is farmers on King Island, where there are no commercial forestry 
operations and where the Act has therefore not really had application before. Many 
King Island farmers are now facing real financial costs as a result, with the introduction 
of vegetation clearance regulation. (TFGA, sub. 160, p. 8) 
There are some restrictions on changing land use on farming properties. In some 
cases, landholders are required to obtain approval to ensure that a proposed 
development complies with a planning scheme. Restrictions — or outright refusal     
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— may result in cases where the proposal has implications for species listed under 
the TSP Act. Restrictions may affect landholders’ ability to introduce new 
technology, or to switch from grazing activities to cropping in particular areas. The 
TFGA (sub.  160) noted that regulations were preventing landholders from 
introducing centre pivot irrigators in the Midlands region. 
The TFGA (sub.  160) also observed that operating costs for landholders can 
increase as they attempt to control grazing and native animals in circumstances 
where an area of native vegetation reserve either adjoins a property or is required to 
be maintained on a property.  
In some cases, restrictions may have significant implications for the profitability of 
farming operations. 
The significance of … costs will vary between farms. However, in some cases it can be 
substantial. For example, where a large part of a property is covered by a native forest 
type which is limited in overall extent, and therefore where further clearing is 
forbidden, the value of the farm can be substantially degraded below what it was 
previously. (TFGA, sub. 160, p. 9) 
The Commission received little evidence of the impact on investment patterns or the 
attitudes of finance providers. 
Government measures to mitigate negative impacts 
As noted above, there are provisions for compensation to be paid, in certain 
circumstances, to persons adversely affected by the FP Act, the TSP Act and the 
RMPS. However, the compensation provisions of the RMPS, and the TSP Act in 
particular, do not appear to have been exercised to any significant extent. 
Compensation has been paid, in some circumstances, to landholders who have had 
an application to have land declared as a private timber reserve rejected by the FPB. 
The Tasmanian Government is also attempting to encourage voluntary landholder 
participation in the conservation of non-forest native vegetation through property 
management planning, for which funding has been provided: 
Vegetation management agreements will be negotiated with landholders, which 
identify and map the native vegetation assets on a property and describe how those 
assets will be managed to provide both sound conservation and production outcomes. 
Those agreements will give a landholder certainty over how those assets can be used 
over a considerable planning horizon. 
The [Australian Government] has agreed to provide up to $1.75 million from the 
Natural Heritage Trust program to assist the State in giving effect to this protection of 
non-forest vegetation and this will assist us in establishing vegetation management 
agreements over priority properties. (Tasmanian Government, sub. 201, p. 12)     




In terms of native forest vegetation, significant funding has been provided through 
the PFRP to pursue the objectives of the CAR reserve system on private land. To 
date, of the $30 million allocated to the program, over the period 1998–2002, 
approximately $4.8 million was spent securing 31  120 hectares of native forest 
vegetation.10 The average payment to landholders to secure native forests under 
conservation covenants over the same period was $155 per hectare, and the average 
cost of ‘extremely high priority’ forests purchased by the program was $709 per 
hectare (PFRP 2002).  
In addition to direct payments to landholders, ten municipal councils offer annual 
rate rebates and a number of other councils are considering the introduction of such 
measures (Tasmanian Government, sub. 201).  
The Tasmanian Government considered that: 
The [PFRP] demonstrates that conservation of biodiversity can be integrated with 
sustainable agriculture across rural landscapes through effective partnerships with 
landowners, which are entered into voluntarily, and by providing financial incentives 
related to conservation and market values of land. (sub. 201, p. 11)  
The TFGA noted that landholder participation in the PFRP highlighted the 
advantages of involving landholders in a voluntary process when pursuing 
conservation outcomes, rather than a more interventionist approach. The TFGA 
considered that programs, such as the PFRP, were: 
… a far cry from [processes where] … somebody from the government is likely to 
come along and tell [landholders] that this area of land needs to be locked up, restricted 
and so on, and that will be done under a legislative process rather than some form of 
ownership. There’s a clear difference between the two [processes], and I think the 
importance of what's happened so far is that people have been willing to get involved; 
decide what they would like to do and they’re quite proud of it … (trans., p. 735) 
The TCT (trans., p. 763) considered the PFRP was a ‘good idea’ for securing high-
value conservation land, but expressed some concerns over the costs of the 
program. Reserve Design Management considered that ‘there is absolutely no 
relationship between the resource provided and the economic cost’ (trans., 
pp. 805–6). 
                                              
10 Includes properties secured through purchases, covenants and management agreements.     
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H.7  Impacts on regional communities and other 
economic activities 
To the extent that production and incomes of landholders decline as a result of 
native vegetation and biodiversity regulations, this may be reflected in the demand 
for services (labour and other) in regional communities. Declining productivity may 
also have implications for a local council’s rate base and, consequently, its ability to 
provide certain services. However, the Commission is not able to make an overall 
assessment because of a lack of evidence on the extent of impacts of native 
vegetation and biodiversity regulations generally, and a lack of evidence presented 
to the Commission about the impact on regional communities.  
H.8 Summary 
Native vegetation and biodiversity conservation regulations in Tasmania do not 
seem to have had broad scale impacts on landholders, largely because agricultural 
industry is well established and there does not appear to be high demand for 
extensive clearing for agricultural purposes. 
Also, the impact of policies such as the CAR reserve system do not appear to have a 
significant impact on landholders as the majority of land reserved has been on 
public land. Where private land has been required for reserve purposes, funds have 
been made available for compensation through schemes such as the PFRP and, in 
some instances, the Forest Practices System. However, some individual landholders 
may have been significantly affected by some of the provisions. This may occur 
where high conservation value vegetation must be retained, but the landholder is not 
eligible for compensation. There are also concerns among landholders about the 
restrictions that may be implemented by the Tasmanian Government as a result of 
the recent bilateral NHT agreement. 
In terms of implementation, there are some concerns as to whether local 
government has the resources and skills to administer increasingly complex native 
vegetation and biodiversity regulations effectively. Environmental objectives 
stipulated in the regimes appear to have been achieved, particularly with respect to 
forest native vegetation, although there is ongoing debate about the adequacy of the 
objectives.     




I Northern  Territory 
I.1 Introduction 
Land clearing has not been considered a major issue in the Northern Territory until 
relatively recently. It is estimated that 0.37 per  cent of the Territory has been 
cleared for all types of development, including urban expansion, infrastructure 
provision, and agriculture and mining (Hosking 2002, p. 6).  However,  particular 
areas of the Territory have been subject to more extensive clearing, for example, 
14.6 per cent of the Litchfield Shire (adjacent to Darwin) has been cleared and 9.3 
per cent of the Daly Basin (Hosking 2002, p. i).  
The majority of clearing in the Northern Territory has been on general freehold 
land, which excludes Aboriginal freehold. Pastoral land is the largest single type of 
land tenure (46  per  cent) followed by Aboriginal freehold (44  per  cent). General 
freehold represents less than 4.5 per  cent of the Territory’s land area 
(Hosking 2002, p. 8).  
I.2  Description of the regulatory regime 
The Northern Territory has several regulatory regimes covering the clearing of 
native vegetation and protection of biodiversity. Separate regimes apply to clearing 
of general freehold and Crown land, pastoral leases and clearing in the Litchfield 
Shire (which is covered by the Litchfield Area Plan 1992). A moratorium on further 
clearing in the Daly region has also been announced. Other legislation and 
regulations may also impact on the ability of landholders to clear native vegetation.  
Planning Act 
The  Planning Act 1999 (Planning Act) regulates the planning, control and 
development of land in the Northern Territory.1 It does not explicitly regulate the 
clearing of native vegetation or the preservation of biodiversity. However, 
                                              
1 The  Planning Act 1999 replaced the Planning Act 1992.      





section 31 of the Act permits the relevant Minister to issue an Interim Development 
Control Order (IDCO) to vary the planning scheme. An IDCO is intended to be a 
temporary measure pending an amendment to the Planning Act. Section 31(2) states 
that:  
(2) An interim development control order may declare that – 
(a) a development provision does not apply to all or part of the land to which the  order 
relates; 
(b) development specified in the order in all or part of the land to which the order 
relates may proceed only with a permit granted under Part  6 by the consent 
authority specified in the order; or 
(c) specified types of development are prohibited, 
and while the order remains in force the provision does not apply, or development may 
only proceed or is prohibited, accordingly. 
In November 2002, the Minister for Lands and Planning signed IDCO No.  12, 
which came into force on 11 December 2002 and is in place for two years. The 
order prohibits, without the consent of the Minister, clearing of more than one 
hectare of native vegetation whether this is required as part of the development or 
not.  
The order applies to all freehold (including Aboriginal freehold) and Crown land 
where the area of land specified on the title is greater than two hectares. However, 
the controls under the IDCO do not apply to:  
•  pastoral leases (which are subject to clearing regulations set out in the Pastoral 
Land Act 1992 (PL Act); 
•  national parks and reserves (which are subject to their own legislation); 
•  towns and current control plan areas such as Darwin, Katherine and Alice 
Springs;  
•  land where clearing is controlled by the Mining Act 1980; and 
•  Litchfield Shire (where land clearing is subject to regulation under the Litchfield 
Area Plan). 
The IDCO specifies that the clearing of native vegetation means the cutting down or 
destruction, by any means, of the native vegetation on the land. However, it does 
not include: 
(a) the removal of a declared weed within the meaning of the Weeds Management Act 
or of a plant removed under the Plant Diseases Act; 
(b) the lopping of a tree; 
(c) the clearing of native vegetation through the grazing of animals;     




(d) the harvesting of native vegetation planted by a person for harvest; 
(e) the clearing of firebreaks or roads for access to the land or other land; or 
(f) the destruction of native vegetation in the course of Aboriginal traditional use, 
including the gathering of food, the production of cultural artefacts and the use of 
fire. (Vatskalis 2002, pp. 2–3) 
Applications to clear native vegetation 
The clearing controls require landholders to apply for a permit before clearing 
native vegetation on their property. The IDCO itself does not establish specific 
criteria for clearing native vegetation; permits for clearing native vegetation are 
therefore treated like other development applications. To be approved they must 
comply with the statutory criteria set out in section 46 of the Planning Act.  
These criteria include a requirement for the application to contain: 
•  an assessment of how the development complies with an IDCO (if any); 
•  an assessment demonstrating the merits of the proposed development; 
•  a description of the physical characteristics of the land, a detailed assessment 
demonstrating the land’s suitability for the purposes of the proposed 
development and an assessment of the effect of the development on that land and 
other land; 
•  an assessment of the potential impact on the existing and future amenity of the 
area in which the land is situated; and 
•  an assessment of the benefit or detriment to the public interest of the 
development.  
The Northern Territory Government (NT Government) has also published 
guidelines for land clearing (NT Government 2002) which provide technical advice 
for those planning and undertaking land clearing (box I.1).  
The IDCO specifies that the Minister for Lands and Planning is the consent 
authority for the purposes of the Planning Act. Applications to clear native 
vegetation must therefore be approved by the Minister (or his or her delegate). The 
Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Environment (DIPE) states that clearing 
applications will be assessed by senior government officers with experience in the 
fields of soil conservation, water resources and biodiversity (DIPE  2002). The 
Planning Act requires applications to be processed within 12 weeks.      





Decisions by the Minister as the consent authority are not subject to appeal. Hence, 
there is no appeal in the case of clearing applications under the regime established 
by the IDCO.  
Enforcement and prosecution provisions are specified in section 75 of the Planning 
Act. These provisions provide for maximum penalties of $20 000 for an individual 
and $100  000 for corporations. The DIPE has indicated that monitoring of 
compliance will be through the use of satellite image analysis and on-ground 
investigations by departmental staff (DIPE 2002).  
 
Box I.1  Northern Territory’s land clearing guidelines 
The NT Government introduced land clearing guidelines to ‘provide basic information 
on how to clear in an environmentally responsible manner’ (NT  Government 2002, 
p. 3). When the Minister tabled the guidelines he stated that: 
They reflect best management practices of land clearing in the Territory and will be 
periodically reassessed in accordance with comments received from community and 
industry. (Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Record no. 3, Ninth Assembly, First Session 
26/02/02) 
These guidelines apply to all land tenures (and are consistent with specific guidelines 
for clearing on pastoral land).  
The guidelines provide information on: 
•  legislative requirements for clearing approvals; 
•  planning clearing operations, including information on: 
–  the preparation of clearing plans;  
–  site selection (including information on ‘no-go’ areas and ‘clear with care’ areas); 
and 
–  required buffers around waterways and the provision of corridors for native 
wildlife;  
•  the clearing operation, including information on: 
–  operational techniques and the timing of clearing to minimise soil disturbance, 
avoid channelling and concentration of water and to minimise disturbance to 
areas not subject to clearing; and 
–  erosion and sediment control measures;  
•  specific issues relating to clearing for subdivisions and linear developments.  
Sources: NT Government (2002); Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Record no. 3, Ninth Assembly, First 
Session 26/02/02.  
 
     




Litchfield Area Plan 
Development and land use in the Litchfield Shire is regulated by the Litchfield Area 
Plan 1992 (LAP), which is, in turn, a development provision of the NT Planning 
Scheme under the Planning Act.  
The control of native vegetation clearing is not, of itself, a focus of the plan. 
However, objectives of the plan include, amongst others, the protection of 
residential amenity and areas of environmental or conservation value. One of the 
instruments to achieve these objectives is the regulation of native vegetation 
clearance. Clause 22.5 of the plan states that: 
Except with the consent of the Authority, the removal of natural vegetation from an 
area within an allotment exceeding approximately 50% of the area of the allotment is 
prohibited. (LAP 1992, p. 62) 
Under the plan, a Development Permit must be obtained prior to the removal of 
more than 50 per cent of the native vegetation on any allotment. The decision to 
approve clearing or not is made by the Development Consent Authority. The 
Authority is advised by a vegetation clearing committee, which comprises four 
members, one each from industry, government, council and the general public.  
Pastoral Land Act 
The use of Crown land subject to pastoral leases is regulated by the PL Act. The 
PL Act requires lessees to maintain, improve and protect the land that they hold 
under a pastoral lease.  
Section 38(1)(h) of the PL Act states: 
… that the lessee will not clear any pastoral land except with and in accordance with 
the written consent of the Board or guidelines, if any, published by the Board. 
Under this section of the PL  Act, the Pastoral Land Board (PLB) published 
guidelines for clearing on pastoral land in 1993 (PLB 1993). These guidelines 
formalised the conditions under which pastoral land could be cleared and the 
administrative arrangements for obtaining the Board’s approval to clear.  
The PLB requires formal approval for the following operations: 
•  clearing vegetation for cropping or pasture improvement; and 
•  clearing for other purposes, which include, but are not limited to: 
–  pushing and lopping woodland and scrub country to provide drought or top 
feed;     





–  thinning trees to improve access and management; and 
–  pushing or chaining non-preferred shrub or tree species. 
However, the guidelines indicate that lessees are not required to apply for 
permission to clear for the purposes of: 
•  making fixed improvements (for example, building additional infrastructure); 
•  selectively removing noxious weeds; or 
•  removing woody weeds (over an area of less than ten hectares) from land 
surrounding fixed improvements.  
Applications to clear native vegetation 
Lessees intending to clear vegetation on pastoral land must apply to the PLB for 
approval. The lessees must provide the following information as part of the 
application: 
•  the total area to be cleared; 
•  a site location plan (which also indicates any previous clearing); 
•  a description of soils, slopes and topographical features of the area to be cleared; 
•  the main species to be cleared; 
•  the proposed method of clearing; 
•  a statement outlining how the cleared land is to be used; and 
•  the proposed timing of the clearing.  
Clearing applications are forwarded to relevant government departments for 
comment before consideration by the PLB. A sub-committee of the PLB may also 
undertake a site inspection prior to approving an application. The PLB may approve 
the application unconditionally or approve it subject to the lessee meeting certain 
conditions.  
Table I.1  provides  information on the number of land clearing applications 
approved by the PLB and the area of land involved. It should be noted that these 
figures may not necessarily indicate the actual degree of clearing. They may under-
estimate the extent of land clearing on pastoral land because of the exemptions 
discussed above. On the other hand it is possible that landholders do not clear to the 
full extent of the approval.       




Table I.1  Pastoral Land Board approvals to clear pastoral land 
 
Year 
Area approved to be 
cleared (hectares) No. of applications
1994-95 1  433 5
1995-96 2  760 9
1996-97 100 2
1997-98 309 4
1998-99 1  100 3
Total 5  702 23
Source: Brock (2001).  
Daly region moratorium 
On 9 November 2003, the Chief Minister of the Northern Territory announced the 
establishment of a Community Reference Group (CRG) to develop a draft 
Integrated Regional Land Use Plan for the Daly region. The CRG is to seek public 
input and is required to report by September 2004. Until the CRG’s report is 
received by the NT Government there will be a moratorium on further land clearing 
in the Daly Region. 
The NT Government states that the function of the CRG is to: 
… advise government through development of a draft Integrated Regional Land Use 
Plan, framed to ensure that ecologically sustainable development is achieved in the 
region and in line with the following core principles, that is, there will be: 
•  no dams on the Daly River; 
•  no cotton grown in the Northern Territory (existing trials will be completed); and 
•  no further subdivision for new agricultural blocks or new land clearing approvals 
until the Integrated Regional Land Use Plan has been completed. 
(NT Government 2003a) 
On 10 December 2003 the Chief Minister announced that the CRG will comprise 
18 members and will be chaired by Mr Rick Farley. Those on the reference group 
represent Indigenous groups, resource users’ associations, environment interests, 
local government and members of the community who live in the Daly region 
(NT Government 2003b).  
Other legislation  
There is a range of other legislation that may affect a landholder’s ability to clear 
native vegetation.      





•  Soil Conservation and Land Utilisation Act 1995 
–  Primarily concerned with measures to control soil erosion and sedimentation. 
Some restrictions may be imposed on the clearing of vegetation to avoid 
erosion. Where clearing results in erosion, the Act contains provisions which 
can be used to require rehabilitation at the landholder’s expense.  
•  Water Act 2000 
–  Concerned with the protection and management of water resources in the 
Northern Territory. There is scope to protect native vegetation in catchment 
management zones.  
•  Heritage Conservation Act 1991 
–  This Act enables places and objects to be declared to be of heritage value and 
to be placed on the NT Heritage Register. In addition, all prehistoric 
archaeological places are protected under this Act. Such places may not be 
disturbed without the written permission of the relevant Minister.  
•  Territory Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1988 
–  Establishes parks and reserves approved by the Legislative Assembly of the 
Northern Territory. Particular areas may be designated ‘essential habitats’ 
under the Act. Permission must be sought to undertake certain activities in 
areas designated as ‘essential habitats’. 
I.3  Development of the regulatory regime 
The regulation of land clearing on general freehold land was introduced recently by 
the NT Government. The clearing of native vegetation on pastoral leases and in the 
Litchfield Shire has been regulated for just over ten years. The regulation of 
clearing in these latter cases was introduced as part of the wider regulation of land 
use and development.  
Regime applying to freehold land 
The new arrangements relating to the clearing of freehold land under the Planning 
Act were introduced without prior consultation with landholders or the general 
public. However, the NT Government had foreshadowed the introduction of 
clearing controls when land clearing guidelines were published in February 2002. 
When the guidelines were tabled in the Northern Territory Assembly, the Minister 
stated:     




The next step in this process is the development of a policy on land clearing. A draft 
policy for the clearing of native vegetation in the Territory is currently being prepared 
for Cabinet consideration. The draft policy is to be implemented by the Planning Act 
and it is proposed that there will be a requirement for land clearing to be subject to 
approval on all tenures. The community will be advised and consulted on the draft 
document and issues associated with the policy implementation in the next six months, 
and we will also have further consultation with the Commonwealth. (Legislative 
Assembly, Parliamentary Record no. 3, Ninth Assembly, First Session 26/02/02) 
Approximately six months later, in response to a question, the Minister stated: 
We said we were also going to incorporate the clearing of land into our Planning Act. 
The Planning Act currently is under review … We are going to put out a white paper 
and we are going into wide consultation with all people affected so we actually have a 
Planning Act that is at last going to work. (Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Record 
no. 6, Ninth Assembly, First Session 13/08/2002)  
The NT Government issued the IDCO introducing clearing controls in November 
2002 and the new regulations came into force in December 2002. The IDCO 
remains in place for two years and then lapses; it cannot be re-introduced until three 
months have elapsed after the original order expires.  
The NT Government is currently undertaking a comprehensive review of all aspects 
of the Planning Act. A discussion paper (NT Government 2003) has been released 
and the Government has invited public submissions. It is proposed that the clearing 
guidelines (box I.1) be incorporated into the revised Act.  
Litchfield Area Plan 
The Litchfield Shire was developed, in part, to provide a rural lifestyle for those 
who preferred not to live in the more urbanised Darwin area. Following Cyclone 
Tracy in 1974 many people moved to Litchfield from Darwin to take advantage of 
the availability of larger blocks of land (between 2 and 8 hectares) and the 
‘perceived immunity from interference with lifestyle caused by closer settlement’ 
(NT Department of Lands and Housing 1990, p. 6).  
The 1984 Darwin Regional Structure Plan (which encompassed the Litchfield 
Shire): 
… recognised that rural living can make a positive contribution to the development of 
the region by the creation of an environment which is characterised by some 
uniqueness and variety, rather than the all-too-familiar unbroken urban sprawl of most 
Australian cities. (NT Department of Lands and Housing 1990, p. 6)     





The continued development of a separate identity for the Litchfield Shire led to the 
development of the Litchfield Land Use Structure Plan in 1990 and the Litchfield 
Area Plan in 1992. Controls on the clearing of native vegetation (as well as a range 
of other planning controls) were put in place to protect the rural feel of the area and 
promote the economic development of the Shire.  
Regime applying to pastoral land 
The PL Act was introduced to provide a secure leasehold tenure and to introduce a 
pastoral land administration with an emphasis on land care. In the second reading 
speech the Minister stated the Government’s aim in introducing the legislation was: 
… the provision of secure perpetual lease tenure on which pastoralists can base long-
term investment and management decisions, to ensure that … all pastoral land is well 
managed and utilised prudently so that its renewable resources are maintained and its 
productive capacity sustained. (Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Record no. 7, 
Sixth Assembly, First Session 12/11/91) 
The new Act was developed by the NT Government based on an implementation 
group consisting of representatives of various government departments including 
the Departments of Land, Housing, and Primary Industry and Fisheries, and the 
Conservation Commission.  
I.4  Promotion of environmental goals  
The attainment of environmental goals is not the primary focus of either the 
Planning Act or the PL Act. However, both pieces of legislation, as well as the 
LAP, are used to pursue environmental objectives.  
A consultant’s report, prepared for Environment Australia as part of the National 
Framework for the Management and Monitoring of Australia’s Native Vegetation, 
concluded that in relation to the Northern Territory: 
… there is no native vegetation crisis in the NT. Territory NRM [natural resource 
management] agencies, therefore, do not focus specifically on vegetation. They are 
concerned instead with its management in a broader natural resources context, towards 
sustainable development goals generally. (URS Corporation and Griffin NRM 
2000, p. 27) 
The objectives of the regimes in the Territory should be viewed in this context. 
There is not considered to be a crisis in terms of native vegetation clearance but 
there is a desire to develop the Territory’s resources in a sustainable manner.      




Objectives of the regulatory regime 
The objectives of the legislation controlling native vegetation clearance are, in some 
cases, specified in the legislation or regulatory instrument. At other times they must 
be inferred from the second reading speech or other public statements.  
Planning Act 
This Act does not have an explicit statement of objectives. However, in the second 
reading speech for the Planning Bill, the Minister indicates that the planning scheme 
contained in the bill is ‘a step towards more consistent and better integrated 
planning across the Northern Territory’ (Baldwin 1999, p. 3). The other element of 
the Act is to establish a process for the approval of development projects in the 
Northern Territory.  
The IDCO introducing the land clearing regulations for freehold land did not state 
any objectives or give any reasons for the new controls. However, in the press 
release announcing the new controls, the Minister stated that: 
These new measures clearly demonstrate this Government’s commitment to the long-
term sustainable development of our natural resources … While the Northern Territory 
has so far avoided the environmental damage that goes with poor land clearing 
practices, now is the time to act. (Vatskalis 2002, p. 1) 
The objective of the regulations does not appear to be to prevent clearing. In the 
foreword to the land clearing guidelines, the Minister for Lands and Planning notes 
that ‘the future development of the Territory will involve some clearing of 
vegetation on land that is capable of sustaining such enterprises’ (NT Government 
2002, p. 1). The objective appears to be to ensure that any clearing is carried out 
according to appropriate guidelines and in a sustainable manner.  
Litchfield Area Plan 
The LAP is focused on protecting the amenity of the Shire and encouraging 
appropriate agricultural development. The LAP states that its overall aim is: 
… to protect the rural character of the Litchfield Shire and to identify locations suitable 
for the range of activities and services associated with development in the Shire. 
(LAP 1992, p. 1) 
As well as having an overall aim, the LAP has eight specific objectives. One of 
these is to protect the integrity of areas of environmental and conservation value. 
The other objectives include, amongst others, the protection of land with 
horticultural potential, prohibiting visually intrusive developments on arterial roads     





and ensuring that non-residential developments are sited to avoid or minimise 
conflict with the residential amenity of adjoining lots.  
The LAP states that, in relation to the prohibition on removing more than 
50 per cent of the native vegetation on an allotment: 
The purpose of this clause is to ensure that where the removal of native vegetation is 
proposed for an area exceeding 50% of an allotment, the vegetation is removed in 
accordance with environmental guidelines. (LAP 1992, p. 62) 
The regulation of native vegetation clearance is therefore an element of the overall 
objective of maintaining the amenity of the shire.  
Pastoral Land Act 
The PL  Act contains a range of objectives aimed at ensuring the efficient 
administration of pastoral leases and ensuring that lessees do not damage or degrade 
pastoral land. The objects of the PL Act are: 
(a) to provide a form of tenure of Crown land that facilitates the sustainable use of land 
for pastoral purposes and the economic viability of the pastoral industry; 
(b) to provide for — 
  (i) the monitoring of pastoral land so as to detect and assess any change in its 
 condition; 
  (ii) the prevention or minimisation of degradation of or other damage to the land 
  and its indigenous plant and animal life; and 
  (iii) the rehabilitation of the land in cases of degradation or other damage; 
(c) to recognise the right of Aborigines to follow traditional pursuits on pastoral land; 
(d) to provide reasonable access for the public across pastoral land to waters and places 
of public interest; and 
(e) to provide a procedure to establish Aboriginal community living areas on pastoral 
land. 
In addition, the PL Act sets out the general duties of pastoral lessees:  
(a) to carry out the pastoral enterprise under the lease so as to prevent degradation of 
the land; 
(b) to participate to a reasonable extent in the monitoring of the environmental and 
sustained productive health of the land; and 
(c)  within the limits of the lessee's financial resources and available technical 
knowledge, to improve the condition of the land.      




The environmental objectives of the PL Act and the duties imposed on lessees are 
very general in nature and do not refer explicitly to the issue of land clearing or 
biodiversity conservation.  
Comparing objectives across regimes 
Regulation of the clearing of native vegetation and protection of biodiversity is not 
the primary focus of either the Planning Act (including the LAP) or the PL Act. 
They have broader overall objectives, of which the protection of native vegetation 
and biodiversity is one element.  
The regulation of clearing under the LAP is more for the preservation of visual 
amenity and lifestyle reasons, while the controls relating to pastoral land and other 
freehold land are aimed at ensuring appropriate clearing (including avoiding past 
mistakes) for agricultural development.  
The focus of the clearing regulations under both Acts is to ensure that clearing takes 
place within appropriate guidelines. The objective of neither Act is to prevent 
clearing per se.  
Understanding of objectives 
Guidelines have been published for both clearing on pastoral land and for the new 
controls applying to freehold land. In both cases the guidelines provide an 
introduction to the process of obtaining permission to clear land and provide 
technical guidelines relating to the actual clearing process. The Northern Territory’s 
Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Environment has also published a series 
of brochures that provide an outline of the clearing regulations and provide step-by-
step information on how to apply for a clearing permit.  
It is therefore likely that landholders are aware of what is required of them under the 
various regimes — at least in terms of application procedure and the technical 
requirements for clearing in accordance with the guidelines.  
The extent to which they understand the underlying rationale for the regimes is not 
clear. However, as part of the current review of the Planning Act being undertaken 
by the NT Government there has been extensive public consultation with 
landholders (and the community generally). As part of the consultation process 
there have been public forums, field days for departmental staff and individual 
meetings and briefings.      






The general nature of the objectives makes it difficult to assess the extent to which 
they have been achieved.  
Clearing controls in the Litchfield Shire take no account of the environmental (or 
public amenity) value of the land to be cleared. Landholders are free to clear up to 
50 per cent of their property without prior approval.  
The NT Government recognises that this may not protect environmentally valuable 
areas in the Litchfield Shire:  
In some cases, the 50% rule has not been effective in the protection of natural 
resources, as there is no recognition that one area of land may be more significant than 
another. (NT Government 2002, p. 9) 
In relation to regulations affecting other freehold land (outside the Litchfield Shire) 
it is perhaps too early to assess the effectiveness of the regime in achieving its 
objectives.  
The lack of transparency in the evaluation of clearing applications on pastoral land 
makes it difficult to assess the extent to which the objectives of the regime have 
been achieved.  
Compliance levels 
There is little evidence on the level of compliance with the regulations relating to 
clearing native vegetation.  
Consideration of economic and social impacts  
Section 51 of the Planning Act sets out 17 matters to be considered by the consent 
authority when assessing a development application (including an application to 
clear native vegetation). These criteria would apply to applications to clear freehold 
land under IDCO No. 12 and under the LAP.  
Some of these criteria are: 
•  the potential impact on the existing and future amenity of the area in which the 
land is situated; 
•  the public interest; 
•  any potential impact on natural, social, cultural or heritage values; and     




•  any other matters the consent authority thinks fit. 
However, the extent to which these issues are considered in relation to applications 
to clear native vegetation is not clear.  
In relation to pastoral land, applications to clear native vegetation are assessed in 
accordance with the guidelines for clearing pastoral land published by the PLB. 
However, the guidelines only provide technical information relating to clearing 
(such as the need to maintain buffers and guidelines on site selection, timing and the 
method of clearing). There is therefore no requirement for the PLB to take into 
account the social or economic impact of clearing decisions.  
I.5  Administration and implementation 
There are different administrative arrangements for each of the Territory’s native 
vegetation clearing regimes.  
Administrative costs 
Administrative costs are incurred by the landholders applying to clear native 
vegetation, the agencies assessing the applications and other parties involved in the 
process, such as environmental groups or local community groups.  
In relation to costs borne by landholders, applications to clear native vegetation on 
freehold land (under IDCO No.  12 and the LAP) incur a $120 application fee. 
Applications to clear native vegetation on pastoral leases under the PL Act are free.  
In all cases landholders would also incur the cost of completing the application 
process.  
Time delays do not appear to be a problem for landholders subject to the regimes 
enabled under the Planning Act. The Act requires applications to be assessed within 
12 weeks of submission. There is no such requirement under the PL  Act for 
applications to clear pastoral land. However, the Commission has received no 
evidence that the time taken to assess applications under the PL  Act has been 
excessive.  
Costs are also incurred by the agencies that assess the applications and monitor 
compliance with the terms and conditions applicable to the permits.      





Costs of inconsistency 
There is no evidence of costs arising because of inconsistency between regimes at 
the Territory level, nor is there any evidence of problems between the Territory 
regimes and the Australian Government’s Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act).  
Dispute-resolution procedures 
There are separate dispute resolution procedures for applications made under the 
Planning Act and the PL Act.  
Dispute resolution under the Planning Act 
Under section 108 of the Act, decisions by the Development Consent Authority 
(DCA) may be appealed to the Lands and Mining Tribunal (LMT), which is an 
independent statutory body established under the Lands and Mining Tribunal Act 
1998.2 Appeals under the LAP would be dealt with through this mechanism, but not 
those in relation to the clearing of native vegetation on freehold land regulated by 
the IDCO under the Planning Act. In this case the IDCO designates the Minister as 
the DCA and decisions by the Minister in this capacity are not appealable.  
For those matters that may be appealed through this route, a notice of appeal must 
be filed with the LMT within 28 days of the decision by the DCA. In the first 
instance, the LMT requires the parties to attend a compulsory mediation conference. 
If the matter is not resolved, the LMT can require the provision of written 
submissions from the parties and may call for evidence at a hearing. After 
considering this material the LMT makes a binding determination on the 
application.  
Section 133 of the Planning Act permits an appeal against a decision by the LMT 
only on a question of law. Such appeals must be lodged within 28 days of the 
LMT’s presentation of a statement of reasons for the determination.  
In the period between June 2000 and June 2002, 18 appeals under the Planning Act 
(although not necessarily in relation to the clearing of native vegetation) were 
lodged with the LMT. Of these, 10 were resolved during mediation, 5 required a 
formal decision by the LMT and 3 were not yet finalised (LMT 2002, p. 3). The 
                                              
2  In addition to being the ultimate appeals body under the Planning Act, the Lands and Mining 
Tribunal also has a role in relation to the compulsory acquisition of land under the Lands 
Acquisition Act 1978.     




average time from filing to decision for appeals under the Planning Act was 2.7 
months (LMT 2002, p. 7).  
Dispute resolution under the Pastoral Land Act 
The Pastoral Land Appeal Tribunal is established under section 115 of the PL Act. 
The Tribunal hears appeals by pastoral lessees against, amongst others, decisions or 
actions of the PLB. A lessee could appeal a decision by the PLB to refuse 
permission to clear pastoral land or against conditions imposed by the Board in 
relation to the clearing operation.  
A lessee unhappy with a decision by the PLB is required to lodge an appeal within 
28 days after the notification of the decision subject to the appeal. In the first 
instance, section 118 of the PL Act requires the Tribunal Registrar to convene a 
compulsory conference between the parties to the proceedings.  
If the matter cannot be resolved at a compulsory conference, it is heard by the 
Appeals Tribunal. In hearing an appeal, the Appeals Tribunal may ‘inform itself on 
any matter in such manner as it thinks fit’ (PL Act s.116(2)). The Tribunal may 
summons persons to attend a hearing, require persons to answer questions and 
require the production of any relevant written material.  
In relation to an appeal, section 119 of the PL Act grants the Appeals Tribunal the 
power to: 
(a) confirm the decision or action; 
(b) vary or revoke the decision or action; or 
(c) substitute its own decision for that of the Board, Minister or Valuer-General or 
direct that particular action be taken in lieu of the action the subject of the appeal.  
The Commission has not received any information on the number of appeals to the 
Tribunal relating to native vegetation clearance on pastoral land.  
I.6  Impacts on landholders 
The Commission has received very little information from participants regarding 
the impact (either positive or negative) of native vegetation and biodiversity 
regimes on landholders. During the Commission’s visits to the Northern Territory, a 
number of farmers indicated that they had some issues with the new arrangements 
introduced by IDCO No. 12. However, they believed they could work with the new 
regulations and many of the requirements set out in the guidelines for land clearing 
were already common practice.      





Impacts on farming practices 
The clearing regulations in the Northern Territory appear to have had limited (if 
any) impact on farming practices. During visits, some landholders indicated that 
conditions on approvals to clear, under IDCO No. 12, required them to leave wider 
‘wildlife corridors’ of native vegetation than they would have otherwise left. These 
requirements did not, however, seem to pose a major problem for landholders.  
The regulations relating to freehold land appear to be aimed more at ensuring that 
clearing takes place in an appropriate manner, than preventing clearing or the 
development of land in the Territory. The Environment Centre Northern Territory 
(ECNT) argued that: 
In the Northern Territory negative impacts on property owners from the introduction of 
treeclearing regulations under the new Interim Development Control Order Number 12 
have been minimal. Overall the new IDCO has not reduced the level of clearing, it has 
merely provided an administrative approvals process. (sub. 147, p. 2) 
The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) expressed a similar view:  
ACF are not aware of, nor do we believe that the interim controls could be having, any 
‘impact’ on landholders which might be in any way considered unreasonable or 
significant. (sub. 146, p. 13)  
Similarly, in relation to clearing on leasehold land, the ECNT argued that: 
In relation to leasehold applications, the application and decision process is currently an 
internal procedure by the Pastoral Lands Board under the Pastoral Lands Act. Although 
broad figures on clearing rates are available it is very difficult to determine any 
negative impacts on landholders without access to the appropriate information. 
(sub. 147, p. 3) 
The lack of perceived detrimental impacts of the regulations in the Northern 
Territory suggests that there are unlikely to be any negative impacts on agricultural 
property values in the Territory. Other factors, such as the Government’s decision to 
release additional land for sale in the Daly region and any positive assistance to 
promote development are more likely to have an impact on property values than 
land clearing regulations themselves.  
The Commission received no information regarding the impact of the vegetation 
clearing regimes on: 
•  investment patterns;  
•  the attitudes of finance providers; or  
•  government measures to mitigate negative impacts.      




I.7  Impacts on regional communities and other 
economic activities 
The Commission has received information on the impact of regulation on 
Indigenous communities and more limited information on the impact on other 
economic activities. This may reflect, in part, the relatively recent nature of the 
regimes in the Northern Territory.  
Impacts on Indigenous communities  
The Commission received evidence that land clearing and biodiversity conservation 
regulation has significant adverse impacts on the Indigenous people of the Northern 
Territory. The Northern Land Council (NLC, sub. 221) noted that the Australian 
Government’s EPBC Act and the Territory’s regulation can prevent the small scale 
commercial harvest of native species by Indigenous people. The NLC stated: 
The core purpose of legislation covering clearing of native vegetation is to determine 
when it is in order to destroy or discard individuals and populations of native species of 
plants and animals, often in very large numbers. It makes no sense to provide for such 
quantitatively large scale incidental ‘use’ while obsessively regulating or banning 
altogether small scale direct commercial use of a few individuals of the same species 
taken from the same place. (sub. 221, p. 8)  
The NLC argued that regulations preventing the sustainable commercial 
exploitation of native species by Indigenous people removes an important 
opportunity for economic and social development in remote areas where other 
opportunities are severely limited. The NLC argued that:  
A legislated preference for widespread casual destruction over localised considered use 
disenfranchises those interested in alternatives to broad scale development, who are 
denied the opportunity to develop more sustainable systems of resource use. 
(sub. 221, p. 8) 
In cases where Indigenous people are able to make use of native flora and fauna the 
NLC noted that the information requirements necessary to obtain permits often 
impose significant costs on already economically disadvantaged communities 
(sub. 221, p. 14).  
     





Impacts on other industries 
The Commission received very little information on the impact of the regulations on 
other industries in the Territory. However, the ACF noted the impact of land 
clearing on eco-tourism in parts of the Northern Territory. In particular: 
The clearing in the Daly Basin is also likely to be to the detriment of the tourism and 
recreation industries which rely heavily on the health of the Daly River and estuary 
ecosystems. There is inadequate scientific research into the values of the region, the 
functioning of regional ecosystem processes and the threats posed to those values and 
functions by clearing and associated water development. For the Government to press 
ahead with broad-scale development under these circumstances is unconscionable. 
(sub. 146, pp. 13–14) 
Since the ACF made this submission to the Commission, the NT Government has 
announced a moratorium on further clearing in the Daly region, pending the 
preparation of an Integrated Regional Land Use Plan.  
As part of the Daly region review, the NT Government has announced that there 
will be no further development of the cotton industry in the Territory (trial projects 
currently underway will be permitted to continue until their completion) 
(NT Government 2003a). Overall, the clearing regulations in the Northern Territory 
appear to have had limited impacts on other economic activities. Current regulations 
do not appear to be preventing the wider economic development of the Territory.  
I.8 Summary 
Land clearing is not currently considered by many to be a major issue in the 
Northern Territory ― less than one per  cent of the land area has been cleared. 
However, the Territory has three regulatory regimes (covering general freehold 
land, leasehold land and the Litchfield Shire) to ensure that when land is cleared it 
is done according to appropriate environmental guidelines.  
The primary legislation underpinning the regimes does not focus specifically on 
land clearing and the preservation of biodiversity, but rather has wider development 
and resource management objectives. The regulations do not appear to have had 
major adverse impacts on landholders in the Territory.      




J Australian  Capital  Territory 
J.1 Introduction 
Legislation dealing with biodiversity conservation and native vegetation 
management has been in place in the Australian Capital Territory since 1980. This 
legislation operates in a framework of leasehold land and nature reserves, as there is 
no freehold rural land in the Australian Capital Territory.  
Over 53 per cent of land in the Australian Capital Territory is public land set aside 
as nature reserves and 21 per cent is rural land managed for agricultural purposes 
(ACT Commissioner for the Environment 2000).  
Historically, two classes of rural leases were issued in the Australian Capital 
Territory (Environment ACT 2003). 
•  ‘Partial’ or ‘nil tenant rights’ leases — these leases were usually short-term 
(some of 90-day duration) with all timber clearing rights vested in the ACT 
Government. Most leases in the Australian Capital Territory were of this nature. 
•  ‘Full tenant rights’ leases — a small number of these leases were issued for 50-
year terms in 1956 (38 were still in operation in 1999). The landholders retained 
rights to all improvements, including embedded rights to clear timber, with the 
ACT Government required to compensate landholders for any acquisition of 
those rights.  
However, from 1999, the ACT Government undertook a policy of transition to 
uniform long-term rural leasehold. In July 2003, around 50 per cent of the leases 
were of 99-year duration (Environment ACT, sub. 17).  
Land-use data for the period 1995–2000 show that the total area of land deployed in 
agriculture has fallen by 27 per cent, while the size of conservation reserves and 
urban areas has grown by 6 per cent and 16 per cent respectively. Consequently, it 
has been suggested that urbanisation rather than agriculture creates the greatest 
pressure for native vegetation clearing in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT 
Commissioner for the Environment 2000).     





In the 2000 State of the Environment report, the ACT Commissioner for the 
Environment stated that it was not possible to obtain any specific data on the level 
of native vegetation clearing in the reporting period (1997–2000). Despite this, 
broadscale clearing is generally not considered a significant issue in the Australian 
Capital Territory. 
J.2  Description of the regulatory regime 
The primary responsibility for land-use planning and management in the Australian 
Capital Territory lies with two arms of the Department of Urban Services — 
Environment ACT and the ACT Planning and Land Authority (ACTPLA). 
Environment ACT manages the bulk of the nature conservation estate and 
coordinates delivery of off-reserve conservation programs. ACTPLA administers 
planning legislation and the Territory Plan. The Australian Government has 
management and planning authority for land defined as ‘national’.  
The two key pieces of legislation which govern the use of rural leasehold land in the 
Australian Capital Territory are the Land (Planning and Environment) Act 1991 
(LPE Act) and the Nature Conservation Act 1980 (NC Act). 
Another key instrument is the Territory Plan, established under the Australian 
Capital Territory (Planning and Land Management) Act 1988 (Cwlth), and 
prepared by ACTPLA. It contains broad goals for the conservation of biological 
resources and objectives, controls and policies for land uses. The Territory Plan is 
designed to interact with the LPE Act and, to a lesser extent, with the NC Act. 
The ACT regulatory regime, historically, has governed native vegetation clearance 
of nil or partial tenant rights leases and now covers the new 99-year leases. 
However, the full tenant rights leases could be exempted from some regime 
requirements through their embedded lease conditions (ACT Sustainable Rural 
Lands Group Inc, sub. DR258). 
Land (Planning and Environment) Act  
The LPE Act does not have an objects section. The objectives of the land-planning 
regime are given by the Territory Plan. With regard to rural leasehold land, the 
Territory Plan lists the following among its objectives: 
a) to conserve the distinctive rural landscape setting of Canberra and maintain its 
ecological integrity; 
b)  to conserve sufficient wildlife habitats to adequately protect native plant and animal 
species; and     




c)  to make provision for the productive and sustainable use of land for agriculture … 
(Territory Plan, Part B11, p. 2) 
To promote these objectives, the LPE Act contains three mechanisms that may 
restrict vegetation clearing on leased land. These are: 
•  land management agreements with landholders; 
•  environmental impact assessment; and 
•  heritage listing.  
Land management agreements 
Land management agreements (LMAs) are the most widely used mechanism for 
regulating native vegetation clearance in the Australian Capital Territory (box J.1). 
The LPE Act states that the Minister may only grant a new rural lease, or renew or 
vary an existing rural lease, if the landholder has entered into an agreement for 
managing the land subject to the lease (s. 186C). The LMA addresses conservation 
objectives and may incorporate the following conditions: 
•  land capability matters such as stocking rates, pasture improvements, land care 
provisions and fencing; 
•  protection of remnant woodlands and native grasslands; 
•  conservation, regeneration and planting of trees; 
•  maintenance of tree cover along streams and on hills and ridges; 
•  provision and maintenance of buildings and associated landscaping; 
•  protection measures to conserve water quality in adjacent streams; and 
•  provision for fire hazard reduction measures (Territory Plan, Part B11). 
Breach of the terms of an agreement entered into under the LPE Act is an offence 
which carries a penalty of $5000 (LPE Act, Schedule 5).      






Box J.1  Land management agreements 
Land management agreements (LMAs) are required by s. 186C of the Land (Planning 
and Environment) Act 1991 for all rural leases. A LMA is prepared by a rural lessee 
and jointly agreed by the lessee and Environment ACT. LMAs attach to land title and 
are not invalidated by subsequent transfers of the land. They are reviewed at 5-year 
intervals. LMAs have three major components: 
•  statement of responsibilities; 
•  site assessment; and 
•  land action plans. 
Statement of responsibilities 
A statement outlines the agreed responsibilities of the lessee and the ACT Government 
and provides for review of the LMA if the use of the land becomes inconsistent with the 
purpose of the lease. The statement also provides for dispute resolution through 
negotiation, mediation and referral to the Minister for final determination. 
Site assessment 
A site assessment documents the current state of the land. Factors considered include 
current and proposed uses of land, environmental factors including water and soil 
condition, sites of significant environmental value, heritage sites, and sites containing 
native vegetation which is not of significant environmental value.  
Site assessment is conducted using two techniques: 
•  visual assessment — conducted by the lessee, this usually requires simple 
measurements and photographic documentation; and  
•  technical assessment — conducted by the ACT Government, in conjunction with the 
lessee, on sites of significant environmental and heritage value. 
Land action plans 
Land action plans are prepared for each of the environmental factors included in the 
site assessment. Each plan follows the following template: 
•  description of issue; 
•  desired outcome; 
•  proposed action; 
•  proposed timetable (including timetable for achievement, monitoring and review); 
•  ACT Government responsibility (including level of assistance in monitoring); and 
•  lessee responsibility (including responsibility for implementation and monitoring). 
Plans are drafted by lessees and are presented to Environment ACT for finalisation. 
Source: Environment ACT (sub. 17). 
     




Environmental impact assessment 
The LPE Act empowers the Minister to require the landholder to go through an 
environmental impact assessment process for any ‘development’ of leasehold land. 
Under the Territory Plan, assessment is mandatory for clearing of more than 
0.5 hectares of native vegetation (Territory Plan, Appendix II). This requirement, 
however, does not apply to full tenant rights leases if it conflicts with their 
embedded developmental rights (ACT Sustainable Rural Lands Group Inc, 
sub. DR258). 
Environmental impact assessment is conducted in two stages. First, the landholder 
is required to submit a proposal for the development and the Minister has discretion 
to order a preliminary environmental assessment. When the proposal involves 
clearing of more than 0.5 hectares of native vegetation, the Minister is required to 
order a preliminary assessment. Information considered during preliminary 
assessment includes status of the project, its description, current state of the 
environment in the relevant locality, and the potential positive and negative effects 
on the environment of the proposed development. Preliminary assessment involves 
a benefit-cost analysis of the development.  
Second, where the Minister, on considering the preliminary assessment report, 
believes that the environmental impact of the development would be significant, the 
Minister can direct the landholder to submit a formal environmental impact 
statement (EIS) or public environment report (PER). The following matters must be 
included in the EIS or PER: 
•  details of the proposal; 
•  objectives of the proposal; 
•  alternative ways of achieving the objectives; 
•  the method of giving effect to the Minister’s approval; and 
•  alternative methods of giving effect to approval (Land (Planning and 
Environment) Regulations 1992, r. 4). 
The EIS or PER must explain how the proposal (and its alternatives) would affect 
the environment and what standards and safeguards the landholder would adopt. 
The landholder is required to use detailed technical assessments from expert 
consultants to provide information on the environmental impact of each course of 
action. 
The landholder must make drafts of the EIS or PER available for public comment 
and must submit the EIS or PER to the Minister together with any comments from     





the public. On the basis of this information, the Minister recommends either an 
approval, an approval subject to conditions, or a prohibition of the development. 
Heritage listing 
The LPE Act sets up a Heritage Council responsible for the preparation of a 
Heritage Places Register for places which provide:  
significant habitat … for rare, endangered or uncommon species, for species at the 
limits of their natural range or for district occurrences of species … [and for places 
which exhibit] unusual richness, diversity or significant transitions of flora, fauna or 
natural landscapes and their elements … (LPE Act, Schedule 2) 
The LPE Act requires the Heritage Council to call for, and consider, the views of 
the general public and of individuals affected by proposed heritage listing.  
A heritage listing results in restrictions on land use which vary on a site by site basis 
depending on the heritage feature being protected. Restrictions can vary from an 
absolute prohibition of certain activities to a requirement to obtain Ministerial 
approval before engaging in a particular activity. Details of the restrictions are 
incorporated into the Heritage Register and a breach of a heritage requirement is an 
offence resulting in a fine of $20 000 (LPE Act, Schedule 5). 
The LPE Act also empowers the ACT Government to acquire heritage listed land 
compulsorily, if the Government believes that:  
(a) the place has substantial heritage significance;  
(b) acquisition is the most prudent and feasible means to ensure the conservation of that 
significance; and 
(c) it is in the public interest for the Territory to acquire the place. (LPE Act, s. 64) 
Acquisition has to be on just terms and cannot take place without prior 
consideration of the views of the relevant landholder. 
Review of Minister’s decisions under the LPE Act 
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal deals with dispute resolution and appeals for 
review of Minister’s decisions under the LPE Act. The Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal has a Land and Planning Division set up specifically to deal with appeals 
under the LPE Act. Members with expertise in environmental management and 
heritage sit on such appeals.      




Nature Conservation Act  
The NC Act does not have a specific objects section. However, it provides for the 
establishment of a Nature Conservation Strategy that formulates conservation 
objectives and strategies for the Australian Capital Territory.  
The Nature Conservation Strategy lists the following among its off-reserve 
conservation objectives:  
1.  To integrate nature conservation into the management of leased rural lands as a 
fundamental tenet of both ecologically sustainable primary production and of 
conservation of the biodiversity of the ACT. 
2. To incorporate the conservation requirements of native species and ecological 
communities into planning for land development, with special consideration being 
given to those elements of our natural assets that are poorly conserved or sensitive 
to environmental change. (Environment ACT 1997, pp. 15–16) 
The conservation of threatened species and communities objectives include the 
following: 
1.  To enable species and communities that are threatened with extinction to survive 
and thrive in their natural habitats. 
2. To prevent additional species and ecological communities from becoming 
threatened. (Environment ACT 1997, p. 20) 
The NC Act creates an office of Conservator of Flora and Fauna, which plays a role 
in regulating vegetation clearing through the following mechanisms:  
•  the requirement to obtain a licence for removal of some native vegetation and 
protected fauna; and 
•  conservation directions.  
The NC Act also creates a Flora and Fauna Committee, which is an expert body 
responsible for providing nature conservation advice to the Minister. 
Licences for removal of native vegetation and fauna 
Section 16 of the NC Act empowers the Conservator to declare a species of native 
plant to have ‘special protection status’ if that species is threatened with extinction. 
The Conservator can also declare any species of native plant to be a ‘protected 
native plant’ on the grounds that it promotes conservation of a significant ecosystem 
in the Australian Capital Territory (s.  17). Landholders are required to obtain a 
licence for removal or destruction of a declared species of native plant (s.  42). 
When assessing an application for a licence to remove a declared native plant, the 
Conservator considers the following factors:     





(a) the purpose for which the plant is required; 
(b) the qualifications and experience possessed by the applicant relating to the science 
of botany or horticulture; and 
(c) the effect the taking of the plant will have on the area in which the plant is growing; 
and in the case where the application is to take seed from a native plant, the effect 
of such taking on the ecological or biological welfare of the plant or the community 
in which it occurs. (Nature Conservation (Licensing Criteria) Determination 2001, 
s. 14(1)) 
Failure to obtain a licence for removal of a species with ‘special protection status’ is 
an offence which carries a penalty of $10 000 or 12 months imprisonment or both. 
Clearing a ‘protected native plant’ without a licence carries a penalty of $5000 or 
12 months imprisonment or both. Exemptions from the licence requirement include 
clearing of vegetation planted by the landholder, and clearing of vegetation when 
using the land for primary production in accordance with lease conditions. 
The NC Act also prohibits the felling of native timber on leased land without a 
licence (s. 43). Native timber is defined as timber taken from a tree that is a native 
plant. When assessing an application for a licence to fell native timber, the 
Conservator considers the following factors:  
(a) the effect of the felling, damage or removal on the land to which the application 
relates; 
(b)  the conservation requirements of the native timber species or the ecological 
community with which it is associated; and 
(c) the management objectives for the land concerned. (Nature Conservation (Licensing 
Criteria) Determination 2001, s. 14(2)) 
Felling native timber without a licence is an offence carrying a penalty of $5000. 
The landholder may also be ordered to pay site restoration costs. Exemptions 
include timber planted by the landholder, timber cleared to avert an immediate 
danger to person or property, and timber cleared for personal use on the land for a 
purpose other than sale or trade. Full tenant rights leases may also contain 
exemptions to the licence requirement (ACT Sustainable Rural Lands Group Inc, 
sub. DR258). 
Conservation directions 
Section 47 of the NC Act vests the Conservator with power to give a landholder 
directions for protecting or conserving native animals, native plants or native timber 
on land. The Conservator may make the order when: 
(a) the actions of the occupier of land constitute or are likely to constitute a threat to the 
native animals, native plants or native timber on the land; or     




(b) there are actions that the occupier of land could take that would constitute or would 
likely constitute a threat to the native animals, native plants or native timber on the 
land; or 
(c)  there are actions the occupier of land should take that would promote the 
conservation of the native animals, native plants or native timber on the land. 
(Nature Conservation Criteria Determination 2001, Schedule 1) 
Examples of activities that fall within the above criteria include any actions that 
materially affect endangered, threatened or scientifically significant species. 
Failure to comply with a conservation direction is an offence resulting in a fine of 
$10 000, if the direction concerns a protected species, and $5000 in all other cases. 
In terms of the apparent scope of discretion available to the Conservator, the 
conservation directions are the most powerful mechanism available under this 
legislation. However, they have been rarely invoked.  
Review of Conservator’s decisions 
The landholder can apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of the 
Conservator’s decisions regarding conservation directions and the granting of 
licences. 
Environment Protection Act  
In addition to the LPE Act and the NC Act, the Environment Protection Act 1997 
(EP Act), although chiefly concerned with regulating polluting activities, appears to 
impose a general environmental duty of care on landholders:  
A person shall take such steps as are practicable and reasonable to prevent or minimise 
environmental harm or environmental nuisance caused, or likely to be caused, by an 
activity conducted by that person. (s. 22) 
Section 22(2) directs that regard is given to the risk of harm or nuisance from the 
activity, nature and sensitivity of the receiving environment, current scientific 
knowledge, financial implications of the activity, and likelihood of minimising or 
preventing the negative impacts of the activity. 
However, section  22(3) states that failure to observe the duty of itself does not 
constitute an offence and does not give a right to civil action or remedy. 
Nonetheless, LMAs made under the LPE Act refer to the ‘general environmental 
duty’ (Environment ACT, sub. 17).     





J.3  Promotion of environmental goals 
The ACT Commissioner for the Environment is responsible for producing a 
triennial State of the Environment Report, that includes an assessment of the state of 
the environment in the Australian Capital Territory and makes recommendations for 
government action on specific environmental issues which include land use and 
biodiversity.  
The 2000 State of the Environment Report stated that, in the period 1997–2000, 
many small stands of trees were cleared for residential development. Indeed, the 
ACT Government has been criticised by the ACT Sustainable Rural Lands Group 
Inc for pursuing conflicting objectives of environment conservation and urban 
expansion on rural land: 
Urban encroachment carries a very high cost and many organizations that try to claim 
environmental credentials … are … taking the land for urban expansion … ACT 
Government is a good example of this policy conflict in action. (sub. 125, p. 1) 
The last two State of the Environment Reports point out that there is no 
comprehensive database or long-term monitoring of biodiversity in the Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT Commissioner for the Environment 1997; 2000). However, 
both reports consider biodiversity conservation in the Australian Capital Territory to 
be ‘reasonably good’ because of the large proportion of the land protected within 
reserves. 
In the context of this lack of information, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of 
the regulatory regime in promoting native vegetation and biodiversity goals outside 
of protected areas in the Australian Capital Territory. 
However, as LMAs are adapted for individual farms, this instrument is likely to 
have a reasonable degree of flexibility to deal with conservation issues on a site-by-
site basis, particularly as lessees are given some opportunity to participate in their 
development and operation.  
Social and economic impacts 
There is some consideration of economic and social impacts of decisions made 
under the LPE Act as LMAs are a product of negotiation. Although LMAs are 
primarily focused on the environment, the outcome of negotiation is likely to reflect 
the economic impacts on the signing landholder. Social and economic costs are also 
taken into account in the preliminary assessment stage of environmental impact 
assessment under the LPE Act where the Minister is required to conduct a benefit-
cost analysis of the proposed development.      




The NC Act, on the other hand, does not explicitly provide for consideration of 
social and economic factors. Declaration of native vegetation species is on the 
advice of the Flora and Fauna Committee, which is a body made up entirely of 
biodiversity and ecology experts and which makes recommendations on nature 
conservation grounds only. In a review of the Act and associated subordinate 
legislation, it was recommended that the NC Act be amended to allow 
representatives from a rural lessee group to be included in the Flora and Fauna 
Committee (Braysher 1999). This recommendation was not followed by the ACT 
Government on the grounds that a change in the composition of the Fauna and Flora 
Committee would contradict its purpose of giving scientific advice. 
J.4  Impacts on landholders 
As part of its policy of transition to 99-year rural lease terms, the ACT Government 
sought to address the potential impact of LMAs on new lease values by 
incorporating the restrictions on land use into the lease price. Until January 2002, 
valuation of all new leases was based on the stock carrying capacity of the land 
(scheduled dry sheep equivalent values which vary depending on property size). 
Subsequently, leases have been sold or renewed at market value prices, which 
would also reflect the impact of the environmental framework imposed. Thus the 
bulk of the costs imposed by the regime is borne by ACT taxpayers in general rather 
than rural landholders.  
As LMAs are entered into on purchase or renewal of the lease, the costs imposed by 
the environmental requirements are made known to and accepted by the landholder 
at the time of purchase or renewal (although subsequent review may change the 
lessee’s obligations, and hence costs). 
Having said that, the new ACT Government policy seeks to convert all leases to a 
uniform class of lease which may result in a degradation of some leaseholders’ past 
rights. The ACT Sustainable Rural Lands Group Inc (sub. DR258, p. 2) claimed that 
the new regime imposed costs on landholders holding 50-year full tenant rights 
leases by terminating their contractual rights of renewal on current conditions.  
The ACT Government also discourages rural lessees from alienating their leases for 
a period of 10 years from the date of commencement of the new lease. The 
Government is entitled to a share of 50 per cent of any windfall gains from the sale 
of the lease during this period. The windfall gain represents the difference between 
the price paid on lease acquisition or renewal, and the market value of the land 
(exclusive of all lessee owned-improvements) that is realised from the sale of the 
lease on the open market.      





So far, the LMA scheme seems to have proceeded without many challenges from 
landholders. To date, there have not been any cases which have activated the 
dispute-resolution mechanisms incorporated in the LMAs (Environment ACT, 
sub. 17). In addition, all LMAs include the following question: 
Has the presence of sites of significant environmental value on your lease affected 
agricultural productivity? (Environment ACT, sub. 17, p. 2) 
Environment ACT (sub. 17) observed that, as at July 2003, all of the lessees who 
signed the LMA answered ‘no’ to this question.  
J.5 Summary 
There is little demand for broadscale clearing of native vegetation on rural land in 
the Australian Capital Territory. The regime governing native vegetation clearing 
and biodiversity conservation is, therefore, chiefly concerned with management of 
vegetation on private rural land. 
The regulatory regime imposes relatively stringent requirements on rural 
landholders. However, it appears that the regime has not had a major adverse impact 
on most landholders. All private land in the Australian Capital Territory is leasehold 
due for renewal in the period 1999–2006, and the mechanisms for selling leases to 
landholders incorporate the restrictions imposed by the regulatory regime into the 
lease purchase price. The costs of the regime are, therefore, largely borne by the 
ACT taxpayers in general, rather than rural landholders.      




K  Estimating regional impacts of 
broadscale clearing restrictions 
This appendix outlines how the estimates of the economic impacts of broadscale 
clearing restrictions in two shires — Moree Plains and Murweh — were derived 
(presented in chapter 6). Additional material, including data, consultants’ reports 
and referees’ comments are available from the Commission’s website — 
www.pc.gov.au (see under ‘Completed Projects’). 
As part of the Commission’s public consultation process, a workshop was held on 
27  February  2004 to discuss the Commission’s preliminary analysis of the 
quantitative impacts from clearing restrictions. Two independent commentators — 
Dr Geoff Slaughter (University of Queensland) and Sean Constable (Constable 
Consulting) were appointed to review the Commission’s preliminary analysis and 
present their findings at the workshop. 
Some of the key issues raised at the workshop included: 
•  the viability of thinning to mitigate impacts of clearing restrictions; 
•  possible differences in the productivity of land that is currently cleared and land 
that may be cleared in the future; 
•  impacts of thickening and regrowth on carrying capacity;  
•  private landholder benefits from conserving native vegetation; 
•  management constraints on landholder clearing; 
•  adverse environmental impacts as a result of vegetation thickening; and  
•  returns to cleared and uncleared land.  
A number of these issues involved points of clarification and were resolved in the 
workshop. Others, such as the private conservation benefits of retaining vegetation, 
are addressed further in the analysis below. Where a matter raised in the workshop 
is addressed, it is noted in the text.     






Land development, land use, productivity and management practices vary markedly 
across regions and across farms. Consequently, estimating impacts on landholders 
from clearing restrictions is inherently difficult and requires a degree of abstraction. 
Studies at a State level (such as ABARE and BRS 2003 and Donaghy 1999) provide 
estimates of the order-of-magnitude of impacts, but given the degree of abstraction 
required, these aggregated studies shed little light on the farm-level factors 
underpinning the impacts. For some States, such as New South Wales, it is almost 
impossible to model impacts effectively at a State level because not all of the 
remnant native vegetation has been mapped.1 On the other hand, it is difficult to 
gain an understanding of how widespread the impacts are from studies (such as 
Scott and Sinden 1999) that examine impacts at a farm level. 
Impacts at a shire level were estimated in this study to highlight the factors affecting 
the magnitude of impacts through time. Generally, there is comprehensive 
information available at a shire level, including land use and land-management 
practices, farm returns and vegetation mapping.  
Possible impacts on two shires have been examined — Moree Plains in northern 
New South Wales and Murweh in south-west Queensland. These shires were 
selected because there is considerable demand for clearing in them, albeit for 
different reasons. The purpose of clearing in Moree is to facilitate a switch from 
grazing to cropping, which is typical of clearing in the northern New South Wales 
wheat belt (Benson 1999). Clearing in Murweh, to improve livestock carrying 
capacity, is also typical of clearing in much of central and western Queensland 
(Swift and Skjemstad 2002). 
Only impacts of broadscale clearing restrictions are examined. Estimating impacts 
from clearing restrictions on individual trees is difficult at a regional level because 
detailed information would be required on the number and distribution of individual 
trees on individual properties.  
In estimating the impacts of clearing restrictions, landholder administrative costs 
associated with compliance, including costs of applying for clearing permits, are not 
considered. In addition, any costs of maintaining protected native vegetation — 
such as fencing, pest and weed control and maintaining fire breaks — are excluded. 
The Commission received evidence of these costs (for example, South Australian 
                                              
1  There is currently a mapping program underway (Native Vegetation Mapping Program) to map 
remnant native vegetation in New South Wales.     




Farmers Federation, sub.  140 and AgForce, sub. 54), but they are difficult to 
estimate at a shire level because they vary markedly.  
Policy measures to mitigate the impacts of clearing restrictions are not included in 
this analysis because, from evidence presented, these measures do not significantly 
offset impacts (chapter 6). Examples of such measures are technical assistance and 
grants of up to $10 000 for managing and improving native vegetation under the 
Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NVC Act) in New South Wales. 
K.2 Measuring  impacts 
The magnitude of impacts generally depends on the number of hectares affected and 
the returns forgone per hectare. The number of hectares affected by the restrictions, 
that is, the number of hectares cleared without clearing restrictions less the number 
of hectares cleared with restrictions, is estimated outside the model (section K.4). In 
general terms, the greater the amount of clearing without restrictions, the greater the 
estimated impacts.  
To measure the returns forgone as a result of clearing restrictions, returns to 
clearing with and without clearing restrictions are estimated independently, the only 
difference being the rate of clearing. The net present value of the difference in 
returns to clearing under these scenarios provides an estimate of the impacts of 
clearing restrictions. 
Returns to clearing defined 
Returns to clearing are returns to cleared land (returns to currently uncleared land 
after it is cleared) less returns to uncleared land (opportunity cost of clearing), less 
development costs (costs of initial clearing, additional infrastructure and pasture 
improvement). Returns are measured as profit at full equity (box K.1). 
The starting year from which the impacts are examined is different for the two case 
studies. For Moree, impacts are estimated from 1995, the year of the introduction of 
the State Environmental Planning Policy 46 (SEPP 46). For Murweh, the starting 
year is 1999, one year prior to the enactment of the Vegetation Management 
Act 1999 (VM  Act), which was passed in December 1999 and enacted in 
September 2000. These starting periods capture the possible effects of pre-emptive 
clearing and stronger clearing controls. 
In the absence of restrictions, clearing may extend over generations and an 
end-point must be chosen to evaluate impacts. Clearing restrictions are assumed to     





apply to 2030. A period of around 30 years is equivalent to a generation of 
landholders. Clearing restrictions to 2030 may continue to affect landholders in 
perpetuity. For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that impacts are incurred 
to 2040. 
 
Box K.1  Profit at full equity 
Profit at full equity (or returns produced by all of the resources used in the farm 
business) is defined as: 
total cash receipts – total cash costs + changes in trading stock – depreciation (including 
depreciation on leased items) – imputed labour cost + rent + interest and finance lease 
payments. (ABARE 2001, p. 5) 
Profit at full equity can be interpreted as the residual paid to the owner, which may be 
used however he/she sees fit, for example, to repay debt, meet family expenses, or to 
invest off-farm. The impact that clearing restrictions may have on the allocation of 
returns and hence farm management (for example, a change in farm maintenance and 
productivity) is not considered. 
Profit at full equity is not a precise measure of economic profit because it may include 
some payments to factors of production (such as management and capital) that are 
necessary to keep them in their current use.  
 
 
Because returns to clearing accrue over time, future returns must be discounted to 
present dollar values to account for landholders’ time preference. It is assumed that 
the rate at which future returns are discounted is constant at five per cent in real 
terms. This approximates the real commercial business overdraft rate in 2003, 
assuming an inflation rate of around two per cent. 
A key feature of this framework is that returns to clearing vary through time, 
depending on changes in output per hectare from productivity improvements and 
changes in the farmers’ terms of trade (the ratio of output prices to input prices).  
In Murweh Shire, future output (livestock carrying capacity) per hectare is also 
affected by vegetation thickening on uncleared land. Woodland thickening, which 
occurs as a result of both an increase in vegetation growth and an increase in plant 
numbers, increases the foliage protective cover on uncleared grazing land. Greater 
competition from thickening reduces forage production and livestock carrying 
capacity through time.  
Thickening across a range of different land systems in Queensland is well 
documented (see for example, Sharp and Whittaker  2003;  Fensham et al. 2002; 
Burrows 2002; Crowley and Garnett 1998; and Hopkins et al. 1996), and is not just 
limited to northern Queensland (see for example, Westoby et al. 1989; Walker and     




Noy-Meir  1982; and Westoby  1980 for international examples). Thickening was 
also identified in several submissions (Property Rights Australia, sub. 171; Inland 
Burnett Regional Vegetation Management Committee, sub. 139;  and  AgForce, 
sub. 54). 
When examining impacts ‘with thickening’ in this study, both the scenarios with 
and without clearing restrictions include the effect of thickening. All else being 
equal, thickening progressively reduces the per hectare returns to uncleared land. 
The greater the amount of uncleared land in any period, the greater the effect of 
thickening on total returns to uncleared land (the opportunity cost of clearing).  
Under the ‘without clearing restrictions’ scenario, landholders are able to reduce the 
impact of thickening by clearing. Under the ‘with restrictions’ scenario, clearing 
restrictions limit the ability of landholders to offset the effects of thickening. 
Therefore, all else being equal, returns to clearing under the ‘with restrictions’ 
scenario are higher than under the ‘without restrictions’ scenario because the 
opportunity cost of clearing is lower. 
In the modelling workshop, the use of thinning (selective removal of individual 
trees/shrubs from thickened areas) to mitigate landholder impacts from thickening 
was raised. Evidence presented to the Commission, suggested that these options are 
not economically viable (see Beale 2004 for an overview of studies on this issue). 
Beale  (2004) argues that retained trees grow much faster as a result of lost 
competition after adjacent trees are removed (thinned). Hence, the thinned 
woodland quickly returns to its original state and pasture growth is suppressed. That 
said, if cost-effective means of thinning woodlands were permitted, the impacts of 
restrictions would be reduced. No allowance has been made for thinning in Murweh 
in this analysis.  
As pointed out by participants at the workshop, regrowth, like thickening, reduces 
livestock carrying capacity on cleared land in Murweh over time. The effect of 
regrowth on carrying capacity was incorporated into the analysis. Because regrowth 
only occurs after clearing, for any given period, carrying capacity and returns to 
cleared land depend on the timing of previous clearing. All else being equal, 
regrowth reduces the returns to clearing through time. However, the impact of 
regrowth on carrying capacity is reduced by re-clearing, which is assumed to take 
place every 10 years.      





K.3  Estimated returns to clearing 
The net present value of future returns to clearing one hectare of woodland are 
estimated to range between $66 and $104 in Murweh (without thickening), and 
$281 and $911 in Moree (2003–2040).  
Estimates of returns to cleared and uncleared land over historical periods,   
1995–2002 in Moree and 1999–2002 in Murweh, are based on observed prices and 
yields for those years (where available) and cost data for an average year. For the 
period 2003–2040, returns are based on annual returns for an average year (prices, 
costs and yields across each Shire) with adjustments for future productivity growth 
and future changes in farm terms of trade (tables K.1 and K.2).  
Table K.1  Annual average per hectare returns to cleared and uncleared 
land in Murweh without vegetation thickening 
Assumed fall in average real 
beef prices, 2003–2040a 
Annual average 
returns 2003 








Productivityb  $ per hectare
(2003 prices)
Uncleared land         
1.5 per cent a yearc 2.4  -2.6  0.9  -2.4
1.1 per cent a yeard 2.4  -2.1  0.9  -1.5
0.7 per cent a yeare  2.4 -1.7  0.9  -0.5
Cleared land       
1.5 per cent a yearc 11.2  -2.6  2.0  5.8
1.1 per cent a yeard 11.2  -2.1  2.0  10.6
0.7 per cent a yeare  11.2 -1.7  2.0  15.4
a Given the importance of future real cattle prices to returns to clearing, a range of different price scenarios is 
examined with cattle costs assumed to increase by 1.1 per cent a year. Terms of trade for sheep fall by 
2.2  per  cent a year across all scenarios. b  Share-weighted average of beef cattle and sheep for 
livestock-specialist farms in Australia (Knopke, O’Donnell and Shepherd  2000). Productivity growth on 
uncleared land is assumed to be half that on cleared land. A greater proportion of cleared land is devoted to 
cattle grazing than uncleared land. c On average for 2003–2040, prices are equal to the 20-year average price 
(ABARE 2003). d On average for 2003–2040, prices are equal to the 10-year average price (ABARE 2003). 
e On average for 2003–2040, prices are half-way between current real prices and average real prices over the 
last 10 years. 
At the workshop, Dr Geoff Slaughter concluded that the estimates of average 
returns at 2003 were broadly consistent with returns data collected for his PhD 
thesis (Slaughter 2003). From his farm surveys, Slaughter observed that in some 
parts of the Shire, annual returns on cleared land exceeded $20  per hectare. 
Slaughter’s comments on estimated returns and the approach used in this analysis 
are published in Slaughter (2004).     




Table K.2  Annual average per hectare returns to cleared and uncleared 
land in Moree 
Yield and number of crops 
on newly cleared land  
Annual average 
returns 2003 








Productivityb  $ per hectare 
(2003 prices)
Uncleared land  23.6  -2.2  1.7  22.6
Cleared land       
Yields are the same as 
previously cleared land 
   
8 crops in 10 years  92.1  -3.3  3.7  105.0
6 crops in 10 years  69.1  -3.3  3.7  78.7
Yields are 90 per cent of 
previously cleared land 
   
8 crops in 10 years  66.4  -3.3  3.7  69.0
6 crops in 10 years  49.8  -3.3  3.7  51.9
a  Assumed terms of trade changes are based on a 20-year historical trend (Knopke, O’Donnell and 
Shepherd 2000). b Share-weighted average of beef cattle and sheep for livestock specialist farms in Australia 
and crop specialist farms in New South Wales (Knopke, O’Donnell and Shepherd 2000).  
Estimated average returns for Murweh at 2003 are also consistent with ABARE 
farm survey data for the Murweh Shire and surrounding areas (Blackall, Tambo, 
Bauhinia and Booringa local government areas). From ABARE farm survey data, 
estimated average returns (profit at full equity) to farmed land between 1996-97 and 
2001-02 are $6.00 per hectare. Average returns to all farmland in Murweh estimated 
in this analysis are $5.20 per hectare.2  
For future periods in Murweh, returns to uncleared land are projected to fall (even 
in the absence of thickening) because average annual productivity growth 
(0.3 per cent for sheep and 1.1 per cent for cattle) is too low to offset the average 
annual projected decline in the terms of trade. Productivity growth for livestock 
production on uncleared land is assumed to be half that on cleared land. There is 
less scope for implementing technological innovations on uncleared woodlands, 
such as improved pasture varieties, and adoption of better management practices. 
Future real cattle prices are assumed to decline compared to prices experienced over 
the last few years.  
Despite this, it is assumed that landholders continue to graze uncleared land until 
gross margins become zero. Grazing when returns are negative, but gross margins 
                                              
2  This is based on estimates of the proportion of cleared and uncleared land devoted to cattle and 
sheep grazing provided by Devine Agribusiness in 2003 (76 per cent of uncleared land and 95 
per cent of cleared land is used for cattle grazing). Sixty-three per cent of farmland is cleared at 
2003.     





are positive, allows for some of the fixed costs allocated to grazing on uncleared 
land to be met (assuming that these costs would be incurred if grazing ceased).  
This does not mean that returns across a whole farm would be negative in 2040. By 
2040, returns from uncleared land would comprise a much smaller proportion of 
total farm returns because of clearing. Estimates of returns to uncleared land may be 
underestimated to some degree because they ignore the value of fodder harvested 
from native vegetation, such as Mulga, during drought periods. 
In Moree, returns to cleared land depend heavily on the productivity of newly-
cleared land and the number of crops that may be harvested in a 10-year cropping 
cycle. Alternative assumptions were incorporated into the analysis in response to 
issues raised in the workshop regarding the productivity of newly-cleared land in 
Moree. Newly-cleared land in Moree may be less productive than 
previously-cleared land because most clearing is being undertaken in the west of the 
Shire, where average rainfall is lower than in the east.  
For future periods in Moree, improvements in crop yields (that reflect past 
improvements for crop specialist farms in New South Wales over the last 20 years), 
more than offset declining terms of trade for cropping, resulting in small increases 
in returns relative to 2003. 
Data and key assumptions for average returns, 2003–2040 
Devine Agribusiness, a consulting firm operating in Murweh Shire, was 
commissioned to provide average cost and yield data across the Shire for cleared 
and uncleared land. Devine Agribusiness was also asked to estimate the effect of 
thickening and regrowth on livestock carrying capacity. Sheep, wool and cattle 
prices are from ABARE (2003). Full documentation of the Devine data, 
assumptions and data limitations can be found in Kenny and Beale  (2003), 
Kenny (2004)  and  Beale (2004)  on  the Productivity Commission website — 
www.pc.gov.au (see under ‘Completed Projects’). All data used to calculate returns 
to cleared and uncleared land are also available from this site. 
For Moree, data to estimate annual returns for an average year on cleared and 
uncleared land came from several sources, including ABARE (farm survey data), 
CSIRO Land and Water and Constable (2003).      





For simplicity, it is assumed that the use of uncleared land remains unchanged 
through time and the use of cleared land is the same as recently-cleared land. In 
reality, any number of new land uses could emerge in the next 40 years. 
In Moree, it is assumed that the reason for clearing woodlands and grasslands is to 
convert land from grazing to cropping. This is consistent with evidence presented in 
submissions (Rod Young, sub. 27) and other studies (Constable 2003).  
Switching from grazing to cropping is an ongoing trend in Australian agriculture. 
Knopke, O’Donnell and Shepherd (2000) have identified greater productivity gains 
in cropping relative to grazing as a driving force for recent switching. Productivity 
gains have come from improved crop rotations, fertiliser application and tillage 
practices. On the North West Plains of New South Wales, returns accruing to the 
average grazing specialist have exceeded returns to the average cropping specialist 
only once since 1990 (ABARE farm survey data). 
The shares of uncleared land devoted to sheep and cattle, and cleared land devoted 
to different crops (wheat, barley, sorghum, chickpeas) are taken from ABARE farm 
survey data for the North West Slopes and Plains. The number of crops that will be 
planted on newly-cleared land depends on the season. It is assumed that 6 or 8 crops 
may be planted in a 10-year cycle. When a crop is not planted, it is assumed that 
this land remains fallow, and consequently earns no return (table K.2).  
In the Murweh Shire, clearing is assumed to be undertaken on woodlands (and to a 
lesser extent on shrublands and open forests) to improve the profitability of existing 
grazing activities. Clearing reduces competition between grass and woody 
vegetation and facilitates the introduction, in many cases, of improved perennial 
pasture species, such as Buffel grass.  
Clearing and introducing improved perennial pastures also facilitate a switch from 
sheep to cattle, with the share of grazing land devoted to cattle rising from 
76 per cent on uncleared land to 95 per cent on cleared land. Cattle production is 
better suited to these pastures because their robust and highly-productive nature in 
the growing season is better utilised by larger, stronger and more mobile bovines 
(Kenny, G., Devine Agribusiness, Roma, pers. comm., 7 October 2003).  
Prices and production costs 
Average cattle and sheep prices per dry sheep equivalent (dse) in Murweh are 
estimated using ABARE data (ABARE  2003) and a herd dynamics model to 
estimate the number and composition of sold stock. For example, the composition     





of cattle sold on cleared land is different from that on uncleared land. On cleared 
land, the assumed calving rate is 80 per cent, compared to 60 per cent on uncleared 
land, which means more cattle are turned off from cleared land each year. Of the 
stock sold from cleared land, around 50 per cent are 2-year-old steers weighing an 
average of 450 kg. On uncleared land, around 50 per cent of the stock are yearling 
steers weighing an average of 220  kg. Higher calving rates and larger animals 
translate into higher cattle prices per dse on cleared land relative to uncleared land 
— $74 per dse compared with $67 per dse.  
Average sheep and wool prices for Murweh were also based on ABARE (2003) 
data. On uncleared land, sheep grazing is for wool production and the value of stock 
purchased (replacement stock) is greater than the value of stock sold (cast for age). 
Reproduction rates for sheep on uncleared land are very low and replacement ewes 
must be bought.  
Murweh cost data are different for cleared and uncleared land. The data are 
averaged across a number of farms that are broadly representative of grazing on 
cleared or uncleared land (Kenny 2004). Embedded in these costs are the effects of 
economies of size which tend to reduce unit production costs after clearing because 
production increases without proportionately increasing production costs. For 
example, up to a point, production may be expanded by clearing land without 
acquiring extra equipment. Larger farms are also better able to separate 
management and on-farm labour roles, allowing for more effective farm 
management (Hooper et al. 2002a). Larger farms are also more likely to adopt new 
technologies (Hooper 2002b). Many participants highlighted economies of size as a 
factor driving land clearing (Canegrowers, sub. 101;  Pastoralists  and  Graziers 
Association of Western Australia, sub. 91; and Property Rights Australia, sub. 171). 
Price data in Moree are average prices from 1996–2003 ABARE farm survey data 
for the North West Slopes and Plains. Cost data for crops are from CSIRO Land and 
Water (generated for the National Land and Water Resources Audit). For grazing on 
uncleared land, variable costs are from CSIRO Land and Water. In the absence of 
credible fixed-cost data for Moree, fixed costs are assumed to be the same as for 
grazing on uncleared land in Murweh. 
For both Shires, farm terms of trade are assumed to decline over time. Australian 
agricultural products, as with other commodities, have experienced declining terms 
of trade throughout history. Generally, this reflects the ongoing effect of 
technological advances in a competitive world market. As technology increases 
productivity and reduces costs, profit can be maintained at lower prices.  
For Murweh, the decline in the terms of trade depends on the decline in real future 
cattle prices (table K.1). It is assumed that current real prices are not likely to     




continue, on average, to 2040. Given the uncertainty about future cattle prices over 
this period, three scenarios are examined in which annual average real cattle prices 
decline by 1.5 per cent, by 1.1 per cent and by 0.7 per cent. These declines are 
equivalent to assuming that average prices over the period 2003–2040 equal, 
respectively, average prices over the last 20 years, average prices over the last 
10 years, and prices mid-way between current prices and average prices over the 
last 10 years. In all cases, costs are assumed to increase by 1.1 per cent per year.  
Terms of trade changes in Moree are assumed to equal historical declines for 
Australian livestock producers and New South Wales crop specialists over the last 
20 years (Knopke, O’Donnell and Shepherd 2000). 
Crop yields and livestock carrying capacity 
For Murweh, carrying capacity on cleared and uncleared land was estimated using 
the Safe Carrying Capacity (SCC) model developed by the Queensland Department 
of Primary Industries (Johnston, McKeon and Day 1996). Safe carrying capacity is 
the maximum long-term livestock carrying capacity (dse per hectare) at which no 
change, or a gradual improvement, in land condition is experienced. All else being 
equal, if some land in Murweh is overgrazed, safe carrying capacity will be less 
than observed stocking rates in the Shire. 
The SCC model estimates the relationship between safe livestock carrying capacity 
and tree/shrub foliage growth. This relationship depends on a number of variables 
including rainfall, tree and shrub foliage protective cover and rainfall use efficiency 
(how efficiently a given land system will convert rainfall to forage). The output of 
this model has been extensively ‘ground truthed’ against observed carrying capacity 
at a farm level within the Murweh Shire. The SCC model has also been used on 
around 100 south-west Queensland properties to evaluate applications for financial 
assistance under the South West Strategy Scheme, a Queensland Government 
scheme to improve farm viability. 
Most applications of the SCC model have been to estimate safe carrying capacity on 
a property basis. In this study, the SCC model was used to estimate the average safe 
carrying capacity (assuming average rainfall) across all uncleared land systems in 
the Shire, including land systems that are not currently grazed. To estimate safe 
carrying capacity for all uncleared land, the model inputs were averaged across all 
uncleared land systems.      





Estimated average safe carrying capacity at 2003 across all uncleared land systems 
in Murweh is 0.40  dse  per  hectare (assuming average rainfall).3 If this land is 
cleared, the SCC model estimates that safe carrying capacity is 0.70 dse per hectare. 
However, this does not include the benefits from the introduction of improved 
perennial grasses, such as Buffel, on cleared land. The extra carrying capacity from 
improved perennial grasses on cleared land (0.15 dse per hectare)  is  estimated 
outside the SCC model. It is based on a carrying capacity of one dse per hectare 
observed on newly-developed Mulga-based land systems, taking into account the 
suitability of these grasses on land cleared in the future (Kenny 2004).4 For more 
information about estimates of average carrying capacity for cleared and uncleared 
land, see Kenny and Beale (2003) and Kenny (2004). 
If these estimates for carrying capacity are applied to Murweh farmland that is 
currently cleared and uncleared, safe carrying capacity for the Shire as a whole is 
estimated to be 0.57 dse per hectare. This is not inconsistent with stocking rate data. 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics estimates stocking rates for Murweh between 
1994 and 2001 to be 0.50 dse per hectare (ABS 2003).5 ABARE (farm survey data) 
estimates stocking rates for Murweh and surrounding areas (Blackall, Tambo, 
Bauhinia and Booringa local government areas) from 1996-97 to 2001-02 to be 
between 0.60 dse per hectare and 1.10 dse per hectare.  
For Moree, crop yields on land cleared in the future are based on 10-year average 
yields for existing cleared land in the North West Slopes and Plains (ABARE farm 
survey data). However, as noted earlier, it is possible that yields on land cleared in 
the future will be lower than on previously-cleared land, because much of the 
uncleared land is in drier parts of the Shire. Therefore, two yield scenarios for 
cleared land have been estimated (table  K.2). In the first scenario, yields are 
assumed to equal average historical yields on previously-cleared land. In the 
second, yields are assumed to be 90  per  cent of average historical yields on 
previously-cleared land. Stocking rates on uncleared land in Moree are estimated to 
be one dse per hectare (Constable 2003).  
For future periods, crop yields and carrying capacity depend on future productivity 
growth in both Shires. It is assumed that future productivity growth follows rates of 
                                              
3  In the absence of thickening, carrying capacity at 2003 is equal to the carrying capacity at the 
start of the simulation period, 1999. With thickening, the carrying capacity at 2003 is equal to 
0.30 dse per hectare. 
4  Where most of the development in the Shire is being undertaken. In total, the carrying capacity 
of cleared land is 0.85 dse per hectare. 
5  Safe carrying capacity for cleared and uncleared farmland in Murweh is a share-weighted 
average of cleared and uncleared land, using 2003 weights. Sixty-three per cent of farmland is 
remnant at 2003.      




growth over the last 20 years (Knopke, O’Donnell and Shepherd 2000), except for 
uncleared land in Murweh, where rates of growth are assumed to be half those on 
cleared land (table K.1).  
Concerns about the effect of broadscale land clearing on long-term productivity 
growth were highlighted in a number of submissions (for example, Wilderness 
Society, sub. 89; and Australian Conservation Foundation, sub. 146). For this study, 
it was assumed that impacts of soil degradation on future productivity growth would 
mirror past impacts. The risk that soil erosion and salinity will reduce future 
productivity growth in the Moree and Murweh Shires is discussed below.  
Productivity over 20 years to 1998-99 has increased on average by 2.6 per cent per 
year for all broadacre farms (Knopke, O’Donnell and Shepherd 2000). This growth 
rate includes the impact of degradation from sources such as salinity, erosion, 
compaction and acidification. Historical productivity improvements from 
technological change have dwarfed losses from land degradation (Chisholm 1992).  
For Murweh, future carrying capacity on uncleared and cleared land is also affected 
by woodland thickening and regrowth. Changes in safe carrying capacity from 
thickening in Murweh are estimated using the SCC model, assuming a one per cent 
increase in the foliage protective cover per year (Kenny and Beale  2003; 
Beale 2004). Changes in safe carrying capacity resulting from thickening are shown 
in figure K.1. Without periodic clearing, safe carrying capacity in Murweh is 
estimated to fall by around 80 per cent between 2003 and 2040, from 
0.30 dse per hectare to 0.05 dse per hectare.  
Figure K.1  Change in safe carrying capacity from thickening, 




























Data source: Kenny and Beale (2003).     





The assumed one per cent a year rate of thickening from Kenny and Beale (2003) 
and Beale (2004) is based on foliage protective cover measurements taken from 
aerial photographs of undisturbed vegetation in the 1960s and 1990s in the Murweh 
Shire. 
As part of the consultancy to the Commission, Beale (2004) supported this estimate 
with on-farm examples in Murweh of Mulga that had returned to thick bush (with 
foliage protective cover of around 40 per cent) in less than forty years. In addition, 
Beale (2004) derived estimates of foliage protective cover changes of around 
0.8  per cent from studies of other regions and land systems within Queensland 
(Fensham et al. 2003; Burrows 2002). However, Beale and Slaughter (2004) point 
out problems with extrapolating thickening rates from other shires for Murweh.  
The safe carrying capacity of cleared land also declines due to regrowth. The 
decline in safe carrying capacity through time from regrowth is estimated using the 
SCC model and an assumed one per cent per year increase in the foliage protective 
cover. However, the impact of regrowth on safe carrying capacity in this analysis is 
largely negated by re-clearing, which is assumed to take place every 10 years, 
before the foliage protective cover significantly affects carrying capacity. 
Development, clearing and regrowth control costs 
Woodland clearing costs for Murweh were estimated to be $35 per hectare and 
$20  per hectare for regrowth control, based on quotes from local contractors 
(Kenny 2004). Included in the clearing costs are the costs of establishing perennial 
pasture in Murweh. Regrowth control costs are assumed to be incurred every 10 
years after initial clearing. It is assumed that all cleared land is not grazed for two 
years after initial clearing, regardless of the vegetation type cleared. 
There were no clearing-cost data available for shrubland and open forest because 
clearing of these vegetation categories comprises a relatively small portion of total 
clearing. Clearing costs for shrubland and open forest are assumed to be the same as 
for woodland.  
In addition to clearing and regrowth control costs, development costs — comprising 
additional capital costs to improve fencing, establish extra bores and to increase the 
herd size on cleared land — are incurred. These costs were incorporated as an 
annualised interest expense, assuming a 20-year loan to improve the infrastructure 
of an average property. 
The cost of clearing in Moree Shire is estimated to be $30 per hectare for grassland 
and $150 per hectare for woodland (Constable 2003). There is no regrowth 
treatment required in Moree because land is assumed to be cultivated for either six     




or eight years in every ten. It is assumed that a crop is produced immediately after 
grassland is cleared and one year after woodland is cleared.  
K.4  Estimated clearing with and without clearing 
restrictions 
The area of land affected by clearing restrictions, that is, the area of projected 
clearing without restrictions minus the area of projected clearing with restrictions, is 
a major determinant of estimated impacts.  
Clearing without restrictions 
Estimated clearing in the absence of restrictions for both Murweh and Moree Shires 
is presented in table K.3.  
For this analysis, it is assumed that landholders do not clear all remnant native 
vegetation on their land because of private benefits from retaining some selected 
vegetation and because of management constraints. Thus, landholders are assumed 
to set aside an amount of vegetation for private benefits and clear at a rate equal to 
historical rates prior to the introduction of clearing restrictions. 
Table K.3  Estimated clearing without restrictions, 2003–2030 
  Hectares
 per year 
Total 
hectares 
Farmland covered in 
remnant vegetation %, 2030
Murweh Shire  63 325a 1.8m 19b
Moree Plains Shire  6 727c 188 356  33d
a Average annual change in remnant vegetation between 1997 and 1999 (Accad et al. 2001). b Includes 
native grasslands that are assumed to remain uncleared without restrictions. Based on Queensland EPA 
(2003) estimates of remnant vegetation. c  Average annual clearing rate between 1985 and 1999 
(Constable 2003). d Based on NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation (DLWC 2001) estimates of 
remnant vegetation. 
Applying these estimated rates of clearing, a significant amount of farmland would 
remain covered with remnant native vegetation at 2030: 19 per cent and 33 per cent 
respectively for Murweh and Moree, compared to 44 and 63 per cent at 2003.6 
                                              
6  Estimates of farmland covered in remnant vegetation is based on vegetation mapping (refer to 
table K.7 for references) and assuming historical annual clearing rates continue into the future.     





This approach is consistent with the approach used by ABARE and BRS (2003) and 
ABARE (2000).7 An alternative approach was adopted by Scott and Sinden (1999). 
In this latter study, two scenarios were explored: clearing was restricted by the 
availability of capital and by expenditure on variable production costs. 
Vegetation set aside for private benefits 
Private consumption benefits from native vegetation (and trees generally) include 
recreational and aesthetic benefits and wood extracted for on-farm use. Landholders 
may also receive private benefits from conserving vegetation for the public good. 
Private consumption benefits have been identified in numerous studies including: 
Alexander et al. (2000); Lockwood, Walpole and Miles (2000); Wilson et 
al. (1995); Walpole, Lockwood and Miles (1998); and Miles et al. (1998). 
Private production benefits from native vegetation include windbreaks, shade for 
stock, reduced risk of erosion, and pest control from local fauna. On the whole, 
research indicates that the production of grazing properties is up to 20  per  cent 
higher with these services than without (Miles et al. 1998). However, extensive 
research by CSIRO (Cleugh et al. 2002) as part of the National Windbreak Program, 
concludes that production benefits for crops are localised and, in most cases, 
marginal. 
In addition to private production benefits, it is possible that farmers may cooperate, 
for example through Landcare groups, to ensure sufficient tree conservation to 
reduce the off-site risk of salinity.  
These benefits may vary widely within a region, depending on land use, climate, 
topography, soil types, vegetation type and fauna. Estimating benefits at a regional 
level is beyond the scope of this analysis. Instead, it was assumed that landholders 
set aside certain remnant vegetation (on private freehold and leasehold land) for 
conservation purposes because the consumption and production benefits of native 
vegetation outweigh returns from clearing.  
The areas assumed to be set aside voluntarily are: 
•  vegetation on steep slopes; 
•  vegetation on land with a high risk of soil salinity;  
•  vegetation along watercourses and lakes; and 
•  wetlands.  
                                              
7  In the ABARE and BRS study, clearing is capped at historical levels initially, but the rate falls 
through time.     




CSIRO Land and Water provided the Commission with estimates of these areas in 
both Shires. In total, they account for 2.8 per cent and 1.3 per cent of farmland in 
Moree and Murweh respectively. Land in these regions is generally flat with few 
waterways or wetlands. As well, no remnant vegetation in either of the Shires was 
on land deemed to have a high future salinity risk. The data sources and criteria for 
the conservation areas are presented in table K.4.  
These estimates have a number of limitations. Salinity-risk assessments in 
Queensland are based on attributes that are considered to drive salinity — geology, 
land use, excess rainfall and elevation. This method is less reliable for assessing 
salinity risk than using groundwater data (NLWRA  2001a). There is work 
underway to collect groundwater data for Queensland.  
Land set aside for private benefits may also be underestimated because of the 
lenient slope constraint assumed. Twenty degrees is often cited as an upper limit, 
below which clearing may safely take place with machinery (Bourne 1999). It is not 
an upper limit to avoid soil erosion.  
Table K.4  Data sources and criteria for determining areas voluntarily 
protected from clearing on private land 
Digital map  Data source  Criteria 
Native vegetation 
maps 
North West Vegetation Mapping, Moree Shire 2001, 
NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation 
Survey and Mapping of Vegetation Communities and 
Regional Ecosystems of Queensland 2003, 
Queensland Herbarium, Queensland Environmental 
Protection Agency 
na 
Steep slope  Present Annual Hillslope Erosion,  
Natural Land and Water Resource Audit 2001 
20 degrees 
Soil salinity  Australia Dryland Salinity Assessment Spatial Data, 
Natural Land and Water Resource Audit 2001 
High riska 
Wetlands  North West Vegetation Mapping, Moree Shire 2001 
NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation 
Survey and Mapping of Vegetation Communities and 
Regional Ecosystems of Queensland 2003, 
Queensland Herbarium, Queensland Environmental 
Protection Agency 
Generally swamps, 
wetlands and land 




Hydro theme 2003, 
Geoscience Australia  
20 metres from all water 
courses and lakes 
a In New South Wales, this is land where the groundwater table is within 2 metres of the surface at 2000. In 
Queensland, the risk assessment is not based on groundwater levels. Instead, the risk is based on attributes 
that are considered to drive salinity in other regions, such as geology and excess rainfall. b Including sedge, 
rush, fern, mangroves and herbland. na Not applicable.  
CSIRO Land and Water estimated that almost all of the soil in both of the Shires is 
classified as highly-erodable, including 97 per cent of land already cleared in both     





Shires.8 It is assumed that native vegetation on highly-erodable soil is not set aside 
for conservation because minimum tillage practices, such as direct drilling, can be 
used to minimise soil disturbance and the risk of erosion. 
Future erosion risks in the pastoral zone are generally related more to management 
practices, such as stocking rates, than tree clearing (Rolfe 1999). For example, 
White (1997) points out that the introduction of Brahman cattle and supplement 
feeding in drought times during the 1970s and 1980s resulted in increased rates of 
degradation.  
For Murweh, stocking rates are assumed to be equal to long-term safe carrying 
capacity levels. Thus, for the purposes of estimating impacts, it may be reasonable 
to assume that only uncleared land on steep slopes is set aside to avoid erosion.  
Management constraints on clearing 
Annual clearing constraints are suggested by ABARE and BRS  (2003), 
ABARE (2000) and Scott and Sinden (1999). They include cash reserves and access 
to finance, water entitlements, management skills and farm labour.  
To what extent assumed annual constraints persist into the long term is uncertain. 
For example, annual constraints may decrease as the viability of farms improves in 
accordance with increases in average farm size. Alternatively, they may become 
more stringent. For example, access to water increasingly may limit development. 
Annual clearing may also be limited by increased risk from clearing and landholder 
attitude to risk. Generally, clearing can be risky because future land productivity, 
prices, diseases, technology, government regulation, interest rates and inflation are 
uncertain.  
Farm decision theory generally assumes that landholders are risk averse 
(Hardaker  2000; Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker  1977). This is supported by 
empirical studies (Antle 1987; Bardsley and Harris 1997).  
All else being equal, landholders would be reluctant to clear all land that is 
economic to clear in one year. Clearing incrementally allows farmers to gather 
information about the productivity of cleared land and the best way to manage 
cleared land. Where clearing is for land-use change, such as in Moree, landholders 
may wish to retain native vegetation and grazing as insurance against losses from 
                                              
8  The K factor was used as a measure of soil erodability (from the Universal Soil Loss Equation) 
in this study. Highly-erodable soils are assumed to have a K factor equal to, or greater than, 
0.045 — the approximate K factor for loamy sand.     




cropping. Generally, although returns to cropping may be higher on average, they 
are more variable than for grazing. For example, it is more difficult to negate the 
effects of drought. 
One issue for clarification raised at the workshop was the ceiling on annual clearing 
in Moree. The ceiling for Moree is observed annual average clearing rates for 1985–
1994, not permit approvals (Constable 2003).  However, using annual average 
clearing from this period may be a conservative estimate of actual clearing 
constraints because observed annual clearing in Moree increased after clearing 
restrictions were announced (Constable 2003). If some of the extra cleared land 
were put into production rather than left idle, using historical clearing rates for 
Moree may underestimate the amount of clearing possible in a given year under 
business-as-usual conditions. On the other hand, land may have been cleared and 
simply left idle to circumvent the expected tightening of clearing restrictions on 
remnant vegetation. 
In Murweh, the clearing constraint is the annual average change in remnant 
vegetation for 1997–1999 (Accad et al. 2001). Clearing constraints were in place on 
leasehold land during this period under the Land Act 1994. Therefore, the assumed 
ceiling on annual clearing may include legislative constraints, which may 
underestimate the annual clearing constraint. However, the impact of the Land Act 
on clearing in Murweh may have been small. For Queensland as a whole, clearing 
of woody vegetation on leasehold between 1995–1997 and 1997–1999 increased by 
around 20 per cent (NR&M 1999; 2001b).  
The annual clearing constraint for vegetation types is assumed to follow historical 
clearing trends for each vegetation type. In Moree, clearing of woodlands comprises 
62 per cent and grasslands 38 per cent of total annual clearing. In Murweh, clearing 
of woodlands comprises 79  per  cent, open forest 7  per  cent and shrubland 
14 per cent of total annual clearing.9 
Clearing with restrictions 
The assumed policy scenario in this analysis is a clearing ban on remnant native 
vegetation, commencing in 2004 in Moree and in 2007 in Murweh and continuing 
to 2030. Included in this scenario is clearing under regulatory regimes already in 
place from 1995 in Moree and 1999 in Murweh. 
                                              
9  If clearing constraints were not placed on each vegetation type, most of the projected clearing 
would be of grasslands because it is the least costly vegetation type to clear. The benefits from 
clearing native vegetation are assumed to be the same for all land types.     





For Moree, clearing from 1995 to 2003 is based on approved applications for 
Barwon (NSW Department of Sustainable Natural Resources 2003). It is assumed 
that half of the approvals in Barwon are for Moree, consistent with the approach 
used in Constable (2003). From the empirical data available about historical 
clearing rates, there appears to have been an increase in clearing in Moree after the 
introduction of the NVC Act, perhaps in anticipation of tightened clearing 
restrictions. ‘Pre-emptive’ clearing potentially offsets the future impacts of 
legislative clearing restrictions. 
For Murweh, from 1999 to 2002, annual clearing is assumed to be the same as 
without constraints. From the data available, it appears that there was negligible 
pre-emptive clearing prior to the proclamation of the VM Act in Murweh because 
most of the native vegetation is on leasehold land, where clearing has been limited 
by the Land Act. From the start of the moratorium to the year before the announced 
ban is implemented (2003–2006), total clearing is estimated to be 62 500 hectares. 
This is calculated as Murweh’s share of clearing in Queensland for 1997–1999 
(around 13  per cent), multiplied by the clearing cap over this period 
(500 000 hectares).  
Clearing regrowth, as defined in Queensland legislation, is assumed to be 
unrestricted under the policy scenario, as is clearing of native grasses. However, 
vegetation species (including grasses) protected by the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 are assumed to be restricted from clearing. 
Illegal clearing is not included as a policy response. There are reports of illegal 
clearing, including a suggestion of up to 200  000 hectares of illegal clearing in 
Moree (Constable 2003). Illegal clearing will reduce the impacts of the restrictions 
on landholders.  
As noted above, there is no allowance for thinning in response to vegetation 
thickening (section K.2). 
K.5 Results 
In Murweh, without thickening, the net present value of total impacts over the 
period 1999–2040 from clearing restrictions are estimated to be between $42.3 
million and $76.3 million (2003 dollars), depending on assumed future real cattle 
prices (table K.5). This equates to between $2.4 million and $4.4 million per year 
(2003 dollars) over the period.     




Table K.5  Net present value of forgone future returns from clearing 
restrictions in Murweh Shire,a 1999–2040 
Assumed fall in average  
real beef prices, 2003–2040b  Without thickening With thickening
1.5 per cent a yearc $42.3m $81.3m
1.1 per cent a yeard $60.1m $103.9m
0.7 per cent a yeare $76.3m $124.4m
a All values are in 2003 dollars and calculated using a constant real discount rate of 5 per cent. b Beef prices 
and terms of trade for beef are assumed to fall under all of these scenarios, 2003–2040. c On average for 
2003–2040, prices are equal to the 20-year average price (ABARE 2003). d  On average for 2003–2040, 
prices are equal to the 10-year average price (ABARE 2003). e  On average for 2003–2040, prices are 
half-way between current real prices and average real prices over the last 10 years. 
For Moree, net present value of total impacts over the period 1995–2040 from 
clearing restrictions are estimated to range from $26.8  million to $83.9 million 
(2003 dollars), depending on the yield and number of crops on newly-cleared land 
(table  K.6). This equates to between $1.5  million and $4.7  million per year 
(2003 dollars) over the period. 
Table K.6  Net present value of forgone future returns from clearing 
restrictions in Moree Plains Shire,a 1995–2040 
Yield and number of crops on newly cleared landb 
Per hectare yields are the same as previously cleared land 
8 crops in 10 years  $83.9m
6 crops in 10 years  $54.5m
Per hectare yields are 90 per cent of previously cleared land 
8 crops in 10 years  $47.0m
6 crops in 10 years  $26.8m
a All values are in 2003 dollars and are calculated using a constant real discount rate of 5 per cent. b For 
years where there are no crops, it is assumed that no inputs are added (the land is fallow).  
Despite the greater net present value of per hectare returns to clearing in Moree, 
impacts are of the same order of magnitude because the area of land affected by the 
restrictions in Murweh is estimated to be seven times as large. This highlights the 
importance of the estimated rate of clearing in the absence of constraints.  
It was suggested in the workshop that clearing without restrictions in Murweh may 
be overestimated because the amount of land set aside for private benefits may be 
underestimated. Some participants argued that many of the draft remnant native 
vegetation management plans included vegetation to be set aside for biodiversity 
protection. In ABARE and BRS (2003) these areas were treated as land that would 
be voluntarily set aside by landholders without financial assistance to the 
landholder.      





However, draft vegetation management plans have not been approved and it is not 
clear whether protecting these areas is conditional on financial assistance. For 
example, in the Draft Mulga Lands Management Plan, there is a request for the:  
… provision of financial assistance to landholders and other stakeholders (such as 
traditional owners) who are inequitably affected by legislative controls or 
recommendations from this plan. (Mulga Lands Regional Vegetation Management 
Committee 2003, p. 6) 
Nonetheless, without clearing restrictions, if landholders in Murweh clear at 
historical annual rates, but cease once they reach a prescribed conservation target — 
such that 30  per  cent or 40  per  cent of farmland is set aside to protect remnant 
vegetation — then impacts are estimated to fall by $4.2 million and $13 million 
respectively, relative to the scenario without a conservation target (table  K.7). 
Alternatively, conservation targets could be viewed as areas of land that are 
uneconomic to clear. 
The effect of conservation targets on estimated impacts is not large because even 
without a conservation target, 19 per cent of farmland would still be covered in 
remnant vegetation at 2030 (compared to 63 per cent in 2003) because of assumed 
management constraints on clearing. As well, given that landholders clear at 
historical rates, they would not reach these conservation targets until 2024 and 2018 
respectively, by which time returns to clearing are heavily discounted.  
Table K.7  Net present value of forgone future returns from clearing 
restrictions in Murweh Shire,a 1999–2040 
Alternative conservation scenarios 
 
Key assumptions 
Share of private land covered in remnant native 
vegetation, without clearing restrictionsb
 19  per  centc 30 per centd 40 per centd
Without thickening and cattle prices fall 
by 1.1 per cent a year, 2003–2040  $60.1m  $55.9m  $47.1m
a All values in 2003 dollars and are calculated using a constant real discount rate of 5 per cent. b Landholders 
are assumed to clear at historical rates until they reach their conservation targets. c No  prescribed 
conservation target (from table K.5). d Prescribed conservation targets — percentage of farmland set aside for 
conservation of remnant native vegetation. 
In Murweh, clearing restrictions not only limit development opportunities on 
uncleared land, but eventually render grazing on uncleared land unviable because of 
vegetation thickening. Taking thickening into account, the net present value of 
impacts are estimated to be between $81.3 million and $124.4 million 
(2003 dollars) in Murweh, depending on assumed future real cattle prices.  
That said, the effect of thickening on estimated impacts is based on the assumption 
that fixed costs on uncleared land are unavoidable and landholders will continue to     




farm thickened land to cover some of their fixed costs. It is likely that some fixed 
costs would not be incurred if landholders ceased to graze uncleared land.  
To reflect this, an alternative scenario is that landholders stop grazing uncleared 
land once returns on this land fall to zero. In this case, landholders cease 
maintaining uncleared land and lay-off farm workers, but continue to incur 
administration costs and costs related to infrastructure on that land (interest expense 
and depreciation) for the next 20 years.10 Under these assumptions, with future real 
cattle prices falling by 1.1 per cent a year and thickening, the net present value of 
impacts are estimated to be $82.9 million, compared with $103.9 million when all 
fixed costs are assumed to be unavoidable (2003 dollars). 
It should be noted that the SCC model estimates the effect of thickening on safe 
carrying capacity, not stocking rates, hence it ignores possible management 
responses to thickening. As pointed out by Slaughter in the workshop 
(Slaughter 2004 and 2003), in practice, landholders (especially those with relatively 
small areas of cleared land) may try and maintain stocking rates on uncleared land, 
despite thickening.  
In the long term, as pasture cover declines from over-grazing, there are increased 
opportunities for invasion by unpalatable weeds and woody shrubs, thereby 
reducing carrying capacity (Slaughter 2004). Environmental costs associated with 
over-grazing in south west Queensland, such as erosion, are well documented (see 
for example, Heywood et al. (2000), Burrows (1999) and Witt et al. (2000)). All 
else equal, with clearing restrictions, this response would somewhat delay and 
reduce the impacts of thickening, but would generate adverse longer-term 
environmental impacts.  
Concerns were raised by Bruce Wilson (sub. DR254) about the assumed rate of 
vegetation thickening on uncleared land in the Murweh Shire. In particular, it was 
suggested that the assumed rate of thickening (one per cent a year) would diminish 
as the foliage protective cover increased. If it were assumed that the foliage 
protective cover increases at one  per  cent a year until foliage protective cover 
reaches 35  per  cent, and then increases at 0.2  per cent a year, impacts fall by 
$4.6 million (compared to when the rate of thickening is constant at one per cent a 
year).11  
The relationship between foliage protective cover and safe carrying capacity is not 
linear in the SCC model (Kenny and Beale 2003). If foliage protective cover 
                                              
10 After 20 years, it is assumed that the interest expense will no longer be incurred and the value of 
the infrastructure will be devalued to zero. 
11 Assuming that real beef prices fall by 1.1 per cent a year between 2003 and 2040.      





exceeds 35 per cent, pasture production and carrying capacity is seriously depleted 
and additional thickening makes little difference to carrying capacity. If foliage 
protective cover is less than 10 per cent, thickening of sparsely-wooded areas has 
little impact on carrying capacity. However, between 10 and 35 per cent foliage 
protective cover, safe carrying capacity is highly sensitive to thickening.  
Given that the foliage protective cover in Murweh is approximately midway 
between 10 and 35 per cent (25.6 per cent at 2003), it appears inevitable that 
uncleared land in Murweh will reach 35 per cent foliage protective cover (at which 
point pasture growth is seriously depleted), regardless of the assumed thickening 
rate. To reduce the impacts of thickening significantly and avoid reaching 
35 per cent foliage protective cover, the assumed rate of thickening would have to 
be below 0.35 per cent a year.  
A key assumption underlying impacts in Murweh is that all regrowth on newly-
cleared land will be cleared before it has a serious detrimental effect on carrying 
capacity. However, as pointed out by Slaughter (2004), management constraints on 
clearing remnant vegetation are also likely to affect the clearing of regrowth.  
This has two possible effects on landholder impacts. On the one hand if, in the 
absence of clearing restrictions, landholders delayed clearing (or failed to clear) 
regrowth, returns to clearing and potential impacts from clearing restrictions would 
be reduced. On the other hand, if they delay clearing regrowth, there is the risk that 
it will be reclassified as remnant. Landholders would then be unable to develop the 
land in the future.  
These impacts were not examined in this analysis because it is difficult to determine 
the extent and nature of management constraints and whether they would prevent 
clearing of regrowth prior to reclassification. The extent and nature of management 
constraints on clearing warrants further study.  
Estimated impacts in this analysis are generated in a partial equilibrium framework 
and ignore potential general equilibrium effects. Commodity prices are assumed to 
be unaffected by reductions in production relative to the ‘without clearing 
restrictions’ scenario because producers are assumed to be price takers. Fraser and 
Waschik (2003) suggest that if governments purchased land in the pastoral zone for 
retirement from production (as part of the National Reserve Scheme), world wool 
prices may rise. The magnitude of price changes depends on the elasticity of 
demand for Australian wool. 
For this analysis, reduced demand for factors of production leads to a reduction in 
their use with no factor price changes. In reality, reduced demand for factors of     




production, all else being equal, would lead to a reduction in costs of these factors. 
This would reduce the impacts on landholder returns, all else being equal.  
Comparison with other studies 
It is difficult to compare these results with those of other studies because of 
differences in assumptions, modelling approaches and policy scenarios.  
ABARE and BRS (2003) estimate the total net present value of forgone returns 
from clearing restrictions in Murweh to be in excess of $8  million (the precise 
estimate is not reported). The impact of vegetation thickening was not considered. 
Impacts are estimated over 25 years, compared to 40 years in this analysis.  
Although the amount of land assumed to be affected by clearing restrictions in 
Murweh was not reported in the ABARE and BRS study, it may be lower than the 
area estimated in this analysis. The ABARE and BRS study assumes that clearing 
without restrictions is initially the same as historical rates, but falls through time. 
The current analysis assumes that clearing rates remain at historical levels. Also, the 
ABARE and BRS study includes minimum vegetation retention thresholds from 
draft regional native vegetation management plans in its estimate of clearing 
without restrictions.  
The annualised returns to clearing one hectare of woodland in Murweh in 2003 are 
also different in the two studies: $3.90–$6.20 a year in this study compared to 
$0.70–$2.10 a year for the ABARE and BRS study.12 
In the ABARE and BRS study, estimates of returns to clearing are based on land 
prices in the Murweh area. Land prices capture landholders’ current expectations of 
future returns, based on their current knowledge, management skills, uncertainty 
and their attitude to risk. The Commission’s approach does not explicitly take these 
factors into account.  
In general terms, the aim of the ABARE and BRS study was to estimate the order of 
magnitude of the impacts for Queensland as a whole. The ABARE and BRS study 
uses aggregated historical data that may not capture developments in regional 
management practices, such as the introduction of perennial pasture on 
newly-cleared land. Introducing improved perennial grasses after clearing further 
increases carrying capacity, allows a switch from sheep to cattle grazing and 
increases cattle prices received due to improved carcase quality. These effects are 
captured in the current study. 
                                              
12 Amortised net present value of returns to clearing one hectare of land in 2003, assuming a 
5 per cent discount rate.     





For Moree as a whole, Jack Sinden (sub. 15, p. 7) estimated the impacts of clearing 
restrictions to be between $198 million and $230 million. These estimates, which 
are significantly greater than the impacts estimated in this analysis, are derived from 
a previous paper (Sinden 2002).     
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